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N E W  F R O N T I E R S  O F  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y
In many developing countries, the mixed record of state effectiveness, 
 market imperfections, and persistent structural inequities has undermined 
the effectiveness of social policy. To overcome these constraints, social 
 policy needs to move beyond conventional social service approaches 
toward development’s goals of equitable opportunity and social justice. 
This series has been created to promote debate among the development 
community, policy makers, and academia, and to broaden understanding 
of social policy challenges in developing country contexts.
The books in the series are linked to the World Bank’s Social  Development 
Strategy. The strategy is aimed at empowering people by transforming 
institutions to make them more inclusive, responsive, and accountable. 
This involves the transformation of subjects and benefi ciaries into citizens 
with rights and responsibilities. Themes in this series include equity and 
development, assets and livelihoods, citizenship and rights-based social 
policy, and the social dimensions of infrastructure and climate change.
Titles in the series:
• Assets, Livelihoods, and Social Policy
•  Building Equality and Opportunity through Social Guarantees: New 
Approaches to Public Policy and the Realization of Rights
• Delivering Services in Multicultural Societies
• Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity
• Inclusive States: Social Policy and Structural Inequalities
• Institutional Pathways to Equity: Addressing Inequality Traps
•  Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts
•  Living through Crises: How the Food, Fuel, and Financial Shocks Affect 
the Poor
•  Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in a 
Warming World
•  Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to 
Fragile Situations
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I have been associated with the Institutions Taking Root project from its 
inception, providing advice and participating in the many discussions that 
were organized around the review of these case studies. It has been a privi-
lege and an enriching learning experience.
Addressing the dynamics of poor governance and accountability, inef-
fective institutions, repeated political crises, and continuous cycles of 
 violence—known collectively under the generic term “fragile situations”—
is critical for reducing world poverty. It is estimated that by 2030, 40 
percent of poor people will live in countries that are currently classifi ed 
by the World Bank as fragile. If situations of extreme violence and active 
confl ict in middle-income countries are added, that percentage jumps to 
nearly 75 percent. At the same time, global phenomena such as climate 
change, increased internal and cross border migration, illicit trade, and 
 rising inequality create additional stresses.
An increasing number of studies address issues of fragility, confl ict, 
and violence, but the literature is still very focused on understanding the 
drivers of fragility, as well as its impact on social and economic develop-
ment. Relatively little is known about how countries and societies have 
managed to exit fragility. Examples of positive transformation, especially 
of public agencies that manage macroeconomic and fi scal policy or deliver 
frontline social services, are not being suffi ciently studied.
Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging 
 Contexts is one exception to that trend: This study has disentangled how 
nine selected institutions across four fragile and confl ict-affected countries 
have managed to improve their capacity in very challenging environments. 
This volume was born from a simple idea: Study public organizations that 
have improved their capacity and get a better understanding of how these 
changes actually happened. The authors of the case studies in this  volume 
have taken a deep dive into the internal workings of nine public agen-
cies. They looked at a comprehensive set of issues from institutional 
 management practices to relationships with clients, and more broadly to 
F O R E W O R D
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the authorizing environment and the agencies’ connections with country 
elites. The authors emerged from this exercise with extremely valuable 
insights on institutional development in fragile environments.
One insight that caught my attention is the fundamental importance of 
agencies’ ability to carefully manage their relationship with elites. In fragile 
environments, these elites often operate outside predictable frameworks, 
and they respond to incentives created by the local sociopolitical context, 
which has little to do with the Weberian concept of the State. The study 
also reveals three common pathways that managers of the public agencies 
have used to handle the elites’ authorizing environment. The similarity of 
these pathways across continents, and in very different situations, is sur-
prising and provides a useful insight for policy makers.
Another interesting fi nding is that many of the internal reforms under-
taken by public agencies were very similar to “good practice” management 
techniques from the western world. This implies that not everything has to 
be done differently in a fragile environment. Organizational leadership can 
manage the very challenging external environment, while internally apply-
ing some of the more universal public management innovations to improve 
capacity and performance. 
Institutions Taking Root also highlights recommendations that stand 
in stark contrast to the traditional “best practices” of capacity building, 
which donor partners have applied routinely across varying contexts for 
many years. Rather than parachute solutions in from the outside, this book 
proposes that development partners accompany domestic agency managers 
and staff in their own efforts to reorient institutions. This insight implies a 
very different role for development partners in providing support to agen-
cies as they handle internal and external constituencies than in traditional 
capacity building projects. It implies staying engaged in the very long term. 
And it implies fi nding creative mechanisms for shaping public agencies’ 
internal culture. 
Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging 
 Contexts is an important contribution to the literature on fragility; I hope 
that it will challenge many of the existing models of capacity building in 
fragile environments.
 Alexandre Marc
Chief Specialist
Fragility, Confl ict, and Violence
The World Bank
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Building and operating successful public institutions is a perennial and long-
term challenge for governments, even under ideal circumstances. The com-
plexity of this challenge is compounded by the volatile conditions found 
in fragile and confl ict-affected settings (FCS), where human security, social 
cohesion, political stability, and economic activity have been dislocated. 
The academic and practitioner literature on FCS is replete with instances of 
institution-building challenges, obstacles, and—ultimately—failures. Yet, 
despite the daunting odds, some public institutions in FCS do manage to 
take root and effectively deliver results and core services, earn legitimacy 
in the eyes of the citizenry, and forge resilience in an  otherwise tumultuous 
operational context. This observation is the analytical puzzle motivating 
this study. We concentrate on a sample of these success  stories in order to 
illuminate the shared causal factors underlying success and thereby isolate 
the institutional practices and processes that underpin capable public insti-
tutions in inhospitable settings. The fi ndings contribute to fi lling a criti-
cal gap in the literature on FCS and provide guidance for policy makers 
engaged in public sector institution-building efforts in countries with weak 
institutional capacity.1
Institution building is a lengthy and complex undertaking anywhere, 
yet in FCS the challenges that must be navigated are especially daunting. 
FCS are marked by salient, often long-standing, societal, political, and geo-
graphical cleavages. The sociopolitical landscape is often fl uid and subject 
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to large and unpredictable sways. Usually the state has a light footprint 
beyond the capital and informal institutions are more present in citizens’ 
lives than formal ones. Patronage and widespread rent-seeking and corrup-
tion are common. The state has little legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry 
and the state-society compact is weak at best. Development partners are 
inconsistent in their responses to these situations: on the one hand, they 
often disengage from situations that are broadly dysfunctional, while, on 
the other hand, they pour abundant and often poorly coordinated resources 
into the immediate aftermath of violent confl ict.
We fi nd that institutions succeed in these inhospitable environments 
when they are able to construct strategies of deft management—through 
a shared repertoire of tools and reforms—and concurrently employ tac-
tics to navigate the broader sociopolitical environment in which they are 
embedded. In our sample, there are no clear predictors of which institu-
tions or  sectors will be successful. Sector institutions that are succeeding in 
one country are failing in other FCS. Yet one clear pattern emerges from 
our study: by focusing on delivering results and generating legitimacy at the 
same time, successful organizations develop internal effi ciency and create 
the external constituencies needed to secure political support. They cumula-
tively build resilience and the ability to sustain gains in what can be rapidly 
shifting political-economic environments. Broad social support makes it 
politically attractive for principals to support reforms and can help restrain 
excessive political interference. In all of the cases, a network of technical 
leaders and practitioners ignites and sustains the successful trajectory.
The agencies in this study display different patterns in the manner in 
which they connect their micro-organizational strategies to the broader 
macro-sociopolitical environment. Some institutions succeed on the basis 
of a positive cycle driven by strong elite commitment to their particular 
policy area. Other successful institutions seize on a window of oppor-
tunity to lock in reforms and build a measure of operational autonomy 
before the political equilibrium shifts. Still other agencies succeed by more 
actively cultivating broad support from clients and key stakeholders, 
sometimes in the face of an adverse political environment, working under 
the radar to implement reforms and achieve results, later mobilizing some 
support from political principals. The distinction between these three 
pathways to institutional success is in the degree to which institutional 
success emanates from political incentives and imperatives or the institu-
tion’s own ability to build a case for its political signifi cance. Yet all of 
these profi les combine macropolitical and microinstitutional strategies in 
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ways that enable institutions to take root and succeed. Notably, the rep-
ertoire of strategies these agencies deploy is remarkably similar across the 
different pathways. 
We build our argument as follows. First, we frame the pursuit of state 
capacity in challenging environments as an undertaking at the intersection 
of macropolitical context and opportunities and microinstitutional choices 
and strategies. Second, we defi ne institutional success, outline the struc-
tured, focused case comparative methodology employed in the study, and 
discuss our sample of successful agencies. Next we turn to the empirical 
fi ndings emerging from case studies of nine successful public agencies in 
The Gambia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Sierra Leone, and 
Timor-Leste. Third, we describe three alternative pathways to institutional 
success. Fourth, we briefl y catalog the core institutional repertoire of tools 
and strategies underpinning success across the variety of agencies in our 
study. And fi fth, we present the policy implications emerging from our 
study. The conclusion briefl y revisits our key fi ndings and suggests further 
research possibilities on this topic.
Literature Review: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts
The development community has converged on the consensus that the 
challenges facing fragile states lie in the extreme degree to which they lack 
institutional capacity. Elites in FCS must develop two dimensions of insti-
tutional capacity to be able to effectively deliver on any form of state-
society compact. The fi rst dimension of state capacity is the “Weberian” 
element of intensive capacity, which rests on the internal organization and 
autonomy of public agencies (World Bank 1997). The second dimension of 
institutional capacity is the “Tocquevillian” element of extensive capacity, 
focused on the state’s connections to society.2 In short, successful public 
agencies require the internal organization to defi ne and act on their man-
date and they must manage their external relationships to deliver on soci-
etal needs and successfully navigate the sociopolitical context. 
Macro Side: Fit with the Sociopolitical Context
Institutional capacity-building and reform initiatives, to be tractable, 
durable, and legitimate, must resonate with a country’s social and politi-
cal fabric, aligning with the incentives of the makers and  implementers 
of policy and taking into account the social context in which the broader 
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population lives. World Development Report 2011 advances such a good-
fi t, incentive-compatible philosophy, arguing that institutional reforms in 
FCS do not need to be technically perfect; rather, they should be adapted 
to the political context and incentives in place at any given point in time. 
Some have argued, in this vein, that successful institution building 
must necessarily be aligned with the negotiation and composition of the 
state-society compact.3 The ability of public institutions to deliver on the 
state’s compact with society depends on their interaction with many sets 
of  stakeholders—including their political and bureaucratic principals, 
their donors and implementation partners (public and private), and their 
 service clients. Leonard (2010) points out that organizational effectiveness 
depends, in part, on the benefi ts the agency generates for politically power-
ful groups.4 Manor (2007) argues on the basis of detailed empirical case 
studies that organizations in FCS are more likely to be successful if they 
design programs and adapt implementation based on close consultation 
with local-level stakeholders. 
Similarly, the ability of an institution to take root is embedded in 
political processes and power structures, both formal and informal, and 
the country’s historical trajectory.5 Some elements of fragility are deeply 
ingrained in societal dynamics and relationships, and a core dimension of 
institutional capacity concerns the extent to which the agencies of the state 
are able to help mediate social confl ict and assist in repairing and building 
the sociopolitical fabric.6
In fragile states, with low institutional capacity, these political forces and 
macro social cleavages can be fl uid and sometimes subject to surprisingly 
swift—and easily reversible—change. In a practical sense, organizational 
effectiveness is contingent on the broader political context and institutions 
that shape what is operationally feasible.7 In some cases, the overarching 
elite political bargain will serve developmental goals; in other cases, the 
interests of the political elite may give it a particular interest in a specifi c 
sector or category of public services for an important part of society. 
Micro Dimensions: Institutional Strategies for Success
Scholars and development practitioners have found that internal and exter-
nal dimensions are relevant in explaining successful institution building 
in challenging contexts; and, moreover, they tend to argue that the two 
dimensions interact.8 In surveying the literature, Leonard (2010) observes 
that one major strand of hypotheses on organizational effectiveness holds 
that it is determined in large part by how an organization’s management 
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structures it to achieve its tasks. Grindle (1997), for example, highlights 
four characteristics that enable public sector organizations to perform 
relatively well in otherwise unfavorable developing country contexts. 
Successful organizations develop an organizational mystique, or an inter-
nalized sense of mission; have fl exible managers who are problem-solving 
and teamwork oriented; have clearly defi ned performance expectations; 
and have some autonomy in personnel management. 
The focus on how an agency’s functions can affect performance is akin 
to Israel’s (1987) landmark theory of “specifi city” in institutional develop-
ment, whereby organizations that perform more highly technical and spe-
cialized functions (e.g., central banks, compared with education ministries) 
are more likely to be high performers.9 Fukuyama (2004) narrows the con-
cept of specifi city to suggest that state-building and institutional reform 
efforts are most successful in agencies where tasks are highly specifi c and 
the volume of transactions is low, because these are the organizations in 
which monitoring outputs and accountability is most possible. 
Moving away from the recourse to fi rst-best reform dictums, the devel-
opment community has come to agree on the concept of “good enough 
governance,” fi rst articulated by Grindle (2004, 2007). The notion centers 
on “good-fi t” approaches, or contextually grounded and feasible institu-
tional arrangements that achieve a de minimus degree of quality suffi cient 
to enable a country to fulfi ll its developmental goals. In a similar vein, 
institutions are more likely to be successful in fragile contexts when they 
carefully identify, tap into, and build on preexisting capacity—whether 
this capacity is situated in the agency, other public institutions, or non-
governmental or civic groups. Teskey (2005), for example, emphasizes the 
importance of aligning individual staff competence, the organization, and 
institutional context in the pursuit of sustained capacity building. As mech-
anisms for doing so, he underlines the importance of precisely defi ning the 
institutional challenge and the interests involved, as well as constructing a 
targeted approach to the scope of organizational reform. 
Often, public sector agencies that pursue certain functions adopt sim-
ilar institutional forms across countries, especially in response to donor 
preferences and programs that emphasize certain normative models of 
 organization—for example, ministries of fi nance tend to resemble each 
other quite closely.10 Isomorphic mimicry can prove an important strat-
egy for successful institutions to garner fi nancial resources and other 
forms of donor support. Yet, as Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2013) 
assert, this focus on institutional form can often mask a lack of functional 
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development activity and create a “capability trap” instead of enhancing 
 capacity. In practice, the institutional form of public sector agencies can 
and should vary in their pursuit of specifi c functions.11
Research Design: Explaining Institutional Success
Many advances have been made in recent years in defi ning and measuring 
public sector institutional capacity writ large.12 Yet relatively little causal 
thinking has been devoted to assessing what elements of institutional design 
and operation actually contribute to success. This study seeks to under-
stand the underpinnings of successful institution building by focusing on 
those public organizations in which success has been achieved. In choos-
ing to study only successful institutions, we are deliberately selecting on 
the dependent variable. The approach of focusing on success stories to 
understand organizational effectiveness in developing countries has a dem-
onstrated intellectual lineage. Leonard (2010, 94) points out a small, yet 
infl uential, group of scholars—including himself, Norman Uphoff, Judith 
Tendler, and Samuel Paul—who have studied successful development 
interventions on the premise that “it is dangerous to derive development 
prescriptions only from data that are largely dominated by failures.” This 
includes the research project Institutions for Successful Societies led by 
Jennifer Widner, at Princeton University, that investigates and chronicles 
how reformers build effective government institutions.
We defi ne an institution as successful if, at a minimum, it achieves three 
core sets of outcomes: results, legitimacy, and durability.13 An institution is 
considered to achieve results if it exhibits sustained, measurable improve-
ments in key agency outputs and outcomes. In measuring legitimacy, we 
focus on the population’s sentiments regarding the agency’s performance, 
including whether an institution has achieved results across any cleavages 
(e.g., rural-urban, between ethnic groups, and so forth) that may exist.14 
Finally, a resilient institution is durable, sustaining and enhancing results 
over time, even in the face of changing leadership and exogenous shocks. 
These three dimensions of success are, of course, interwoven—an organiza-
tion’s legitimacy depends at least partly on its results; an institution that is 
seen as legitimate is more likely to be resilient; and, in turn, a more resilient 
institution has a greater opportunity to earn legitimacy and achieve results. 
We considered for analysis any public institution in a country on the 
World Bank’s FCS list in 2009 that met the defi ned criteria of success as 
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long as it can be reasonably seen as a permanent instrument of the state. 
The public institution could thus be a fi nance ministry, a service delivery 
institution, or even a state-owned enterprise—but not a project implemen-
tation unit or donor-funded program. We use the term  “institution” col-
loquially, that is, interchangeably with “agency” or “organization,” rather 
than hewing to the new institutional economics defi nition of institutions 
(see North 1990) as “rules of the game” or “established social practices” 
that are distinct from organizations. 
A pool of potential case study institutions was created by soliciting from 
FCS practitioners at the World Bank examples of institutions that appeared 
to meet the three defi ned criteria of success. The success of each institution 
proposed through this process was subsequently corroborated through 
secondary research and a round of narrative-based interviews with indi-
viduals with fi rsthand experience with the institutions. Three criteria were 
then applied to this sample of successful institutions to select a subset of 
cases for intensive study. First, we narrowed the list of countries to those in 
which two or more successful institutions were identifi ed, thus enhancing 
analytical leverage of the study by enabling each country case to encompass 
at least two units of observation. Second, we selected countries to cover a 
broadly categorized spectrum of institutional capacity in FCS, ranging as 
follows: (a) generally disintegrating institutional capacity; (b) weak institu-
tional capacity with some pockets of effectiveness; (c) broadly improving 
institutional capacity, with some serious defi ciencies; and (d) strengthening 
institutional capacity across the board.15 Finally, we aimed for some degree 
of cross-regional coverage for the purpose of global knowledge building 
and sharing. 
Applying these three selection criteria, the study covers nine varied 
public organizations in four countries: in The Gambia, the Ministry of 
Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) and the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs (MoFEA); in the Lao PDR, the Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport (MPWT) and Électricité du Laos (EDL); in Sierra Leone, 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and Local 
Councils; and in Timor-Leste, the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Central 
Bank (formerly the Banking and Payments Authority or BPA), and the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS). The analysis of each organization’s 
evolution extends over one or two decades, thus covering periods of fragil-
ity or confl ict as well as the ensuing developments. The contrast between 
the selected institutions and the overall quality of public administration 
is particularly stark in countries with low overall institutional capacity. 
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But the cases are also positive outliers even in countries in which overall 
institutional quality has markedly improved in recent years. Although the 
four countries vary in their level of overall state capacity, they all are at 
the lower end of global capacity and fragility scales.16 The four countries 
in the sample are all relatively small, and generalizing fi ndings demands 
caution; nevertheless, the study’s methodological approach enables the 
drawing of contextualized insights that will be relevant to the FCS universe. 
The selected institutions were examined through a structured, focused 
comparison across cases to shed light on the shared causal underpinnings 
of success, along with process-tracing within cases to bolster our under-
standing of how the various causal mechanisms are sequenced and com-
bine to produce observed outcomes. The method is “structured” in that the 
case study guide was grounded in a set of questions refl ecting the research 
objective and hypotheses; and the method is “focused” in that it deals only 
with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. Overall, this meth-
odology is well suited to identifying causal mechanisms and to building 
theoretical generalizations on the relatively small universe of cases of insti-
tutional success in FCS. Use of the case study guide to standardize data 
collection enables a systematic comparison of the cases and also allows for 
future research on additional cases to test and strengthen the fi ndings.17
The core causal expectations shaping the inquiry covered three concen-
tric circles of internal institutional workings, external operating environ-
ment, and broader sociopolitical context. Field research on the basis of the 
case study guide was conducted through a combination of in-depth elite 
interviews and focus group discussions with agency offi cials, staff, stake-
holders, and clients; these were complemented through secondary survey 
sources where possible. Interviews and focus groups were sequenced in 
a manner both outside-in (focusing on external stakeholders and clients 
fi rst before moving to agency staff) and bottom-up (beginning with front-
line service providers before moving to agency management and politi-
cal leaders), so as to ensure that typically less dominant viewpoints were 
represented. 
The following two empirical sections present the key fi ndings emerg-
ing from this research program. First, we map three broad pathways along 
which successful agencies navigate the evolving sociopolitical context 
in which they are embedded, emphasizing how they do so by introduc-
ing internal management reforms while increasing their engagement with 
 clients and stakeholders. Second, we catalog the core institutional repertoire 
of tools and strategies underpinning success across the agencies in our study.
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Pathways to Institutional Success: Navigating the Evolving 
Sociopolitical Context
This section synthesizes the experiences of the nine studied institutions by 
describing three alternative pathways along which the agencies interact 
with their evolving sociopolitical context.18 These three pathways represent 
stylized descriptions of the dynamic—often nonlinear—manner in which 
micro-organizational-level strategies and reforms connect with the macro-
sociopolitical environment in the context of FCS. These three pathways 
are neither country- nor institution-specifi c. Different institutions may be 
situated along different pathways in the same country. And the same insti-
tution may switch pathways over time as it fi nds itself in a shifting macro-
political environment. 
The fi rst pathway is one in which the institution’s objectives are closely 
and consistently aligned with elite incentives, which facilitates the introduc-
tion of wide-ranging reforms in a relatively short time span and generates 
a positive cycle of better results and more political support. The second 
route is one in which the institution takes advantage of an initial alignment 
between the organization’s goals and elite incentives, quickly implementing 
and locking in reforms before the prevailing political equilibrium changes. 
The third trajectory is one in which a public organization works with no 
active support from political principals and may in fact face adversity from 
them. Yet the institution uses its results and connections with a broader set 
of stakeholders to build credibility and, ultimately, mobilize support from 
elites to reinforce existing gains.
We fi nd that the concurrence of an organization’s goals with the incen-
tives of the political elite is important and can help achieve results quickly, 
but it is neither a necessary nor a suffi cient condition for institutional suc-
cess. First, all the nine institutions we examine deploy, to a remarkably 
similar degree, a micro-institutional repertoire of management tools and 
reforms which we catalog in the next section. This repertoire appears to 
be important for institution building in all three trajectories regardless of 
the level of elite support. Second, agencies build connections with clients, 
other stakeholders and donors to shield the institution from adverse elite 
infl uence or to secure elite support. This is particularly important when the 
institution’s goals are not aligned with those of the broader political elite. 
In other words, institutions that achieve momentum for reform and legiti-
macy can infl uence their macropolitical environment rather than merely 
being subject to it. In our description of the three pathways, we therefore 
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emphasize the organization’s relationship to not only its political principals, 
but also its clients and other stakeholders, including its external donors.
In a comparative snapshot, it can be diffi cult to differentiate those insti-
tutions that have always relied on elite support from those that have had 
to build such support more actively. Because of that, it may erroneously 
be concluded that an institution invariably has to count on elite support 
to succeed. Looking at institutional trajectories over time reveals changes 
in elite behavior toward the institution and sheds light on the strategies 
institutions have deployed to affect elite views and support. A longitudinal 
approach also highlights the importance of organizational inertia and path 
dependence, illustrating how institutions that achieve results in a period of 
elite support build resilience toward times of waning elite support, espe-
cially when they have built bridges to other stakeholders. 
Positive Cycle of Strong Elite Commitment and Results
The fi rst pathway captures those cases in which the objectives of elites and 
those of a public agency are aligned. This agreement creates a virtuous 
cycle of results and legitimacy that reinforces support for the agency by the 
political elite. In some cases, this virtuous cycle generates legitimacy well 
beyond the confi nes of the agency itself and strengthens the legitimacy of 
the state as a whole.
Elite support can initially be motivated by factors that range from devel-
opment aspirations to badly needed donor resources, or even a genuine 
existential threat. Because of the support from elites, the agency enjoys the 
resources and space to manage its affairs based on technocratic grounds. 
Elite support can also help mobilize informal institutions and actors to rein-
force reforms and remove spoilers or roadblocks to implementation. All 
this yields visible results that generate legitimacy for the institution among 
citizens. Elites can exhibit these results to domestic and external  audiences, 
which in turn helps sustain their interest and support for the agency. 
Over time, the positive cycle translates into the scaling-up of services and 
increasingly sophisticated internal management systems.
Early reforms and results also make the agency an attractive partner for 
development organizations and bilateral donors, which see the institution 
as an entry point in an otherwise diffi cult environment and a place where 
their assistance can generate returns. Organizations on this pathway become 
progressively more capable of coordinating and integrating aid programs 
and driving the dialogue with external partners. The fi nancial and technical 
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support of development partners amplifi es elite commitment and provides 
the institution with additional resources to continue its reform program.
The trajectories of Lao PDR’s EDL (Barma and Robert -Osken in this 
volume) and MPWT (Barma and Robert Osken in this volume) as well as 
Sierra Leone’s MoFED (Viñuela and Barrie in this volume) exemplify this 
pathway. We briefl y illustrate the pathway with the case of MPWT; details 
on all three cases can be found in the respective case studies. 
At the end of Lao PDR’s violent confl ict in 1975, the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party was greatly preoccupied with solidifying the territo-
rial integrity of the young country. This concern underpinned initial elite 
support for the transport sector. The state has thus devoted a substan-
tive portion of domestic resources to expanding the road network, with 
MPWT for its part focusing on results and the effi ciency of its invest-
ments. A small but consistent set of bilateral and multilateral donors has 
supported the sector for more than 30 years, and MPWT benefi ted from 
early bilateral support centered on planning, human resource manage-
ment, and fi nancial management. Donors adopted a division of labor on 
the basis of geography. Having demonstrated strong fi nancial manage-
ment practices, MPWT was able to resist the practice of donor-specifi c 
 project implementation units and instead mainstreamed the administra-
tion of donor-fi nanced programs, enabling the in-housing of this institu-
tional capacity. Once the reach and density of the road network had been 
expanded, MPWT progressively shifted part of its efforts to maintenance 
and introduced a more advanced evidence-based performance manage-
ment system to determine the frequency and level of capital allocations 
needed to preserve existing roads. 
Opportunity to Lock in Reforms
The second pathway captures those cases where the political landscape 
temporarily allows for locking in reforms. The reforms may be part of 
a peace settlement or seen as necessary to prevent a relapse into confl ict 
or fragility. Over time, the political commitment fades as the sense of 
urgency diminishes or because politics shift. Foreseeing the possibility of 
such a reversal and trying to maximize the momentum for reform, leaders 
of agencies on this pathway push for rapid changes and fast-track reform 
programs before the window of opportunity closes. Such reform efforts 
may focus on human resource gaps, fi nancial systems, or legal provisions, 
but—most importantly—they also put substantial effort into translating 
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these initial reforms into rapid and visible results that earn the agency legit-
imacy with clients. 
In the medium term, the agencies on this second pathway are able to 
sustain the gains made, thanks to the institutional capacity harnessed dur-
ing the years of intensive investment. In some cases, the autonomy of the 
institution has been “locked-in” by a legal framework or resourcing provi-
sions that cannot be changed easily. As part of the strategy to make reform 
policies stick, agencies on this pathway mobilize a wide range of domestic 
and external stakeholders and engage clients in frequent dialogue to dis-
seminate information about programs and their results, get feedback to 
adjust interventions, and promote trust in the institution. Visible and docu-
mented results and stakeholder appreciation provide some shield to the 
organization for when political priorities change and act to restrain elites 
from more actively intervening or clawing back resources and autonomy. 
Along with clients, development partners value the achievements made 
by agencies on this pathway. This backing serves as important capital for 
the organization and, at times, a crucial counterweight when the political 
elite withdraw their support for the agency. Development partners can rein-
force their support to the sector through additional resources, by sharing its 
results widely, or by actively advocating for the agency and its autonomy. 
The Sierra Leone Local Councils (Glynn and Larizza in this volume) 
and the Timor-Leste MoH (Anderson in this volume) and BPA (Viñuela 
in this volume) exemplify this second pathway. We illustrate this path-
way by briefl y describing the histories of the local councils and the BPA. 
Details for these two cases as well as MoH can be found in the respective 
case studies. 
Even before the confl ict in Sierra Leone ended in 2002, there was wide-
spread agreement among political leaders and development partners that 
addressing the root causes of confl ict would require not only improving 
security and control over the territory, but also rapidly delivering services 
to regions long neglected by the central government. One of the main 
groups that could have opposed the restoration of local councils—the 
 traditional chiefs—had little collective action capacity at the time since 
they had been a prominent target for rebels. To lock in the decentralization 
reform, a law creating local councils was rapidly approved, before the for-
mal decentralization policy was adopted. The fi rst round of local elections 
was held in 2004—a year before the national elections, which ultimately 
led to a change in ruling party. Once established, local councils were given 
a block grant and asked to deliver a fi rst round of small capital projects 
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in the fi rst 100 days of their mandate. This strategy helped the councils to 
acquire visibility rapidly and engage with citizens. Six years later, a 2010 
survey showed that a greater percentage of Sierra Leone’s citizens trust 
local government than central government. A central government that 
seeks reelection may thus refrain from reneging on the popular decentral-
ization agenda, at least publicly. Nonetheless, the incumbent party, which 
has strong links with traditional authorities and has historically used them 
as its political operators, has shifted some important revenue sources to 
the chiefdoms, eroding the revenue base of the local councils.
Another example of the second pathway is Timor-Leste’s quasi central 
bank, BPA. During the early years of independence, the Timorese elite 
prioritized the legal underpinnings of the state and created a lean govern-
ment, including laying the foundations for an independent central bank 
and for the transparent and conservative management of revenues from 
the then nascent oil sector. BPA quickly adopted a roadmap for institu-
tional development and supported the preparation and passing of key 
pieces of legislation (including the Petroleum Law), the capitalization of 
the institution, and the adoption of a separate human resource policy 
and pay scale. BPA early on established an outreach strategy for citizens, 
along with regular press conferences and releases of data for civil society 
organizations,  parliamentarians, and other stakeholders. The autonomy 
BPA had gained by 2006 helped the agency to manage the transition 
toward a government that favored the immediate use of petroleum rev-
enues, undermining the institution’s efforts for maintaining price stabil-
ity and the transparency of petroleum revenue management. Although 
the government has not decreased the autonomy or independence of BPA 
and has even passed an organic law to establish it as the Central Bank, 
a new Petroleum Law has drastically limited the institution’s infl uence 
over the management of oil revenues. Strictly sticking to its mandate, the 
Central Bank has used its considerable institutional and outreach capacity 
to inform decision makers and the public at large of the risks associated 
with the revised policies. 
Results to Mobilize Support from the Ground Up
The third pathway captures those organizations that lack explicit support 
from the political elite because the institution’s objectives run contrary to 
elite interests or do not make the list of their priorities. These institutions 
have had to actively mobilize support from their principals and advocate 
for their organizational goals. 
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Initially, these institutions may not be shielded from direct and fre-
quent unwanted interventions from principals. They work under the 
radar to implement internal reforms and achieve early results and mobi-
lize domestic and external assistance to scale up programs. They try to 
shield critical areas from frequent political interference by parsing func-
tions and introducing legal autonomy. The leaders of agencies on this 
pathway are active advocates for their sector and dynamically mobilize 
political support. In particular, they reach out to clients and build coali-
tions that are able to act as a counterweight to the ruling elite. They 
display results to convince principals of the importance of their policy 
area and the potential returns to increasing investment in their organi-
zations. Demonstrations of external recognition (good scores in inter-
national rankings or assessments, progress against international goals, 
prizes and mentions, among others) may also help elevate the sector on 
the national policy agenda.
This set of successful agencies offers an attractive opportunity for 
domestic elites and external donors to add support and by doing so, receive 
some credit for the achievements. The results that emerge from internal 
reforms, along with the increasing fl ows of external aid and recognition, 
help them to increase the attention and interest of leaders in their policy 
area and, in turn, cement their own successes. In a very real sense, the 
organization contributes to the transformation of its external operational 
environment. Tangible results enhance the position of the state in society 
more broadly. Increasing client satisfaction refl ects positively on the legiti-
macy of the regime and thereby creates a positive feedback effect that trig-
gers the favor of political principals. A positive cycle ensues and allows the 
institution to introduce more sophisticated internal management systems 
and make further gains in terms of results.
Development partners working in these situations can deploy 
resources and technical assistance to support internal changes and help 
expand the space for reforms. At times, they actively help shield the 
sector’s resources from political interventions by channeling support 
through ring-fenced mechanisms, or through projects, resources, or the 
suspension of programs to aid sector offi cials and dissuade the elite 
from interfering in technical decisions.
The Gambia’s MoBSE and MoFEA (Viñuela and Alvesson in this vol-
ume) as well as Timor-Leste’s MSS (Anderson in this volume) exemplify 
this pathway. We illustrate this pathway by briefl y describing the journeys 
of MoBSE and MSS. Details are available in the respective case studies.
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In The Gambia, expanding access to education in rural areas and increas-
ing the participation of girls and minorities was a not a high priority in the 
public agenda until recently. Nonetheless, from the early 1990s, MoBSE, 
partnering with several domestic and external organizations, began mak-
ing consistent gains in school enrollment that accelerated after 2000. It was 
only then that President Jammeh started to highlight the sector in his pub-
lic addresses and launched a program to support girls’ education. Having 
made signifi cant progress on enrollment, MoBSE has now turned its atten-
tion to improving the quality of education and expanding the number of 
qualifi ed teachers. 
Another example is the case of MSS in Timor-Leste. The country’s social 
protection agenda was hampered by the fi rst independent government’s 
strong dislike of the subsidies and cash transfers used under Indonesian 
rule. Building on the experience and credibility of administering pro-
grams for veterans and internally displaced populations and managing 
disaster relief, the organization slowly introduced several initiatives for 
other groups, including mothers and children, the elderly, and disabled 
individuals. As these programs proved effective and valued by citizens and 
district and traditional authorities, the government started to support their 
scale-up. With new external support, MSS is now focused on increasing its 
effi ciency to deliver cash transfers and monitor their effectiveness and is 
scaling up a program of community mediation.
Core Institutional Repertoire: Shared Underpinnings of Success
Each of the organizations in our sample has resourcefully navigated the 
sociopolitical context in which it is embedded. Each of the organiza-
tions has achieved results and expanded the scope and coverage of the 
services it provides, making special efforts to ensure services for hard-
to-reach populations and across societal cleavages. Each of the insti-
tutions has built relationships with its clients and other stakeholders, 
enabling them to establish legitimacy and manage shocks and chang-
ing conditions. The institutions have commonly resorted to formal and 
informal partnerships to augment the scope, legitimacy, and stability 
of their mandates. 
Our research shows that the agencies deploy a repertoire of organiza-
tional tools in achieving these outcomes that is remarkably similar across 
the sample. The repertoire includes making strategic choices; adapting 
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administrative architecture and processes to the mission; managing 
people; building organizational identity; relying on leadership beyond 
individuals; fostering learning and self-evaluation; and cultivating rela-
tionships with clients and other stakeholders. Table O.1 summarizes the 
strategies observed across the cases. Grindle (1997) identifi es many of 
the elements of these strategies as contributors to organizational suc-
cess in developing countries; the elements also represent the conven-
tional wisdom in organizational management theory more generally. 
The study confi rms that these earlier conclusions and generalizations 
are applicable to FCS and should be given more weight in operational 
approaches to supporting FCS.
Making Strategic Choices 
Reorienting the mission and focusing on results, identifying the agency’s 
most immediate needs and ways to neutralize spoilers, making effective 
use of change management, and constant messaging of priorities are all 
common strategies used by the well-performing organizations we study. 
Clearly targeted and implementable goals, along with an early focus on 
implementation, have been an important building block of organizational 
effectiveness. In most examples, institutions have developed strategic and 
mid-term plans through participatory means, which have ensured that the 
mission can easily be identifi ed by staff at all levels, by clients, and by 
relevant stakeholders. Raising awareness about the organization’s mission 
and targets has had the added benefi t of creating a constituency for change 
and establishing external accountability.
Adapting Administrative Architecture and Processes to Mission
Following an incremental or building block approach in developing organi-
zational structure and functions has helped several of the studied agencies 
to deploy existing resources and capacities more effectively and build on 
them to expand the mission’s scope gradually. Restructuring has been used 
to fl atten organograms and delegate decision making to  middle managers 
who are located closer to the front line of service  provision. As services 
expand and the number of clients grows, these agencies have streamlined 
processes and systems to adapt to the new scale and  complexity. Timor-
Leste’s BPA, for example, started out simply handling payments for the 
administration and gradually added other functions, always making sure 
adequately trained staff were in place before the new function was acti-
vated. In other organizations, especially in the case of central fi nance 
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agencies, insulation was used to shield several functions from political 
interference by granting semiautonomous status to various units.
Managing People
A common characteristic of the analyzed institutions is that they pay a great 
deal of attention to the agency’s staff. They mobilize and build on existing 
skills (or “organizational survivors”), competitively recruit senior and mid-
dle management staff, train new employees, and retain staff in the medium 
and long term. Access to continued training as well as international expo-
sure have been important in attracting and retaining staff. Électricité du Laos 
and Timor-Leste’s Central Bank and MoH, for example, have implemented 
long-term capacity-building initiatives with foresight. Timor-Leste’s MoH 
temporarily subcontracted services to international nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) while sending staff to be trained abroad, offering them 
a guaranteed position on return. After fully resuming the responsibility for 
health services, it absorbed the well-trained local personnel of the interna-
tional NGOs and those that had worked for the Indonesian government.
The ability to retain staff has often been a function of remuneration 
and benefi ts. The more autonomous agencies, such as the Central Bank 
of Timor-Leste and Électricité du Laos, offer salaries that are much more 
competitive than those of other public entities. In other cases, above- 
average remuneration has been introduced through ad hoc systems or 
project-funded positions. More fl exibility in pay schemes, whether through 
a different pay scale or the use of special allowances, has permitted these 
agencies to deploy skilled staff closer to their clients, which in turn has 
helped institutions to understand and meet their needs. 
Many of the public agencies in the sample have instituted processes to 
motivate people to improve their performance. Such efforts range from 
fairly sophisticated 360-degree performance evaluation to much sim-
pler appraisal mechanisms, but all link the attainment of certain goals to 
rewards (cash payments and in kind) and career advancement opportuni-
ties. In these agencies, the evaluation of work programs has provided a 
basis for planning and implementing service improvements and has pro-
vided staff with information on their performance and an understanding 
of how they fi t in the organization. 
Building Organizational Identity
The institutions in our sample have deliberately cultivated an organiza-
tional identity. Organizational success, and the external recognition that 
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it entails, is a signifi cant part of the culture and narratives that prevail 
in the studied organizations. The sense of collective accomplishment has 
contributed to reinforcing an esprit de corps and the strong identifi cation 
of staff with the organization. Organizational culture and professional val-
ues have been an important factor in driving success. Deliberate efforts to 
model, articulate, and encourage values by political and technical man-
agers have played a signifi cant role in shaping organizational culture. In 
most cases, organizational leaders have been central in the move from rela-
tively rigid and control-oriented organizations to more participatory and 
entrepreneurial organizations. At the same time, they have empowered and 
collaborated with career civil servants in senior management positions to 
promote more durable change.
Improving internal communication, information sharing, and employee 
participation has been a core element of building corporate identity and 
improving performance. By actively involving employees, organizations 
are also tapping their explicit and implicit knowledge, skills, and commit-
ment. Newsletters, posters, training, and other means are often used to 
complement face-to-face communication. Front line staff and other levels 
of civil servants interviewed for the study cited better communication as 
having been important for improving their morale and understanding 
of programs, as well as for giving them the opportunity to voice their 
concerns to senior management. Some agencies also deploy symbolic 
features to strengthen institutional identity. The blue-shirt uniforms of 
Électricité du Laos staff, for example, make staff instantly recognizable 
as belonging to a cherished institution and are thus a source of respect 
and pride. 
Relying on Leadership Beyond Individuals 
Although institutional success is often attributed to charismatic leadership, 
our case studies highlight that leadership is not exercised by a single indi-
vidual even if some individuals stand out. In all the cases we examined, 
a core group of senior technical staff and managers have been crucial in 
delivering results and building legitimacy and resilience. In the moments of 
greatest turmoil, these leaders have been essential in ensuring the continu-
ity of service delivery and maintaining the institutional memory of their 
agencies, sometimes in the face of a severe shortage of staff and widespread 
physical destruction of facilities and systems. Beyond crisis situations, these 
networks of leaders have ignited and sustained a successful trajectory for 
their institutions. 
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Even after the Sierra Leone civil confl ict reached the capital in 1998–99 
and MoFED’s main building was destroyed, for example, the ministry con-
tinued to function thanks to a core group of staff and local consultants. 
They remained in the capital, exercised key functions, and preserved criti-
cal records. After Timor-Leste’s independence, a small group of leaders 
became instrumental in designing the organizational structure and service 
protocols for MoH. These were built around the pool of qualifi ed nurses 
and doctors who had been trained and employed by the Indonesian health 
services and by religious organizations, and who continued to provide ser-
vices, either privately or through NGOs after much of the health infra-
structure was destroyed in the violence unleashed by the country’s vote 
for independence from Indonesia. The Gambia’s MoBSE relied on a net-
work of committed education specialists who, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, were trained and deployed as part of its policy planning unit. This 
was essential in keeping a consistent approach and sustaining the orga-
nization along its trajectory. This pool of individuals, moving in and out 
of MoBSE as a result of political interventions in top-level staffi ng, led a 
number of reform initiatives in various corners of the institution and pro-
vided the human assets to fi ll the most senior positions in the ministry and 
partner organizations. They were instrumental in maintaining a consistent 
approach along the institution’s trajectory. 
Across the case studies, leaders have employed deliberate efforts to com-
municate, model, and encourage values that actively shape organizational 
culture. The leaders of the Lao MPWT have been committed to excellence 
in service delivery and have emphasized a hands-on, learning-by-doing, 
problem-solving approach to the ministry’s work. Their credibility with 
the ministry’s personnel is enhanced a great deal by the fact that they have 
risen up through the ranks of the organization. In addition, agency leaders 
effectively used rhetoric and coalition-building strategies in the service of 
institutional change and reforms. In The Gambia, for example, MoBSE 
leadership has played a signifi cant role in advocating for the sector, moving 
education to a higher position on the political agenda, and building inter-
nal and external coalitions to support sector goals. They have consistently 
fostered a culture of learning and self-evaluation. 
The majority of leaders rose through the ranks of public service, and they 
often combine technical competencies with social and political capital. In 
Timor-Leste, for example, leaders often hail from the resistance movement 
and have strong ties to traditional leadership structures, augmenting their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The leaders we encountered in our case 
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studies are astute politicians who understand that achieving results can 
be a platform for their subsequent political and professional careers, and 
importantly, they can effectively translate technical issues into the politi-
cal language of their principals. They sometimes move in and out of the 
public agency supporting the sector alternately from within and beyond. 
They are also well networked through their educational and professional 
experiences, internally and abroad. 
Fostering Learning and Self-Evaluation
The early introduction of monitoring tools and development of analyti-
cal skills for self-evaluation is an important organizational feature across 
the cases in the sample. The Gambia’s MoBSE, for example, introduced a 
process to measure and record student and teacher performance. Although 
systems vary in their degree of complexity and sophistication, they all col-
lect information about outcomes, and some measure client satisfaction. The 
most successful systems have been those that are customized to the specifi c 
needs and capacities of a given institution; hence, they are often not very 
sophisticated. Beyond putting in place information systems, these organiza-
tions have actually linked the collection of information with their planning 
and policy development processes to improve services and adapt strategies. 
At the same time, giving employees opportunities for participation, learn-
ing, and change has improved employee morale and motivation even when 
facing disappointing results. Information systems have contributed to bet-
ter targeting of resources, developing standards, and improving effi ciency 
in service delivery. Realistically assessing human, fi nancial, and institutional 
constraints has helped managers develop approaches for dealing with them. 
Cultivating Relationships with Clients and Other Stakeholders 
The institutions in our sample have built durable relations and coalitions 
that help them deliver on their mandates and mobilize support for their pro-
grams. These include a strategic attention to consultative mechanisms with 
service clients; an emphasis on displaying results, with a particular empha-
sis on signaling competence; innovative implementation partnerships with 
private and public sector organizations; policies adapted to informal insti-
tutions; and promotion of, and assistance with, donor coordination.
The organizations in the sample have reached out to clients to assess their 
needs and consult with them on strategies and alternatives to prioritize them 
or to seek feedback on the quality of services. Increasing accountability and 
bottom-up communication with end users appears to have had benefi cial 
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effects on program effectiveness and afforded the institutions a better under-
standing of clients’ preferences. A  remarkable example is provided by The 
Gambia’s MoBSE, which introduced a Coordinating Committee in the late 
1990s that met every two months with directors of all regions and included 
visits to front line staff and inspections by senior management. This has 
been a remarkable mechanism in a political context where open debate is 
extremely limited. Over the next decade, the  committee was expanded to 
include teachers, principals, partner NGOs and donors, as well as other 
relevant stakeholders. Électricité du Laos has a hotline where consumers 
can report issues, and these are almost invariably attended to within days.
Building Implementation Partnerships
The service delivery agencies in our sample have cultivated and relied on 
innovative partnerships with other public agencies, the private sector, and 
informal institutions. One example is the social dialogue program man-
aged by Timor-Leste’s MSS. The program was initially created to facilitate 
the return of displaced populations after the 2006 crisis. It also focused on 
mitigating confl ict risks, dealing with violence between martial arts groups, 
and mediating land and cultural disputes. Innovatively, the social dialogue 
model works in partnership with community leaders and uses traditional 
dispute resolution methods. The use of these familiar mechanisms has 
allowed MSS to realize signifi cant achievements in a short period of time 
and to secure the trust of the population. 
In the Lao power sector, the push to reach 90 percent electrifi cation 
by 2020, has prompted EDL in concert with provincial governments to 
contract small and medium private companies to extend the grid to remote 
areas, through a build-operate-transfer model. In the aftermath of Timor-
Leste’s 1999 independence vote, the MoH’s ability to restore services was 
the result of its partnership with international civil society and religious 
organizations. Since the early 1990s, road sector development in Lao PDR 
has emphasized the building of private sector capacity. In the delegated 
MPWT system, project management (including budgeting, planning, and 
quality control) was shifted to the provincial level, and implementation 
was contracted out to a nascent private sector at the provincial and district 
levels.
Signaling Capacity to Mobilize External Resources
All of the studied organizations have been successful in mobilizing fi nan-
cial resources to fund their mandates and, under some circumstances, to 
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expand the number of activities that they undertake. The ability to signal 
effectiveness, report results, and obtain external recognition has been a 
critical aspect of that effort. Most organizations have at least basic moni-
toring and data collection systems that allow them to document their activ-
ities and achievements and show decision makers that fi nancial resources 
are being well spent. 
In addition, the case studies offer multiple examples of how organiza-
tions have adopted similar models as organizations in the same sector in 
other countries. Whether adopting these models has contributed to greater 
effectiveness is diffi cult to determine with this sample size. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that adopting certain organizational forms has constituted an 
important signal for development partners and, in many cases, has been 
driven by the need to conform to requirements to access funding or exter-
nal assistance. This has led in some cases to disruptive changes that have 
not furthered institutional interests or effectiveness. In many cases, isomor-
phic pressures are the result of the specialization of international agencies 
providing technical assistance in a given area, as well as of the professional 
norms shared. 
Policy Implications
One of the explicit goals of this study has been to understand the shared 
causal factors underlying successful institution building in FCS to provide 
the basis for targeted operational insights for policies and programs con-
cerning institutional reform. The detailed empirical discussion above has 
identifi ed a number of specifi c lessons in terms of the institutional under-
pinnings that public agencies should attempt to pursue and that develop-
ment partners would be well advised to support. Although our sample 
size is small, our robust methodology allows us to offer some additional 
operational lessons. We start by discussing how our fi ndings help to pro-
vide evidence on a piece of relatively established conventional wisdom on 
institution building. Then we elaborate a series of more actionable lessons 
for FCS policy makers and their development partners. 
Designing Good Fit IS Best Practice
Our research confi rms that good-fi t institutional strategies are essen-
tial, a point we are not alone in emphasizing.19 Nevertheless, our work 
reveals a subtle point about institutional fi t, in that it must be achieved 
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in two  dimensions—micro-organizational strategies must be chosen 
and supported on the basis of their ultimate function, and they must be 
implemented in light of the macro-sociopolitical context in which public 
agencies are embedded. We have emphasized, in this regard, the impor-
tance of viewing institutional development and success as a nonlinear, 
dynamic, evolving process. The pathways to institutional success illustrate 
a self-reinforcing dynamic such that the causality between institutional 
repertoire and the sociopolitical context works both ways. Better under-
standing the history of institutions and how their makeup of individuals, 
programs, and policies has evolved is critical to designing better interven-
tions and programs for institutional strengthening. A better grasp of how 
institutions forge domestic and external coalitions for change can also 
inform more comprehensive external support to aid those efforts. 
A focus on institutional form is hence only warranted by context, never 
ex ante. Isomorphic mimicry can sometimes be positive in helping agencies 
to signal competence, but it should not be pushed beyond the pursuit of 
very specifi c functions. Normative approaches to best practice only make 
sense if they fi t with the political economy context; and their implementa-
tion must be tailored to the existing capacity of agencies. In terms of the 
scripts of institutional reform, donor coordination is crucial—especially to 
mitigate fragmentary and contradictory advice—although many successful 
institutions take care of this themselves.
Suggestions for Policy Makers
Implement a Building-Block Strategy. Public institutions, with the 
 support of their development partners, should follow a building-block 
approach to developing their mandate that combines short- and long-term 
 objective-setting on the basis of clearly defi ned targets. Agencies should 
focus on scoring early, monitorable, and reportable successes that can be 
used to generate further support, leverage resources, and build morale 
and momentum. Where possible, functions should be added in step with 
the development of the necessary capacity. Alternatively, institutions can 
outsource functions to NGOs or the private sector either temporarily or 
permanently, while focusing on providing the policy and regulatory frame-
work, setting standards, monitoring outcomes, evaluating programs, and 
identifying course corrections. 
Emphasize Constant Learning and Use Evidence Wisely to Implement 
Course Corrections. Institutions achieve and sustain success with an 
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emphasis on continuous organizational learning and evidence-based deci-
sion making. Information itself is not enough; the key is what is done with 
the information—how it is used to validate successful strategies, scale up 
experiments and pilots that have gone well, close down initiatives that 
have shown lesser results, and continuously correct the institution’s course. 
Client surveys and feedback can be used to shape changes in service deliv-
ery goals and processes; and systems to collect basic and real-time data on 
service provision can be used to make incremental as well as more serious 
adjustments to reforms. 
Give Staff and Clients a Stake in the Institution’s Success. Often institu-
tions and donors focus too much on the very top leadership of the agency 
and their connections with the outside world—and too little on building 
and encouraging leadership qualities in the broader management team 
that are more internally focused. Middle and senior managers can sty-
mie otherwise well-designed reforms, or they can be essential in deter-
mining and successfully implementing an agency’s mandate. Enabling 
some measure of autonomy in fi nancial and human resource manage-
ment is important, along with greater managerial fl exibility to give them 
a stake in success. For technical staff and frontline service providers, 
a similar pride and stake in the organization can be cultivated through 
tangible performance incentives and more intangible corporate culture 
and practices.
Clients can be a potent source of political leverage for an institution, 
and yet they are often an overlooked stakeholder. Client participation and 
feedback is important for optimizing services, but also because social forces 
can be the most dramatic and supportive of  stakeholders. How, then, can 
institutions better connect with their  clients and mobilize this force? The 
act of closer communication with  clients gives them a deeper stake in the 
institution’s success and thereby builds a constituency for sustained change. 
A further step to empowering that constituency—and building broader 
state legitimacy in the eyes of  society—is to integrate client consultation 
and participation into  decision-making processes. If the essence of fragility 
is the disintegration of the state and social  fabrics, then their mutual regen-
eration is a crucial element in overcoming it.
Refl ections for Development Partners
Revisiting “Country Ownership.” Our research confi rms the general con-
sensus that donor support contributes to results when agency counterparts 
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are fi rmly in the driver’s seat. Yet donors must be nuanced in “respecting 
country ownership.” The political landscape rarely produces unequivocal 
support for reforms, and agencies sometimes face considerable hostility 
and interference from political elites. In this context, donors can help to 
shape the immediate operating environment of an agency by helping it 
to connect to a broader set of stakeholders internally and abroad. In so 
doing, donors can help the institution buffer itself to some degree against 
unwanted political interference. 
Support Networks of Leaders. We have highlighted the importance of the 
networks of leaders that ignite and sustain institutional success, usually 
heads of agencies and a cadre of managers and technical staff around them, 
sometimes reaching into the private and nongovernmental sectors. Donors 
can support these local networks by expanding their ability to connect 
across borders and learn from each other. Donors can reward effective lead-
ership through initiatives like the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African 
Leadership and by offering other avenues for international recognition.
Be in It for the Long Haul. The one certain good that donors can pro-
vide to their counterparts is a greater degree of stability and continuity 
in programming and staffi ng, along with more hands-on and continued 
engagement from the donor side. Institution building is a dynamic, nonlin-
ear process that moves in fi ts and starts and is often reversible. To embrace 
the reality of institutional change, development partners must be prepared 
to recognize these facts and work fl exibly to add momentum to salutary 
change and help protect agencies against adverse change. Nimble, oppor-
tunistic pursuit of reform moments and champions has its place—but 
must be accompanied by sustained, incremental partnerships for long-term 
 success and lasting change.
There Is No Such Thing as a Blank Slate. This study emphasizes, above 
all, that micro-institutional strategies must be consonant with the macro-
sociopolitical context if organizations are to succeed. To state that donors 
must understand the political economy of reforms has become a truism; 
but the development community is still a long way from putting that 
wisdom in practice. The sine qua non of good program design is a deep 
and nuanced understanding of the sociopolitical context in which institu-
tions are embedded, combined with an accurate assessment of organiza-
tional capacity, appreciating at least a measure of the historical trajectory 
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shaping both. Understanding who the leaders are in a sector within and 
outside the public agency and how they fi t in the broader sociopolitical 
context is particularly important. For development assistance to work, it 
must be undertaken in the context of the particular conditions agencies 
face. One concrete way of thinking about this is that the three pathways to 
success articulated above suggest different opportunities and entry points 
for donors to act on in addition to the elements of support that will make 
sense no matter what. Furthermore, the specifi c methodology we have 
developed and employed in conducting this study serves as a concrete tool 
for undertaking adequate upstream due diligence and thereby maximizing 
the potential for donors to support institutional success in FCS.
Conclusion
This volume describes how institutions in fragile and confl ict-affected states 
succeed when they are able to construct strategies of deft internal manage-
ment and astute external connections to negotiate the broader sociopoliti-
cal environment in which they are embedded. Successful institutions share 
a core institutional repertoire in so doing; and the agencies in our study 
display different patterns in the manner in which they connect these micro-
organizational strategies to the broader macro-sociopolitical environment. 
The comparative method employed in this study has enabled us to more 
systematically test some of the hypotheses and causal expectations that 
individual case studies and more theoretical scholarship have pointed to 
before. It offers the potential, as well, for further research to test, refi ne, 
and expand on our fi ndings. Most of our cases studies concern central 
agencies and service delivery organizations. This work could usefully be 
complemented by an examination of success in other areas that are con-
sidered critical in FCS, such as security services and judicial institutions. 
A dedicated analysis of successful decentralization would also be useful. 
Another promising avenue for research would be to focus more narrowly 
on how development partners have specifi cally aided the agencies in our 
study, along with careful process-tracing of how signifi cant those elements 
of support were in achieving success. 
We have endeavored not to project successful sequences as necessarily 
being the product of a series of conscious choices—sometimes luck inter-
venes, in the form of a particular political moment. We have emphasized the 
importance of looking at institutional development as a long-term process. 
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Institutional success is a nonlinear and dynamic process; the governance 
puzzles that must be solved on the route to success evolve constantly and 
are sharper at some moments and more opaque at others. A better under-
standing of the context in which institutions are embedded, their own par-
ticular trajectory in connecting to that context, and the internal resources, 
human and otherwise, of those institutions is essential for designing better 
interventions and programs for institutional strengthening.
In presenting our fi ndings, we believe that we have moved the study of 
institution building in FCS beyond the high-order contextual factors often 
analyzed, such as overarching questions of political stability and systemic 
institutional strength in cross-cutting governance functions such as public 
fi nancial management or civil service capacity. Holding such factors con-
stant in their often low equilibria, we still observe islands of success—such 
public institutions manage to operate successfully despite the overwhelm-
ing odds against them. Hence we see some institutional successes in other-
wise stalemated or even highly confl ictual political environments. We also 
see specifi c achievements in institution building even when systemic public 
sector capacity-building initiatives have stalled. Sometimes, as the agencies 
in our sample display, the success of individual institutions can even have a 
positive feedback effect on the broader (re)construction of state legitimacy 
and the institutional landscape. 
Notes
 1. The study is intended to make a contribution to the broad dialogue on fragile 
state engagement; for example, OECD (2008); LSE et al. (2008); Jones et al. 
(2008); OECD (2010); ECDPM (2008); NORAD (2009); IPPG (2010); Cox 
and Hemon (2009).
 2. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985); Migdal (1988).
 3. Jones et al. (2008); World Bank (2012). See also Bates (2008); Hickey (2012); 
North et al. (2007); (North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009); Slater (2010); Vom 
Hau (2012); and Waldner (1999).
 4. Some institutions are more likely to sustain good performance if they are 
accountable to multiple principals, such as a legislative body or to the public, 
particularly if these multiple channels of accountability offer agencies alterna-
tive tactical options. By contrast, if agencies are dependent on satisfying all of 
these multiple, competing principals, they can get tied up in process-oriented 
knots.
 5. IPPG (2010); OECD (2010), World Bank (2011).
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 6. The World Bank’s Societal Dynamics and Fragility study (World Bank 2012) 
examines these societal dimensions of fragility and state-building on the basis 
of detailed empirical work. 
 7. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) offer a complementary perspective on institu-
tions as vehicles through which sociopolitical power is expressed and shaped. 
 8. In an important research agenda-setting piece, Leonard (2010) examines 
“pockets” of institutional effectiveness in countries with poor governance and 
weak administrative records. He reviews the literature on this subject to gener-
ate fi ve meta-hypotheses—two of which are internal and three external—and 
discusses how they may interact.
 9. On specifi city, see also Hirschman (1967) and Wilson (1989).
 10. A large institutionalist literature addresses the causes of isomorphism in orga-
nizations. See, in particular, Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), and Meyer et al. (1997). For an explicit treatment of institutional iso-
morphism in public sector agencies, see Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004). 
Pritchett and de Weijer (2010) also discuss institutional mimicry and its con-
sequences for de jure form versus de facto function in building institutional 
capacity in fragile states.
 11. Rodrik (2007) has emphasized the value and signifi cance of focusing on insti-
tutional function, with locally rooted innovation, over institutional form.
 12. World Bank (2011); IPPG (2010); Fukuyama (2004); and Pritchett and 
de Weijer (2010).
 13. Barma (2011) and Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela (2012) detail the 
research design of the study, including a fuller defi nition of the outcomes 
studied, the process by which cases were selected, and the case-centered 
methodology. 
 14. See Lamb (2005), Weatherford (1992), and Bellina et al. (2009) on measuring 
legitimacy. 
 15. The notion of institutional capacity improving fi rst in pockets and then more 
broadly fi ts with the notion that there is a “virtuous cycle” element to success-
ful institution building whereby stronger institutions are better able to mediate 
internal and external stressors to stability, and also that enclaves of good gov-
ernance can accrete to a dynamic process of institutional improvement. See, 
respectively, World Bank (2011) and North et al. (2007).
 16. Lao PDR and The Gambia experienced stagnation and fragility during the 
1990s, while Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste emerged from protracted confl icts 
in the early 2000s. Lao PDR and The Gambia graduated from the World 
Bank list of fragile situations in 2010 as their Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment scores improved.
 17. Case-centered methodological insights are adapted from George and Bennett 
(2005). Barma (2011) provides more details on the study’s research design, 
including a discussion of the potential limitations of the research design and 
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ways in which these were mitigated, along with the structured, focused inquiry 
comprising the case study guide. 
 18. Other cases might reveal additional pathways, but it is beyond the scope of 
this study to speculate on these.
 19. Grindle’s (2004, 2007) concept of “good enough governance” is foundational 
on this point. See Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2013) for the most recent 
discussion of this issue; other citations are in the literature review above. 
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As a small country, surrounded by Senegal, with little natural resources 
and high dependence on offi cial development assistance,1 The Gambia 
is exposed to external shocks and deeply concerned with preserving its 
 independence. The Gambia faces challenges in generating suffi cient 
 revenues to cover annual expenses and more broadly address its vast devel-
opmental needs. Of its population of 1.7 million, 58 percent live in poverty. 
Agriculture, mainly related to the production of peanuts and subsistence, 
employs two-thirds of the population and represents a quarter of gross 
domestic product, while the service sector, including tourism, accounts for 
the rest. Agriculture is frequently affected by extreme climatic events.
The Gambia became independent from England in 1965 and con-
verted into a republic in 1971, emerging as one of a handful of multiparty 
democracies in Africa. Although freely contested elections were held every 
fi ve years, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) dominated politics for the 
next three decades. President Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, who was the 
leader of the independence movement and had a strong base of support in 
the Mandinka rural population, was reelected fi ve consecutive times and 
ruled until a coup d’état ousted him and banned his party from electoral 
competition.2 The three opposition parties represented largely the interest 
of urban centers, whose leadership came primarily from the Wolof/Aku 
ethnic groups. Although coexistence of different groups has been mostly 
peaceful, politics have often taken ethnic undertones, and there have been 
sporadic events of violence.
The Gambia: Balancing Structural Constraints 
and Hegemonic Politics
Lorena Viñuela
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In the 1970s, as many other countries in West Africa, The Gambia 
 pursued a policy of industrial substitution that channeled the surplus 
from agricultural exports into industrial ventures in urban centers. Part of 
the substitution policy involved subsidies for the population of Kanifi ng 
and Banjul and reinforced some of the long-standing biases in favor of the 
metropolitan area. A parastatal, the Gambia Oilseeds Marketing Board, 
controlled the exports of the main cash crop, groundnuts. Yet, in response 
to the government’s taxation policies, peanut producers changed crops 
or resorted to smuggling products to Senegal in search of better prices. 
In time, this, together with the failure of many of the import substitu-
tion initiatives, led to a sharp drop in public revenue and gave rise to 
a parallel market that diverted much of the foreign exchange from the 
formal system. At the same time that the government experimented with 
industrialization, the minute state apparatus left in place by the British 
expanded rapidly. The number of civil servants grew geometrically with 
the creation of 4,500 new posts and soon the fi nancial situation of the 
state deteriorated. 
By 1980, the country began having problems serving its debt obliga-
tions and the Central Bank’s reserves dwindled. Rising unemployment and 
food prices led to increasing social unrest and an eventual coup attempt 
by a group of Jola paramilitary in 1981 that was stopped by the interven-
tion of the Senegalese army. The intervention led to widespread violence. 
In reaction to the instability, a Senegambia Confederation was established 
in 1982, and for the fi rst time, a national army was created. In addition 
to providing for common security, the goal of the Confederation was to 
coordinate foreign affairs and economic policies. 
In the late 1980s, the plunging international price of groundnuts, popu-
lation growth, dwindling external assistance, and climatic hardships led to 
a deep economic crisis as attempts by the government to adjust fi scal poli-
cies intensifi ed the downturn. The IMF/World Bank-fi nanced Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP) sought to curtail infl ation, privatize state-owned 
companies, and liberalize agricultural prices, but did not succeed in boost-
ing economic growth. The prolonged nature of the economic stagnation 
eventually resulted in wide discontent. In 1989, fearing the loss of lucrative 
indirect taxes if a custom union was established, The Gambia withdrew 
from the Senegambia Confederation.
As relations with Senegal grew strained, President Jawara became 
increasingly isolated politically. In 1994, unrest developed in the 
Gambian army after the government signed a defense agreement that 
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allowed Nigerian offi cers to head the army. In July, Lieutenant Yahya 
Jammeh succeeded in overthrowing the government and banned the 
PPP from participating in electoral contests for seven years. The United 
Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden, in particular, warned their citizens 
against  traveling to The Gambia, which in turn led to an estimated loss 
of 25 percent of tourist industry employment, while other countries 
 suspended direct support. 
Responding to pressure for a return to civilian rule, Jammeh’s Armed 
Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) established a National 
Consultative Committee (NCC) to draft a new constitution. The new 
constitution, approved two years later, granted additional prerogatives 
to the presidency over the unicameral legislature and the judiciary. A 
presidential election gave an ample victory to President Jammeh and his 
party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) 
in 1996. Since then, Jammeh has won three consecutive elections. 
Slowly after the transition to civilian rule, relations with donors 
 normalized despite the restricted level of political and civilian liberties. 
In July 2001, the ban on the PPP was lifted. Nonetheless, the opposition 
is weak and divided, and it is widely considered to have no real chance 
of gaining power, with the APRC controlling the majority in the 53-seat 
National Assembly since 1996 (of which fi ve members are directly 
appointed by the president). Over the years, the regime has increasingly 
limited press liberty and arrested various journalists and opposition 
leaders.3 Local  nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are generally 
weak, with a few exceptions, and independent media is very limited. 
Governance reached one of its  lowest points in 2002–03, when irregular-
ities in economic  management and monetary policy led to a severe crisis. 
Notes
 1. As a former British colony, The Gambia maintains strong links with the 
United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in West Africa, such as 
Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria. Among emerging partners, Taiwan, China, 
remains the most important, followed by Cuba and República Bolivariana 
de Venezuela, while Kuwait exerts a growing infl uence. Libya was an impor-
tant association between 1995 and 2011. However, traditional development 
partners, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the African Development Bank (AfDB), retain important roles.
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 2. It is important to note that until 1996 The Gambia had an unusual voting 
system in which voters deposited marbles into a steel drum marked with the 
candidate of their choice.
 3. Eight of the detainees were sentenced to death and executed for their part in 
an alleged coup plot in 2010.
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The Gambia’s recent history has been marked by economic shocks and 
low political inclusiveness that have had negatively affected the country’s 
development. Fragility has been the result of weakening state institutions, 
increasing centralization of power in the executive, and the deteriorat-
ing socioeconomic conditions that reached a critical point in 2003. The 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) has been directly 
infl uenced by the political context and was at the center of the economic 
crisis and the subsequent recovery. 
As in many low-income countries, the ministry faces signifi cant  challenges 
in pursuing more effective and transparent public fi nancial  management 
and prudent fi scal policies. These diffi culties are compounded by volatile 
economic conditions and the nature of the political regime. The country 
is heavily dependent on external assistance, and this gives international 
fi nance institutions and other development partners providing program-
matic support some infl uence in the institution’s operational environment. 
As a small but open economy, the impact of fi scal policies and external 
economic shocks are felt rapidly, and this constitutes an important stress 
factor. 
There have been two important turning points in the development of the 
institution that have contributed to giving greater autonomy (or dissuaded 
principals from actively intervening in internal matters), at least in some 
areas of public fi nancial management. On the one hand, the 2002–03 mon-
etary crisis acted as a strong focusing event to renew development part-
ners’ support and technical assistance to the Central Bank and MoFEA. 
The Gambia Case Study: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs
Lorena Viñuela and Helle M. Alvesson
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The crisis demonstrated the risks that manipulating the exchange rate and 
rising domestic debt can have in an economy of the size of The Gambia 
and created a wide consensus on the need to consistently invest in the 
capacity and credibility of the Central Bank and the central fi nance agency. 
On the other hand, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief (MDR) mechanisms offered signifi cant incen-
tives for reform, allowing the country to cut external debt by half and 
access critical technical assistance. At the same time, greater coordination 
among donors has facilitated dialogue with the institution. Advances in 
the various dimensions of fi scal policy have had positive feedback effects 
in motivating additional reforms, attracting new talent and resources, and 
mobilizing budget support.
Domestic coalitions and constituencies for economic stability have 
played a critical role in the response to the crisis and in helping to mitigate 
ongoing challenges emerging from political interference in the allocation of 
funds and pushing for greater transparency in public accounts. The close 
collaboration with the Central Bank, which enjoys greater autonomy, has 
allowed the ministry to access local technical capacity and resources. In 
addition, the private sector has been a strong and infl uential advocate of 
macroeconomic sustainability.
Internally, the institution has undergone major restructuring and mod-
ernizing of processes since 2004. These changes have been accompanied 
by considerable updating of the budget legal and regulatory frameworks. 
In recent years, greater attention has been paid to the staffi ng of middle 
management positions and attracting new professional staff. Nevertheless, 
a core group of technical staff and individuals that remained or returned to 
the institution have played an important role in conserving the institutional 
memory and helping the institution navigate a turbulent political and eco-
nomic environment. Notably, the introduction of a new fi nancial manage-
ment system has acted as a major catalyst for process modernization and 
improving the coordination and communication with spending ministries. 
Having real-time information on spending and revenues proved critical 
during the international fi nancial crisis of 2008–09 and allowed the min-
istry to rapidly react and contain the impact on The Gambian economy.
The ministry has managed the challenging political context by main-
taining a “technocratic front,” while at the same time, providing maximal 
political discretion to the president to remove ministers frequently. This 
strategy has, to some extent, removed civil service appointments from direct 
political interference. This arrangement has offered several advantages, 
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including opening space for broad reforms, such as the implementation 
of transformational projects like the new integrated fi nancial management 
information system and the clearing of the backlog of fi nancial statements, 
as well as facilitating the working relationship with development  agencies. 
It has fallen short, however, from ensuring the continuity of these reforms, 
especially when economic and political circumstances lead to a shortage in 
funds from development agencies. 
Institutional Success
Emerging from the 2002–03 crisis, MoFEA has set a path toward its capa-
bility to deliver on its core mandate and address demands from clients 
and various stakeholders. Within a constrained environment, in economic 
and political terms, MoFEA has undergone a signifi cant transformation. 
Many challenges lie ahead in the institutional evolution of MoFEA, and 
the description of the institutional success should be considered in that 
context and with the necessary caveats.
In the mid-2000s, the ministry was affected by a host of problems and 
relied on structures and systems that were glaringly inadequate for man-
aging public resources effectively. The regulatory framework for fi scal 
policy dated from colonial times, there was a multiplicity of information 
systems that had been built on an ad hoc basis that did not communicate 
with each other, and most of the accounting and transactions were still 
being  processed manually. The plethora of problems included poor debt 
 recording, low credibility of budgeting practices, use of unreliable data and 
models to forecast revenues, inadequate public accounting practices, and 
a decade-long delay in producing general ledgers and fi nancial statements 
(World Bank 2005b). Moreover, there were large discrepancies between 
payroll and personnel data, below-the-line accounts were opaque, and 
accounts had not been audited for many years. Large arrears had accumu-
lated and domestic revenue mobilization was low in comparison with other 
low-income countries. 
Since then, a wide array of reforms in the organization’s structure and 
processes have had tangible results and helped to build MoFEA’s credibil-
ity. New processes have improved communication fl ows and coordination 
with line ministries and counterparts, allowing for more effective and effi -
cient public expenditure management. In addition, the country has man-
aged to maintain macroeconomic stability in the face of external shocks 
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during 2008 caused by high food and fuel prices, as well as abrupt reduc-
tion in offi cial assistance and tourism revenues in 2009–10.
Results
MoFEA has exhibited measurable and gradually improving results in sev-
eral areas. The Gambia has made important progress in public fi nancial 
management and toward achieving debt sustainability. The positive tra-
jectory has been refl ected in improving Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) indicators. Since 2005, The Gambia has received higher 
scores in key areas related to the ministry’s mandate (see fi gure 2.1 and 
table 2.1), including macroeconomic management, fi scal policy, and the 
quality of budgeting and fi nancial management. A more modest improve-
ment has been achieved in debt policy, mainly because of concerns about 
rising domestic debt during 2009 and 2010. 
Many elements of public expenditure management have consistently 
improved in the past seven years, including an update of the legal and reg-
ulatory framework, improvements in the timeliness of fi nancial reporting 
with an introduction of an integrated fi nancial management information 
system, and a more organized budget process. The backlog of accounts 
has been cleared and sent to the National Assembly and presently there is 
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within-year reporting. These improvements in public fi nancial management 
are refl ected in the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 
performance scores (see annex). The Gambia has obtained above average 
marks in the aggregate expenditure and revenue outputs, budget classifi -
cation and comprehensiveness of budget information, and  orderliness and 
participation in the budget process, as well as account reporting (World 
Bank 2010b). 
Although efforts to reduce domestic debt have been curtailed by various 
economic shocks, the ministry has taken important steps to improve the 
quality of debt management systems and data, and it has successfully taken 
advantage of debt reduction facilities that translated into sizable reduc-
tions of external debt levels. Some of the improvements included adopting 
a medium-term debt management strategy and a new recording system, 
establishing a dedicated unit for debt management, improving coordina-
tion and sharing of data with the Central Bank, carrying out regular debt 
sustainability analyses. In turn, and in the context of global relief initia-
tives including HIPC and the MDR mechanism, The Gambia was able to 
halve external debt. In parallel, between 2003 and 2008, the Central Bank’s 
fi nancing was signifi cantly reduced (see fi gure 2.2), whereas the overall defi -
cit as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) improved from 2005 to 2007 
(see  fi gure 2.3). However, domestic debt levels have since risen. The govern-
ment made use of treasury bills as a short-term strategy to bridge the wid-
ening gap between domestic revenues and expenditures in 2009 and 2010.
Another dimension of public fi nancial management in which the 
 country has made considerable advances is revenue mobilization. Greater 
effi ciency in tax administration resulting from the merging of the two 
major tax collection agencies has translated into a steady increase in 
domestic  revenue. Between 2004 and 2010, tax revenue increased an 
 Table 2.1. CPIA Scores
Indicator
The Gambia IDA average
2005 2010 2005 2010
1. Macroeconomic management 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.7
2. Fiscal policy 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.5
3. Debt policy 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.4
13. Quality of budget and fi nancial management 2.5 3.5 3.2 3.3
14. Effi ciency of revenue mobilization 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5
16. Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9
Source: World Bank Indicators, 2013.
Note: IDA = International Development Association.
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average of 17 percent per year (see fi gure 2.4). Domestic revenue has also 
risen as a share of GDP, reaching 21 percent in 2007 and then falling 
again ( fi gure 2.5). The government planned to replace sales taxes with 
a value-added tax (VAT) by January 2013, which is expected to further 
increase public  revenues. However, the prevalent informality in the econ-
omy  continues to be a major obstacle to broadening the tax base and is 
yet to be addressed.
Legitimacy
The output legitimacy, or the outward performance, of the ministry is high 
across clients and external stakeholders. The institution’s perceived effec-
tiveness has improved as a result of institutional changes and the streamlin-
ing of processes related to budgeting and account recording. In particular, 
the deployment of budget offi cers and accountants in line ministries has led 
to more frequent and effective interactions with them in the daily manage-
ment of fi nancial resources. Clients were mostly positive about the cash 
management system and the fi nancial management information system, as 
well as training opportunities that came with the latter. Others referred to 
the support received from the ministry in contractual and technical matters 
in positive terms.
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Conversely, the procedural legitimacy appears weaker. Some observers 
have reported that MoFEA has limited engagement with other economic 
agencies. The ministry is sometimes perceived as paying limited attention 
to the preferences of clients. Although there are some formal consulta-
tions, for example through the budget forum and hearings in the National 
Assembly, clients do not see them as having a signifi cant impact on the 
decision-making process. Many of the public agencies interviewed also 
expressed their concerns about the scarcity of funding and how cash con-
straints affect their program component, but they also recognized that such 
factors were beyond the control of the ministry. 
Despite these persisting challenges, the ministry has consistently 
gained credibility and legitimacy vis-à-vis external and domestic 
 stakeholders. The improving trust in its capacity to manage funds has 
been refl ected in the recovering level of external assistance. Reforms 
on public expenditure management have been extremely important 
in allowing The Gambia to mobilize more development assistance, 
 including budget support. As  fi gure 2.6 and fi gure 2.7 show, after an 
 sizable drop in 2002–03 (a drop of approximately a third), offi cial 
development aid more than doubled and reached US$130 million by 
2009, or 19 percent of GDP. 
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Resilience
The resilience of MoFEA, or its ability to sustain and enhance results over 
time, has been tested in several ways. First, the improvement in results 
has been maintained despite a high turnover of ministers and personnel. 
Second, The Gambia has weathered the 2008 food price crisis and down-
turn in the international fi nancial system.
Improved information management—particularly related to account-
ing, forecasting, and debt management—and a closer collaboration with 
the Central Bank have allowed the ministry to adjust policies and spend-
ing rapidly to changing macroeconomic circumstances. MoFEA resorted 
to cash rationing during 2008 and 2009 to cope with the food crisis and 
the rising prices of fuel. In 2010, the ministry was able to manage a large 
shock generated by the suspension of the European Union’s contribution 
to budget support.
Sociopolitical and Historical Context
The high concentration of power in the presidency and the Alliance for 
Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) has been accompanied 
by an increasingly discretionary treatment of civil servants. State capac-
ity has been severely undermined by the politicization of the civil service 
and deterioration of public salaries, as evidenced in the high turnover of 
personnel at all levels. In practice, civil servants no longer enjoy stability in 
their positions and can be summarily dismissed. At the same time, there is 
a centralization of decisions at the highest levels of authority over policy, 
managerial, and personnel issues. For example, the president is also the 
Minister of Agriculture and in the recent past has simultaneously held the 
position of Minister of Higher Education.
Frequent changes and reshuffl es in the cabinet have been a common 
feature of contemporary The Gambia. The turnover also reaches senior 
civil servants, permanent secretaries and deputy permanent secretaries, 
and almost all levels of the civil service. This level of insecurity has driven 
qualifi ed staff to seek employment in international and civil society orga-
nizations, donor programs, and the growing service sector, in particular 
banking. The trend was especially acute during the 2002 crisis.
 During 2002–03, expansionary fi scal policy, accommodating mon-
etary policy, and a drought led to a deep economic crisis. Infl ation 
rose from 5 percent to 17 percent in two years; the national currency, 
THE GAMBIA CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS • 51
the dalasi, depreciated by 55 percent; and gross national income plunged 
(see  fi gure 2.8). The large increase in government domestic borrowing to 
cover current expenditures had destabilizing effects. During this period, 
civil servants’ salaries were severely eroded (see fi gure 2.9). The IMF 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan and other international 
assistance programs were suspended because of concern about various 
irregularities in reporting and the lack of compliance with macroeco-
nomic goals. 
In the then Department of State Finance (now MoFEA), this episode 
was marked with the appointment of a minister, who did not count with 
a technical background, and an exodus of technical staff—including some 
that are now back in the institution. Nevertheless, the crisis acted as a 
strong catalyst for renewed external support to the ministry. The assistance 
focused on improving fi scal discipline and increasing coordination between 
the ministry and the Central Bank. 
The crisis helped to create better awareness of the implications that 
expansionary fi scal policies and rising domestic debt can have on an econ-
omy of the size of The Gambia. It also contributed to create a wide consen-
sus on the need to invest in the skills of the Central Bank and the Ministry 
of Finance. Since the crisis, and after a steep and prolonged decline in state 
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capacity,1 The Gambia has started moving toward strengthening its institu-
tional capacity and improving the conditions of public employment again. 
The country graduated from the list of fragile and confl ict-affected situa-
tions in 2011, and its overall CPIA score has consistently increased since 
2005. Although the overall quality of public administration is comparable 
to that of other International Development Association (IDA) countries, 
the country’s Macroeconomic Management and Quality of Budgeting and 
Financial Management scores are above the average. The areas in which 
The Gambia lags are Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the 
Public Sector and Debt Policy. Similarly, The Gambia scores below the 
median in most of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, except for politi-
cal stability.
External Operational Environment
In a challenging sociopolitical context, the operational environment of 
MoFEA has been marked by the increasing politicization of public fi nan-
cial management since the mid-1990s. As a critical arena of politics, fi scal 
policy has been exposed to interference and political pressures to allocate 
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resources according to short-term priorities. The ministry is less insulated 
from the political economy context than the Central Bank. In practice, this 
has meant that ministers’ tenure depends on their relation with the execu-
tive and that they are likely to be removed or transferred to another govern-
ment entity when it changes. Yet, despite the lack of continuity in political 
leadership, there has been relative stability in senior and middle manage-
ment positions, especially in the Treasury and the heads of semiautono-
mous agencies.2 Under pressure from donors, the  ministry has increased 
the number of partially autonomous agencies as a way to shield certain 
strategic functions, such as revenue administration and procurement.
In addition, the ability of the ministry to deliver on its core mandate is 
affected by its high exposure to external shocks and dependency on external 
aid. Disruptions and uneasy relations with traditional donors have often 
resulted in shortfalls in project fi nancing and budget support. More recently, 
high energy and food prices pose an important challenge to the continua-
tion of economic reforms. At the same time, the global economic downturn 
in countries during 2008–11 negatively impacted two of the main sources 
of foreign receipts, tourism and offi cial aid, and remittances decreased.
However, the ministry benefi ts from being one of the main interlocutors 
of international fi nance institutions and development partners and having 
access to resources and technical assistance. In recent years, donor coordi-
nation has improved and two key donors, the African Development Bank 
and the World Bank, adopted a Joint Assistance Strategy. Moreover, the 
introduction of budget support as an assistance tool has provided a clearer 
framework for engaging development partners and reducing transaction 
costs for the institution. However, the ministry has been subjected to some-
times contradictory pressures and priorities from donors. 
Another source of motivation for policy reform is The Gambia’s 
 membership in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) along with fi ve 
other countries. They plan to introduce a common currency, the eco, by 
the year 2015. This commitment to regional integration has helped the 
country to set objectives and goals and has provided a monitoring and peer 
review mechanism.
Domestically, MoFEA’s partnership with the Central Bank, which has 
rebuilt its own capacity, has been critical in advocating for the need of attract-
ing and retaining trained individuals and communicating key  messages to 
the leadership around fi scal sustainability. Foreign and domestic investors in 
the hospitality and service sectors have also been important constituents of 
sound fi scal policy, debt management, and regulatory reform. 
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Reestablishing Coordination with the Central Bank
The Central Bank is an important domestic stakeholder. Having gained 
greater autonomy in recent years, it is in a stronger position to demand 
actions from MoFEA, and to offer technical support in key areas. The 
Central Bank vocally advocates for more prudent fi scal policy and for 
reducing domestic debt and the use of treasury bills. In the words of the 
governor, “An understanding was reached that the Central Bank alone 
 cannot achieve price stability … we are doing this together.” Thus, the 
agency has been a strong backer of the introduction of the Integrated 
Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) and worked closely 
with the Debt Management Unit to improve its recording and forecasting 
systems, as well as seconded a senior staff to lead the Budget Department. 
In addition, the two institutions have formalized their channels of com-
munication and set up a number of joint committees to monitor common 
targets. Three new committees have been fundamental for harmonizing the 
fi scal and monetary policies by bringing together the two institutions, but 
also creating a clear reporting framework. These include the Treasury Bills, 
Liquidity, and Monetary Coordination committees. Their meetings are 
often attended by donors and other technical assistants. This interagency 
partnership has been instrumental in communicating to key decision mak-
ers the potential consequences of pursuing expansive fi scal policies and 
has increased the stability of their programs. The introduction of various 
data collection systems (debt recording, accounting, and forecasting) in the 
Ministry of Finance has allowed better and timelier coordination between 
the two institutions, and provided clearer targets and an accountability 
mechanism. 
Navigating Disruptive Isomorphic Infl uences
Isomorphic infl uences are visible in the structure and systems of the ministry. 
In order to conform to international best practices and requirements from 
donors, the organization and processes of the ministry have been revised 
numerous times. Subsequent reforms have introduced new functions and 
transformed several departments into semiautonomous  agencies. Major 
landmarks in this process were the passage of the Government Budget 
Management Accountability Act (2004), the Procurement Act (2004), and 
the Revenue Authority Act of 2005. The Public Utilities Regulatory Agency 
(PURA) had been created in 2001. 
Most of the changes have been made to meet the triggers of various fund-
ing projects or in direct response to recommendations from the World Bank 
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or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As one senior  offi cial of the 
 ministry described it, “project performance is a key driver of the develop-
ment of the organization.” By adopting models that are widely considered 
good practice, the government has signaled its commitment to certain objec-
tives, such as improving debt management, increasing domestic revenue 
mobilization, and improving budgeting and reporting practices. However, 
at times, isomorphic pressures have proven often diffi cult to manage. The 
not always consistent nature of technical advice and assistance has been 
evidenced in the creation and dismantling of the Ministry of Planning and 
Industrial Policy within the same year in 2010.
In addition, isomorphic pressures emerge from the specialization or 
division of labor between donors. Systems and structures in some areas 
are comparable to those of other countries in the region where these devel-
opment partners have also provided technical assistance. For example, 
the Debt Management Unit has introduced the Commonwealth’s Debt 
Recording and Management System that is used in other English-speaking 
countries of the region. The defunct National Planning Commission, and 
later the Ministry Planning, had a structure similar to institutions supported 
by the African Development Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in other countries in the region. Similarly, the setup 
of the IFMIS, which was fi nanced by the World Bank, has incorporated 
lessons from the implementation of fi nancial systems in Tanzania and 
Rwanda, and the project counted with the same experts that assisted those 
countries.
However, the dissemination of ideas, through the training staff mem-
bers receive and the professional circles they belong to, has contributed 
to normative isomorphism. As a department head put it, “The Ministry 
is all about its people.” There is a relatively small pool of Gambians, 
living in the country, with the qualifi cations to undertake the technical 
tasks that most positions in the ministry require. The large majority of 
those individuals studied abroad, in either other English-speaking West 
African countries or the United Kingdom, and in many cases, they were 
classmates. In turn, only a small number of high schools have tradition-
ally provided students access to scholarships and opportunities to study 
abroad. Most professionals in the ministry attended one of these and 
many personal relationships and networks were forged during those early 
years. Furthermore, once recruited, staffers are sent to the same institu-
tions to receive further training, including in the IMF Institute and sum-
mer programs in universities in the United States, which have contributed 
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to reinforce certain professional norms and views on the role of a fi nance 
agency. Likewise, the consultants and experts that advise the ministry 
tend to bring with them practices and models from other developed and 
developing countries where they were trained or had a professional career. 
Internal Institutional Workings
Mirroring the changes in the sociopolitical context and external opera-
tional environment, MoFEA has gone through a cycle of institutional 
strengthening in the 1990s, deterioration of technical capacity and outfl ow 
of professionals during the early 2000s, and rebuilding since 2004–05. 
The more recent efforts to improve the institution’s internal workings have 
been made possible by the renewed interest and support from development 
partners and domestic constituents.
Although some of the building blocks for the establishment of more effi -
cient and transparent public fi nancial management were put in place in the 
late 1990s, it was only after the so-called Gambian crisis that the reform 
agenda gained momentum. Once the high-level commitment to improving 
the functioning of the institution and the necessary resources were secured, 
a rapid succession of changes followed. The main transformations related 
to attracting qualifi ed professionals to key units, rebuilding the capacity of 
the ministry to collect and analyze data, introducing information manage-
ment systems to support core functions, and improving support to and 
collaboration with line ministries and other public agencies.
Because the institution’s setup and systems were so dated, large gains in 
effi ciency were achieved in a span of fi ve years through the introduction of 
automated information systems, process reengineering, and the restructur-
ing of the most important areas, including treasury, budgeting, revenue 
administration, and debt management. In turn, these rapid and sizable 
gains helped reinforce the internal commitment to institutional develop-
ment and the real-time information that the new systems produced allowed 
the ministry to more effectively handle economic turbulence thus demon-
strating to its principals the value of maintaining such investments.
Prioritizing Public Financial Management and 
Circumscribing the Mandate
The reform effort departed from updating and confi ning the institu-
tion’s mandate to a set of specifi c macroeconomic and public fi nancial 
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management tasks through a new legal framework and strategic plan.3 
Furthermore, in 2010, MoFEA, along with nine other government agen-
cies, received support from the UNDP/Spanish Schematic Trust Fund to 
develop a strategic plan. 
The new mandate and strategic objectives provide a clear monitor-
ing framework against which to measure the organization’s perfor-
mance. At the same time, the mission and mandate, as currently defi ned, 
include elements of governance change that are beyond the control of 
the  institution. Although the leadership, senior management, and staff 
clearly articulate the mandate, they are conscious of the constraints that 
the institution faces in achieving this mission, especially regarding objec-
tives on accountability and fi scal discipline. Consequently, the focus 
has been placed on improving the effectiveness and effi ciency of public 
fi nance management and making marginal gains in the areas of transpar-
ency and accountability.
Restructuring and Insulation of Functions
Concomitantly, the institution underwent a major reorganization. The 
majority of changes aimed at insulating and protecting from political inter-
ference functions that were seen as critical to improving the mobilization 
of resources and the allocation of public resources. From 2001 to 2007, 
following the passage of various pieces of legislation, six semiautonomous 
agencies were created—including the Public Utilities Regulatory Agency, 
the Revenue Authority, the Public Procurement Authority, the Bureau 
of Statistics, and the Divesture Agency. The new revenue administra-
tion agency merged two previously independent tax collection agencies, 
the Department of Domestic Taxes and the Department of Customs and 
Excise. Yet, these agencies exhibit considerable variation in their capacity 
and effectiveness largely because of differences in their ability to mobilize 
own revenues and the amount of technical assistance they have received. 
Conversely, the previously independent Accountant General’s offi ce was 
transformed into the Directorate of Treasury, which now reports to the 
minister directly. 
Achieving Rapid Effi ciency Gains through Information Management 
Modernization
Some of the most important changes in the internal workings of the 
 ministry relate to improvements in its management practices (table 2.2). 
In particular, upgrading of information systems and streamlining budget 
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Table 2.2. Milestones of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
Year
Sociopolitical 
context
External operating 
environment
Internal institutional 
workings
1994 Jawara ousted in coup led by 
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh
1996 Vision 2020 adopteda
New constitution 
promulgated
Jammeh elected President
2000 Ban is lifted on the political 
parties
2001 Jammeh wins a second term Gambia Public Procurement 
Authority Act 
Public Utilities 
Regulatory Act
Public Utilities Regulatory 
Agency (PURA) began 
operating
2002 APRC wins parliamentary 
elections
Drought
2003 Economic Crisis PRSP I
Suspension of IMF Poverty 
Reduction and Growth 
Facility
Gambia Public Procurement 
Authority began 
operating
2004 Normalization of relations 
with donors and IFIs
Government Budget 
Management 
Accountability Act
Procurement Act
2005 Ministers and civil servants 
are dismissed and more 
than 30 senior offi cials 
are arrested over 
corruption allegations
Revenue Authority Act
Statistics Act
Central Bank Bill enacted to 
guarantee the operational 
independence of the 
Central Bank
2006 National elections IFMIS implementation 
began
The Gambia Bureau of 
Statistics replaced the 
former Central Statistics 
Department
The National Planning 
Commission is created
2007 PRSP II
Memorandum of 
Understanding with the 
Central Bank
HIPC process initiation
The Gambia Revenue 
Authority began operating
The Gambia Bureau of 
Statistics began operating
Debt Management 
department was created
Revenue Authority began 
operating
(continued next page)
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Table 2.2. Milestones of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (continued)
Year
Sociopolitical 
context
External operating 
environment
Internal institutional 
workings
2008 Food and Fuel Crisis Accountant General’s offi ce 
is transformed into 
the National Treasury 
Directorate
2009 International Financial Crisis
2010 Eight men, including 
a former army chief, are 
sentenced to death for 
their part in an alleged 
coup plot in 2009
Budget support 
negotiations start 
The National Planning 
Commission is 
transformed into the 
Ministry of Economic 
Planning and 
Industrial Development, 
which is later closed
Government-wide pay 
reform
The Department of State 
of Finance is transformed 
into MoFEA and merged 
with the planning 
Ministry
IFMIS rollout
2011 President Jammeh wins 
another term
Severe drought
European Union cancels 
planned budget support
2012 Ruling party wins 
parliamentarypolls 
boycotted by the 
opposition
PAGEb
European Union approves 
10 million euros in budget 
support
Note: IMF = International Monetary Fund; IFI = international fi nancial institution; HIPC = Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries; IFMIS = Integrated Financial Management Information System; PAGE = Programme for Accelerated 
Growth and Employment; PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
a. A long-term development framework for economic development.
b. Based on Vision 2020 and various past strategies and the government’s long-term vision.
process have been highlighted by staff and clients as one of the most impor-
tant building blocks of the gains in performance observed since 2005–06. 
Notably, the introduction of an IFMIS has led to improvements across the 
board in the capacity of the ministry and in particular of the Directorate 
of Treasury (see box 2.1). As well, the project has provided for training 
and deployed specialists in all major public agencies and line ministries. 
As expected, the implementation of IFMIS has implied improvements in 
information communications technology services and signifi cant gains in 
the effi ciency of the ministry’s work. It has also meant that ad hoc systems 
have been unifi ed, and there is now a sizeable group of staff with profi -
ciency in the system. Before 2008, for example, there was one individual 
who had the capability to use the payroll utility in the entire government, 
and many other transactions were still done manually. Simultaneously, 
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special skill and IFMIS allowances have been used to motivate employees 
to use the system and attract a new cohort of professionals.
Through the various reorganizations and process updates, the structur-
ing of individual tasks has become clearer and more specifi c overtime. In 
addition, a number of measures have been taken to improve internal com-
munication. There are regular staff meetings, newsletters, and some of the 
agencies have an intranet that makes collaboration easier. The ministry 
has appointed focal points for each of the semiautonomous agencies that 
represent the institution in each of the respective boards.
BOX 2.1
The IFMIS Project
The Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) Project, which 
became effective in August 2010, builds on the initial introduction of the Integrated 
Financial Management System in The Gambia under the preceding Capacity Building for 
Economic Management Project (CBEMP), which closed in December 2008. The Gambia’s 
IFMIS is an enterprise resource planning software application that bundles budget 
preparation, budget execution, accounting, payroll, fi nancial management, and report-
ing activities. In the fi rst phase of the establishment of the application in The Gambia 
(supported through CBEMP), the setup of the system was accompanied by organiza-
tional  restructuring, reengineering of operational procedures, and extensive training of 
staff. The system is now processing all central government transactions and producing 
the annual accounts and monthly fi scal reports in a timely manner. IFMIS has helped 
reduce the substantial backlog of annual audits dating back to the early 1990s. With 
the improved reporting and better documentation provided by the system, IFMIS is 
expected to facilitate the more timely preparation of future audits.
In the second phase, IFMIS has been rolled out to 39 additional government minis-
tries and agencies and is expected to be rolled out to the Central Bank later this year, 
which will enable sector resources to be managed better thanks to access to real-time 
information on the status of their budgets. The project also aims at ensuring that the 
government will be able to operate and maintain IFMIS in the future without external 
support, in order to sustain beyond the duration of the project the gains that have arisen 
from the establishment of the system.
Source: World Bank 2010c.
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Staffi ng Key Units and Dealing with Pay Challenges
In recent years, the institution has actively taken steps to attract quali-
fi ed individuals for middle and senior management positions from other 
institutions, such as the Central Bank, and former employees, Gambians 
that have pursued higher education abroad, and the private sector. These 
efforts have encompassed the management and technical positions of proj-
ects that now are almost exclusively staffed by nationals. MoFEA, as part 
of a broader public service reform, has increased salaries and stipends, 
introduced special skills allowances and incentives for participating in 
regular trainings, and provided opportunities for continuing education in 
The Gambia and abroad.4 Access to on-the-job learning, training, and net-
working opportunities were consistently cited by the interviewed staff as 
the main features that attract professionals to the ministry. 
Senior positions, such as the director of aid coordination and the direc-
tor of budget, were fi lled with professionals recruited from the private sec-
tor and the Central Bank to improve the profi les of these offi ces. There 
is an emphasis on learning and increasing the speed of the response to 
external economic shocks and improving the effi ciency of debt and cash 
management. Technical assistants and external consultants are routinely 
paired with civil servants to facilitate knowledge transfer. Unlike most frag-
ile and confl ict-affected countries, the number of externally funded techni-
cal assistants is relatively low, and emphasis has been placed on improving 
the training and remuneration of civil servants. 
Nonetheless, relatively uncompetitive salaries remain a hindrance for 
retaining personnel in the long term. Institutional autonomy in person-
nel management and pay scales has empowered semiautonomous agen-
cies to attract qualifi ed personnel at all levels and, thereby, enhanced their 
performance. In some cases, the agencies have brought in staff from the 
core directorates to the detriment of the ministry’s capacity. Performance 
appraisal has been introduced and used to promote individuals, but the 
general lack of stability in public employment undermines the benefi ts.
The ministry is governed by the civil service pay scale and has relatively 
little room to compete with the private sector, semiautonomous govern-
ment agencies, and donor-funded project management units. In this con-
text, externally funded workshops and travel are highly valued for their 
per diems, as well as long-term training abroad. Fuel and cars, access to 
laptops, as well as food items, housing, and responsibility allowances 
have been widely used to compensate staff. Allowances are on average 
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38 percent of the total compensation that public employees received (World 
Bank 2010b). The downside of this approach has been that employees and 
managers are regularly taken away from their jobs, affecting the imple-
mentation of programs and the performance of the departments.
Coping with Leadership Turnover
Being at the center of economic and political turbulence, MoFEA has expe-
rienced frequent changes in its top leadership, ministers, and permanent 
secretaries, much like most institutions in The Gambia. Removals and 
cabinet reshuffl es have been a frequent occurrence since 1994. Since then, 
there have been 11 ministers,5 three of which were appointed during suc-
cessive reshuffl es in 2010. The result is often a loss of institutional memory 
and delays in implementation, as new ministers need to become aware of 
the policy issues and programs. 
Ministers are acutely aware that their position is of a short-term nature. 
This has inspired some of them to try to make the most of their time. 
A  former senior civil servant compared it to a track race, stating
It looks like a relay in a track race which may not take long because 
the runners are very fast, and yet those runners become so motivated 
to make the best of this short time by making sure that each runs their 
distances the fastest they can, that the race is won even before spectators 
are able to identify them; but knowing that afterwards they will become 
the hot topics of discussions and admiration by the same spectators until 
another similar race is run.… Each race won moves the team much closer 
to the goal and this is the way, in which each incremental effectiveness 
and e ffi ciency in the MoFEA leans to every Minister and/or Permanent 
Secretary that served it even if for just a day.
The pervasiveness change at the top, however, discourages interactions 
with the technical staff. A former civil servant stated: “We live with it. We 
look in the newspaper every morning to read who has been fi red….so the 
lesson is ‘Don’t deal with PS and Ministers’—they will leave!”
The leadership positions of various government agencies, especially 
the more specialized ones, such as Trade and Finance, commonly rotate 
among a relatively small number of individuals, given the constraints in 
skills in the country. The level of technical competency of ministers and 
permanent secretaries has been for the most part generally high. In fact, the 
large majority of senior and middle managers started their careers at the 
ministry as cadet economists or budget offi cers and benefi ted from access 
to long- and short-term training and on-the-job learning. The Economic 
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Management and Planning Unit is where most of the senior civil servants 
(including the minister, the permanent secretary, and the deputy permanent 
secretary) began their careers. Many left the institutions temporarily and 
later returned to more senior positions; others rose through the institu-
tion’s ranks. The Ministry of Trade, sometimes referred to as “the other 
half of the Ministry of Finance,” has overlapping interests with MoFEA, 
for example on the development of local industries and attracting foreign 
investment. The mobility of staff at all levels is unsurprisingly high between 
the two institutions. 
But, despite the excessively high turnover of political heads, the stability 
in the technical and administrative management has been greater and, to 
some extent, this has mitigated the negative consequences of the continu-
ous turnover in the leadership. The experience of the Central Bank is simi-
lar in that mobility among young economists should be expected—likewise 
at the top—but it is important to maintain staff at the director level. In 
general terms, the more specialized the unit and the more specifi c the skills, 
the greater the stability in their management and the efforts to retain per-
sonnel has been. Examples of this are the Budget Unit and the Treasury, 
which have typically enjoyed greater stability than their counterparts in aid 
coordination and debt management. 
In addition, individuals who belong to the ministry, as well as those 
who at some point of their career were staff members,6 strongly identify 
with the institution and its professional norms. The esprit de corps is 
visible. Nonetheless, uncertainty over job security and the general politi-
cal context have taken a toll on the internal culture and motivation of 
individuals.
Rebuilding Relationships with Clients
The ministry has not had a strong tradition of consulting clients, although 
it has sporadically held consultations with clients, for example, when it 
developed its current strategy or through the IFMIS project. Nonetheless, 
more recently, the institution has taken additional steps to improve its out-
reach to various stakeholders, including the National Assembly and non-
state actors. The ministry is recognized as vital for the operation of sector 
ministries, but its interactions with line ministries is mainly associated with 
the budgetary process. 
Clients recognize the limitations of the Gambian economy and that the 
ministry has to respond to challenging circumstances on the ground and 
make diffi cult choices when allocating resources. At the same time, there is 
64 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
an understanding that some of these decisions are not necessarily made by 
the ministry but respond to political preferences. The space of the ministry 
to navigate between these choices is perceived to be limited. Frustration 
with the damaging effects that governance problems have on national 
growth is at times directly coined on behalf of the MoFEA, as in the words 
of a former offi cial:
On the one side you have [economic growth] and might conclude that the 
President is doing well. At the same time they (MoFEA) experience that 
when two journalists are thrown in prison then the country loses 2% of 
the GDP.
The ministry is seen as benefi tting from its direct contact with donors 
and the international fi nancial community. This contact is perceived as cre-
ating opportunities that the offi cials of other agencies do not necessarily 
have. Travels abroad to headquarters of international organizations or to 
countries for diplomatic or business-related exchanges carry several mon-
etary and nonmonetary connotations. 
MoFEA is recognized by the main stakeholders to have improved 
several fundamental structures in recent years, but the improvements 
started at a low level with the implication that the ministry still has a 
long way to go. It is widely acknowledged that budget processes have 
improved over the past two or three years. The bilateral budget negotia-
tions are now well prepared, and the ministry provides line ministries 
with updated information on budget fl ows and is requesting perfor-
mance targets. 
However, the actual allocation of the budget provided to line ministries 
is perceived to be a top-down decision and sector ministries have to accept 
the suggested budget. As one senior staff summarized: “We receive what 
we are told is available.” Whereas the allocated budget is transferred in a 
timely manner throughout the year, the tranches are consistently smaller 
than anticipated (about 70 percent). The ministry is generally not per-
ceived to be responsible for the latter, and it is generally stated that “they 
allocate what they have.” With the rollout of IFMIS and the improvements 
in the budget process, there have been some spillover effects. One manager 
clarifi ed: 
IFMIS is very helpful in general, but also during negotiations [with 
MoFEA] because it helps us to see how effectively we are using our funds. 
If we have not utilized them, the Ministry will identify it and ask us why 
we have not used the allocations. The introduction of IFMIS really has 
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helped the MoFEA to be more effi cient. They are also more open to us 
now … access to information is key to me—previously it was diffi cult to 
track payments.
The budgetary procedures have improved and the communications sur-
rounding them are more professionalized; however, it is the nonbudgetary 
interactions that are described as scarce in scope. A general comment is 
that there is limited outreach to clients to be consulted on macroeconomic 
discussions related to their sector. Some clients also pointed out that min-
istries or agencies that generate revenues or have other sources of fund-
ing are in a better position to negotiate with MoFEA. The clients who 
depend solely on domestic funding report facing more diffi culties in getting 
attention from the ministry on their work program and having discussions 
about how it links to other sectors. 
External clients expressed few opinions or insights on the internal work-
ings of the institution. This may have been because they were reluctant to 
share information with the team, but it may also refl ect a limited commu-
nication and visibility strategy beyond the interactions related to budget 
preparations, allocations, and activities related to IFMIS. An exception 
was on the side of the Central Bank, which more closely interacts with 
several of MoFEA’s departments. Several department heads in that institu-
tion pointed out the progress achieved on various fronts, while recognizing 
the areas in which more work needs to be done. The general dissemination 
of fi scal and monetary information to citizens from MoFEA is limited. 
MoFEA supports a website with features, but more direct methods of com-
munication are rarely used.
Challenges
MoFEA has made important strides to improve its functioning, promote 
economic growth, and sustain gains despite the challenging political and 
economic context. Nonetheless, there are still signifi cant risks related to the 
high domestic indebtedness and concerns about extra-budgetary spend-
ing. This trend has raised concerns among external observers and domestic 
stakeholders because it is setting the country on a nonsustainable path that 
could undermine the gains made on other fronts.
In 2009–10, the country resorted to treasury bills to fi nance its cur-
rent expenditure, although by 2011, domestic borrowing had been curbed. 
That year, net borrowing was only slightly above the budget and strict cash 
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budgeting was used to limit spending, although it was an election year. 
While poverty-reducing programs in education, health, and agriculture 
have continued to be funded, the level of spending is still relatively low, 
and considerable resources go to fi nance fuel subsidies and extra-budgetary 
expenditures. The other important challenge is expanding the revenue base. 
There are additional concerns about the sustainability of the IFMIS pro-
gram and the long-term ability of MoFEA to retain technical staff. The still 
frequent political infl uence in internal decisions and the high turnover of 
senior offi cials are some other challenges that are unlikely to be resolved 
without broader change.
The combination of the elevated economic vulnerability to external 
shocks and the high turnover of leadership highlights the need for a 
new paradigm of capacity building for MoFEA. Specifi cally, the govern-
ment and its development partners should move from a narrow focus 
on organizational, technocratic, and public management approaches 
to a broader perspective that incorporates the political dynamics and 
the institutional rules of the game within which public organizations 
operate.
Conclusions
The case of The Gambia’s MoFEA underscores that even in restricted 
political environments, internal constituencies can play a signifi cant role 
in economic growth and stability and lead to marginal gains in areas such 
as transparency and effi ciency of public spending. Moderation that comes 
from trade openness and aid dependence can be used to further promote 
policy reform.
The experience of MoFEA illustrates the importance of pursuing 
reforms in a comprehensive manner and the synergy of supporting concur-
rently the central fi nance agency and the Central Bank. In addition, other 
capable institutions in the country can not only advocate for change but 
also provide resources.
The case of MoFEA is one in which drivers of change have predomi-
nantly emerged from the external operational environment. The size of the 
economy, scarce natural resources, and the consequent long-term depen-
dence on external assistance have all given development partners strong 
leverage to press for institutional reform. An environment of increasing 
donor coordination and more consistent engagement has created conducive 
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conditions for dialogue. Nevertheless, external dependence has also led to 
sometimes contradictory changes and imposed taxing reporting require-
ments on the institution. In addition, there are domestic constituents for 
economic and price stability, in particular in the tourism and banking sec-
tors, that are important sources of foreign exchange. 
The 2002–03 crisis put macroeconomic management at the top of the 
political agenda, motivated learning, increased attention to middle man-
agement, and brought recognition that technical skills are critical. The 
successful reform of the Central Bank also provided an example of how 
effective institution building could be achieved. The positive handling of 
more recent fi nancial turbulence has reinforced the commitment by devel-
opment partners. 
Since 2005, a relative reduction in political interference in the function-
ing of the institution has allowed for the return of many civil servants that 
were rotated into other positions or that left to work in other sectors. The 
greater attention paid to the staffi ng of middle management positions and 
the training of technical staff has had positive impacts in the performance 
of the organization. The introduction of new systems and technology has 
increased the effi ciency of internal processes and allowed for a much more 
rapid response to external changes. Throughout this process, a core group 
of technical staff and individuals that remained or returned to the institu-
tion have been important in conserving the institutional memory and help-
ing the institution navigate a turbulent political and economic environment.
PEFA Complete Indicator Set
A. PFM OUT-TURNS: Credibility of the budget Score
PI-1 Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared with original approved budget B
PI-2 Composition of expenditure out-turn compared with original approved budget C
PI-3 Aggregate revenue out-turn compared with original approved budget B
PI-4 Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears NS
B. KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: Comprehensiveness and transparency  Score
PI-5 Classifi cation of the budget B
PI-6 Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation B
PI-7 Extent of unreported government operations D+
PI-8 Transparency of intergovernmental fi scal relations D
PI-9 Oversight of aggregate fi scal risk from other public sector entities D+
PI-10 Public access to key fi scal information D
(continued next page)
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Notes
 1. The downward trajectory in the competence of the civil services had started 
in the mid-1970s and was driven by the overexpansion of the staff, patronage 
hiring, corruption, informality, and the drain of professional and technical 
skills (World Bank 2010a). Nonetheless, serious defi ciencies are still unad-
dressed, including the politicization of the civil service, low pay, and the dis-
ruptive nature of senior and middle management rotation.
 2. These agencies have powers of self-government within a larger organization or 
structure.
 3. The Government Budget and Management Act of 2004 established that 
the ministry’s mandate would include (a) developing the government’s 
(continued)
C. BUDGET CYCLE Score
C(i) Policy-Based Budgeting 
PI-11 Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process B
PI-12 Multiyear perspective in fi scal planning, expenditure policy, and budgeting D+
C(ii) Predictability and Control in Budget Execution 
PI-13 Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities C
PI-14 Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment C
PI-15 Effectiveness in collection of tax payments NS
PI-16 Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures C
PI-17 Recording and management of cash balances, debt, and guarantees B
PI-18 Effectiveness of payroll controls C+
PI-19 Competition, value for money, and controls in procurement NS
PI-20 Effectiveness of internal controls for nonsalary expenditure C+
PI-21 Effectiveness of internal audit D
C(iii) Accounting, Recording, and Reporting 
PI-22 Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation C
PI-23 Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units D
PI-24 Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports B+
PI-25 Quality and timeliness of annual fi nancial statements D+
C(iv) External Scrutiny and Audit 
PI-26 Scope, nature, and follow-up of external audit D+
PI-27 Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law C+
PI-28 Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports D+
D. DONOR PRACTICES Score
D-1 Predictability of Direct Budget Support NS
D-2 Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on 
project and program aid 
NS
D-3 Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures NS
Source: CFAA Report, World Bank (2009).
Note: NS = not scored. CFAA = Country Financial Accountability Assessment.
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macrofi scal policy and the medium-term revenue and expenditure frame-
work for budget preparation; (b) managing the budget preparation process; 
(c)  coordinating the management of external grants and loans; (d) carrying 
out budget execution and internal auditing, cash management and current-
year fi nancial planning, management of government banking arrangements, 
management of  government accounting and reporting, and management of 
public debt; (e)  promoting fi scal transparency and effective management in 
respect of revenues, expenditures, and assets and liabilities of the  government; 
(f) exercising control over the implementation of the government budget, 
including any adjustments to the current-year budget; (g)  publishing, where 
appropriate, the progress of budget execution; (h) inspecting the fi nancial 
operations and proper management of budget agencies; and (i)  preparing 
and submitting annual statements of government accounts to the Auditor 
General and publishing them for the interest of the general public.
 4. The institution has a bonding system in place to ensure that individuals return 
and apply their skills.
 5. Secretaries of State Darboe, Jahumpa, Mendy, Jatta, Colley, Foon, and Gaye 
and Ministers Keita, Ngum, and Njie.
 6. Many of the leadership or senior management positions in other ministries, 
civil society organizations, and local teams of development partners are occu-
pied by former employees of the ministry.
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Despite facing formidable political, economic, and capacity challenges, 
The Gambia has recorded sizable advances in the education sector 
in a relatively short time frame. Since 2000, enrollment has more than 
doubled in secondary schools, while the number of students enrolled 
in basic  education has increased by 40 percent, with notable growth in 
the  madrassas schools. Gender equality and completion rates in basic 
education have continued to improve across the board and surpass the 
regional averages. Simultaneously, the number of teachers formally trained 
and the number of students enrolled in the Teachers’ College has grown 
 considerably since 2005. 
These gains are directly linked to the scaled-up investment in the  sector, 
which has translated into a greater number of schools, larger number of 
qualifi ed teachers and monitors, and the introduction of innovative pro-
grams catering to hard-to-reach groups. In turn, these achievements have 
been made possible by the organizational and management changes intro-
duced by the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) and 
its ability to remain focused on a small set of goals, report results, and 
mobilize domestic and external support to realize them, while generating 
and renewing its leadership cadre. To achieve this, the institution has had 
to navigate and solve numerous challenges in its internal organization and 
in the governance environment.
The Gambia Case Study: Ministry of Basic 
and Secondary Education
Helle M. Alvesson and Lorena Viñuela
C H A P T E R  3
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MoBSE has benefi tted from signifi cant and increasing technical and 
fi nancial assistance for more than two decades. In parallel, the share 
of the national budget allocated to the sector has increased over time. 
Initiatives such as Education for All and the Millennium Development 
Goals created a favorable environment for prioritizing universal access to 
basic education. The institution’s leadership has played an important role 
in advocating for the sector, moving education to a higher position in the 
political agenda, and building internal and external coalitions to support 
MoBSE’s goals. In doing so, the minister has shielded the institution from 
frequent senior management turnover and created a more stable operating 
environment, which is rare in the Gambian context. 
Continuity of senior management and middle management has allowed 
the institution to lock in capacity gains made through various assistance 
and training programs. Notably, a core group of staff that were trained and 
mentored in the Policy, Planning, and Budgeting Unit in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s has been instrumental in realizing a wide-ranging reform 
program over two decades, with three ministers and two permanent secre-
taries coming from this unit. Staff stability has enabled skill development 
and the establishment of a culture of organizational learning. In addition, 
the longer tenure of senior and middle managers has contributed to bet-
ter implementation of reform programs and allowed for greater account-
ability. At the same time, the use of monitoring tools and development 
of analytical skills for self- evaluation have been critical. The introduction 
of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) database, the 
Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA), and other assessment tools has 
allowed MoBSE to not only measure outcomes but also to plan more effec-
tively and allocate resources.
Internally, MoBSE has crafted its internal communication to reinforce 
organizational goals and strategies. Changes in structure and communica-
tion strategies have been carefully coordinated to impact organizational 
culture. In parallel, organizational success and the external recognition 
that it has generated have contributed signifi cantly to the prevalent culture 
and narratives of the ministry and staff about the organization’s evolution. 
Recently, the ministry introduced a sophisticated performance manage-
ment system.
The institution stands out in the Gambian context because of its level 
of openness and accessibility to stakeholders and clients. Some notable 
examples of how the ministry interacts with its stakeholders include hold-
ing bimonthly visits from senior management to districts, a community 
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scorecard on education outcomes, and an integrated school management 
system. As part of this system, parent-teacher associations and mother cir-
cles comprise part of school managing boards and oversee the fi nances and 
the implementation of the curricula. Moreover, MoBSE has  collaborated 
closely with religious and community organizations in tailoring basic edu-
cation curricula, introducing Arabic and local languages, and using the 
madrassa system to include its system hard-to-reach groups. The organiza-
tion has relied on local community leaders and women’s groups to identify 
children, especially girls, not enrolled in the system.
To fully appreciate the progress made in the education sector, it is 
important to consider the backdrop against which the ministry operates. 
Although it is a small country, with 1.7 million inhabitants, The Gambia 
is a diverse society in terms of ethnic, linguistic, and religious affi liations. 
This introduces special challenges related to reaching and catering to the 
preferences of distinct groups. With few natural resources and relatively 
low agricultural productivity, poverty is endemic and two-thirds of the 
population lives under the poverty line. 
Poverty continues to be the main constraint preventing children from 
attending school. However, there are other obstacles, including the direct 
and indirect costs of education, the relatively low perceived relevance of 
education, fear of erosion of traditional values—and for girls more specifi -
cally, early marriage and pregnancy.1 Over half of the adult population has 
no formal education, illustrating the long-standing biases in access to pub-
lic services that until recently negatively affected rural and female children. 
For most of the country’s history, access to and quality of education have 
been uneven across its territory and across genders. 
Institutional Success
The dire initial conditions of enrollment levels, gender inequality, and low 
completion rates have gradually improved over the past two decades, and 
today, the sector is recognized as having turned into a well-performing sector.
Results
The results that categorize MoBSE as a success are related to access, 
equity, and teacher training.2 The Gambia is among the most advanced 
countries in the region in terms of enrollment and completion rates at all 
levels. School enrollment has risen signifi cantly, particularly among girls. 
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Figure 3.1. Enrollment in Lower Basic Education, 2000–09
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Source: World Bank (2011).
Figure 3.2. Enrollment in Upper Basic Education, 2000–09
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Source: World Bank (2011).
Between 2000 and 2009, enrollment increased 25 percent in lower basic 
education, 85 percent in upper basic education, and 20 percent at the sec-
ondary school level (see fi gures 3.1 to 3.4). Toward a goal of 90 percent 
enrollment, upward of 75 percent of all school-age children (7–15 years old) 
are currently enrolled in basic and secondary school (World Bank 2011). 
Concerted efforts to increase access to education in the interior of 
the country have resulted in enrollment gains in all regions. The gross 
enrollment ratio in basic education levels is greater than 60  percent 
in 30 of 37 districts, and greater than 80 percent in 20 districts 
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Figure 3.3. Enrollment in Secondary School, 2004–09
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Source: World Bank (2011).
Figure 3.4. Enrollment in Higher Education, 2004–09
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(see map 3.1). Moreover, thanks to substantial investments in infra-
structure and teacher training, only 6 percent of students are attending 
 incomplete schools, or schools that do not offer all grades (compared 
with 21  percent in Chad and 38 percent in Guinea) (World Bank 2011). 
The Gambia has the second highest completion rate in the region for 
basic and secondary education. School expectancy, or the number of 
years of education that a Gambian child would receive, is 7.8 on aver-
age. This fi gure is higher than the average 6.9 years for other countries 
in the region at a comparable gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
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(World Bank 2011) (see fi gure 3.5). Female completion rates have grown 
as well, from 34 percent to 71 percent (see fi gure 3.6). In this category, 
The Gambia surpasses other countries in the region by more than 10 
percentage points.
The Gambia has made important strides in increasing gender equality in 
basic education and secondary education. In a decade, the country went from 
73 percent of girls to boys to equal numbers by 2010, and from being below 
the regional average to surpassing it by 10 percentage points (see  fi gure 3.7). 
The percentage of girls graduating from basic education and progressing to 
secondary school is going up, but at a slower pace  (fi gure 3.8). Nevertheless, 
the improvement is extensive when the current 82 percent rate is compared 
with the 38 percent in 1992.
Figure 3.5. Primary School Completion Rate, Total, 1992–2010
Source: World Bank (2011).
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Source: MoBSE (2011).
THE GAMBIA CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF BASIC AND SECONDARY EDUCATION • 77
 Figure 3.6. Primary School Completion Rate, Female, 1992–2010
Source: World Bank (2011).
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Figure 3.7. Ratio of Girls to Boys in Primary and Secondary Education, 
2000 and 2010 
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Another dimension in which the ministry has introduced important 
innovations is in the integration of Koranic schools. The Gambian 
school system permits the establishment of private and religious schools 
in addition to public schools. During the past fi ve years, the ministry 
has intensifi ed its collaboration with religious schools, in particular the 
Koranic madrassas as well as the preschool daras. The main goal is 
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to increase the enrollment rate of hard-to-reach children through this 
collaboration.
Although efforts to include and cater to the Muslim population are 
not new—for example, Koranic classes have been offered in conventional 
schools since the 1970s—in recent years, the ministry has radically revised 
its approach to working with Islamic schools. MoBSE has developed 
Islamic and Arabic trainings and special tracks for teachers through The 
Gambia College and translated text books and other materials into that 
language. Madrassas now have the option to adopt a special curriculum 
that is aligned with the offi cial one, but in which subjects are taught in 
Arabic. A harmonized curriculum allows students to transition more eas-
ily into upper basic and secondary schools once they graduate without 
having to repeat grades in the conventional system. The ministry also pro-
vides madrassas with English teachers and other resources, such as text 
books, furniture, and the construction of additional classrooms and other 
civil works. The madrassas that collaborate with the ministry are super-
vised by the respective regional directorates and the Secretariat for Arabic 
Education. Recently, the School Management Manual has been translated 
into Arabic. But the institutionalization of madrassas at a larger scale is 
only starting to emerge. Not all school supervisors, or cluster monitors, 
are fl uent in Arabic and, therefore, there are limitations in their super-
vision. To address this shortcoming, there is an initiative to introduce 
focal persons for madrassas in each region and thus far two have been 
appointed.
Figure 3.8. Progression to Secondary School, Female, 2000–10 
Source: World Bank (2011).
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Legitimacy 
The ministry enjoys increasing legitimacy among the majority of its cli-
ents and stakeholders. As the improved enrollment numbers demonstrate, 
the mobilization and sensitization of students have been successful. The 
ministry is largely attributed with this impact, although nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) Mothers’ Clubs, and the World Food Programme (WFP) School 
Feeding Program, are other sources of infl uence. One parent in a focus 
group expresses the importance ascribed to education this way: 
Although we [most parents] have not gone to school; we have seen the 
benefi t of education either through our children or from other people. As 
such, we will continue to make every effort to ensure that we promote 
education in our community.
Despite the fact that gains in access have not been accompanied with 
equal progress in terms of quality, the majority of citizens are satisfi ed with 
the quality of education and the construction of schools in their communi-
ties. In the most recent household survey, only 13.4 percent of household 
heads responded that the quality of education was poor (see fi gure 3.9). 
Nevertheless, the results of the citizen scorecards suggest that there may 
be considerable differences in perceptions between rural and urban loca-
tions (fi gure 3.10). In 2005, the government conducted a pilot on com-
munity score cards as part of a process to improve accountability and 
participatory monitoring and evaluation. The pilot involved 59 public 
 Figure 3.9. Perceptions of Household Heads on the Quality of Public Education, 2007
Source: Gambia Bureau of Statistics 2007. 
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schools and 15 health services. The pilot indicated large differences in the 
overall performance of schools across the six regions. The approval rat-
ing for teachers was more than 70 percent for all regions, except Kanifi g, 
which is the largest urban area in the country. The results from this exercise 
suggest that satisfaction with school facilities and textbooks is much lower 
and varied across regions.
Yet in the context of the focus group consultations, many participants 
expressed that they had better quality teachers in the new classrooms. 
Schools seem to have lowered learning outcomes as access has expanded, 
in particular after grade 6. There is some recognition that the ministry is 
aware of the quality gap, in particular in regions 1 and 2 where principals 
and cluster monitors appear most informed about the ongoing discussions 
in the ministry. A principal of a school participating in a focus group dis-
cussion in an urban area highlighted: 
Thank God that there is a very good team in the Ministry and they have 
realized and accepted that quality is dropping and they are also doing 
something about it. An example is the introduction of EGRA. By the time 
those in grade 1, 2 and 3 get to grade 6, they would be able to write any 
letter and also be able to read well. Quality will come back to the level 
it was. However, I am worried as to whether it is going to be sustained.
In the regions outside the capital area, the information fl ow to the prin-
cipals and the schools did not appear as dense and concern about quality 
was linked instead to deteriorating discipline and motivation of students, 
 Figure 3.10. Satisfaction with Primary Education Services in the Six Regions 
Source: MoBSE 2011.
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which the ongoing reforms were not perceived to address. For schools that 
still have unmet need for classrooms or auditoriums, more infrastructure 
investment is a priority. The ministry has created high expectations for 
the capacity to deliver classrooms. However, the general picture is that 
many communities have received a school or an additional classroom and 
that teacher absenteeism has decreased. This earns the ministry signifi cant 
legitimacy in these areas. 
MoBSE has for more than a decade demonstrated to development part-
ners its ability to plan strategically, disburse funding, and achieve the main 
results agreed in relation to improving access to education in primary and 
basic schools. The perceived effectiveness related to output is strong and 
stable. With the support of the donor community, about fi ve years ago, the 
ministry initiated a major effort to improve the performance of  teachers 
so as to achieve better learning outcomes. In this process, the institution 
and its senior management have acted with openness in identifying and 
acknowledging the poor level of content knowledge of teachers. This 
honesty and self-examining attitude has been commended by the largest 
donors. The critique of the delay in systematically approaching the com-
plex area of improving quality of education derives mostly from nongov-
ernmental stakeholders and clients. 
Trained teachers with classroom experience make for a large proportion 
of the management in the ministry. This is a highly respected platform for 
policy makers in the ministry and, in particular, is recognized by nongov-
ernmental stakeholders and local agencies. The homogeneity in the career 
path is shared, in fact, by stakeholders and, apart from being a strong 
identifying marker, it is perceived as making collaboration more directed 
at solving well-known problems in the sector. 
In procedural terms, the ministry earns substantial legitimacy from all 
partners involved in this study. The ministry has actively consulted with 
communities on how to solve problems and reach more children. One 
development partner explains:
So they took some of those suggestions from the communities for the 
development of the new program. It could be something as basic as, okay 
the young kids they have to walk a long way to go to the schools, what 
do we do with those kids? So we should show that they actually attend 
school. So they had something very simple, but you might not think 
about this having the donkey with the carriage. So now they go with the 
donkey on the carriage. And the fact that we now need to procure those 
donkeys is very unique.
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The regular visits of the Coordinating Committee Meetings (CCMs) 
appear also to have ascribed more authority from local leaders. Ward 
councilors or governors are reported to join CCM when it passes their 
region and the initial fear has largely been replaced with appreciation. 
Misuse of CCM to report on teachers or particular schools is still a  concern 
among principals, and the fact that the leadership still reminds partici-
pants about the focus of improving performance and not blaming each 
other are indications of the big normative changes the ministry is trying to 
achieve. However, the conclusion about CCM is that it is respected for its 
fi ne adjustment to the regional and local contexts and its applicability for 
schools and regional cluster monitors. 
CCM is powerful because it includes not only people from the ministry, 
but all stakeholders, including donors. Current or future donors are thus 
potential observers during the school inspections, and it is within the man-
date of the permanent secretary to close down a school if it does not live 
up to the requirements. The visibility of the leadership in the CCMs makes 
these points clear to schools, which in turn helps the supervisors in their 
daily work.
During the past four years, the president has publicly expressed his 
support to the ministry. He has encouraged other sectors to learn from 
MoBSE, for example, from its performance management system and focus 
on strategic planning. 
Durability
MoBSE has sustained its performance during more than a decade. There 
are several elements in this resilience. The Senior Management Team 
(SMT) comprises a group of fi ve or six persons with extensive experience 
in education reform who have worked together more than 10 years. There 
is a strong sense of purpose in the group to improve the sector, good train-
ing, and a diversity of operational experiences. There is peer pressure to 
perform at the same time as social and informal interaction is intertwined 
with delivering results. The shared values of leading the country out of 
poverty with professionalism through education and of empowering girls 
have contributed to building a strong SMT. 
The ministry has resorted to two main learning sources, quantitative 
data through EMIS and fi eld observations through CCM. The ministry 
has institutionalized CCM as an accountability measure that provides 
the opportunity for regional and national clients and stakeholders to par-
ticipate in the ongoing supervision of the ministry. CCM provides SMT, 
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including the minister, regional visibility and learning opportunities to 
strengthen the links between policy and practice. The EMIS was intro-
duced in the late 1990s, and the ministry currently uses the data to make 
decisions and explore alternatives to improve quality. There has been a 
high focus on data related to access, while indicators of retention and qual-
ity have received less attention. Data related to access have fed back into 
the formulation of the policy for a number of years, while is it only recently 
that the content knowledge of teachers and the reading skills of students 
have begun to be systematically monitored.
Solutions for Governance Challenges
Since the 1970s, the ministry has benefi tted from substantial external 
fi nancial and technical support, which has contributed to strengthening 
its capacity and coverage. In addition, the ministry has been spared from 
senior and middle management rotations and has retained qualifi ed staff at 
the same time as new professional staff has been recruited. The snapshot of 
the evolution of the sector in the following section will highlight long-term 
and strategic investments in the education sector. 
The role of education as a driver out of poverty and out of dependence 
on the former British colonial power was emphasized after independence 
in 1965. Previously, access to education was restricted to the capital area of 
Banjul and left children in the rural areas with limited opportunities. The 
estimated enrollment rates in primary schools were less than 20 percent in 
the late 1960s (World Bank 1969). 
The country embarked on a long-term sensitization program to engage 
the population in the benefi ts of schooling for young children, and by 
1974 the enrollment rate had increased to approximately 24  percent 
(World Bank 1975). The British Overseas Development Ministry pro-
vided fi nancial support to the education sector, and a few other interna-
tional donors considered investing in the education sector in the early 
1970s. In a working plan covering 1976–86, the government’s policy 
objectives for education included improving the quality of education, 
particularly at the primary and secondary levels, improving access for the 
rural population, and aligning education and training with employment 
needs (World Bank 1978). 
During the late 1970s, the government received fi nancial support 
through newly initiated education projects—among them the fi rst 
84 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
World Bank–fi nanced project (World Bank 1978). The objective of the 
fi rst US$6.5 million investment was to alleviate the shortage of managerial 
skills through building learning institutes and centers, upgrading secondary 
education, and improving educational planning and administration. One 
of the conditions for obtaining the credit was to set up a planning unit. 
The fi rst task of the unit was to draw a school map and a detailed plan for 
expanding primary education in rural areas. Other major donors initiat-
ing their support in the 1970s included the African Development Bank, 
the Islamic Development Fund, the European Economic Community, and 
the Overseas Development Ministry (United Kingdom). The latter pro-
vided technical assistance through teacher trainings and curriculum devel-
opment. NGOs were still few, but the United Kingdom–based Voluntary 
Service Overseas Program was also established early on and provided low-
cost technical assistance to the education sector.
The expansion of primary schools was secured through the construc-
tion of government schools, the start-up of self-help schools, and establish-
ment of parent-teacher associations (PTAs) to mobilize the communities 
and channel technical and fi nancial support from international NGOs 
to the sector. ActionAid became, for example, instrumental in setting up 
community schools and providing teachers in rural districts where no 
government schools were available. The light state footprint in the east-
ern regions that was inherited from the colonial period was still refl ected 
in higher percentages of children out of school (more than 20 percent) 
in the northeastern areas than in the western areas of the country. The 
fi rst steps toward improving access to schools were later capitalized in the 
1988–2003 Education Policy, which was prepared with the assistance of 
the World Bank. 
The 1988–2003 Education Policy, sometimes referred to as the “access 
policy,” highlighted the need of prioritizing the physical infrastructure and 
basic school supplies to an even higher extent. The number of children was 
fast increasing at the time, and the coverage in rural areas was still very 
low. Generating access was the uncontested priority until the preparations 
of the New Education Policy (2004) were initiated. 
Already in the late 1970s, external support was seen as essential for 
moving the sector forward. International Development Association (IDA) 
investment became the fi rst of an uninterrupted series of World Bank edu-
cation projects, which are still active and currently on the Third Education 
Project–Phase II. United Nations agencies, such as UNICEF and WFP, 
have continuously supported the education sector as well. The more 
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recent Education for All–Fast Track Initiative is currently providing sub-
stantive fi nancial support to the sector. The Department for International 
Development (DFID) has been a major bilateral player, most recently with 
the Basic Education Support for Poverty Reduction (BESPOR) Program, 
which has infl uenced the managerial and organizational changes in the 
ministry directly. However, DFID phased out its support to The Gambia 
in 2011.
Table 3.1 lists the key events since 1978. The events signify important 
policy and programmatic decisions that have contributed to the  institution 
building of the ministry. Some of the events have had major fi nancial impact, 
such as membership in the “Education for All” movement, while others 
have resulted in major programmatic shifts in approach and priority, such 
as the inclusion of regional directors on the SMT.
The school system in The Gambia has historically consisted of a mix of 
schools, notably private mission and Koranic schools, in addition to public 
schools. Children of the local elites have attended a few well-established 
mission schools in the capital. With nongovernmental boards, market-
based tuition, and competitive salaries for teachers, mission schools have 
secured the availability of good schools for the wealthiest households in 
the capital. Several Catholic mission schools are so-called grant-aided 
schools, which are governed by their own board but receive government-
paid teachers in return for maintaining the regulated tuition levels agreed 
with MoBSE. 
With the investment in rural schools since the late 1980s, a portion 
of the urban-rural inequality in access to education has increasingly been 
addressed. The early establishment of PTAs provided an entry point for 
engaged parents and politically or fi nancially strong representatives to 
gain some infl uence in the running of the local schools. The role of the 
PTA was redefi ned in 2008 to revitalize community participation in school 
management.
Already in the later 1970s, the fi rst building blocks in  strengthening 
the planning capacity of the ministry were defi ned, and this process was 
continued during the preparation of the second IDA credit in 1990. A reor-
ganization and reinforcement of the educational planning and manage-
ment capacity was one of the key objectives of the project. These early 
 investments, including technical assistance in statistics, contributed to the 
launching of EMIS in 2000. 
In 2003, The Gambia became an offi cial member of the Education for 
All (EFA) movement as a Fast Track Initiative (FTI) participant based on 
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 Table 3.1. Timeline of Key Events in the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education
Year
Sociopolitical 
context
External operating 
environment
Internal institutional
workings
1978 World Bank Education Project 
(US$5.5 million)
1988 Education Policy 1988–2003
1990 World Bank Education Sector 
Project (US$21.2 million)
1994 Jawara ousted in coup led 
by Lieutenant Yahya 
Jammeh
1995
1996 Vision 2020 adopteda
New constitution 
promulgated
Jammeh elected President
Abolition of the Primary School 
Leaving Certifi cate Examinations 
Introduction of the Joint 
Coordinating Committee Meeting
1997 Local Government Act Guidelines for Provision of 
Government Assistance to the 
Madrassa
1998 World Bank Third Education 
Project (US$51.3 million)
2000 Ban is lifted on the 
political parties
Reaffi rm commitment to 
Education For All in Dakar
Presidential Fund for Girls’ 
Education
Establishment of the Education 
Management Information System 
2001 Jammeh wins second 
term
2002 APRC wins parliamentary 
elections
Drought
2003 Economic Crisis Joined the Education for 
All—Fast Track Initiative 
Partnership
Sectorwide approach
Abolition of entrance examinations 
at the end of grades 6 and 9
2004 New Education Policy 
(2004–15) (Key areas: access 
to basic education; quality 
of teaching and learning; 
teaching and learning 
materials; nonformal 
education; and skills training 
in appropriate technology)
President’s Empowerment of 
Girls Project
Establishment of the National 
Training Authority through a 
public-private partnership
Regional Directorates to monitor 
the decentralization process and 
the takeover of schools
Establishment of the Senior 
Management Team(s)
Restructuring of the Joint 
Coordinating Committee Meeting
Girl-Friendly School Initiative
Scholarship Trust Fund for Girls
2005 Ministers and civil 
servants are dismissed 
and more than 
30 senior offi cials 
are arrested over 
corruption allegations
Children’s Act established 
compulsory basic education
BESPOR Program begins
Girls’ Education Unit renamed 
“Gender Education Unit”
Introduction of education in 
Gambian language in grades 1 to 3 
and from grade 4 on as a subject
Participatory Performance 
Monitoring
(continued next page)
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 Table 3.1. Timeline of Key Events in the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education 
(continued)
Year
Sociopolitical 
context
External operating 
environment
Internal institutional
workings
2006 National elections World Bank Third Education 
Project - Phase II (US$77.2 
million)
First Public Expenditure Review of 
the Education Sector 
Education Sector Strategic Plan 
2006–15
2007 Ten ex-army offi cers are 
sentenced to prison 
for plotting a coup
School Management Manual
School Review Manual
Early Grade Reading Assessment
The Department of State for 
Education is divided into the 
Department of State for Tertiary 
and Higher Education, Research 
and Scientifi c Technology, and 
the Department of Basic and 
Secondary Education
Introduction of the Cluster 
Monitors
Schools develop mission and vision 
statements
2008 Food and fuel crisis First National Assessment Test (and 
then annually)
Medium-Term Plan (2008–11)
Restructuring of the Coordinating 
Committee Meetings
New PTA Constitution
Second Public Expenditure Review 
of the Education Sector
2009 International fi nancial 
crisis 
The Gambia EFA-FTI Catalytic 
Fund 2009–11 (US$28 million)
Adoption of Minimal Standards for 
Basic School Management
2010 Eight men, including a 
former army chief, are 
sentenced to death for 
their part in an alleged 
coup plot in 2009
2011 President Jammeh wins 
another term
Severe drought
DFID phases out support and 
BESPOR program ends
Introduction of the School 
Improvement Program
2012 Ruling party wins 
parliamentary polls 
boycotted by the 
opposition
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on materials from the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education, and 
interviews.
Note: BESPOR = Basic Education Support for Poverty Reduction; EFA-FTI = Education for All–Fast-Track 
Initiative; DFID = Department for International Development, United Kingdom; PTA = parent-teacher 
association.
a. A long-term development framework for economic development.
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its successful mobilization of fi nancial and political capital to reach uni-
versal education by 2015.3 This membership provided opportunities for 
international and national advocacy for education, which in turn made 
the country eligible for technical and fi nancial support for the ministry and 
civil society. EFA membership became a key turning point for the ministry. 
It also led to the establishment of the EFA network of NGOs in 2003.
Although the ministry has benefi tted from stable leadership—changing 
ministers and permanent secretaries only twice since 1999, which for the 
Gambian context is a low number—the shift in ministers at the end of 
2004 and the internal turbulence that preceded it led to the loss of several 
senior staff. One of the elements of the internal crisis was the stark deterio-
ration of salaries across the civil service because of the 2002–03 economic 
crisis, increased politicization, and interference in the everyday manage-
ment of the ministry. The senior management staffs that left the ministry 
continued their careers in education, but in the civil society. The instability 
in the management group negatively affected the working environment, 
especially at the central level, but the policy review and EFA membership 
were completed in time. 
Paradoxically, the internal instability occurred during this productive 
period of several important and lasting outputs. The education sector 
policy review that resulted in the New Education Policy (2004–15) was 
the fi rst policy to be prepared in a broadly participatory manner in which 
stakeholders at the regional and central levels were consulted. The pro-
cesses are recounted at the central level as groundbreaking in method and 
results. In 2005 a new senior management team led by new Minister Fatou 
L. Faye initiated the implementation of this comprehensive new policy, 
which, in addition to access, highlighted quality and relevance in educa-
tion. In parallel, the BESPOR project fi nanced by DFID was launched. 
BESPOR provided technical assistance to adopt a sectorwide approach 
in education and more specifi cally to develop the quality of teachers and 
education outputs—and became another new and energized partner in 
education.
Notwithstanding the autocratic character of the current regime, improv-
ing access to education became a goal compatible with President Jammeh’s 
priorities. During the past decade, education has climbed to the top of 
the political agenda. External funding of the education sector was already 
substantive when President Jammeh took power and enrollment rates were 
improving. The president initiated a fund in 2000 to boost girls’ enrollment 
in schools and has actively supported the fast-tracking of girls’  education. 
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The education sector has made important advances in increasing its 
overall funding and, most important, the amount of domestic resources 
dedicated to this area. Education represents 22 percent of recurrent 
expenditure (see fi gure 3.11) and 18 percent of total government expen-
diture, the highest allocation among all public sector services and above 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, public spending on education in 
2010 equaled about 5 percent of GDP, which is relatively low though 
still above average for Sub-Saharan Africa (see fi gure 3.12). Government 
spending on education over the past eight years has grown slowly but 
steadily. Lower basic education accounts for 51 percent of overall MoBSE 
expenditure.
External Operational Environment
MoBSE has actively worked to mobilize support from its principals and 
other stakeholders. Although education was congruent with the goals 
of both presidents, it only became a priority in the past decade, to some 
extent as a result of prior achievements. As donors ramped up fund-
ing for the sector, thanks to the good performance of the ministry and 
international initiatives to support the commitments for Education for 
All and the education Millennium Development Goals that generated 
 Figure 3.11. Public Spending on Education, Total, 2010
Source: World Bank 2011.
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strong momentum, the government has also increased domestic funding 
for the sector. 
The long-term commitment to education, from the ministry and the 
donor community, has critically contributed to the formal and informal 
coordination of activities. This is one of the crucial elements underpinning 
the positive outcomes of the sector, together with the scale-up of invest-
ment. The institution has actively reached out to clients and has built 
 critical coalitions of stakeholders that offer some counterweight to the rul-
ing elite. 
Displaying results has been critical to convince principals and stake-
holders to show not only the importance of the policy area, but also the 
potential returns of increasing investment in their organization. External 
recognition—in particular, progress against international goals, prizes and 
mentions, among others—has also helped raise the sector in the domestic 
policy agenda and mobilize own-source resources to sustain and expand 
the gains achieved. Moreover, improvements in access to education have 
supported the position of the state in society more broadly as citizen’ satis-
faction has increased, refl ecting positively on the legitimacy of the regime. 
Thus, there is a feedback effect triggering the favor of political principals. 
Presently, President Jammeh frequently expresses his support of the 
e ducation sector, and the ministry has gradually become surrounded 
with a long list of engaged supporters, from the vice president to local 
 Figure 3.12. Public Spending on Education, Total, 2000 and 2010
Source: World Bank 2011.
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communities. During the past three years, the president has in his public 
speeches made direct reference to innovations in the ministry. National-
level stakeholders emphasize the leadership of the ministry as driving the 
change; the stability of the minister and the permanent secretary is there-
fore perceived as essential for continued success, and people are worried 
about the consequences if they were to leave. The ministry is viewed as 
a high-performing and respected institution that echoes the views of the 
president.
As a maturing institution that is in a position to drive the agenda of the 
sector or policy area and the dialogue with internal and external stakehold-
ers, the additional support provided by the country’s top leadership has 
helped amplify some of the gains. A positive cycle has ensued and is allow-
ing the institution to introduce ever more sophisticated internal manage-
ment systems and to make further gains in terms of results. 
Achieving External Accountability Through Collaborative Mechanisms
The ministry is ultimately accountable to the president and the cabinet 
and, because of blurred lines between the executive and the legislative, rap-
port with the president is essential. This places great weight on the capacity 
of the minister to establish and maintain a working relationship with the 
president and vice president. Apart from the informal entry points, there 
are formal meetings in the cabinet during which the minister reports or 
answers to specifi c issues on education. 
The ministry is also formally accountable to the National Assembly 
and, since a few years back, reports annually to the Assembly on progress 
and future work. The Select Committee on Education within the National 
Assembly has become increasingly involved and informed about develop-
ments in education, and the ministry has adopted participatory and testi-
monial approaches to engage the parliamentarians since the formulation of 
the Education Policy in 2003 and 2004. For example, committee  members 
have been taken on school visits and confronted with students being 
excluded from school. These approaches have been described as innovative 
and effective eye-openers for the committee to understand the challenges 
the ministry faces. One stakeholder explains:
The Select Committee in the National Assembly—they visited schools. It 
became a wake-up-call in their own constituencies, in their own schools. 
When they went and visited to see for themselves …, making schools is 
one thing but—even before the CCMs—they went out to the schools. 
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This was in collaboration with ProPAC.4 Maybe the whole idea of the 
CCM has originated from that… I don’t know. In 2004–2005 they made 
the fi rst visit and it was eye-opening. They saw things that really needed 
to be addressed.
The methods signify a shift in prioritizing strategic advocacy activities tar-
geting the broader political representatives and not only the cabinet. 
The most recent and innovative accountability measure is CCM. Over 
the course of the past three to four years, CCM has evolved into a wide-
ranging forum where the main stakeholders of education are members. 
This includes Gambia Teacher Union, international and national NGOs 
active in education, development partners, and local government represen-
tatives (ward councilors or the governor) from the region in which CCM 
is held. Although SMT is responsible for decisions related to policy, CCM 
has developed into a coordinating body for decisions related to implemen-
tation and for recommendations to SMT on policy changes. CCM has 
by all national and regional stakeholders been described as an innovative 
accountability measure. 
The transformation of CCM emerged as a part of the development of 
the Performance Management System (see box 3.1). “We have a crisis 
in the system” was one of the clear conclusions in 2005 after the real-
ization that reading levels were very low. This ignited a long process of 
strengthening the reporting and monitoring systems in the technical and 
administrative directorates as well as the schools. The BESPOR Project 
was instrumental in this process. As an integral part of the performance 
system, CCM—with its ambition of creating a space for openly discuss-
ing problems and achievements—has been adopted by the sector. In a 
public speech, the  president encouraged other ministries to replicate this 
performance management system. Through fi nancial support from DFID 
and other donors, it has become possible for the ministry to fi nance these 
events. The direct and open discussion of identifi ed problems in an other-
wise politically sensitive climate has been framed as a tool of performance 
management.
Mobilizing and Consulting Clients
Given its distribution and large number of core clients, the ministry applies 
various strategies to reach families. The strategies include local discus-
sion forums, mass media campaigns, and dissemination of education mes-
sages through NGOs. In practice, the most frequently applied channel of 
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BOX 3.1
The Innovations of the Coordinating Committee Meetings
In 2008, the Coordination Committee Meeting (CCM) was transformed into a bimonthly, 
rotational monitoring and supervision forum with the purpose of tracking progress on 
targets in the Strategic Plan and the Medium-Term Plan. The mandate of CCM was 
changed to a forum where decisions for implementation can be made. Prior to 2008, 
CCMs were composed of managers in the ministry, and the meetings were held in the 
capital and were characterized more as a forum of information sharing.
On-site participatory inspections of 15 schools in one Regional Directorate at a 
time feeds directly into the monitoring system and anchors the following two days 
of discussions on implementation progress and challenges. In each of the 15 schools, 
CCM members visit one day and make observations on the extent to which minimum 
standards of the school environment are followed. The observations are reported to all 
CCM participants and identifi ed issues are discussed, and when possible solved during 
the meeting. The plenary format is mentioned as a strength in terms of addressing the 
gaps immediately, although they also can imply highly engaged discussions. During the 
data collection for this study, CCM identifi ed several unregistered schools in the region 
under observation that indicated a severe gap between the collaboration between the 
regional directorate and the central-level planning directorate. The severity of the iden-
tifi ed problems was referred to by several stakeholders throughout the data collection 
for this study.
With the expansion of participants to include representatives from civil society, 
district and ward authorities, donors, and other ministries, CCM has become a strong 
internal and external accountability measure. Teachers have mentioned the fact that 
CCM can bring the minister into their classroom as a very strong motivating factor for 
improvements.
With the change of mandate into making decisions related to implementation, the 
direct observations, discussions, and conclusions provide new space for external stake-
holders and mid-level managers in the ministry to take an active part in the review of the 
region in which they work.
information is the local school, through the teachers, which has the benefi t 
of contextualizing the information. 
The perceived performance trend of the ministry is positive. A substan-
tial increase in the number of school buildings, available learning materi-
als, and teachers are the visible improvements most frequently mentioned. 
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The improved access to schooling for young children is described as an 
essential community platform for the future and an intervention that 
directly addresses a need in rural as well as urban neighborhoods. The 
steep expansion of schools has improved access. The long walks of pri-
mary school children or the need for accommodation of secondary school 
students in capital cities in the rural regions have been reduced consider-
ably, which is seen as a fundamental improvement. Closeness to a school 
was described as the single most important indicator of a child entering 
primary or continuing secondary school. 
School management practice is an area of prioritized reforms by the 
ministry. The reform includes a broadening of the management group at 
each school, the development of a school management manual and the 
implementation of minimum standards of school management. The prin-
cipal has traditionally been in charge of the management of the individual 
school. The management is now suggested to be shared between the prin-
cipal and the School Management Committee (SMC), which consists of 
PTA representatives, mother’s clubs, and head teachers. The implementa-
tion is ongoing; it requires normative changes and implies a long-term 
process. 
One of the new tasks of SMC is to develop annual and fi ve-year work 
plans for the school. The suggested activities and improvements should be 
differentiated by level of costs. Although all the focus group discussions 
agreed on the benefi ts of restructuring school management practices, the 
implementation was reported to vary. The level of activity in the SMC 
was reported to vary considerably among schools. The seats in the SMC 
that are fi lled by representatives from the community are selected through 
election every four years. This is a recent and important change from the 
traditional long-term or life-long service of PTA chairs and members. In 
schools with positive experiences of raising additional funds, there was 
consensus that the requirement of a maximum number of years of service 
in the PTA was important in order to reduce capture by the most infl uential 
persons in the community. 
However, it was also found that the goal of having informed, engaged 
parents and communities is not as easy to achieve in poorer areas with 
lower enrollment levels. In these settings, there are many challenges related 
to sensitizing families on the importance of education for boys and girls. 
The parallel, rather than sequenced, mobilization of parents to send chil-
dren to school—at the same time as they were invited to participate in the 
SMC was perceived as less effective by PTAs and teachers. The challenge 
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involved two elements. First, in rural areas where about every fi fth child 
is out of school, the sensitization of parents involves economic and social 
considerations that relate not only to the supply of schooling, but also 
to the demand for schooling. Second, the recent democratization of SMC 
implies sociocultural changes to include parents with no prior tradition of 
participating in management groups. 
The development of a school management manual and the identifi ca-
tion of minimum standards of school management have been received 
positively by principals and teachers. The manual was reportedly avail-
able in the SMCs included in the study. The minimum standards were 
 commended for being operational and relevant, except in cases when 
changes implied high investment costs, such as the construction of addi-
tional gender-separate bathrooms. The low- or no-cost improvements in 
the schools are emphasized as being designed as a mitigating measure 
for poorer communities, but clients expressed limited support for this 
strategy in resource-poor communities. The mothers’ clubs were instead 
mentioned as instrumental in sensitizing communities through locally 
appropriate means to prioritize education of their children. The com-
munities have experienced that resources are available for infrastructure 
improvement and for those schools that still lack classrooms or auditori-
ums for national examinations; the low- or no-cost alternatives were not 
well received.
Some of the identifi ed challenges between the ministry and the local 
schools are the abolition of the middle school entrance exam and of physi-
cal punishment in schools. The preferences of the  clients are not overlap-
ping with the policy changes in these respects. The abolition of physical 
punishment is perceived to be one of the causes of disruptive classes. 
The ministry has developed tools for alternative disciplinary methods, 
but perceptions about corporal punishment will take time to change. 
The gap between policy and client preference should be understood in 
the broader context of child discipline. Over 84 percent of children aged 
2 to 14 were subjected to at least one form of psychological or physical 
punishment by their mothers, caretakers, or other household members 
according to a household survey (GBoS 2007). And 21.5  percent of chil-
dren were exposed to severe physical punishment, strongly indicating 
the gap between practices in the homes and in the schools. 
The second challenge identifi ed was a concern about the abolition of the 
middle school entrance exam in grade 6. The exam was associated with 
selectivity of the academically strong students, but more important, it was 
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a direct motivator for students to perform well on the test. With the loss of 
the exam, parents and teachers report experiencing a dilution of concen-
tration at an age where academic achievement should advance. Members 
in the senior management group disagreed on these views and explained 
that children who have low reading skills are the students who prior to 
the school reform would not have passed the entrance exam. Principals 
agreed to a large extent, but nuanced the situation by adding that the new 
emphasis was on ensuring that children learn to read  during the fi rst years 
of schooling through emphasizing phonetics. In schools that have imple-
mented the early grade reading program, it is found that children in grade 
3 are better readers than students in grade 6. EGRA is presented as the 
solution for the new students, but is not applicable for the children at the 
end of their schooling.
The traditional public discussion forum Bantabar is a popular venue 
for addressing current social and cultural issues in society. The ministry 
has adjusted this tradition of public discussion forums to the opportunities 
of national television and is weekly broadcasting a Bantabar on a selected 
topic related to education, such as reading skills improvements. An increas-
ing number of especially urban households have access to television. Local 
community radio programs reach a broader segment of the population, 
according to clients.
Managing Isomorphic Infl uences
The ministry has received technical and fi nancial support since the late 
1970s, and a substantial part of this support has been directed as capacity 
building and improving the managerial aspects of the ministry. In particu-
lar, during the past 15 years, the development partners, which have been 
the main source of fi nancial support, have redefi ned their roles and respon-
sibilities. The capacity of the government to receive support has improved. 
Initially donors coordinated projects to ensure the continuation of funding 
and technical support through the sequencing of various projects. Post-
Paris declaration, more formal mechanisms were introduced, such as reg-
ular Joint Donor Review meetings, participation in the bimonthly Joint 
Coordinating Committee Meeting, and the Fast Track Initiative–funding 
mechanism. 
Defi ning the source of infl uence is a composite task in tightknit col-
laborations. Task team leaders (TTLs) and technical advisors from 
multilateral and bilateral development partners have worked in close 
coordination with the SMT for more than a decade. The turnover of 
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TTLs and advisors has been low in multilateral and bilateral organiza-
tions, as has the turnover in SMT. This stability has contributed to deeper 
engagement. 
In asking one of the TTLs if a particular process was led by the interna-
tional organization, the answer was that it is not this simple. “We came in 
together” is one of the opening explanations of how the close collabora-
tion between a main donor and the leadership were established. The sense 
of urgency in strengthening the sector was shared. Another representative 
from the donor community explained the normative isomorphism through 
the same training opportunities and access to the academic literature on 
education reforms: 
They look at the literature; they have consultants who come quite often 
and they have discussions with us all the time. So these are things that 
fi lter through the literature. It’s nothing really purely [donor-specifi c] in 
the country.
The SMT and donor group was explained to share the same under-
standing of development in Gambian education, which implies there is 
a short distance from identifi ed need or problem to solution. This is an 
indication of the strategic capacity of the ministry to manage development 
partners and mobilize a long-term interest in education in The Gambia. 
Close relationships have been established with TTLs of the main donors, 
which have resulted in direct operational assistance from TTLs, as when 
the fi rst Public Expenditure Review (PER) in 1998 was prepared. From 
the point of view of the ministry, it was expressed that results, and more 
specifi cally documented results, are essential in securing this engagement. 
When this is accomplished, the donors are able to help the ministry in 
identifying new sources of support. For example, donors have advocated 
on behalf of the ministry for additional resources from the Treasury, and 
they have communicated concerns when potential changes in senior man-
agement were seen as endangering previous achievements and the reform 
agenda. The common drive for better results among donors and the min-
istry has created a strategic space where each partner speaks to the other’s 
expectations.
The composition of development partners has resulted in differ-
ent responses by the ministry. Since 2005, the ministry has benefi ted 
from substantial fi nancial and technical support from FTI, the World 
Bank, and DFID. BESPOR, a DFID-funded program, opted for placing 
a senior technical assistant in the ministry who was accepted to join 
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the SMT. The ministry has expanded the collaboration with NGOs 
in particular since the EFA membership and fi nancial support, which 
included a requirement to include civil society in the movement. Because 
of the increased volume of fi nancial support for constructing schools, 
the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was transformed into a Project 
Coordinating Unit (PCU). This transformation is in line with interna-
tional best practice.
EFA-FTI resources made it possible to expand primary school education 
radically so children would have to travel less than three kilometers to a 
school. The ministry had already reformed the school structure and intro-
duced nine years of schooling followed by three years of secondary school-
ing in accordance with international recommendations. In 2005, when the 
Child Act was signed, schooling became mandatory.
The Performance Management System (PMS) was introduced, with 
BESPOR’s support, at a time when the ministry had realized that many 
children per class were not able to read after several years of schooling. 
“We have a crisis in the system” framed the following fi ve to seven years 
of improving performance of teachers and administrative and technical 
staff. In developing the PMS, it was explicitly recognized that the systems 
had been developed in high-income, Western settings. Examples of PMS 
implementation in other African countries were discussed, and apart from 
a few initial international consultants, the consultants who had performed 
assessments and studies related to PMS were locally recruited in an attempt 
to adjust the system to the local context. PMS is complemented with a 
program in which retired teachers provide in-service training to teachers to 
create incentives to perform better. 
Several new functions in MoBSE have been developed over time, 
in addition to the transition from a PIU to a PCU and the develop-
ment of EMIS, which is a unit under the Directorate of Planning. A 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was established under the Directorate 
of Planning to strengthen the evidence base of education policy rather 
than the individual projects. Science and mathematics have been weak 
in the curriculum, and the capacity to design a program was recog-
nized as challenging and expensive. A new directorate of science was 
established to increase focus on this area. The director and staff were 
recruited externally with the task to sensitize the population to science 
through private-public partnerships. Although the need is in line with 
international best practices, the method in gaining momentum appears 
homegrown.
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Internal Institutional Workings
The current structure of the ministry is the result of a major reorganiza-
tion in 1998. The restructuring became a turning point for capacity build-
ing of the ministry. The 1988–2003 policy was reviewed at mid-term in 
1995, and one of the main fi ndings was to transform the ministry into a 
directorate model to fi t better with the increasing number of functions in 
the ministry. During the restructuring, the number of directorates doubled. 
The Directorate of Information Technology and Human Resources was 
established. The Directorate of Planning gained more importance with 
the creation of EMIS and in the development of the budget. The regional 
offi ces were upgraded to Regional Education Directorates in an effort to 
adjust better and support implementation at the local level. It took a few 
years before all the directorates were in place; for example, the Directorate 
of Science and Technology Education was fi rst established in 2001. 
The SMT was also revised in 1998, and two management committees 
were given the responsibility for effective management and coordination 
of policy implementation, respectively. SMT is comprised of the direc-
tors, the permanent secretary, and two deputy permanent secretaries 
and chaired by the minister. The CCM became the second management 
forum and was originally composed of directors, principal education 
offi cers, managers or deputy managers, and deputy permanent secre-
taries and chaired by the permanent secretary. CCM was conceptual-
ized in the beginning of the 1990s, but it was with the restructuring in 
1998 that CCMs became functional and were used to strengthen the 
central-regional relationship. Over the years, CCM  suffered some set-
backs caused by lack of regularity and some challenges in living up to 
the principle of collective accountability measures since 2005. In 2008 
CCM was expanded to include political and nongovernmental stake-
holders. It is now more institutionalized; regular meetings are held in the 
regions, and the principle of making CCM decisions during the meetings 
is respected and identifi ed as one of the most important aspects of the 
ministry. 
In 2007 the Ministry of Higher Education and Research was created 
as a response to the need to strengthen tertiary education in the country. 
The Directorate of Tertiary Education was transferred to the new ministry. 
With the increased number of students completing secondary schooling, 
the need for tertiary education has increased. The opening of the University 
of The Gambia indicates the ambitions of strengthening tertiary education 
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and research. The new ministry was tasked with increasing funding for 
these plans and thus refl ects an adjustment to the local context. 
Renewing the Seeds of Leadership
MoBSE has been the most stable ministry in terms of leadership since the 
coup in 1994. The ministry has been led by only three ministers and seven 
permanent secretaries over this period. The former ministers had similar 
backgrounds in education and moved on to work in international edu-
cation. The current minister came into offi ce in 2005. The institutional 
memory in SMT is strong, with several directors having served the ministry 
since the early 1990s. A group of fi ve to six professionals entered the plan-
ning offi ce, worked in the ranks, and eventually became members in SMT 
(see box 3.2). The Directorate of Planning has been given a central role in 
emphasizing the need for monitoring implementation. Production and dis-
semination of education data have gradually been used as a tool to advo-
cate the importance of impact in education. As a former senior member of 
the Planning Directorate concluded: 
If you don’t have data you are not moving. But data has to feed into 
policy process; if it does not feed into policy—data does not help you.
The ministry has benefi tted from substantial capacity building since the 
1990s, and the proportion of staff with a master’s degree is reportedly 
the highest in the country. The need for capacity building was emphasized 
in the fi rst PER, and the donors have since then contributed funding for 
capacity building. Many of the current SMT members came into the minis-
try as young teachers, benefi ted from training abroad, and were able to rise 
quickly in the system. This is replicated in the current mid-level manage-
ment (heads of units). 
This aspect is described as unique for the ministry. The traditional model 
in civil service is described as hierarchical, where even directors are expected 
to clear initiatives with the permanent secretary before moving ahead. The 
internal working environment is ascribed high importance by staff and 
managers, and the current leadership is attributed to have created a condu-
cive environment in which technocracy is the main guiding principle. 
The leadership is almost exclusively composed of teachers who have 
made a career in the ministry and now are members of SMT. From the min-
ister to the regional education offi cers, the majority of staff initiated their 
employment as teaches and refer to this experience as essential for their per-
formance in the ministry today. It is associated with a comprehensive list of 
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social skills, an operational approach to management, hard work and dedi-
cation, and joy in improving the results of education. Identifi cation as an 
“educationalist” is very strong. It is mentioned with pride and is the most 
inclusive fundamental of the esprit du corps. However, this is changing as 
professionals entering the middle to high positions tend to have a master’s 
degree in education rather than teaching experience. The generational gap 
is only slowly becoming visible.
The ministry internally emphasizes the priority of listening to the grass-
roots. Inclusive leadership is described as an important source of inspira-
tion and linked to the fact that several members in SMT left the ministry 
in the early 2000s, worked for NGOs, and returned to the ministry in 
2005. An internal narrative on the leadership emphasizes “the aggressive 
leadership.” It is positively framed and implies boldness, directness, and 
dedication to achieve results. It also describes confrontational strategies for 
when problems need diffi cult solutions. These characteristics constitute the 
BOX 3.2
Building the Directorate of Planning
The function of a planning unit was already established in 1978, but it was not until 
1995–96 that the offi ce was able to present data of fair quality and provide feedback 
to the management and to schools. Around 1998, Coordinating Committee Meetings 
became one of the new venues for presenting and discussing data. The Directorate 
of Planning had strengthened its capacity and was able to improve data collection, 
 coverage, and timely reporting and to produce annual statistics. The team was built 
through two main mechanisms. The African Development Bank supported the govern-
ment with planning units in selected sectors of which education was a part (others 
included the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Women’s Bureau). As tech-
nical assistance, the ministry received funding for one statistician and one economist, 
and the ministry was successful in retaining staff from schools and other areas of the 
administration to work to the planning offi ce. A highly qualifi ed group of staff was 
formed and has largely stayed in the ministry since then. The infl uence of this group is 
well recognized internally and externally. Over the years, the directorate has benefi ted 
from several short- and long-term training opportunities, which have had great impor-
tance in improving the quality of data and reporting.
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reasons why the ministry perceives itself as a trendsetter, not only nation-
ally, but also internationally.
Implementing Performance Management and Improving Internal 
Communication to Build Morale
The ministry presents itself as a learning institution, and its management 
practices are seen as reinforcing this strategic principle. One senior staff 
member specifi ed the meaning of this principle when stating, “We are 
managing change to our limits,” implying the high ambitions but also the 
sociopolitical restrictions of change in the country.
The broader management practices of MoBSE include the structuring of 
individual tasks that have been the focus of attention, especially since the 
startup of the DFID-supported project in 2005. There has been a strong 
push to assess current practices and identify solutions to the problems and 
gaps that to some degree has consumed SMT. An earlier attempt to intro-
duce an appraisal system failed, and the new Performance Management 
System (PMS) took these lessons into account by directly addressing the 
identifi ed management problems and taking a more holistic and develop-
mental approach (Petersen 2010). The PMS was built gradually, but the 
current challenge is to link all the elements into a holistic system. The man-
agement reforms initiated in April 2005 are extensive and touch traditions, 
such as autocratic management styles and high-power distances within the 
ministry. 
In contextualizing the reforms, it is clear that the transformation of pro-
motion from seniority to promotion based on performance requires time 
and targeted sensitization. This is one of the areas in which the ministry 
emphasizes ongoing learning. There are examples of senior staff that were 
initially against PMS but now are ambassadors for the system. And there 
are examples of staff that have accepted that their current position did not 
fi t well with their qualifi cations and therefore were transferred to another 
post. The meeting is normally opened by the permanent secretary remind-
ing participants that CCM is a social accountability measure. The leap in 
management practice is off to a very positive start, but sustainability of the 
system is not fully developed.
The motivation of individuals has been targeted through PMS over the 
past couple years, and positive improvements have been reported at the 
mid-level staff level and at the regional directorate level and among teach-
ers in schools reporting fewer days of absenteeism. Training opportuni-
ties are highly valued and attractive for staff at all levels in the institution, 
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and have been mentioned as a factor where the civil service outcompetes 
opportunities in the private sector. Through external funding and close 
collaboration with The Gambia College, the ministry has developed 
several new training programs for principals, teachers, and unqualifi ed 
teachers. The upgrading of technical skills of qualifi ed and unqualifi ed 
teachers has been identifi ed as a priority that serves as a strong individ-
ual motivator as well. The volume of training opportunities at low- and 
mid-levels has increased, which is highly appreciated by staff. Linked to 
the program of improving the conditions for teachers more in the rural 
areas, teachers’ living quarters are being built. The provision of housing 
is a strong motivator for teachers to accept a rural appointment and for 
staying in the job. In particular for unmarried women, these facilities are 
important.
The ministry has built a reputation as a large and relatively stable 
employer and recruitment of young professionals with master’s degrees 
is a developing trend. Although the ministry is bound by the civil ser-
vant payroll levels, a special skill allowance for  mid-to-high-level staff, 
and a remote location allowance for teachers and principals have 
been introduced. These allowances provide a substantial increase to 
the very low salary level. Staff that has been trained in IFMIS benefi t 
from an additional allowance. In addition, the ministry has benefi ted 
from some fl exibility in recruiting new staff with particular profi les. 
For example, the staff at the newly established Directorate of Science 
and Technology was recruited externally to fi ll the positions with spe-
cialized skills.
The ministry produces a monthly newsletter in addition to reports 
on the bimonthly CCMs. Each directorate holds staff meetings, but the 
level of delegation of decision-making processes is directly dependent 
of the director in place. The communication of the policy and imple-
mentation changes between the central level and local schools has been 
substantially improved through the introduction of cluster monitors 
(replacing school inspectors). Cluster monitors belong organizationally 
to Regional Education (RED). A cluster monitor is the contact person for 
a geographical area consisting of fi ve to fi fteen schools and has quickly 
become an appreciated link between RED and principals. Interviewed 
principals were very appreciative of the direct contact with cluster moni-
tors. But in spite of the improvement brought by the cluster monitors, 
some concern has been expressed about the excessive workload of the 
cluster monitors.
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Challenges
MoBSE needs to address several challenges. As the strong push to expand 
the number of schools slows down, the ministry is shifting its attention to 
the more challenging task of improving quality outcomes, particularly in 
remote areas. Related to this, there is also a need to improve the training of 
teachers and include more female teachers in the workforce. In 2009–10, 
the teaching force was estimated at around 7,600 teachers, of which 
6,360 were working in government and grant-aided schools. More than 
25  percent were not qualifi ed teachers. Similarly, the share of female teach-
ers was less than a third of the total number. Female representation also 
decreases with the level of education, from 33 percent at basic education 
schools to 9 percent at the secondary level. 
Another important task at hand is to continue to promote leadership 
within the institution so that when the current senior managers change, 
there is enough internal capacity to take on senior positions and enough 
technical and political capital to navigate the country environment.
Similarly, many factors remain outside the control of the ministry, such 
as determining the salaries of teachers. In many ways, mobilizing resources 
to build infrastructure has been easier than fi nancing recurrent expendi-
tures or investing in improving human capital. The Gambia is likely to 
remain vulnerable to economic shocks, and economic conditions will con-
tinue to constrain families in sending boys and girls to school, while impor-
tant cultural barriers will change slowly. Retention of girls, particularly at 
the higher levels of the educational ladder, poses serious challenges, espe-
cially in some ethnic and geographic regions. The remaining percentage of 
children out of school will likely be more diffi cult to reach than those that 
have already become part of the system.
Conclusion
In The Gambia, expanding access to education in rural areas and increas-
ing the participation of girls and minorities was not a high priority in the 
public agenda until recently. Nonetheless, since the early 1990s, MoBSE, 
partnering with several domestic and external organizations, has made 
consistent gains in school enrollment, which accelerated after 2000 and 
gained political recognition.
THE GAMBIA CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF BASIC AND SECONDARY EDUCATION • 105
The ministry relied on a network of committed education specialists 
who, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were trained and deployed as 
part of its policy planning unit. This was essential in keeping a consis-
tent approach and sustaining the organization along its trajectory. This 
pool of individuals, moving in and out of MoBSE as a result of political 
interventions in top-level staffi ng, led several reform initiatives in vari-
ous corners of the institution and provided the human assets to fi ll the 
most senior positions in the ministry and its partner organizations. They 
were instrumental in maintaining a consistent approach to institutional 
development. 
The organizational reform of MoBSE strengthened the role and 
responsibility of the regional directorates. Building these regional struc-
tures has contributed to an intensifi ed focus on implementation. A strong 
project and fi nancial unit has responded to all donors’ needs for moni-
toring and reporting, providing a platform for the scaling-up of external 
fi nancing.
The introduction of the CCM has provided the ministry with a situ-
ational fl at organizational setup for decisions related to implementation. 
CCM provides the opportunity to shortcut the bureaucratic processes 
and makes on-the-spot decisions. This drives the focus on addressing gaps 
immediately when they occur. As an external accountability measure, 
CCM retains important stakeholders to their long-term commitments. 
Direct access to the minister and permanent secretary gives CCM its high 
profi le and perceived effectiveness. 
The ministry has benefi ted from an increasing proportion of the national 
budget. The government has decided to reach the international goal of 
spending 20 percent of the national budget on education by 2015. The 
ministry has been able to monitor, analyze, and present results-based docu-
ments in the budgetary negotiations and thus provided MoFEA with stra-
tegic documentation of the impact of investing in education, which has not 
been the case with other sector ministries. 
Leadership has played a signifi cant role in advocating for the sector, 
moving education to a higher position on the political agenda, and build-
ing internal and external coalitions to support sector goals. Leadership has 
also consistently fostered a culture of learning and self-evaluation. The 
accessibility of the leadership was a recurrent theme in interviews with 
stakeholders at the central level, and it is clear that the ministry is perceived 
to have well-developed formal and informal strategies. 
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Annex 3A
Table 3A.1. The Gambia: National and Regional Study Sample, 2011
Location
Focus group participants 
and in-depth interviews
Number of 
focus groups
(number of 
participants)
Number of 
in-depth 
interviews
Banjul 
(national study)
Interviews with senior staff and the 
leadership in the MoBSE, political 
and nongovernmental stakeholder, 
development partners
25
RED1-6
(regional study)
In each region, two mixed focus groups 
comprised of parents, teachers, and ward 
councilors from each region
In two regions, two focus groups with 
principals
In two regions, two focus groups with 
cluster monitors
Interviews with regional directors in fi ve 
regions; interviews with one cluster 
monitor and one principal in each of six 
regions
12 (100)
2 (12)
2 (11)
16
Total 16 (123) 41
Source: Authors’ compliation.
Table 3A.2. Focus Group Discussants for the Regional Study
Category
Focus group discussions
Cluster 
monitors Teachers Principals PTAs
Mothers’ club 
representatives
Ward 
councilors Total
Women 0 14 3 1 8 0 26
Men 11 63 9 13 0 1 97
Age group 35–45 35–45 45–55 50–60 30–40 40–50 35–45
Subtotal 11 77 12 14 8 1 123
Source: Authors’ compliation.
Table 3A.3. Interviewees for the Regional Study
Category
Individual interviewees
Cluster monitors Regional directors Principals Total
Women 0 1 1 2
Men 6 3 5 14
Age group 40–50 45–55 45–55 45–55
Subtotal 6 4 6 16
Total 17 81 18 139
Source: Authors’ compliation.
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Notes
 1. Of students who never attended school, half say it was because of religious rea-
sons and half say it was too expensive. Children from the poorest 20  percent 
of households are 3.8 times more likely to be out of school than those from 
the wealthiest 20 percent. Those from urban areas are 2.4 times less likely to 
be out of school than those from rural areas (World Bank 2011). As many as 
49 percent of women are married before the age of 18, and of these, around 
10 percent are married before they have turned 15.
 2. However, the quality of education still lags considerably. In a recent sample 
of 25 4th graders, only 10 percent and 6.7 percent of the students met the 
achievement goals in English and mathematics, respectively (World Bank 
2011).
 3. The international community met in Dakar in 2000 to reenergize the EFA ini-
tiative, but it was not until three years later that the action plans were funded.
 4. The current permanent secretary was director of Plateforme Sous-Régionale 
des Organisations Paysannes d’Afrique Centrale (ProPAC) at the time.
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LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
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The Lao People’s Democratic Republic is a small, landlocked,  geographically 
diverse country, populated sparsely with 6.5 million multiethnic peoples. 
Lao PDR is one of the poorest countries in the East Asia and the Pacifi c 
region, but it has enjoyed more than two decades of rapid economic devel-
opment. The country’s overall level of institutional capacity has risen 
steadily over the past 20 years—in tandem with growth and as a result 
of a concerted program of economic and administrative reforms. This 
brief  introduction contextualizes the political economy environment and 
imperatives that have enabled and shaped two particular cases of success-
ful institutional development in Lao PDR—the Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport (MPWT) in the roads sector and Électricité du Laos (EDL) 
in the power sector.
Lao PDR is a one-party, socialist republic governed by the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which came to power in 1975. LPRP is the 
fi rst contemporary authority to govern the whole country, and the cen-
tralization and legitimization of authority have been the crucial challenges 
of nation- and state-building in the modern, post-independence period.1
These challenges have been compounded by the country’s diverse and dif-
fi cult geography, its very low population density, and the sociopolitical and 
economic divisions in Lao PDR—including those among the lowland Lao 
of the Mekong valley, the highland Lao of the plains in the country’s north 
and east, and the diverse ethnic peoples of Lao PDR, many of whom dwell 
in remote, mountainous areas.2 Political and administrative governance 
decisions at all levels—from the macro-level trajectory set for economic 
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reform and modernization, to the micro-institutional questions of govern-
ment agencies’ mandates and modes of organization—should be viewed 
in the context of the overarching sociopolitical and economic challenges 
associated with nation- and state-building.
Traditional Fragmentation and the Socialist Revolution 
The traditional Lao sociopolitical structure was one of hereditary, decentral-
ized governance units, linked together in a hierarchy of personal loyalties 
best conceptualized as concentric circles. Scholars describe this concentric 
structure of power as a mandala system—a multitude of clan-based settle-
ments (meaung) with similar internal organization, positioned in a hierar-
chy where larger centers functioning more as principalities extract tribute 
from smaller ones and power relationships are variable and constantly 
shifting (Stuart-Fox 1997, 7). The territory known as modern Lao PDR 
was always organized in three main divisions, North, Central, and South—
each linked, at various times, more closely with neighboring countries and 
peoples than with each other. For most of the country’s centuries-long his-
tory, these three regions were governed independently of each other; this 
was also the case, in practice, even under the nominally national unity 
governments of post-independence Lao PDR (Stuart-Fox 2004). Colonial 
French administrators and post-colonial Lao elites found that the notion 
of the nation-state—a centrally administered territory with agreed-upon 
boundaries—faced tensions when confronted with the Southeast Asian 
mandala-centered traditional model of power.
Political culture and organization in Laos has remained rooted in 
regional clans, with powerful families enmeshed in regional and personal 
rivalries continuing to exert hereditary political and economic infl uence 
through patronage and marital ties, as well as through regional business 
networks (Stuart-Fox 1997, 60; Soukamneuth 2006, 62–64). The core 
LPRP leadership cadre originally comprised socialist revolutionaries with 
few traditional sources of power. Many of them came from disenfran-
chised tribal and mountainous groups and were elevated on the basis of 
their military prowess and international socialist ties, particularly with the 
Vietnamese regime. Yet, both the LPRP and the government bureaucracy 
have incorporated and become more beholden to the traditionally pow-
erful, regionally based clans, although the armed forces, a small revolu-
tionary cadre, and overseas-educated technocrats serve as counterweights 
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within the state apparatus.3 These regional clans occupy high-level ranks 
in the Party’s all-powerful Central Committee, which governs the country 
from Vientiane. They also exercise a great deal of infl uence through their 
placement in and connections with provincial governor’s offi ces, which 
remain extremely powerful in the country’s overall political equilibrium. 
The Party has pursued centralizing reforms, particularly in pursuit of 
creating a genuinely national economy and taking the reins of economic 
and fi scal governance (Soukamneuth 2006, 71, 187–90). Nonetheless, the 
marketization reforms initiated in 1986 have cemented the concentrated 
and interlocking political-economic dominance of the powerful Lao clans 
(Stuart-Fox 2004, 8). Because of the political nature of the bureaucracy 
and state apparatus, decision making in Lao PDR is concentrated in the 
hands of very high-level offi cials—in particular those in the LPRP’s Central 
Committee, which includes key ministers and provincial governors. 
State Building and Multifaceted Reform
A series of initial obstacles notwithstanding, LPRP has essentially suc-
ceeded in extending its governing authority across the country, binding the 
nation itself together, and building a national economy and administra-
tive infrastructure. The party has governed the Lao PDR with a great deal 
of overall stability since 1975 under the socialist principle of democratic 
centralism. In the early years of the Lao PDR, the Soviet Union and com-
munist Eastern Europe provided the country with 60 percent of its military 
aid, and advisors from the Communist bloc were prominent in Lao PDR. 
Vietnam played an even more direct role in the country’s governance, with 
advisers placed at all key levels in the administration working closely with 
LPRP cadres.4
Guided by a blueprint for socialist economic modernization at the  outset, 
the LPRP identifi ed crucial sectors for investment and capacity building, 
including the power and roads sectors. Yet LPRP’s attempts at more radical 
socialist economic methods, such as agricultural collectivization, national-
ization of large businesses, and a centrally planned economy, were recog-
nized as failures relatively early, prompting market-oriented reforms in the 
1980s (Evans 2002, 195). A crucial turning point in the country’s develop-
ment trajectory was the government’s 1986 decision to embark on the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM), a program of  market-oriented economic 
reforms accompanied by signifi cant administrative reforms. Although the 
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Lao state continues to be involved in a great deal of economic activity, 
NEM reforms have transformed the country’s political economy over the 
past three decades.
Lao PDR has been characterized by recurrent patterns of decentraliza-
tion and recentralization. Under NEM, the government offi cially devolved 
control over revenues and budgetary expenditures, as well as some mea-
sure of autonomy on civil service management, to provincial authorities. 
Because of a combination of weaker government capacity and parochial 
political imperatives at the provincial level, the reform led to fi scal imbal-
ances and macroeconomic instability, which in turn led to a marked 
deterioration in public service delivery. At the end of the 1980s, as mar-
ketization reforms picked up steam, the party recognized the ineffi ciency 
of the administrative system, which had become heavily bureaucratic and 
faced a dearth of skilled engineers and administrative staff at the local 
level.5 As a result, the government embarked on an attempt at administra-
tive centralization, formulated fi rst in the 1991 Lao Constitution, which 
called for a centralization of revenues and reaffi rmed “democratic central-
ism” as the management principle guiding public administration. Through 
the 1990s, line ministries regained more direct control over their provincial 
technical branches. Yet provincial governors, holding high ranks in the 
LPRP, remained politically powerful—and defended their autonomy in the 
management of their localities. 
The Lao government maintains its vision of a centralized state and 
its principle of democratic centralism, while still pursuing a measure 
of devolution. Government elites—supported and advised by develop-
ment partners—are progressively building a centralized state apparatus 
to enforce national policies and integration, while devolving day-to-day 
management and implementation to the provincial authorities. Thus, the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment and the Ministry of Finance have 
retained their prerogative as the agencies charged, respectively, with defi n-
ing socioeconomic development priorities and centralizing all revenues 
and reallocating them on the basis of a bottom-up planning system. At the 
same time, in the early 2000s, the provinces were offi cially handed back 
some measure of fi scal and administrative functional autonomy—with the 
goal of building the provinces as the strategic, decision-making units, and 
the districts as the planning, budgeting, and implementation units. Today, 
Lao PDR is often characterized as a deconcentrated system with powerful 
governors, an administrative result that matches the country’s political 
imperatives. 
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Economic Objectives and Institutional Capacity
Lao PDR remains today one of the poorest countries in the East Asia and 
Pacifi c region—with poverty rates still particularly high among  ethnic 
minorities and remote rural populations. From 1990 onward, however—
as the market-oriented reforms took hold—Lao PDR has enjoyed a 
period of robust economic development and poverty reduction. Over the 
past two decades, the economy has grown at an average of 6.5 percent 
per year, and per capita incomes tripled to US$1,260 in 2012. The num-
ber of poor households fell from 46 percent in 1992–93 to 27 percent in 
2007–08. 
An overarching development imperative for the Lao government has 
been its focus on moving out of least-developed country status and joining 
regional neighbors in the ranks of middle-income countries.6 The original 
LPRP leadership cohort recognized relatively early that growth and devel-
opment would be central to their legitimacy and to the long-term stabil-
ity of the country under their rule. A common refrain today is that Lao 
PDR wants to be like its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
neighbors in terms of economic development and social modernization. 
LPRP has guided the country’s economic liberalization while retaining 
political and administrative control, explicitly following the examples of 
China and Vietnam. At the same time, the role of multilateral development 
banks and bilateral donors was enhanced with the initiation of reforms in 
the mid-1980s. 
Lao PDR has made steady improvements in its level of institutional 
capacity, graduating from the ranks of the fragile and confl ict-affected 
situations (FCS) in the early 2000s. Its current governance structures have 
both strengths and weaknesses. The country is situated in a propitious 
neighborhood of economies with high growth potential and in which elites 
generally have a strong developmental orientation, albeit with varying sys-
tems of government. Yet, while Lao PDR compares favorably with other 
developing countries in East Asia and the Pacifi c and FCS in terms of politi-
cal stability, it underperforms regional and FCS comparators on other key 
governance dimensions (see fi gures 4.1a and 4.1b). Signifi cant areas of 
overall weakness include accountability and regulatory quality, although 
the single-party political system with strongly centralized accountability 
appears to have evolved somewhat in recent years. In particular, the role 
of the 100-plus member National Assembly in policy making continues to 
strengthen, and the State Audit Offi ce has been expanded and now reports 
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to the National Assembly rather than the government. Accountability 
 pressures appear to be building overall; for example, a new hotline was 
established for the expression of citizens’ grievances to the National 
Assembly. Lao people are much more exposed to different  systems of gov-
ernance through connections with regional neighbors and, in particular, 
Thai television. The growing private sector, with international involve-
ment, also raises accountability demands on government.
Government effectiveness and the rule of law are also challenges for 
Lao PDR. Governance and public administration reforms were introduced 
to support economic reforms, yet administrative capacity and effi ciency 
remain a major constraint in both central and line ministries. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that corruption—in the form of state capture as well 
as administrative rent-seeking—is common and increasingly problematic, 
but a lack of public opinion or enterprise surveys has hampered meaning-
ful assessment of the issue. Legal reform has been pursued with a view 
to establishing the rule of law more fi rmly and numerous new laws have 
been enacted; but these remain little understood and, consequently, poorly 
and inconsistently implemented.7 On the plus side—even as it continues 
to face weaknesses in accountability, regulatory quality, and government 
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Figure 4.1. Governance in Lao PDR in Comparison with the Average
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank Institute.
Note: Data are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The six governance indicators 
shown are aggregated from a series of underlying indices and scored from –2.5 to 2.5 for each country in 
the data set. These data should be treated with caution, but they provide a reasonable “at-a-glance” snapshot 
of a country’s governance context in comparative perspective. See also Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2010). 
FCS = fragile and confl ict-affected situations; EAP = East Asia Pacifi c.
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effectiveness—the government has made important advances over the past 
fi ve years in strengthening its public fi nancial management system and 
improving internal oversight mechanisms, thus improving the overall level 
of public sector institutional quality.
Notes
 1. LPRP has developed a nationalist historiography that casts itself as the heir 
to the Kingdom of Lan Xang, which, centered in the ancient capital of Luang 
Prabang was the only other authority that governed most of contemporary 
Lao PDR. 
 2. Almost three-quarters of the Lao population live in rural areas. The popula-
tion is made up of 49 recognized ethnic groups with 160 subcategories. The 
ethnic Lao make up the largest group, at 55 percent of the population, and 
predominantly live in the Mekong lowland areas; the ethnic minorities that 
comprise the rest of the population live mostly in the highland and mountain-
ous regions of the country (Lao Department of Statistics 2008).
 3. Today’s core Party leadership, as represented in the Politburo, retains members 
from the original revolutionary group, with a strengthened role for the mili-
tary (Stuart-Fox 2004, 207).
 4. China, for regional geopolitical reasons (especially the confl ict over Cambodia), 
was essentially frozen out of establishing close relations with LPRP by the 
Vietnamese; the Lao-China relationship only became stronger and more 
important from the mid-1990s onward (Evans 2002, 189–91).
 5. 5th Party Resolution, 1988. 
 6. The Lao government’s oft-stated goals in this area are to reduce the country’s 
poverty level to 10 percent, achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 
2015, and graduate from least-developed country status by 2020.
 7. See Stuart-Fox (2004) for a deeper discussion of legal reforms, along with an 
analysis of the evolving politics of reform in Lao PDR.
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Lao PDR Case Study: Électricité du Laos
Naazneen H. Barma and Stephanie Robert Oksen
Électricité du Laos (EDL), the public electricity utility of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, has achieved remarkable institutional success over 
the past two decades, particularly in terms of the gains in rural electrifi -
cation it has achieved in the country. EDL has distributed electricity to 
a steadily increasing proportion of the Lao population, with improving 
 levels of service consistency and technical effi ciency. Through the expan-
sion of the electricity grid to remote areas and the poorest elements of the 
Lao population, EDL has built legitimacy for itself in the eyes of its clients 
and stakeholders across the country and, in turn, played an important part 
in building the legitimacy of the state. Its successes have, moreover, proven 
durable over almost four decades, across several changes in leadership and 
in the face of setbacks. EDL’s mandate includes the essential business of 
electricity generation, a dimension that has provided essential fi nancial and 
institutional resources to the Government of Lao PDR and has become 
even more crucial as the country has modernized.
This chapter examines how and why, in the otherwise challenging con-
text of a low-income and relatively low-capacity country, EDL has been 
able to achieve these successes. It describes how the core underpinnings 
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of this institutional success emerge in the three concentric circles consti-
tuting EDL’s operating environment—the sociopolitical context in which 
it is positioned, its more immediate external operational relationships, 
and its internal institutional workings. This introduction provides some 
key highlights of the causal argument, with subsequent sections deliver-
ing more detail.
The sociopolitical context in which EDL is situated has enabled and laid 
the conditions for the agency’s success (Barma and Robert Oksen  chapter 4, 
this volume). EDL plays a unique, symbolic role in Lao PDR. It was formed 
before the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and, in the fi rst decades 
after LPRP came to power in 1975, was a crucial source of revenue and 
foreign exchange for the government. EDL was accordingly granted a privi-
leged status among the various organs of the new state. The Government of 
Lao PDR identifi ed the electricity sector as a spearhead and crucial mecha-
nism of socialist modernization—viewing it as essential to enabling heavy 
industrialization and rural livelihoods.1 In addition to these economic goals, 
the power sector has played a major sociopolitical role, serving the govern-
ment and LPRP as a crucial nation-building mechanism by physically bind-
ing together the nation with a geographically expanding electricity grid. 
Likewise, the state-building function served by EDL has been crucial. For 
many Lao citizens, their access to the electricity grid and their interaction 
with EDL employees serve as their primary, and sometimes sole,  tangible 
connection to the state. EDL’s rural electrifi cation program continues to 
serve these nation- and state-building imperatives, as the government uses 
the lure of connection to the public electricity grid to encourage remote vil-
lages to resettle and form into clusters. More recently, Lao PDR has become 
increasingly poised to take its place in the regional economy as the “battery 
of Southeast Asia,” based on its tremendous hydropower potential. The 
electricity sector has thus taken on even more signifi cance, with EDL at the 
helm of the government’s work in this area. Electricity thus continues to be an 
important symbol of Lao PDR’s economic development and national iden-
tity, as well as an instrument for the achievement of these goals of modernity.
EDL has been adept at capitalizing on the crucial symbolic and practi-
cal roles assigned to the electricity sector. In turn, it has delivered impor-
tant results for the Lao governing elite in terms of its goals of nation- and 
state-building as well as economic modernization. In the context of EDL’s 
priority status, its leaders have carved out a sphere of operational indepen-
dence for the agency in an otherwise tightly circumscribed and controlled 
governance environment, managing to insulate the agency from external 
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governance pressures in part by making the services it delivers invaluable 
to LPRP leadership. This relative operational autonomy has enabled EDL 
to pursue internal management strategies that are singularly focused on 
achieving ambitious and ever-expanding service delivery mandates. 
As a state-owned enterprise, EDL enjoys relative autonomy in the man-
ner in which it recruits, compensates, and deploys staff. Remuneration 
 levels are high, and EDL is able to attract the country’s most highly skilled 
and motivated workers. The organizational ethic is one that emphasizes 
professionalism and technical excellence. Furthermore, although the com-
pany operates in a hierarchical, bureaucratic fashion that eclipses true fl ex-
ibility further down the ranks, its management systems and organizational 
culture are such that those workers feel themselves valued members of 
the institution. Such practices range from a transparent annual perfor-
mance bonus system to the utility’s widely respected blue-shirt uniform 
for all staff, including management. EDL emphasizes technical effi ciency 
in a manner that relies on constant data usage, using a service standards 
manual for fi eld operatives, operating 24-hour service hotlines for all cli-
ents, and ensuring electricity losses are minimized. The utility’s consider-
able fi nancial and human resources are thus marshaled toward delivering 
public services in a manner that bolsters EDL’s and the government’s con-
nection with the Lao people and builds state legitimacy in their eyes.
The manner in which EDL has operated vis-à-vis its external  partners 
and context complements its management of its human and fi nancial 
resources, further enabling it to achieve continued success. While leveraging 
its relative autonomy, EDL is nonetheless adept at managing its relation-
ships with the various stakeholders that serve as its principals and imple-
mentation partners—including donors and small and medium enterprises 
in the power sector—and prioritizes a close connection with its  clients. The 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) is responsible for overall strategy 
and policy making in the power sector. Yet, despite its de jure agent status, 
EDL has a wide operational scope in the electricity sector. MEM grants 
EDL a great deal of functional autonomy in practice; the relationship is 
smoothed by the revolving door for top offi cials between the two institu-
tions. MEM is represented on EDL’s board of directors, along with several 
other important principals, such as the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and 
the board serves as a consensus-building mechanism such that any internal 
divisions are not apparent outside the agency. EDL senior management 
is also well-positioned in the party hierarchy and able to represent the 
 agency’s best interests in the political arena. EDL has benefi tted a great 
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deal from the government’s consistent prioritization of, and long-term 
strategic vision for, the development of the power sector. In particular, 
the policy environment put in place to position Lao PDR in the regional 
energy market has been conducive to EDL’s success, especially since the 
agency has been able to adapt itself well to evolving needs and objectives. 
Related in part to the organizational narrative that it is providing a cru-
cial public service, EDL has an exceptionally strong focus on the end users 
of electricity, including households, commercial and industrial entities, and 
government agencies. EDL’s targets are framed in terms of the rate of rural 
household electrifi cation, and its deconcentrated planning and implemen-
tation systems are structured in pursuit of those goals. Furthermore, EDL 
has successfully deployed development partner assistance while remaining 
in the driver’s seat. An early vision of the role of the power sector in Lao 
PDR’s development trajectory was developed by its fi rst cohort of revo-
lutionary leaders in the 1970s and has been used as a blueprint to guide 
sector development over the past four decades. Subsequently, however, the 
contemporary power sector strategy was developed in the early 1990s in 
concert with donors’ institutional development programs after the country 
embarked on economic and administrative reforms. The government has 
managed donor involvement accordingly, relying on multilateral develop-
ment banks for assistance with infrastructure development and the rural 
electrifi cation program (the Asian Development Bank in the north of the 
country and the World Bank in the south) and on bilateral donors, including 
the Soviet Union and France, for policy guidance and technical assistance. 
Institutional Success
EDL was founded in 1961, before the formation of the Lao PDR in 1975. 
It is the state-owned public utility that manages Lao PDR’s electricity gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution assets across the country, as well as 
the import and export of electricity with neighboring countries. The EDL 
Decree of 1986 established EDL as a national company, requiring the pro-
gressive integration of what had been provincial public utility companies 
under the supervision and leadership of EDL Vientiane. EDL is offi cially 
under the  management of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, which sets 
sector policy; in practice, EDL has a great deal of operational autonomy in 
terms of planning and implementing its service delivery mandate. This case 
study of successful  institution building focuses on EDL’s electricity distribu-
tion, or electrifi cation, function, which constitutes its major public service 
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and developmental role, rather than its power generation business, which 
is more commercially oriented.2 EDL has demonstrated success across the 
three criteria of results, legitimacy, and resilience, as is refl ected in objective 
measures and interviewee responses. 
Results
EDL has achieved several tangible successes in terms of its major objec-
tive of expanding reliable access to electricity throughout the country. 
First and foremost is the remarkable growth in the country’s electrifi ca-
tion rates through extension of the electricity grid and household con-
nections to it, especially across rural areas. The Lao government and 
EDL have emphasized distributing electricity to rural areas for more than 
20 years, setting target electrifi cation ratios over time and coordinating 
donor support to achieve improvements in rural access to electricity. In 
1995 the Minister of Energy and Mines declared electrifi cation targets of 
70 percent by 2010 and 90 percent by 2020. EDL has steadily worked 
toward achieving these targets and, as a result of this concerted effort, Lao 
PDR’s electrifi cation ratio has increased an average 4 percent annually 
since 1995. Over 15 years, the number of household connections more 
than quadrupled from about 120,000 households (15 percent) in 1995 to 
more than 700,000 households (almost 70 percent) in 2009 (World Bank 
2012). Access to electricity increased especially rapidly in the latter part 
of the past decade, with the ratio of households connected to the EDL 
grid climbing from 45 percent in 2005 to 72 percent in 2010. Currently, 
over 80 percent of households have access to electricity (including off-
grid solutions) and the government is well on the way to meeting its 90 
percent target (see table 5.1). Remarkably, Lao PDR has achieved its elec-
trifi cation ratio at a relatively low level of per capita income and at a 
more rapid pace of implementation in comparison with other countries 
that have also carried out successful electrifi cation programs (World Bank 
2012, vii). 
Table 5.1. Household Electrifi cation Ratio, 1995–2010
Percentage of all households
1995 2000 2005 2010
Electrifi cation ratio (households with 
access to EDL system) 12 33 46 73
Electrifi cation ratio (households with 
access to any system) 15 36 48 80
Source: Robert Oksen (2012), derived from MEM Statistical Yearbooks.
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Figure 5.1. Historical Records of EDL Losses, 1991–2010
Source: Robert Oksen (2012), derived from EDL Annual Reports.
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Most recently, in support of the goal of 90 percent electrifi cation 
by 2020, EDL has implemented the Power to the Poor (P2P) Program 
in partnership with donors. P2P is intended to provide access to the 
poorest households that have remained off the grid because they can-
not afford grid connection fees. The program provides an interest-free 
credit to poor households for the connection fee (averaging 700,000–
850,000 kip), which the households then pay back to EDL in small 
installments as part of their monthly electricity bill over three years.3 
The monthly payments are roughly equivalent to what poor households 
would be spending monthly on inferior energy sources, such as batteries 
or diesel lamps.
In addition to improving the nation’s electrifi cation ratio, EDL has also 
improved the quality of the electricity supply. It has managed to reduce its 
technical losses over the past 20 years (fi gure 5.1) through improvements in 
the utility’s technical capacity and knowledge. Households and corporate 
clients agree that the reliability and quality of the electricity supplied to 
clients has improved, with the frequency of blackouts decreasing and EDL 
being able to restore interrupted power supply more quickly. Many clients 
noted satisfaction with EDL’s service responsiveness (especially its 24-hour 
service hotline) and the professionalism of the billing and service staff. 
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Some clients noted, however, that voltage drops during peak periods are 
common in the villages and power shortages are still a problem. 
EDL has grown, almost doubling the employee roll from 1,983 to 3,522 
over the past 15 years. And it has increased the effi ciency with which it pro-
vides electricity services, with the number of clients per employee and the 
electricity sales per employee increasing fourfold over 15 years (fi gure 5.2). 
As it has achieved these results, EDL has moved toward adopting inter-
national standards for a public electricity utility—for example, recently 
being granted ISO certifi cation 9001 in recognition of the “International 
Standard Quality Management Systems” of EDL and its general efforts in 
aligning with international practices.
EDL has also demonstrated results in terms of its generation capacity, 
playing a crucial role in increasing Lao PDR’s electricity generation by 
an average of 3 percent per year since the early 1990s.4 Because of the 
signifi cant and steady increase in domestic electricity consumption (which 
increased by a factor of 14 over those 20 years), EDL’s electricity exports 
have fallen an average of 3 percent and Lao PDR’s electricity imports have 
increased to reach 45 percent of domestic electricity consumption. The 
import of electricity is a sensitive issue in Lao PDR, since there are varying 
views even within government on the relative merits of EDL continuing 
to export electricity versus ensuring the country’s power self-suffi ciency. 
Figure 5.2. EDL Effi ciency Gains, 1995–2010
Source: Robert Oksen (2012), derived from EDL Annual Reports.
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Power imports are, in part, a geographical necessity. The power trans-
mission lines from the country’s main generation plants are oriented toward 
export to neighboring countries, and electricity must be imported into other 
regions of the country. There are also advantages to an export orientation: 
it brings benefi ts, such as foreign investment, technical assistance, skills, 
and technology that have assisted EDL in its goal of becoming a state-of-
the-art electricity company. EDL’s mandate has always incorporated elec-
tricity generation but donor recommendations in the early 1990s, as well 
as the regional power sector context, contributed to the dissociation of 
electricity generation and distribution, along with an overall trend toward 
the privatization of power generation in Lao PDR. While EDL remains the 
main agency charged with the rural electrifi cation mandate, the responsi-
bility for power generation and export is shared among other power sec-
tors stakeholders, such as the Lao Holding State Enterprise, MEM, and 
independent power producers that are typically joint ventures between Lao 
and other regional interests.
Legitimacy
By increasing the Lao population’s access to electricity, EDL plays a  crucial 
role in serving the government’s overall socioeconomic development objec-
tives. In turn, EDL enjoys a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population and contributes to building the overall legitimacy of the state. 
For many Lao people, access to the public electricity grid is one, if not the 
only, tangible way in which they interface with the state. In turn, their 
interactions with EDL employees on grid connection, billing, and service 
calls are a major aspect of how they experience the state in their lives. EDL 
benefi ts from a certain aura in the eyes of the population, delivering as it 
does the essential public service of electricity. Users typically perceive EDL 
as “a company serving the development of the nation” and as “a service 
provider.”5 A large measure of EDL’s legitimacy arises from its particular 
mandate to fulfi ll the government’s pledge of electricity access to all  villages. 
Delivering on this mandate is enabled by unique operational factors, such 
as EDL’s monopoly in service provision as well as the public subsidies that 
maintain low electricity prices and facilitate household connections to the 
grid even in remote areas.
The level of public trust in EDL is relatively high. A majority of elec-
tricity users in focus groups report their overall level of trust in EDL as 
medium and evaluate the institution’s technical capacities and equity in 
service delivery as trustworthy. One area of lower trust is in EDL’s ability 
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to supply stable and high-quality power. The results on trust are corrobo-
rated by levels of reported client satisfaction. A majority of users rate EDL 
services and communication as highly satisfactory; but fi ve focus groups of 
twelve rated their satisfaction as medium-low, demanding a higher-quality 
power supply even as they recognized that capacity was being stretched 
because of new users. 
Resilience
EDL predates the formation of the Lao PDR and it has been adept at navi-
gating and adapting to sociopolitical changes, macroeconomic and institu-
tional reforms, and even fi nancial crisis. Throughout its more than 50-year 
history, it has been recognized by the Lao people as an important service 
provider and by the government as a crucial symbol of modernization and 
vehicle for economic development. Its role as a central revenue source for 
government, through the generation of hydropower, has contributed to its 
durable institutional success.
EDL has been headed by several managing directors over time and han-
dled leadership transitions well. Top management at EDL typically rises 
through the organization’s ranks and provides important continuity. In 
addition, the revolving door in top management between EDL and MEM 
along with EDL’s board structure, comprising representatives from all 
major ministries, contributes to its sustained role as a major, well-resourced 
state agency that provides an essential public service in close coordination 
with other government entities.
EDL has also survived a recent crisis, albeit with the fi nancial interven-
tion of the government. Between 1997 and 2001, EDL’s fi nancial perfor-
mance was signifi cantly affected by the depreciation of the kip (a result of 
the Asian Financial Crisis) because the company was borrowing almost all 
its debt in foreign currency. The International Monetary Fund’s structural 
adjustment evaluation underlined that EDL had generated nonperforming 
loans to such an extent that its restructuring was unavoidable. In essence, 
MOF “recapitalized” EDL to prevent its bankruptcy. The government 
signed a fi nancial recovery program that committed EDL to restoring its 
fi nancial viability and improving its capacity to generate funds to meet 
future investment needs. EDL also signed a performance contract with two 
key principals, MOF and the Ministry of Industry and Handicraft (MEM’s 
precursor). The contract established targets for EDL’s technical, commer-
cial, and fi nancial performance; reorganized the utility into profi t cen-
ters; and instituted formal audit practices and accountability mechanisms 
128 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
(Government of Lao PDR 2001). These reforms subsequently positioned 
EDL to recover its operational successes. 
Institutional Sociopolitical Context: Electricity as a Leading 
Edge of Modernization
The power sector has consistently been strategically emphasized as an 
important symbol, major priority, and crucial tool of the Lao socialist 
modernization and development trajectory. Current development of the 
hydropower sector still follows components of the Mekong Committee’s 
development projects in the 1950s as well as a national assessment fi rst 
completed in the 1960s (Robert Oksen 2009). The power sector was seen 
as central to the country’s push to industrialize and to take its geographic 
place as a crossroads for trade. EDL, which was formed in 1961 well 
before the LPRP came to power, serves as an important symbolic role in the 
country’s modernization. Furthermore, in the fi rst decades after the decla-
ration of the Lao PDR in 1975, EDL was a central source of revenue and 
foreign exchange for the government, which faced acute current account 
and budget defi cits, and was granted a privileged status accordingly. EDL, 
in turn, has benefi tted from its state-granted monopoly over the produc-
tion and supply of electricity. It has taken advantage of the opportunities 
offered by economic reform and increasing regional interconnectedness, 
in particular through building a cohort of skilled managers and engineers 
who rely on their international network to focus the EDL mission on pro-
fessional standards.
Governing Elites and the Power Sector
EDL was established as a state-owned enterprise in 1961 in the context 
of a broader vision placing the power sector as central to Southeast Asia’s 
push to industrialize and identifying Lao PDR, with its rich hydropower 
potential, as a key electricity supplier for the region. EDL thus received 
the early support of nations from both Cold War blocs to install the fi rst 
Lao power plants and to develop the power transmission network. During 
its early years, EDL was a microcosm of wider political rivalries (Robert 
Oksen 2009). For example, although the utility’s director was a core mem-
ber of the neutralist faction of the Royal Lao government, EDL manag-
ers and technical staff formed a labor union supporting the revolutionary 
Pathet Lao. This period endowed EDL with a pool of skilled engineers and 
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managers, educated in the colonial era and through key power develop-
ment projects (mainly the Nam Ngum Dam). These skilled EDL engineers 
earned the trust of the leaders of the LPRP as a result of their support 
during the revolution. The engineers also offered the country’s new politi-
cal elite the crucial technical and administrative skills necessary to deliver 
electricity and the fi nancial resources that came with the country’s early 
investment in the power sector (Robert Oksen 2009). 
EDL was, crucially, able to generate revenue and foreign exchange for 
the government until the late 1980s. It was thus essential in helping the new 
LPRP regime to establish its legitimacy and ability to govern and was granted 
a privileged status accordingly. In addition, electricity has served LPRP and 
the Government of Lao PDR as a nation-building mechanism, physically 
binding together what has been in its contemporary history a regionally, 
ethnically, and geographically fractured country ( Barma and Robert Oksen 
chapter 4, this volume). The rural electrifi cation program continues to serve 
this nation-building imperative, encouraging village clusters to form to take 
advantage of power infrastructure and speeding the relocation of remote 
villagers in mountainous areas (where many tribal and ethnic minorities 
continue to live) to more densely populated areas in the lowlands. 
Furthermore, the power sector was envisioned by the revolution-
ary leadership as a tool for development, providing electricity supply 
to households and enterprises; and it was seen as a core industry itself, 
driving and representing Lao developmental achievements. The original 
LPRP leadership recognized relatively early that growth and develop-
ment would be central to their legitimacy and the long-term stability of 
the country under their rule. A common refrain today is that Lao PDR 
wants to be like its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
neighbors in terms of economic development and social modernization. 
Electricity continues to be used as both a symbol of this development and 
a crucial vehicle for its achievement. In addition, the delivery of pro-poor 
public services such as electricity is a central element of LPRP’s strategy 
for retaining popular support and solidarity with the Party. EDL itself 
was embedded in an integrated vision of sector development in the earli-
est days of the Lao PDR (Robert Oksen 2009, 2012; Larsen 2001). It has, 
in turn, benefi tted from its state-granted monopoly over the production 
and supply of electricity, notwithstanding the structural reforms toward 
privatization of the electricity market since the mid-1990s. In addition, 
the government has resourced the sector, in fi nancial and human terms, in 
line with its importance.
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Reform and New Opportunities
An important turning point in Lao PDR’s development trajectory was the 
government’s 1986 decision to embark on the New Economic Mechanism 
(NEM), a program of market-oriented economic reforms accompanied by 
signifi cant administrative reforms (Barma and Robert Oksen chapter 4, 
this volume). Several interviewees identifi ed this reform program as central 
to the subsequent success of the power sector—not least because it was 
under this set of reforms that state enterprises, including EDL, were granted 
operational autonomy and market accountability. In addition to providing 
greater autonomy to EDL in terms of its management, this reform opened 
the way for skilled engineers and managers educated abroad to reintegrate 
into the company. These reforms, in turn, made it possible for EDL to 
enter the regional electricity market as a supplier of affordable hydropower 
(Robert Oksen 2009). 
The EDL Decree promulgated with the 1986 NEM reforms aimed to 
rebuild EDL as a national company, requiring the progressive integration 
of the provincial public utility companies under the supervision and lead-
ership of EDL Vientiane (Robert Oksen 2012). This centralization pro-
cess illustrates many of the core underpinnings of EDL’s continued success. 
The policy proved diffi cult to implement at fi rst but became  easier from 
the 1990s onward, as provincial power systems (beginning with Luang 
Prabang) were connected to the central (Nam Ngum) grid. The support of 
development partners in transmission and distribution projects was essen-
tial in the centralization of the various existing  electricity systems. 
A new generation of power sector managers was trained in the fi rst 
crop of international, independent power projects in Lao PDR, such as 
Nam Ngum, Xeset, Houay Ho, and Theun Hinboun. The leadership of 
this cohort was crucial in integrating and managing the new national 
 company. They facilitated the process of centralization and the standard-
ization of procedures in the new, national, state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
through effective delegation of their authority to an increased number of 
deputies across technical departments, with an emphasis on professional 
standards. This deconcentration of implementation capacity—whereby 
departments, branches, offi ces, and projects were responsible for day-
to-day tasks—also contributed to EDL’s increasing reach and ability to 
deliver services to local communities.
Structural adjustment triggers in the 1980s, as well as the regional 
trend toward privatization of the electricity sector in the 1990s, pursued 
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an emphasis on increasing transparency in the fi nancial relationships 
between SOEs, including EDL, and the government. In turn, these reforms 
improved the operating effi ciency and fi nancial footing of many SOEs and 
put them on a gradual path toward increased commercialization. EDL 
was no exception and was reorganized as a commercial enterprise in the 
late 1990s, with the introduction of a board of directors and a managing 
director. This major structural change coincided with the increased infl u-
ence of a newer generation of managers, many professionally trained by, 
and networked into, projects funded by international investors and devel-
opment partners.6
More recently, the government’s emphasis on the power sector has 
continued with a slightly different cast, as Lao PDR is becoming more 
deeply integrated into the Mekong subregion. Electricity remains central 
to developing the country’s trade connections, in particular with Thailand, 
Vietnam, and China, which in turn have delivered large fi nancial fl ows and 
numerous advantages in terms of economic development. This is evidenced 
by the impressive growth of the provinces most closely connected economi-
cally with neighboring countries, especially Champassak and Phongsaly. 
Representatives of the power sector expressed a conscious pride in their 
role in facilitating economic livelihoods and trade, powering other sectors, 
and being a key to economic development. Furthermore, Lao PDR has 
become increasingly poised to take its place as the “battery of Southeast 
Asia,” based on its tremendous hydropower potential. The electricity sector 
has taken on even more signifi cance, especially as large international power 
producers have struck major power deals with the government, supported 
by development partners (such as the Nam Theun II hydropower project). 
EDL has demonstrated over more than fi ve decades the ability to retain 
its core mandates and position as a leading edge of Lao socioeconomic 
development and modernization. To that effect, the capacity to adapt 
its organizational structure to its sociopolitical context as well as proac-
tive responses to emerging opportunities have been essential. Moreover, 
it has protected itself from demands for state-owned enterprise reform 
as the Lao economy has become increasingly marketized and globally 
connected. This adaptiveness is a hallmark of the institution’s durability 
and resilience. Its institutional success in terms of delivering results and 
earning legitimacy rest on two sets of core underpinnings. One is a high 
degree of operational autonomy that enables an emphasis on technical 
and practical choices geared toward achieving its service delivery targets. 
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The other is the astute management of its connections with Lao stake-
holders, EDL’s end-user clients, and its implementation and development 
partners. The next two sections discuss each of these sets of causal expla-
nations of success in turn.
Results through Operational Autonomy 
Électricité du Laos has built its institutional success by capitalizing on its 
priority sector status and resourcing privileges to carve out a high degree 
of operational autonomy for itself. In turn, it has channeled this auton-
omy into a focus on achieving its service delivery mandate through astute 
management. It has pursued strategic and balanced sector planning in the 
context of the broader socialist planning system; cultivated a strong corpo-
rate and professional identity along with a service-oriented work ethic and 
organizational culture; built a reliance on data and cutting-edge technical 
standards to aid organizational performance; and emphasized professional 
and technical standards through relative autonomy in and attention to per-
sonnel management. In turn, its cumulative success in delivering various 
forms of results for the Lao political elite has garnered the agency even 
more operational autonomy over time. 
Sector Prioritization and Planning
The overall stability of the Lao governing regime, along with the sustained 
emphasis it has placed over time on the power sector and rural electrifi ca-
tion, were identifi ed across the board as core contributors to EDL’s suc-
cess. The government’s prioritization of the power sector and its clear and 
consistent policies for the sector are signaled by the steady support (fi nan-
cial and nonfi nancial) provided to EDL and by the important position the 
agency occupies within the power structure of government. In turn, EDL’s 
success in delivering electricity throughout the country has contributed to 
the government’s cumulative legitimacy. EDL’s success has thus been built 
on the layered combination of political resolve to provide national electri-
fi cation as a public good, clear targets for electricity access, the necessary 
policy and fi nancial commitment to achieve the goals set, and the estab-
lishment of positive and long-standing relationships with regional power 
sector stakeholders and international donors (World Bank 2012, 7).
The power sector’s priority status is not necessarily refl ected in direct 
resourcing by the government. Since 2000, government spending on the 
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combined mining and power sector has been between 1 percent and 5 per-
cent of total public expenditures.7 The government contributed more direct 
funds to EDL in the 1990s—including a great deal of public investment 
in the power sector and loans from development partners to build high-
capacity transmission lines. Today, EDL can and does turn to commercial 
sources of funding, especially for hydropower generation and transmis-
sion. The rural electrifi cation program, however, remains publicly funded 
and is reliant on the support of donors.8 
The government’s nonfi nancial support of EDL, by contrast, has been 
consistent and essential. From a policy environment perspective, the gov-
ernment has acted to protect the company from demands for structural 
changes and to create favorable conditions for the nascent electricity 
 market. In particular, government policy was crucial in creating the favor-
able conditions for foreign direct investment and the technological trans-
fers that came with it. Massive investments were required for Lao PDR 
to become the “Battery of Asia” that neither the government nor EDL 
itself, on the basis of its own revenue stream in a limited market, could 
afford. Sector reforms in the 1990s focused on the privatization of power 
generation with the proclamation of the Electricity Law (1997) and the 
amended Investment Law (1994), which endorsed the build-own-operate-
and-transfer model for independent power producers. The government 
maintained its participation in the new hydropower plants through EDL. 
Several interviewees noted that the government views the energy sector as 
serving as a demonstration effect for international investors, showing that 
it is not too risky to invest in the country.
The National Socio-Economic Development Plan, the government’s 
fi ve-year planning system, and the annual planning mechanisms are crucial 
in terms of overall sector strategy, resourcing, and operational targets for 
any government agency. The annual planning process is facilitated by the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment. The process begins bottom-up, with 
needs articulated at the district level, collated at the provincial level with 
the supervision of the provincial governor’s offi ce, and passed up the verti-
cal line to the agency in question. Prioritization takes place at the top level, 
with discussions over strategy conducted at the highest level of government. 
Resources are then allocated through the ministries to the provincial and 
district levels. As an SOE, EDL’s interests in the planning system are repre-
sented by its principals, MOF and MEM, which directly allocate resources 
to EDL headquarters. EDL is then responsible for resourcing each of its 
branches according to their plans. De jure, nothing can be implemented 
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without being incorporated into the plan; de facto, this means that the 
plan is amended throughout implementation to incorporate new projects 
that are developed when new sources of funding emerge. For example, if a 
village raises funding for a grid connection in collaboration with a private 
sector provider, permission to establish the connection must be granted at 
EDL headquarters and reported in the revised provincial-level plan. 
A problematic aspect of the centralized planning process is that although, 
in theory, inter-ministry coordination is supposed to occur bottom-up 
through the local development plan, in practice there is little coordination 
at the provincial level between the technical staff or even the middle man-
agement of various government agencies. A core advantage of the planning 
system, nevertheless, is that EDL’s annual operational targets are extremely 
clear, and the organization can and does work toward them in a focused 
manner. Furthermore, the lack of inter-ministry coordination and of human 
and fi nancial resources at the local level has created space for EDL to pro-
gressively gain autonomy in its management. Committed to achieving the 
overall sector targets as defi ned by the party and the state administration, 
EDL relies on a data-based system to defi ne priority areas of intervention. 
For example, the rural electrifi cation planning process has become a mul-
tiyear expansion plan running alongside the broader plan system: “It takes 
into account the fi nancial and economic viability of every investment and 
incorporates a project selection methodology that prioritizes areas and vil-
lages to be electrifi ed to maximize social impact, within the constraints of 
available resources.” (World Bank 2012, 10)
Data-Based Organizational Performance and Cutting-Edge Standards
EDL maintains a thorough data collection and analysis system, with opera-
tional decisions made on the basis of these relatively sophisticated tools. 
In other words, the agency practices evidence-based decision making and 
emphasizes the institutionalization of systematic tools for effective man-
agement. This behavior is illustrated by Champassak province’s success in 
addressing its electricity losses, which fell from 26 percent in 2006 (then 
the highest level of provincial losses by far) to 5 percent in 2011 (the lowest 
level of losses by far). The root of this dramatic success in dealing with the 
technical problem was a concerted strategy implemented throughout the 
EDL hierarchy in the province. Data analysis revealed that sources of elec-
tricity losses were faulty conductors and equipment, inadequate switching 
stations, and stealing of electricity through unauthorized connections to 
the grid. A meeting of all district branches within the province was held to 
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discuss these reasons and elaborate on a strategy for addressing them. The 
necessary equipment was purchased from neighboring countries; a training 
manual was developed for service-unit technical staff to assist them with 
equipment maintenance; and a new system of checking client usage against 
billing records was established. Moreover, implementation of the strategy 
was concerted—district branches drew up their own plans of action, the 
management team at the branch offi ce handled prioritization and super-
vision of the strategy, and EDL headquarters assisted as necessary with 
training.9
Other signs of a data-enabled focus on performance exist. EDL frontline 
service providers work with a service manual, with precise instructions on 
steps to take for conducting assessments, equipment installation, mainte-
nance, and so forth, as well as a protocol for when decisions need to be 
elevated up the chain or when assistance is required. EDL also functions 
on the basis of service standards and maintains detailed logs of all service 
calls, recording the request, the action taken, and the response time. At 
headquarters, data records are everywhere in evidence and by all accounts 
thoroughly used to improve the organization’s technical effi ciency and ser-
vice standards. Whether EDL is a “learning” organization is a bit more 
diffi cult to say. A true learning organization would likely be more fl exible 
in adapting to incoming information than EDL, which does seem to have 
relatively rigid, albeit effi cient, channels for response.
Several senior offi cials at EDL and MEM observed that the nature of 
the power sector—more specifi cally, the need to be competitive in order 
to attract international investment—simply demands cutting-edge technol-
ogy and an emphasis on standards. As a result, EDL is at the vanguard 
of technology, including administrative techniques, within government. 
Interviewees pointed out that this emphasis on standards includes the 
imperative for staff to be up-to-date in their education. The fact that 
EDL was recently granted ISO certifi cation 9001 in recognition of its 
“International Standard Quality Management Systems” demonstrates that 
EDL emphasizes and has moved toward international standards for a pub-
lic electricity utility. 
The effi ciency and fi nancial sustainability of EDL operations are key 
motivating factors, as indicated by the strong commitment to reduc-
ing technical losses and improving bill collection and recovering arrears. 
Individual performance is measured in addition to that of the organiza-
tion through a personnel performance evaluation system. On that basis, 
EDL also has a performance-based incentive system where work teams 
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are fi nancially rewarded if they reach their targets and individuals receive 
annual bonuses on the basis of performance. Weekly meetings are orga-
nized at the district branch level to monitor the achievements of front line 
staff, and monthly meetings are held between managers at the provincial 
branch to report challenges and discuss performance. 
Corporate Identity and Service-Oriented Organizational Culture
EDL exhibits a strong corporate identity.10 The utility’s employees, all the 
way up to the managerial ranks, wear a distinctive blue shirt uniform, 
which is reported to bring instant respect and status for EDL employees 
in the fi eld. Professionals in the organization, as well as across the energy 
sector, share training backgrounds and a strong professional identity as 
power sector engineers, which contributes to an organizational mystique 
and sense of belonging. EDL emphasizes the importance of skilled profes-
sionals with formal engineering training and, from its founding, served as 
an incubator of Lao capacity and technical knowledge in the power  sector. 
Today’s senior offi cials in EDL and MEM’s Department of Electricity 
(DOE) come from an original cohort of engineers trained in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe that was later joined by engineers trained in 
Japan and Western Europe. In addition, many current EDL and MEM man-
agers come from the cohort that worked on the Nam Ngum Hydropower 
Project, the fi rst major power generation project in Lao PDR. Some mem-
bers of these engineering cohorts are now on the private industry side, and 
DOE offi cials observed that their continuing professional association with 
their colleagues was an important source of new, innovative engineering 
systems and principles of competition and effi ciency. 
The organization is imbued with a shared sense of purpose that is well-
understood and absorbed throughout the hierarchy. EDL does not appear 
to have a clearly articulated mandate in a typical form, but employees quite 
far down the ranks are able to recite the core goals and objectives of the 
organization and share a sense of pride and commitment to the mission—
with a clear emphasis on accountability for collectively achieving results. 
In interviews, that mission was phrased as “delivering socioeconomic 
development,” “bringing civilization,” and “delivering the government’s 
message in remote areas.” Staff across EDL pointed to rural electrifi ca-
tion and grid extension as a core EDL goal, emphasizing the importance 
of  “providing services to the client” and “supplying quality, affordable, 
and reliable power” for industrialization and modernization, as well as 
“exporting electricity to generate state revenues.”11 To stimulate an esprit 
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de corps, EDL rewards staff performance and commitment through fi nan-
cial bonuses, promotions, and training, along with annual recreational 
events focused on team building. 
EDL is a relatively centralized agency, with traditional, hierarchical 
implementation systems. Provincial and district units essentially function 
as frontline service delivery providers, responsible for implementing the 
precise plans established at the central level in concert with DOE. The dis-
trict units are crucial, representing EDL at the local level and functioning 
as service centers. The district units work with clients to monitor payment 
and provide service (24-hour response), installation, and maintenance. 
Regular management meetings are held throughout the organization to 
ensure that goals are shared across the hierarchy, including weekly meet-
ings of technical unit heads at the district level and monthly meetings of 
district unit heads at the provincial branch level. Provincial EDL branches 
are responsible for the implementation of electrifi cation targets, improve-
ments in customer service, and reduction of technical losses. Branch offi ces 
are empowered with the systems and management to achieve these tasks, 
along with a “highly professional and motivated staff, who take pride in 
their mission and mandate” (World Bank 2012, 10). The organizational 
structure thus reinforces the emphasis on accountability for results gener-
ated by the corporate culture.
Autonomy in Personnel Management
EDL handles its own personnel management, as is its statutory right as a 
state-owned enterprise. It has developed a competitive and systematic recruit-
ment process that includes centrally administered technical entrance exams, 
 in-house and fi eld-based training, and probation procedures for new hires. 
The Central Committee of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party appears to 
be encouraging a general reorientation in the civil service and senior mana-
gerial ranks toward more technocratic, professionalized cadres. EDL has 
emphasized more meritocratic recruitment and career advancement for some 
time, and is often mentioned as a model for the public sector as a whole.
Interviewees at all levels expressed trust in the institution’s practice 
of career advancement on the basis of merit, with respondents confi dent 
that anyone can take their career to the management level.12 Long-time 
Managing Director Khammany Inthirath (who was promoted to vice-
minister of MEM in 2012) worked his way up through the organizational 
ranks from more junior fi eld-based and management positions. More 
generally, the majority of senior staff is reported to have done grassroots 
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work, essential for “understanding people’s needs, and the organization’s 
roots.”13 The institution deploys its staff with attention to local-level 
cultural and linguistic issues. In particular, native-language speakers are 
used in remote, tribal, and ethnic areas—and typically district and pro-
vincial branches—are staffed with individuals from those localities. EDL 
employees have access to continued support in terms of education, train-
ing, and capacity building and, as with all other government employees, 
EDL staff receive political training, organized by provincial and district 
MEM units.
EDL maintains a salary scale different from that of the Lao civil ser-
vice, with higher salaries for all ranks of employees, although EDL remains 
within the government system. In practice, this means that EDL employees 
are among the best-paid workers in Lao PDR, and jobs in the company are 
extremely sought after.14 This relatively high level of remuneration is seen 
as central to attracting and motivating top-quality employees, as well as 
to building a sense of organizational pride and legitimacy in external eyes. 
EDL has an annual performance bonus system that is handled at the 
provincial level, whereby all employees receive a one-time bonus of at 
least 50 percent of their monthly salary, and the top performers in the 
most successful provinces can receive a bonus of up to 200 percent of 
their monthly salary.15 Human resource management is structured on the 
basis of team assignments to specifi c tasks, within the context of the hier-
archical organization. Each head of department, branch, offi ce, and proj-
ect is responsible for implementing strategy by supervising and allocating 
tasks and resources to teams. Individual motivation on the basis of perfor-
mance bonuses is important; but team work, solidarity, and equality are 
core  values in the organization.
Mandate Implementation through Partnerships
Although EDL has created and benefi ted from a high degree of operational 
autonomy, it has also prioritized its relationships with clients, implementa-
tion partners, and stakeholders in building its successes. It has carefully 
managed its relationships with its principals and peers in government, 
placed a singular operational emphasis on concerted attention to client 
needs and levels of satisfaction, and built coordinated service delivery part-
nerships with donors and the private sector. 
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Relationships with Government Stakeholders
EDL is offi cially under MEM management, yet in practice it has a great 
deal of operational autonomy. Many interviewees pointed to a functional 
working relationship between EDL and MEM as the sine qua non of EDL’s 
success. The Minister of Energy and Mines himself employed a telling anal-
ogy in describing the relationship, noting that he held a string connecting 
EDL to the ministry but that he gave that string a great deal of slack, 
empowering EDL to manage itself in delivering on its mandate.16 
EDL must cooperate closely with MEM’s Department of Energy for all 
aspects of its operation; this relationship is delicate but not contentious. 
DOE was established as part of institutional reforms in the power sector 
in the late 1990s, staffed and managed by Lao engineers who had returned 
from overseas training.17 One particular DOE division was assigned 
responsibility for rural off-grid electrifi cation, marking the signifi cance of 
this part of the mandate. DOE takes on key strategic roles related to the 
power sector—overall sector policy, planning, and regulation; coordinat-
ing with donors; and communicating sector strategy to the government 
and national assembly. Senior DOE offi cials noted that this enables EDL 
to focus exclusively on the quality and effi ciency of day-to-day operations 
and service delivery without needing to worry about long-run strategy. 
Thus, although EDL does not have policy autonomy and is in this respect 
an agent of MEM, it has successfully maneuvered for itself a great deal of 
scope in terms of operational autonomy.
Close cooperation between EDL and DOE has been facilitated by trans-
fers of senior offi cials between the two agencies. For example, the DOE 
director-general at the time of research was a member of EDL’s board of 
directors and had previously been EDL’s managing director. EDL’s board 
has also been an important mechanism of close interagency collabora-
tion, with the current board comprising senior offi cials from MEM and 
the Ministry of Finance. A strategic approach to overall staffi ng across the 
power sector also emerges because each of these senior individuals, as is 
typical across government, is nominated by the prime minister and vetted 
by the Party’s Central Committee.
A senior DOE offi cial remarked that the power sector needs an “inter-
preter” to talk to politicians, a function the minister serves well because he 
knows the technical and political contexts. This communication is espe-
cially important because there is sometimes a tension between the interests 
of DOE and those of the party as represented in the higher government 
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ranks. Party offi cials, for example, are typically more interested in energy 
self-suffi ciency, and do not understand the practice of exporting electric-
ity from some locations and importing it at higher rates from  others. The 
minister is thus a crucial champion of EDL in the broader government. 
EDL and MEM are headed by individuals who are increasingly senior 
members of the party’s Central Committee, a refl ection of their individual 
success as well as the signifi cance placed by the party on the power sec-
tor.18 Observers noted that leaders in the sector have been adept, over time, 
at building just the right degree of momentum for innovation and reform 
without running into political constraints. This ability is facilitated, in part, 
by the connections of power sector leaders to the technical network of the 
broader regional and international power sector. For example, retired EDL 
leaders have joined independent power producers as advisors while main-
taining their ability to lobby in the Lao political arena, emphasizing their 
technical expertise and support from their external network to infl uence 
government decision making.
Staff revolves between EDL and MEM constantly, including at the 
uppermost echelons of management. MEM and EDL share one Party 
Secretariat, an important factor in a country in which the party exercises 
political and administrative control. Yet this close cooperation appears to 
break down somewhat below the central levels. Several power sector stake-
holders expressed the sense that coordination between EDL and DOE is 
weak at the provincial and district levels. For example, the two agencies 
sometimes have different lists or maps of which villages are electrifi ed; and 
there are often delays (up to six months to a year) in when data transmit-
ted to Vientiane by one agency are shared at higher levels with the other. 
Provincial-level EDL and MEM branches share political training through 
the horizontal connection to the provincial administration, but the man-
agement of EDL’s provincial branches and district service centers is central-
ized under EDL headquarters. Provincial EDL units follow direction from 
this vertical line, which manifests as a high degree of EDL operational 
autonomy at the subnational level. 
Client Connection
Related in part to the organizational narrative that it is providing a crucial 
public service, EDL has an exceptionally strong focus on the end users of 
electricity, including households, commercial and industrial entities, and 
government agencies. The target of 90 percent electrifi cation by 2020 is 
expressed in terms of households connected, which means in turn, that a 
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great deal of attention is paid to satisfying the energy needs of the popula-
tion. The district branch of EDL serves as the crucial point of interface 
with the population, essentially functioning as a service center.19 District 
branches represent EDL at the local level, conducting billing, carrying out 
maintenance of transmission lines, and working with clients on service 
requests, including installation and repairs. Each EDL district branch staffs 
a 24-hour service hotline, which focus group respondents pointed to as a 
crucial recent improvement in client responsiveness.
EDL pays particular attention to its relationships with its clients, ensur-
ing that households understand the principles of its contracting system. 
Staff often mentioned the time dedicated to explaining to clients matters 
such as billing details and how to save energy. EDL employs an interest-
ing billing model at the village level, outsourcing the collection of house-
hold payments to local people, such as students or villagers, who get paid 
1,500 kip per bill collected. This has enhanced payment levels and would 
seem to represent an important mechanism through which EDL ensures 
sensitivity to local cultural practices and language in its client relationships.
Two aspects of the Lao electricity tariff structure are of particular note 
(see table 5.2, which breaks down the major categories of electricity users 
and illustrates how tariffs have evolved in recent years). First, residential 
electricity is heavily subsidized by the government, with the poorest house-
holds (consuming the least electricity) subsidized the most; and irrigation, 
an important service for subsistence agriculture, is also heavily subsidized.20 
In practice, the poorest consumers of electricity in Lao PDR have been 
subsidized by other customer segments (World Bank 2012, 19). Second, 
during 2005–10, electricity tariffs remained relatively stable (with only 
the  heaviest subsidies being reduced slightly), even as the Lao hydropower 
sector began to take off. This will likely change since, under the planned 
gradual tariff adjustment process, most customers will be paying tariffs 
that exceed the marginal cost of supply (World Bank 2012, 19).
Although EDL works with MEM to build strategic plans for grid roll-
out based on viability studies, provincial governors and their administra-
tions serve, in practice, as an intermediary for village households and hence 
represent an important group of principals that EDL must work with effec-
tively. EDL’s budget is allocated by headquarters, on a negotiated basis 
between MOF, MEM, and EDL, yet strategic decisions about geographic 
locations for grid extension, which EDL must then implement, are coor-
dinated by MEM and the provincial governors’ offi ces. EDL appears to 
play this agent role effectively, coordinating with provincial and district 
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administrations where necessary, but essentially retaining a focus on imple-
mentation rather than negotiating on strategy. EDL’s relative autonomy 
notwithstanding, its provincial and district units sometimes work closely 
with local authorities to build good relationships with the client. EDL can 
rely on its fi nancial resources as well as the company’s aura to build good 
relationships with villages; at the same time, EDL relies on advice from 
local authorities to tailor service appropriately. 
Implementation Partnerships with Donors and the Private Sector
The Lao power sector, and EDL in particular, have benefi ted from early 
and sustained partnerships with donors. Many observers noted that 
donor commitment to rural electrifi cation was a major factor in deliver-
ing  successes in this area. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
World Bank initiated their project portfolios in the Lao power sector at 
the beginning of the 1980s. Aid to the power sector represented about 
15 percent of total overseas development assistance to Lao PDR from the 
late 1990s to the mid-2000s and has since declined to about 6 percent. 
 Table 5.2. Electricity Tariffs, 2005–10
Electricity prices (Kip/kWh) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Residential
0–25 kWh 114 132 152 177 203 269
26–150 kWh 265 273 281 293 301 320
> 150 kWh 765 765 765 773 773 773
Embassies and international organizations
Low voltage 990 1066 1066 1077 1077 1077
Entertainment businesses
Low voltage 1095 1095 1095 1106 1106 1106
Agriculture and irrigation
Low voltage 295 310 325 345 362 399
Medium voltage 251 263 276 293 308 340
Industry
Low voltage 636 627 618 616 607 591
Medium voltage 541 533 526 524 516 502
Commercial businesses and services
Low voltage 826 826 826 835 835 835
Medium voltage 702 702 702 709 709 709
Government offi ces
Low voltage 706 696 686 684 674 656
Medium voltage 600 592 583 581 573 557
Source: Robert Oksen (2012), derived from EDL Annual Reports, 2005–10.
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The World Bank estimates the total cost of the rural grid extension rollout 
from 1987 to 2009 as costing about US$600 million, about 75 percent of 
which was fi nanced by concessionary loans and grants from multilateral 
and bilateral agencies and the balance predominantly from EDL’s hydro-
power export revenues (World Bank 2012, 15).
Until relatively recently, however, only a few international partners were 
engaged in the power sector and, in an interesting twist on donor harmo-
nization, their contributions were geographically bounded and dedicated 
to specifi c objectives. The delimitation of donor support was largely based 
on the donors’ regional and country strategies, but the Government of Lao 
PDR appears to have played a coordinating role as well. ADB has typically 
prioritized power generation projects for export, with a geographic focus on 
developing the Greater Mekong Subregion to the north. The World Bank has 
focused its support on building mechanisms for the effi ciency and sustain-
ability of EDL as well as more generally reforming the power sector. Hence, 
ADB primarily concentrated its interventions in the North, while the World 
Bank (along with the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency) principally supported rural electrifi cation in the South. De facto, 
then, aid was relatively coordinated and effi ciently allocated in the sector in 
that there was little overlap between key donors. Smaller donors and inter-
national nongovernmental organizations have also been central in assisting 
EDL and DOE in expanding access to electricity, especially via off-grid and 
pico (small-scale) solutions, and thereby accelerating the pace of rural elec-
trifi cation. Of today’s 70 percent national coverage, about 2.5 percent of 
households receive access through off-grid solutions.
Donor representatives concur that the government’s ownership of 
power projects and energy sector strategy is high. In part, this has been 
maintained through continuity in staffi ng key donor counterparts on the 
Lao side. Since the party supervises the careers of senior offi cials, they can 
remain designated counterparts even when moving across positions in the 
sector (e.g., from MEM to EDL or vice versa). In addition, the government 
has demonstrated a long time horizon and strategic vision in defi ning and 
remaining committed to its core goals in the power sector. All government 
agencies attract investments and support in alignment with the strategic 
objectives defi ned by the party, and the government has demonstrated 
that it will delay reforms that are not in line with strategic goals. The 
Power Development Plans and the recent Rural Electrifi cation Master Plan 
clearly demonstrate this coordinating vision in the sense that they are actu-
ally built as a list of potential projects. Nevertheless, projects at the local 
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level are sometimes competing and overlapping, even if the national-level 
coordination of development partners appears strong. The overlap is espe-
cially acute between EDL’s grid extension projects, and the off-grid proj-
ects supported by DOE and local authorities, refl ecting the relative lack 
of on-the-ground coordination and cooperation between these agencies. 
EDL has been oriented toward electricity exports to Thailand since 
the 1980s, when approximately 75 percent of the country’s hydropower 
production, mainly from the Nam Ngum plant, was being exported 
to Thailand. During this time, electricity exports made up more than 
50  percent of Lao PDR’s exports and served as crucial revenues for the 
government. In the 1990s, Thailand’s sustained economic growth and 
increasing electricity consumption, particularly for industrial develop-
ment, helped make Lao electricity exports even more successful (Robert 
Oksen 2012). Although electricity generation and export are beyond the 
scope of this study, it is crucial to note that the Thai power sector was 
privatized during this period, having a major demonstration effect on the 
structure of the Lao electricity sector and the operations of EDL itself.
The role of regional bilateral partners, especially the Chinese govern-
ment, has become increasingly signifi cant since the mid-2000s. There are 
no detailed records of this support, but interviewees reported, for example, 
that the Chinese government provides grants and soft loans to the power 
sector, principally for the expansion of transmission and distribution. In 
the specifi c area of hydropower project development, Chinese contractors 
are increasingly competing with Thai investors. The Chinese government 
has recently invested a great deal in EDL itself, assisting with the building 
of EDL’s new headquarters building and, as did Thailand earlier, infl uenc-
ing the way in which EDL does business.
Thus, there appear to be isomorphic infl uences in the power sector, 
driven by the advice of development partners and market-oriented models 
and, more recently, by newly important regional bilateral donors, espe-
cially China. Lao PDR aims to position itself strategically in the regional 
energy market and, therefore, needs to align its policies, regulatory frame-
work, and operations with international practice, especially on the gen-
eration and transmission side. One senior DOE offi cial stated that the 
“nature of the industry pushed us to do things right from the beginning;” 
it was not necessarily that government offi cials and EDL managers were 
“so clever.” Because important stakeholders in the sector—from Nordic 
partners, to Thailand, to China—have had such diverse practices, EDL’s 
adoption of varied practices has also meant, interestingly, that there has 
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been continuous experimentation with organizational models in the sec-
tor.21 Thus, the government has been able to test EDL’s evolving structure 
against its development objectives, choosing to stick with practices that 
serve its developmental and political objectives and jettisoning those that 
are less aligned.
Private sector partners have also been crucial in the Lao power sector. 
Independent power producers (IPPs) play a dominant role in electricity 
generation and transmission and are crucial revenue sources for the state 
in terms of taxes, royalties, and dividends from the government share of 
concessions. IPPs have been central in setting fi nancial as well as social and 
environmental standards in the sector.22 In terms of the rural electrifi cation 
side of EDL on which this chapter focuses, IPPs have played a crucial role 
in training a large proportion of EDL and MEM managers, many of whom 
began their careers in the power sector working on early IPP installations, 
such as Nam Ngum, Xeset, Houay Ho, and Theun Hinboun.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been more signifi cant on 
the electricity distribution side, at least since the early 2000s. For example, 
a World Bank program encouraged the creation of small local companies 
to install solar home systems. These companies do not work directly with 
EDL but as contractors and implementing partners of DOE projects. DOE 
has an established pre-electrifi cation strategy, in which connection to an 
off-grid system presents an opportunity to test villagers’ ability to pay 
for electricity services before EDL invests in grid extension. In this sense, 
the public-private partnership between DOE and the SMEs in the sector 
supports EDL in achieving its mandate to increase access to electricity in 
remote areas. 
In a relatively new aspect of electricity distribution prompted by the 
push to reach 90 percent electrifi cation by 2020, provincial governments 
have begun contracting private companies to extend the grid to remote 
areas. Companies install and operate these systems for fi ve years, at which 
time the infrastructure reverts to government ownership upon repayment 
of the investment along with a reasonable return. Although these part-
nerships represent increased participation of the private sector in power 
distribution, especially in remote rural areas, the electricity law states that 
all electrical systems shall be handed over and administered by the pro-
vincial government even if they were built by MEM. Moreover, although 
these partnerships have provided access to electricity in remote areas, SME 
development and expansion in the power sector has potentially been under-
mined by a bias—in terms of policy as well as in client preferences—in 
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favor of public grid extension and thereby access to subsidized electricity 
tariffs. In this respect, the state monopoly over the domestic production, 
transmission, and distribution of electricity is being preserved. 
Challenges
EDL’s record in achieving results has enabled it to build institutional 
legitimacy. Yet, this may be challenged by the growing expectations of 
high-quality services, the meeting of which in turn rests on the company’s 
ability to generate the resources necessary to meet the growing demand 
for electricity. Several senior managers and principals of the utility stated 
that the lack of self-suffi ciency in power generation is constraining EDL’s 
commercial development. The interviewees drew attention to the need to 
increase technical capacities in power generation. EDL’s development plan 
for 2011–17 is thus strongly focused on increasing its generation capacity, 
at an estimated cost of US$3.3 billion (Électricité du Laos 2010).
Over the course of its history, EDL has managed a complicated, bifur-
cated mandate—on the one hand, electrifi cation (distribution); on the other 
hand, generation and transmission (or production and export), which also 
entails acting as the government representative for international power 
projects. A recent major institutional change for EDL was the separation in 
2010 of its electricity distribution functions (retained in EDL) from its gen-
eration functions (now listed separately as EDL-GEN). Two interrelated 
reasons were mentioned to explain this split. One was the increasing com-
mercialization of the utility and power sector management writ large and 
the government’s (and key partners’) desire for Lao PDR to position itself 
more astutely in the context of the evolving regional energy landscape and 
increasing demand for energy. The second reason was fi nancial viability. 
A recurrent concern for the government and its development partners has 
been that the institution’s debt has been a major challenge to the sustained 
commercialization of EDL. The split enabled the debt to be contained in 
one agency, with EDL-GEN then being poised to become a profi table com-
mercial entity, albeit one that is still owned by the state. 
Many are concerned that the split weakens the ability of EDL itself to 
deliver on rural electrifi cation. Electricity tariffs do not cover the costs of 
electricity generation and supply to the country’s rural areas. In the past, 
EDL was able to employ a cross-subsidy model with funds from gen-
eration to plow back into and subsidize electrifi cation. The strategy was 
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encouraged by donors and international power purchasers. In other words, 
large hydro-generation projects for export that generate sizeable, predict-
able, and sustainable cash streams were the key to successful rural electri-
fi cation over time, along with international development fi nancing. Yet, 
this model worked best when electrifi cation rates were low and there were 
easy-access distribution decisions to be made that did not hurt EDL’s bot-
tom-line profi tability as much.23 The fi nal push on electrifi cation is much 
more expensive at the margin—the average cost per grid connection almost 
doubled from about 4.2 million kip (US$500) in 2005 to about 7.7 million 
kip (US$900) in 2012—and more diffi cult for EDL to fi nance now that the 
split has occurred. Achieving the target of 90 percent household electricity 
access by 2020 will require at least a threefold increase in access provided 
by off-grid solutions and will be a central implementation challenge going 
forward.
Conclusion
The power sector and hence EDL itself have been consistently priori-
tized and supported by LPRP and the government, as a spearhead and 
symbol of the Lao modernization and development trajectory. EDL has 
been adept at capitalizing on the crucial roles, symbolic and practical, 
assigned to the electricity sector. In turn, EDL has delivered important 
results for the Lao governing elite in terms of nation building and eco-
nomic modernization goals. The signifi cance of the power sector and 
the reigning model for its development and expansion have evolved over 
time—from a  revolutionary-era blueprint to more donor- and private 
sector–oriented norms and practices—and EDL itself has transformed 
accordingly. 
In the context of the agency’s priority status, EDL leaders have carved out 
a sphere of operational independence for the agency in an otherwise tightly 
controlled governance environment, managing to insulate the agency from 
external governance pressures in part by making the services it delivers 
invaluable to elites. This relative operational autonomy has enabled EDL to 
make operational choices and pursue internal management strategies that 
are singularly focused on achieving ambitious and ever-expanding service 
delivery targets. The institution enjoys relative autonomy in the manner in 
which it recruits, compensates, and deploys staff, and it is imbued with an 
organizational philosophy that emphasizes corporate professionalism and 
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technical excellence. EDL thus marshals its fi nancial and human resources 
to deliver the public service of electricity to the population in a manner that 
bolsters EDL’s and the government’s connection with the Lao people and 
builds state legitimacy in their eyes.
The astute manner in which EDL has operated vis-à-vis its Lao stake-
holders, clients, and donor and private sector implementation partners 
complements its service-oriented organizational culture and structure, fur-
ther enabling it to achieve continued success. Related in part to the orga-
nizational narrative that it is providing a crucial public service, EDL has 
an exceptionally strong focus on the end users of electricity. In achieving 
its electrifi cation targets, the institution has successfully deployed develop-
ment partner assistance while remaining in the driver’s seat. Over time, 
EDL has experimented with diverse organizational models and practices, 
retaining those practices that serve its developmental and political objec-
tives and jettisoning those that are less aligned.
Notes
 1. The other four sectors LPRP viewed as pillars of socialist modernization, to 
which all villages should have access, were roads, health, education, and water.
 2. Although we do not examine the results of the EDL generation function, we 
do explore the role this mandate played in the power sector’s early priority 
status.
 3. For more details about P2P, see World Bank (2012, 20–26).
 4. This is outside the explanatory scope of this chapter, which focuses on the 
electrifi cation (distribution) side of EDL’s business, but worth highlighting as 
part of this brief snapshot of EDL’s success as an institution. 
 5. The quotes are from focus groups of EDL clients conducted on behalf of the 
study by Indochina Research Limited (Laos). 
 6. Robert Oksen (2012) notes that these new managers were still appointed by 
the party, signaling that the Party was gradually introducing more autonomy 
and commercial orientation in EDL’s activities, as well as pushing to attract 
greater foreign investment through managers more conversant with regional 
and international power sector stakeholders.
 7. A comprehensive record of government expenditures is only available from 
2000/01 onward.
 8. Program evaluations by development partners have consistently underlined 
the lack of transparency in the fl ow of funds between the government and 
EDL, providing additional justifi cation for separating generation from trans-
mission and distribution activities. 
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 9. Group interview with leadership of the Champassak Province EDL offi ce.
 10. See also World Bank (2012, 9–10).
 11. The quotes are from EDL and MEM offi cials and EDL frontline staff.
 12. As with all other government agencies, promotion to managerial levels  (deputy 
division head and above) is overseen by the Party. 
 13. EDL offi cial.
 14. Civil service compensation is on par with private sector pay in the country 
and additional benefi ts—pensions, health insurance, job stability, prestige—
associated with government employment make it extremely attractive. See 
World Bank (2010).
 15. By contrast, the provincial departments of MEM have certifi cates of apprecia-
tion for top performers but cannot afford fi nancial rewards.
 16. Interview with H.E. Mr. Soulivong Daravong, Minister of Energy and Mines, 
February 9, 2012. 
 17. DOE was established as the Hydropower Offi ce in 1997 and reorganized later 
into today’s Department of Electricity.
 18. The relevant minister has, over time, always been in the top half of the Central 
Committee’s ranks.
 19. Interviews with EDL provincial and district branch offi cials, Champassak and 
Xekong provinces, February 2, 2012.
 20. There is a signifi cant difference between the average Lao electricity generation 
price (about 240 kip per kilowatt-hour) and the average price of electricity 
purchase from Thailand (about 560 kip per kilowatt-hour); the latter is the 
price at which 60 percent of domestic usage is provided. Subsidies for poorer 
households are not high in relation to the Lao generation price, but they are in 
terms of the import price.
 21. Robert Oksen (2012) points out that these varied organizational models have 
come with diverse developmental visions for the sector (on the part of interna-
tional stakeholders and Lao power sector players), which have competed with 
each other over time.
 22. These IPPs are outside the scope of this report. They are nonpublic 
entities that own facilities to generate power for sale to the public util-
ity (EDL) and other end users (e.g., the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand). An important example (and an unusual one, because it is 
not wholly privately owned) is the Nam Theun Power Company, a 
joint-venture IPP that was granted the concession to build-operate-and-
transfer the major Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project. The project has served 
as a major driver of momentum in the Lao power sector because it formalized 
and standardized procedures for foreign direct investment, with development 
partners, including the World Bank and ADB, playing crucial roles in pro-
viding risk guarantees to investors and securing some measure of social and 
environmental responsibility through project safeguards. 
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 23. This cross-subsidy model along with the challenges associated with the increas-
ing marginal cost of grid expansion are described in more detail in World Bank 
(2012, ix, 8, 15–16, 30).
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The Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic has achieved a great deal of institutional success 
in the road sector over the past 30 years. The ministry has led the con-
struction and expansion of the road network and, in turn, dramatically 
improved transport times and access to economic opportunities for Lao 
households and enterprises. MPWT has generated legitimacy in the eyes 
of the Lao people for both itself and the Government of the Lao PDR 
writ large, in particular by improving access to markets and public services 
across the country and by helping to physically knit the country together. 
It has slowly expanded its mandate in the road sector and served as a 
crucial incubator of commercial enterprise in the Lao construction sector. 
Moreover, the ministry has continued operations through several changes 
in leadership and demonstrated resilience in the face of crises.
This chapter examines how and why, in the otherwise challenging con-
text of a low-income and relatively low-capacity country, MPWT has been 
able to achieve these successes. It describes how the core underpinnings 
of this institutional success have emerged in the three concentric circles 
constituting MPWT’s operating environment: the sociopolitical context in 
which MPWT is positioned, MPWT’s more immediate external operational 
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relationships, and MPWT’s internal institutional workings. This introduc-
tion provides some key highlights of the causal argument, with subsequent 
sections delivering more detail.
The sociopolitical context in which MPWT is situated has enabled and 
laid the conditions for the agency’s success (Barma and Robert Oksen 
chapter 4, this volume). The road sector plays an important symbolic role 
in Lao PDR, serving as a crucial mechanism of national identity  building. 
The road network is metaphorically and literally the backbone of the 
nation, physically binding together in the post-revolutionary period what 
had been a decentralized country comprised of disparate groups over a 
complicated geographical terrain. Moreover, roads have connected Lao 
PDR with its neighbors and hence its major markets, and have improved 
the access of almost all Lao citizens to economic opportunities. Roads have 
thus served as the crucial arteries through which commerce and people can 
fl ow, and have been essential to the country’s modernization and socio-
economic development, especially after its 1986 economic liberalization 
reforms. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), recognizing the 
sociopolitical and economic benefi ts of road building, has prioritized the 
sector from the inception of Lao PDR in 1975. 
Capitalizing on this mandate and the resources that have come with it, 
MPWT has delivered on the Lao political elite’s crucial state-building and 
modernization goals. The agency stands out for its ability to negotiate the 
constraints and embrace the facilitating factors in its external and inter-
nal environments in a manner that has enabled it to resolve creatively the 
 governance challenges facing the agency and the political elite to which it 
must be responsive. MPWT has built institutional success by capitalizing 
on its priority sector status and the government’s planning system; suc-
cessfully introducing a commercialized and decentralized approach to con-
struction and maintenance of the road network in the context of the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM) and broader governance reforms; carefully 
managing stakeholder relations in the context of macro power structures 
and relationships in the country; and building an organizational esprit de 
corps that emphasizes the agency’s central role in the pursuit of Lao socio-
economic modernization.
MPWT has managed various factors in its external and internal environ-
ment in ways that have enhanced its ability to deliver on its institutional 
mandate. In particular, MPWT’s and the government’s emphasis on build-
ing physical infrastructure has aligned with the goals of Lao PDR’s devel-
opment partners. These goals include state building though public service 
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delivery, institutional strengthening and capacity building, technical criteria 
for decision making in line ministries, and a trend toward  deconcentration 
and commercialization of road construction and maintenance. The agency 
has carefully managed its relationships with donors, emphasizing that the 
ministry is in the driver’s seat, handling aid harmonization, and insisting 
on in-house capacity building rather than relying on project management 
units. As a government ministry, MPWT is subject to public sector recruit-
ment and compensation rules and regulations. Within those constraints, 
nevertheless, MPWT has consistently emphasized strategically building the 
human resource capacity of the ministry and has developed its own person-
nel management system to ensure a focus on performance, complete with 
incentives for high performers. Moreover, MPWT is a learning organization 
that builds on a leadership that has, from the top down, instituted and sup-
ported a work ethic and systems oriented toward problem solving and a 
reliance on data to aid organizational performance and sector management. 
Institutional Success
MPWT is the government agency tasked with the country’s roads, its other 
transportation systems (including civil aviation, urban transport systems, 
and river transport), and other public works, including water and sani-
tation.1 This chapter focuses on MPWT’s road sector operations, where 
the ministry has demonstrated success across the three criteria of results, 
legitimacy, and resilience, according to objective measures and interviewee 
responses. 
Results
The road sector in Lao PDR faces three major challenges. First, building 
a road network in a landlocked country that relies on road transport for 
internal economic activity and external trade links is a complex under-
taking. Second, it is extremely costly to deliver rural road connections to 
the national road network for a low-density population. Third, adequate 
maintenance is crucial to ensure that existing assets do not deteriorate even 
as new construction continues apace.2 There is a clear consensus across 
MPWT management, employees, clients, and other stakeholders that the 
institution has achieved sustained and impressive results on all three fronts. 
There is a widespread perception that MPWT has expanded the Lao 
road network to a signifi cant degree. In turn, this road expansion has 
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greatly increased market access across the country, making commercial and 
household enterprise, as well as rural livelihoods, more viable. Frontline 
staff, in particular, noted that road access enables villagers to sell their 
products directly at a market, reducing their dependence on local traders 
and middlemen. On this basis, moreover, villagers began diversifying their 
production to meet demand, thereby enhancing livelihoods. A multivariate 
analysis estimates that of the 9.5 percent decline in poverty incidence in 
Lao PDR from 1998 to 2003, fully 13 percent of the decline in rural pov-
erty can be attributed to improved road access alone (Warr 2010).
Increased road access reduces transaction costs and makes more forms 
of economic activity viable; it also facilitates access to other public services, 
such as health and education services, located in village, district, and provin-
cial centers. A central measure of success, then, is a reduction in travel time. 
There is no systematic statistical record of this over time, yet oft-cited data 
on this point include a decrease in travel time, over the past two decades, 
from the national capital to major provincial urban centers as follows: 
Vientiane to Savannakhet, from two days to fi ve hours, and Vientiane to 
Luang Prabang, from fi ve days to eight hours. The interprovincial network 
has improved considerably, with travel time between Pakse and Xekong, 
for example, being reduced from two days to two hours. Today, almost 
all the country’s districts are reachable by road, although a major limiting 
 factor is that some are reachable only during the dry season. 
In line with MPWT’s stated goals, rural accessibility—access of villages 
to the national and provincial road network—has increased signifi cantly 
over the past decade, with all-season access growing from 54 percent of 
villages in 2002–03 to 84 percent in 2007–08.3 Rural road extension has 
grown at the fastest rate in comparison with other forms of road construc-
tion. The share of rural roads in the overall road network increased from 
24 percent in 2000 to 42 percent in 2010.4 In addition to increased road cov-
erage across the country, improvements in the quality of the road  network 
are a crucial measure of results. The proportion of sealed and graveled 
surfaces in the country’s road network increased from 42  percent in 2000 
to 50  percent in 2010.5 In addition, a large road development and mainte-
nance program implemented by MPWT between 2002 and 2006 succeeded 
in decreasing the proportion of rough road surfaces from 37 percent of the 
road network in 2002 to 4 percent in 2009 (MPWT 2009). Villagers who 
were interviewed noted that improvement of road quality is essential, since 
it reduces travel time as well as expenditures on vehicle maintenance and 
repair. The program overall was evaluated as delivering a medium level of 
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service, since as it drew to a close road maintenance slowed and overall 
road conditions declined. 
Legitimacy
MPWT plays an important role in serving the government’s overall 
socioeconomic development objectives. In turn, it enjoys some degree of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population and helps in building the overall 
legitimacy of the state. For many Lao citizens, access to roads is a tangible 
way in which they interface with the state. Road sector employees benefi t 
from a certain aura in the eyes of the population; villagers and other road 
users expressed a high degree of trust in and admiration for the central and 
provincial levels of MPWT. Yet, these same users were more critical of the 
district-level branches of MPWT, typically complaining about their relative 
lack of capacity to manage the road extension process and supervise the 
construction companies involved.
MPWT appears to have gained a great deal of legitimacy and  public 
trust from its successes in extending the road network. Now that minimal 
road access needs have been exceeded, however, there is an increasing 
sense among the public that road quality is not as good as it should be. In 
other words, many villagers expressed the feeling that MPWT’s emphasis 
on the quantity of roads was negatively affecting the quality of construc-
tion. Moreover, villagers expressed dissatisfaction regarding MPWT’s 
communication systems, pointing out that they were often left in the dark 
about progress on projects, because consultations during road construc-
tion involved only village authorities and not  public forums. 
Villagers in the focus groups viewed MPWT as a public service provider, 
not a business. They kept clear the distinction between the public agency 
itself and its various implementation partners, including private sector 
construction companies. In this respect, villagers are willing to contribute 
fi nancing as well as labor to build and maintain village roads, although 
they voiced concerns about being properly compensated for losing land. 
Villagers tend to believe that MPWT should be responsible for systemati-
cally maintaining the quality of access roads (i.e., district, provincial, and 
national roads) to the village and that the villagers should not be respon-
sible for fi nancial contributions for road maintenance and rehabilitation.
Resilience
The quality of Lao PDR’s roads and the institutional capacity of MPWT 
(then the Ministry of Communication, Transport, Post, and Construction) 
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were extremely poor at the initiation of the reforms associated with the 
1986 NEM.6 From the early 1990s onward, nevertheless, MPWT has dis-
played a great deal of resilience in the sense of maintaining success over 
time and through changes in leadership. Interviewees emphasized the 
 ministry’s cohesion, stability, and ability to adapt in the context of broad 
socioeconomic and institutional changes in the country. 
This resilience in MPWT’s ability to perform successfully has persisted 
through and been fortifi ed by several major structural changes in the min-
istry and its implementation partnerships over the past two decades. The 
institution has always faced the challenge of securing the high levels of 
funding necessary for major infrastructure projects and maintenance, yet 
it has been able to develop innovative new funding mechanisms over time 
to overcome this constraint. In particular, the agency has demonstrated a 
great capacity for attracting and channeling donor funds and programs 
while maintaining a focus on the government’s agenda. In another dimen-
sion of resilience, MPWT performed well in the face of a recent crisis: 
after Typhoon Ketsana destroyed a full 15 percent of the road and bridge 
network in the Southern Lao provinces in late 2009, the ministry achieved 
its goal of repairing and rebuilding 60 percent of the damaged roads over 
the next two years (Government of the Lao PDR 2009).
Institutional Sociopolitical Context: Roads as a Crucial 
Modernization Vehicle
Since Lao PDR’s inception, the government has strategically emphasized 
the road sector as a major symbol, priority, and crucial tool of the Lao 
socialist modernization and development trajectory. Indeed, the overarch-
ing strategic vision expressed in LPRP resolutions through the late 1990s 
refer to the road sector as a “spearhead sector,” and this is still a  common 
refrain of stakeholders in the sector. Heavy industrialization and rural 
livelihoods, in other words, were not possible without good roads.7 The 
push to build a road network throughout the country, as well as to link all 
 villages to the network, has been a central goal in the sector for more than 
three decades. 
Although roads were identifi ed as a strategic sector, road development 
prior to the mid-1990s was fragmented, with responsibilities dispersed 
across a range of agencies, including the Ministry of Communication and 
Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of the Interior. 
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The country’s transition to the market through the 1986 NEM further 
underlined the importance of a functioning national road network, which 
was seen as crucial to economic success. The primacy of roads in the 
 government’s list of priorities after the initiation of economic and adminis-
trative reforms is apparent: the Third Five-Year Plan (1990–95) emphasized 
improving the country’s transport network and the government’s 1991–95 
Public Investment Program focused on developing roads and other physical 
infrastructure (Barma 2002). Accompanying this greater strategic clarity, 
road sector management was rationalized and institutionalized in the then 
Ministry of Communication, Transport, Post and Construction (MCTPC).
In addition to their economic functions in terms of industrializa-
tion, the development of an agroforestry sector, and rural livelihoods, 
roads have served the government and LPRP as a crucial nation-building 
 mechanism—physically binding together what has been in its contempo-
rary history a regionally, ethnically, and geographically fractured country 
(Barma and Robert Oksen chapter 4, this volume). The fi rst major route 
emphasized after the formation of Lao PDR in 1975 was the country’s core 
North-South trunk road, Road 13, a project seen as essential for territo-
rial integration and internal security. Road network building continues to 
serve this nation-building imperative, encouraging village clusters to form 
to take advantage of connections to the network and thereby, in some 
cases, speeding the relocation of remote villagers in mountainous areas 
(where many tribal and ethnic minorities continue to live) to more densely 
populated areas in the lowlands. 
The government’s early vision for Lao economic modernization saw 
the central role of the transport network in transforming the  country’s 
territorial identity from a landlocked country to a transit country 
(Pholsena and Banomyong 2007). The emphasis on connectivity to 
neighboring countries and to the South China Sea preceded the emphasis 
on rural road access, with an acute demonstration of the country’s geo-
graphic vulnerabilities emerging when Thailand closed its border with 
Lao PDR and embargoed exports in 1976. The construction of Roads 
8 and 9,  connecting Lao PDR with Vietnam, was crucial in response. 
More recently, emphasis on the road sector has continued with a slightly 
different cast, as Lao PDR has become more deeply integrated into 
the Mekong subregion,  joining the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB’s) 
Greater Mekong Subregion scheme in 1992 and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations in 1997. The sector remains central to devel-
oping the country’s trade connections—in particular with Thailand, 
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Vietnam, and China—which in turn have delivered large fi nancial fl ows 
and  numerous advantages in terms of economic development. This is 
evidenced by the impressive growth of the provinces most closely con-
nected economically with neighboring countries, especially Champassak 
and Phongsaly, where, not  coincidentally, major public and private road-
building efforts continue apace. 
Sector representatives expressed conscious pride in their role in facili-
tating economic livelihoods and trade, transporting the inputs and prod-
ucts of other sectors, and being a key to economic development and the 
country’s prosperity. For example, a provincial unit of MPWT displayed 
a slogan that read, “Love your nation, maintain the roads.” In addition, 
the delivery of pro-poor public services such as road access is a central 
 element of LPRP’s strategy for retaining popular support and solidarity 
with the party. In short, roads continue to be used as a symbol of economic 
development and socialist modernization and as a crucial vehicle for their 
achievement. 
In functioning in this sociopolitical context, MPWT has a span of con-
trol over two concentric circles of institutional function—fi rst, the organi-
zation of the internal workings of the agency and, second, the manner in 
which the agency structures its partnerships and other operational mecha-
nisms in the context of the immediate external environment in which it 
functions. Many of the operational decisions made by MPWT in its imme-
diate external environment and relationships as well as its internal institu-
tional workings can be seen as resolving, concretely, a series of governance 
challenges for the agency and the government and political elite it serves. 
In other words, some of the causal underpinnings of institutional success 
identifi ed are explicit responses to the institution’s role and position in the 
broader political and governance structures. In particular, the adoption 
of NEM and the series of political and governance changes around that 
reform actually set in motion several specifi c institutional strategies. Other 
causal underpinnings of success are, by contrast, more geared toward effi -
cient institutional functioning than toward resolving specifi c political and 
governance conundrums. These factors serve to institutionalize MPWT in 
the context of the government’s attempts, supported by donors, to forge a 
more effi cient public administration. Perhaps as a consequence, the causal 
dimensions in this second set are more closely tied to donor advice and 
institutional models that are either isomorphic with international best 
practice or result from greater interconnectivity with neighboring coun-
tries and markets.
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Institutional Strategies to Resolve Governance Challenges
MPWT has negotiated the constraints and embraced the facilitating  factors 
in its immediate external environment and internal institutional workings 
in creative ways that have enabled it to resolve governance challenges 
 facing the agency and the political elite to which it must be responsive. 
MPWT has built its institutional success by capitalizing on its priority sec-
tor status and the government’s planning system, successfully introducing 
a commercialized and decentralized approach to construction and mainte-
nance of the road network in the context of NEM and broader  governance 
reforms, carefully managing stakeholder relations in the context of macro 
power structures and relationships in the country, and building an orga-
nizational esprit de corps that emphasizes the agency’s central role in the 
pursuit of the country’s socioeconomic modernization.
From Sector Prioritization to Integrated Sector Planning
The overall stability of the Lao governing regime, along with the sustained 
emphasis it has placed over time on the road sector, were identifi ed across 
the board as core elements of MPWT’s success. The government’s priori-
tization of roads as a “spearhead” sector and its consistent policies for 
the sector are apparent in its relatively high resourcing of MPWT and the 
important position the agency occupies within the power structure of the 
government. In turn, MPWT’s success in increasing road access through-
out the country has contributed to the government’s cumulative legitimacy. 
Indeed, increasing public access to public services, such as schools and 
health clinics, through better road access has been a core goal of the gov-
ernment’s approach to road expansion in rural and remote areas. Prior to 
the introduction of the Road Management System, the Party prioritized 
road construction on the basis of broad goals, such as territorial integra-
tion and economic interconnectivity with the region. The government’s 
broad vision also emphasized developing road access to every provincial 
capital, followed by district centers and large village clusters. Only later, 
with deeper integration with the donor-supported sector management 
 system, did a shift emerge to prioritization of road access on the basis of 
population density and access to urban centers with public services, thus 
enabling MPWT to continue serving essential nation-building and political 
objectives. 
The road sector’s priority status has been refl ected in direct resourcing 
by the government as well as donor funding. Public expenditure patterns 
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over time demonstrate an extended commitment to public works and 
transport. Quite simply, it has long been the single largest spending sector 
in Lao PDR, with a share in total expenditure of 40–50 percent over the 
past 30 years.8 Although this share has declined slightly in recent years, the 
road sector still accounts for by far the largest share of capital expendi-
tures. This high level of resourcing was made possible by the government’s 
endorsement of road construction and rehabilitation projects over many 
consecutive fi ve-year plans. 
Despite the large fl ow of revenues to the sector, most of the road net-
work in the late 1990s was evaluated as being in poor condition and 
progressively more emphasis was placed on road maintenance (Barma 
2002). This required new funding sources and an effi cient, locally based 
planning system to track and anticipate necessary investments, as well as 
to plan road development in relation to the ability of central and local 
governments to maintain the system. In turn, this resulted in a reorgani-
zation of the planning and budget allocation system. Road construction 
is now fi nanced directly by the government budget— including central 
expenditure, which is allocated to national road construction and reha-
bilitation, and provincial expenditure for the development of provin-
cial, district, and rural access roads.9 Road maintenance, by contrast, is 
provided for through the Road Maintenance Fund (RMF),10 which was 
originally fi nanced primarily by donors and is now primarily fi nanced, 
with some donor support, by a fuel levy (approximately 70 percent of 
total RMF  revenues11), bridge and road tolls, and fi nes for overloaded 
trucks. RMF allocates funds only to national and provincial road main-
tenance.12 Local road maintenance is carried out through village fi nan-
cial or labor contributions; and district road maintenance is supposed to 
be provided for by District Development Funds, which, in turn, depend 
on donor contributions and household contributions based on income 
levels.
The National Socio-Economic Development Plan, the government’s 
fi ve-year planning system, and the annual planning mechanisms are cru-
cial in terms of overall sector strategy, resourcing, and operational tar-
gets for any government agency—and MPWT is no exception. The annual 
planning process is facilitated by the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPI), which centralizes and coordinates the local plans for road devel-
opment. The planning process begins bottom-up, with needs articulated 
at the district level, collated at the provincial level with the supervision 
of the provincial governor’s offi ce, and passed up the vertical line to the 
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agency in question. Prioritization takes place at this top level, with overall 
strategic and resourcing needs decided at the highest level of government. 
Resources are then allocated through the ministries to the provincial and 
district levels. De jure, nothing can be implemented without being reported 
to the central line and incorporated into the plan; de facto, this means that 
the plan is amended throughout implementation to incorporate new proj-
ects that are developed when new sources of funding emerge. For example, 
if a village raises funding for an access road in collaboration with a private 
sector provider, permission to construct the road must be granted at the 
provincial level and refl ected in the revised plan. 
The planning and reporting system follows two logics. On the one 
hand, LPRP’s principle of “democratic centralism” requires plans to be 
established at the local level, with a bottom-up approach. On the other 
hand, the reporting system through the vertical line to the central ministry 
ensures a functioning public administration. MPWT is seen as outstanding 
among its central ministry peers in terms of its capability for undertaking 
a nationwide assessment of the sector and planning future development 
and maintenance requirements in an integrated manner. One problematic 
aspect of the centralized planning process is that, although in theory inter-
ministry coordination is supposed to be a bottom-up process through the 
local development plan, in practice there is little coordination at the pro-
vincial level between technical staff or even middle management across 
different government agencies. Instead, each ministry has extremely impor-
tant bilateral relationships with the provincial governor’s offi ce and the 
provincial units of MPI. Stakeholders noted that the provincial units of 
MPWT enjoy particularly close cooperative and productive relationships 
with both of these crucial local-level allies. A core advantage of the plan-
ning system, nevertheless, is that MPWT’s annual operational targets are 
extremely clear and the organization can and does work toward them in a 
focused manner.
Delegated Implementation: Decentralization and Commercialization
The road sector and MPWT underwent a major institutional reset in the 
early 1990s, after the government introduced market-oriented reforms 
with the 1986 NEM. Prior to NEM, road sector development was han-
dled in-house at MPWT, with an emphasis on top-down management 
from the central ministry and, under the “force account” system, a labor 
force for construction and maintenance positioned within the ministry or 
state-owned companies. The reform refl ected the government’s broader 
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 governing dilemma in defi ning a clear division of tasks between the political 
dimensions of governance, undertaken increasingly through the horizon-
tal line across provinces, and administrative and technical line responsi-
bilities, assigned to the ministerial vertical line. Until this reorganization 
of the road sector administration—which occurred in the context of more 
general governance reforms—road sector development was handled across 
the political level, with an emphasis on top-down management from the 
prime minister’s offi ce, the State Planning Committee, and the provincial 
governors. 
The goal of the government’s decentralization initiative was to estab-
lish provinces as the strategic (decision-making) units and districts as the 
implementation units.13 MPWT, recognizing the need for improvements 
in effi ciency and implementation quality , follows this system to its great 
advantage. It implemented a radical overhaul of its management, decentral-
izing and delegating its operations to the provincial and district levels, and 
accelerated the commercialization of its implementation activities through 
partnerships with the private sector. Project management (including bud-
geting, implementation, and quality control) shifted to the provincial level, 
with implementation contracted out to a nascent private sector at the pro-
vincial and district levels.14 The provincial departments of MPWT have a 
great deal of decision-making authority and accountability. The bulk of 
road sector management and service delivery implementation is coordi-
nated at the provincial level, through the Departments of Public Works 
and Transport (DPWT). DPWT manages and implements the sector bud-
get for its respective province and, according to the Public Investment Law, 
construction bids below fi ve billion kip are tendered at the provincial level. 
In terms of implementation, DPWT engineers work with the district-level 
Offi ce of Public Works and Transport (OPWT) to provide on-site contract 
supervision and quality assurance. By 2000, almost all road sector con-
struction and maintenance was being operated on a commercial basis and 
managed and contracted down the MPWT hierarchy by the provincial 
and district units of the ministry. The central MPWT retained responsibil-
ity for sector strategy, standards, training, monitoring and evaluation and 
overall sector coordination (including donor coordination and aid harmo-
nization). In essence, MPWT went from being a direct service provider to 
an institution that sets policy for and manages service provision but does 
not really implement it directly.
Road sector development since the early 1990s has emphasized the 
building of private sector capacity. Road construction and maintenance 
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depend on this partnership with the private sector. Prior to NEM, many 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were responsible for constructing and 
maintaining the country’s road network on the basis of their workforce 
contributions. Each of these SOEs was tied closely to its home location 
and was managed directly by the provincial authorities, thus representing 
more a department within the provincial administration than an enter-
prise or an implementation agency of MCTPC. These SOEs were split 
into smaller, semiautonomous entities toward the end of the 1980s. Each 
was designated specifi c construction projects by the government and pro-
vided capacity-building and fi nancial support for this contracted work.15 
After the 1986 introduction of NEM and the opening of the country to 
international development partners, these companies also bid for donor-
supported projects and received training and technical assistance from the 
donors. Indeed, privatization was an explicit institutional development 
objective of World Bank and other donor programs in the road sector 
(Barma 2002). 
From 1996 onward, the government ceased supporting these state-
owned enterprises under the force account system. There has since been 
a process of winnowing out. Less successful SOEs were allowed to fail, 
while the more successful SOEs expanded their scope to nationwide con-
tracting, with some of them merging together. These successful SOEs 
continue to be major implementation partners for MPWT, especially in 
remote locations and areas in which it is otherwise diffi cult to operate 
(e.g., “red zones,” where unexploded ordinances or drug traffi cking exist). 
Subcontracting with donors (in particular, the World Bank, ADB, and the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency) has been essential in building 
the capacity, equipment, and  systems of the successful SOEs. 
A vibrant and fast-growing private sector has thus developed around 
road construction, with the number of road construction companies esti-
mated at more than 200. Yet, it is a bifurcated sector. On the one hand, 
there are the larger companies located in the bigger cities that focus on road 
construction. Many of these originally gained their foothold in the con-
struction sector through resource concession for infrastructure deals with 
the government; and they often rely on joint ventures with companies from 
across the region for fi nancing and capacity development. Smaller, locally 
run companies, on the other hand, are contracted by MPWT on three-year 
contracts for road maintenance work; these are constrained in terms of 
their capacity and equipment from taking on larger and more lucrative 
tasks. Interviewees reported three ways for private-sector companies and 
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SOEs to be awarded construction and maintenance projects: responding to 
an advertised bid; negotiating with the government, which under some cir-
cumstances directly chooses a company for a project; and subcontracting 
with donors and larger companies. Road construction enterprises at the 
provincial level mostly subcontract for large companies form Vientiane or 
neighboring countries. Across the country, however, road enterprise man-
agers and engineers share backgrounds and training with provincial and 
district road sector employees, including shared SOE employment in the 
past. These connections and shared understanding make for good working 
relationships at the local level.
The decentralization and commercialization reforms discussed here 
have strengthened and formalized the central role of provincial gover-
nors in strategic planning in the sector, but they have not undermined 
the role of MPWT. On the contrary, MPWT has built its infl uence by 
emphasizing its technical skills and its reinforced position as the over-
all regulator in the road sector. It also offers crucial support to central 
and local governments in conducting integrated planning that evaluates 
road construction needs while conserving government assets through an 
evidence-based needs analysis. Moreover, MPWT’s vertical line remains 
strong through fi rm leadership and an emphasis on technical skills and 
sector cohesion.
Stakeholder Management
MPWT must manage multiple, complicated stakeholder  relationships, 
both formal and informal. The ministry is accountable to many  principals, 
including the government at the central level, provincial  governors, and 
development partners. At the same time, it is responsible for a compli-
cated set of implementation arrangements with its own agents, including 
SOEs and domestic and international private contractors. MPWT 
appears to handle these stakeholder relationships quite well. On the 
principal side, the current MPWT leadership seems adept at rallying 
the support of elites and key stakeholders for its central programs. 
Provincial governors are particularly infl uential, so MPWT must ensure 
their needs are met. On the agent side, MPWT has successfully distrib-
uted implementation responsibilities to various partners, yet retains a 
strategic management role and ensures that it still earns plaudits itself for 
successful outcomes. 
MPWT has worked hard to fi nd the right balance between control 
of the country’s road development versus fl exibility in terms of actual 
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construction and maintenance. Careful management of the policy and 
quality dimensions of road construction is crucial in this respect. MPWT 
appears to handle the policy side well but there are concerns on the quality 
control side. Villagers believe that the process of selection of priority areas 
for road development is fair and justifi ed—expressing their faith in the 
centralized, top-down process of road development planning facilitated by 
the provincial-level DPWTs. But they also expressed the view that they do 
not have close enough contact with the district-level OPWTs, indicating 
that the institution as a whole may need to improve its communication and 
interface with clients.
With the devolution of road planning and construction, provincial 
governors’ offi ces have become responsible for developing new road 
 projects in their respective locations, while national and “strategic” roads 
have remained under the central responsibility of MPWT.16 The overall 
implementation of Party directives on road access for every district and 
village has become the responsibility of provincial authorities and this has 
included the responsibility for resourcing local road projects. Thus, pro-
vincial governors’ offi ces have become more involved in developing new 
road projects along with fi nancing ideas. Champassak province has, for 
example, recently put together a new fi nancing model for building a major 
road from the provincial capital, Pakse, to the Wat Phu monument.17 The 
province successfully borrowed money from the Bank of the Lao PDR in 
order to fi nance the road construction on a build-operate-transfer basis. 
Once the road is constructed, tolls are charged for usage (collected by the 
road operators on behalf of the province) and the province later pays back 
the bank loan. This was reported as the fi rst time Champassak province 
itself has borrowed money; and there are growing and signifi cant reports 
of similar off-budget fi nancing of road construction across the country 
(World Bank 2012).18 For example, another off-budget road fi nancing 
story emerged in Vientiane province regarding the building of a similar 
major road.19
The director of the provincial-level DPWT reports to the provincial 
 governor (the horizontal line) as well as the ministry (the vertical line). 
In practice, DPWT works more closely with the provincial governor’s 
offi ce than with the central ministry and the provincial-level collabora-
tion manages day-to-day resource implementation decisions. In part 
because of this decentralized system, MPWT is subject to the pressures of 
regional politics and the infl uence of provincial governors. The Minister of 
Public Works and Transport has recently moved to emphasize the vertical 
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line and strengthen internal controls; it is, of course, the ministry that is 
accountable in terms of sector goals and responding to complaints. MPWT 
employees themselves are adept at satisfying both sets of goals—the politi-
cal exigencies, typically articulated by provincial governors, and the integ-
rity of  public administration, represented by the central MPWT institution 
and its donor relations. Interviewees emphasized the strong cohesion and 
cooperative capacity at all levels of the MPWT hierarchy as a major factor 
behind the institution’s success. 
Organizational Esprit de Corps
MPWT employees share a remarkable esprit de corps, which is founded 
on their shared identity as engineering professionals and their mission of 
serving the public. This appears to be strongest at the provincial level, 
where strategic decisions are made and day-to-day management is con-
ducted. Road sector employees reported that they are received with respect 
by  villagers in the fi eld, bringing them a measure of status. Many profes-
sionals within the organization—as well as in the private concerns active in 
the road sector—share technical training backgrounds, albeit from diverse 
countries, and a strong professional identity as road sector engineers that 
contributes to a sense of community. Integrated within this cohesive com-
munity are non-engineers, including those employees with more political 
or revolutionary backgrounds. Many of today’s senior cohort of road engi-
neers who are in MPWT, at state-owned enterprises, and running private 
contracting companies, say that they “grew up” together under donor-
funded projects in the 1990s. 
The organization is imbued with a shared sense of purpose that is well-
understood and absorbed throughout the hierarchy. MPWT does not 
appear to have a clearly articulated mandate in a typical form and employ-
ees tend to equate the notion of a mandate with their own unit’s terms of 
reference. Nevertheless, employees far down the ranks are able to recite the 
core goals and objectives of the organization and share a sense of pride and 
commitment to the mission. Indeed, that commitment—stemming from 
the public service and development role staff believe they are performing—
was often identifi ed as the main factor in MPWT’s success. Such sentiments 
were expressed, illustratively, in the following ways: “We serve the people 
and the grassroots level;” “The road is like the blood fl ow;” “A song writ-
ten for Public Works technical staff … refl ects that as workers we have an 
important role in the country’s development;” “We bring civilization to the 
grassroots level.”20 
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Institutionalization, Professionalism, and Mandate Implementation
MPWT has managed other factors in its external and internal environment 
in ways that have enhanced its ability to deliver on its institutional mandate. 
The agency has carefully managed its relationships with donors, emphasiz-
ing that the ministry itself is in the driver’s seat and handling aid harmoni-
zation, and insisting on in-house capacity building rather than relying on 
project management units. As a government ministry, MPWT is subject to 
public sector recruitment and compensation rules and  regulations. Within 
those constraints, nevertheless, MPWT has consistently emphasized the 
strategic building of human resource capacity within the ministry and 
has developed its own personnel management system to ensure a focus 
on  performance, complete with incentives for high performers. MPWT is, 
moreover, a learning organization, as a result of a leadership that has, from 
the top-down, instituted and supported a work ethic and a system oriented 
toward problem solving, as well as a reliance on data to aid organizational 
performance and sector management.
Visionary Leadership Committed to Problem-Solving
Road sector planning and management in the 1980s and 1990s was 
fragmented among various government concerns. Since the mid-1990s, 
successive strong leaders of MCTPC and MPWT have played a  central 
role in institutionalizing the role of MPWT as the lead agency for the 
sector. The 1999 Public Road Law was a crucial mechanism for con-
solidating MPWT’s role. There has been a great deal of leadership 
 continuity, with only three ministers overseeing the road sector over a 
period of 40 years. This continuity seems deliberate on the part of the 
political elite, as was the focused and incremental approach to national 
road development. 
Each of the three ministers who have taken the helm of MPWT supported 
the Pathet Lao during the revolution and all have been high- ranking mem-
bers of the Party’s Central Committee. Thus, the sector has been led and 
driven by strong, symbolic fi gures who have reinforced the sector’s cohe-
sion and identity through the narratives of nationalism and service to the 
grassroots (Robert Oksen 2012). The fi rst minister, Colonel Bounnaphol, 
an engineer educated abroad, was instrumental in leading the sector drive 
to open Lao PDR toward the sea and its neighbors and to increase trade 
interconnectivity within the country. His successor was a mastermind of 
the Rural Development Strategy during his mandate at the State Planning 
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Committee and drove forward the Rural Transport Infrastructure Strategy 
(Dennis 2000).
MPWT’s leaders have been committed to excellence in service delivery 
and have emphasized a hands-on, learning-by-doing, and problem- solving 
approach to the ministry’s work. The minister at the time of writing, H. E. 
Sommad Pholsena, exemplifi es these values. His credibility with the min-
istry’s personnel is enhanced a great deal by the fact that he has risen up 
through the ranks of the organization and combines his political acumen 
with his technical training and expertise. One of his constant axioms is 
“learning by doing,” emphasizing delegation of responsibilities and build-
ing expertise via experimentation with various models.
A delegated, problem-solving approach to delivering on MPWT’s 
goals, along with a conviction in learning-by-doing, is replicated down 
the institutional hierarchy. Department and division heads are delegated 
responsibilities, which it is then their job to ensure are carried out well. 
Staff throughout the organization reported having generally clear terms 
of reference along with relatively free reign, particularly in the Lao PDR 
context, to do their jobs. In turn, this ability for staff to take their own ini-
tiative was seen as an important contributor to the ministry’s success. The 
staff’s  consequent respect for its leaders along with its ownership in sector 
 projects is also crucial.
Donor Harmonization
MPWT pursued an explicit strategy of institutionalizing projects, and 
hence capacity-building, in the ministry itself, refusing to use project imple-
mentation units (PIUs). It was the fi rst Lao ministry to take this approach 
to PIUs. A senior offi cial emphasized that sector policy is fi rst decided by 
the government and then donors are invited to join in implementation. The 
sector has nevertheless enjoyed high donor support and involvement in the 
sector —including, especially, a great deal of engagement with the ADB, 
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 
and the World Bank—with iterated interactions and learning over time. 
Continuity on the donor side, including particularly the use of long-term 
task-team leaders with deep and extensive ties with their Lao counterparts, 
has contributed immeasurably to successful partnerships in the sector. 
Assistance is coordinated, with MPWT in the driver’s seat. The minister 
was interested in a sector-wide approach to aid projects even before the 
concept of donor harmonization really took hold. When it abolished PIUs, 
the ministry set up instead an over-arching Project Monitoring Division, 
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which is intended to be a one-stop shop for donors and donor coordi-
nation. Many interviewees noted that almost all key senior managers in 
MPWT (and in many private and state-owned enterprises active in the 
sector) are alumni of donor programs.
MPWT has benefi ted from early and sustained partnerships with 
donors since the 1980s. Many observers noted that donor commitment to 
road construction and maintenance was a major factor in delivering suc-
cesses in the sector. The road sector has gained from formal and informal 
donor coordination. Initially, there was some regional-based division of 
labor among donors in the road sector: in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union 
was committed to road expansion to Vietnam, and Western assistance was 
targeted toward the country’s main North-South trunk road, Road 13. In 
addition to geographic areas of responsibility, development partners have 
focused on different but complementary substantive areas—ADB on road 
network extension and rehabilitation, the World Bank on institutional 
development and maintenance, SIDA on local-level MPWT capacity- 
building and road improvement, other bilateral donors (e.g., Japan) on 
bridges, and so forth. This complementary division of labor has helped 
MPWT to pursue a building-block strategy in the sector, layering road 
maintenance and institutional systems building on top of a sustained com-
mitment to expanding construction of the national road network. 
Development partners have been engaged in road construction for 
almost three decades. Throughout this period, the transport sector con-
sistently received the largest share of total offi cial development assistance 
disbursements, ranging from 40 percent in the 1980s to about 20 percent 
since 2000. External funds still represent 75 percent of public works and 
transport sector spending.21 Rural roads continue to be important com-
ponents of integrated rural development projects as well as in the social 
sectors, since they are essential to increasing rural access to public services. 
Road construction remained an important part of government and donor 
spending in the 1990s, but attention progressively shifted to road rehabili-
tation needs and, consequently, the urgent need to develop a high-quality 
management system for the road sector that emphasized commitment to 
infrastructure maintenance. Two key elements of today’s MPWT were thus 
introduced with donor support: the Road Maintenance Fund and the Road 
Management System, which measures system performance and serves as a 
planning and budget allocation tool.
In coordinating donor support over time, MPWT has institutionalized 
its role as a strong public institution dedicated to leading a domestically 
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driven path of national road development. Its committed ownership 
of sector strategy and planning, along with the complementary divi-
sion of tasks among implementation partners, are two central strengths 
MPWT has displayed. Although it has voluntarily integrated core com-
ponents from donor programs, especially the technical approach to 
planning and the necessary analytical tools and methods, it has resisted 
and postponed other dimensions advanced by donors that were seen as 
not directly compatible with the sector and the national sociopolitical 
context. 
Sophisticated Adaptations in Human Resource Management
MPWT human resource management (HRM) practices must remain 
aligned to the broader civil service system,22 yet it is widely believed 
that—within those constraints—MPWT personnel practices are the most 
sophisticated in the government. The Personnel Department at the central 
ministry utilizes in-house software to capture demographic data and edu-
cation, training, and career decisions and development for each employee. 
Personnel assessments are carried out annually (with a tool developed by 
SIDA) at the level of district performance, evaluating individual capacity 
as well as assessing the capacity of the unit as a whole. These assessments 
are then used to develop plans for staff improvement, identifying gaps and 
deploying and training staff as indicated. 
Personnel skills within the institution have increased a great deal. 
Interviewees noted that most road sector personnel in Lao PDR’s early 
days were civil servants who were teachers rather than road engineers and 
simply did not know what to do in terms of road development. MPWT 
managers at the district, provincial, and central levels noted the upgrad-
ing of skills across the institution, including the proliferation of advanced 
degrees. Training programs and study tours abroad through scholarships 
were emphasized in the 1990s. 
Development partners contributed a great deal to the upgrading of staff 
skills at the local level, through on-the-job capacity building. Technical 
assistance in the road sector actually provided some measure of skills trans-
fer to Lao counterparts.23 Donor support was also essential in building pri-
vate sector implementation skills over time: “The construction  companies 
were the sons of donors. Each company had its donor and project. We 
received new equipment as well as technical and management training. 
When the state-owned enterprises collapsed, employees built up small new 
companies.”24
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Across the institution, from the minister down, there is an emphasis 
on on-the-job training and learning-by-doing. In turn, this necessitates the 
rotation of staff to fi eld positions, since the provincial and district level is 
where the ministry’s implementation work truly occurs: “Good fi eld man-
agers make good offi ce managers … If you are not trained in the fi eld, you 
are not qualifi ed to come to the Ministry.”25 Thus, MPWT has made a 
big push to decentralize personnel throughout the ranks, moving  project 
management and other HR capacity from central to provincial or dis-
trict  levels.26 Employees are, in turn, ensured good positions in the central 
 ministry when they return; directors are rotated through the provinces and 
central ministry. The institution deploys its staff with attention to local-level 
cultural and linguistic issues, in particular using native-language speak-
ers in remote, tribal, and ethnic areas, and also typically staffi ng district 
and provincial branches with individuals from those localities. The excep-
tion is in the poorer provinces, where the necessary skills cannot be found 
(e.g., Sekong district-level employees do not speak the Sekong dialects).
MPWT has deployed some of the HRM systems recommended by its 
development partners, particularly the use of analytical tools. Overall, 
however, MPWT’s HRM practices seem to represent more of a hybrid that 
adapts donor systems to the domestic context. For example, the systems of 
staff rotation and local-level capacity-building HRM, achieved by placing 
skilled engineers and managers in the districts and provinces, are conso-
nant with the Party’s strategy of institutionalizing democratic centralism 
through the establishment of direct relations with the grassroots (Robert 
Oksen 2012). 
Another important dimension of MPWT’s astute human resource man-
agement is the emphasis placed on individual motivation and performance. 
In part this is made possible by HR performance assessments. Yet, with the 
exception of promotion based on the civil service system and its annual 
performance evaluation, there are no tangible performance incentives. 
Instead, the institution successfully motivates staff through training, capac-
ity building, and weekly meetings that ensure tasks are allocated appropri-
ately and diffi culties are discussed. In addition, team work is prized and 
various recreational activities are organized to maintain team spirit and 
cohesion.
Evidence-Based Sector Management
In the 1990s, MPWT shifted its core mission to develop an emphasis on 
maintenance as well as construction. In turn, this organizational shift, 
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along with the move to decentralization and commercialization, required 
paying attention to administrative capacity in the institution. The emphasis 
on maintenance necessitated data management and administrative over-
sight skills in addition to the engineering capacity needed for construction. 
One mechanism through which MPWT has enhanced its administrative 
capacities is through the use of a relatively sophisticated data collection 
and management system for maintenance of the road network, the Road 
Maintenance System. This system, introduced with World Bank support, 
performs to international standards and has been adapted to the Lao PDR 
context. It is used to measure system performance as well as serve as a 
 planning and budgeting tool and operates throughout the MPWT hierar-
chy. District engineers submit data to the provincial-level DPWT to update 
the provincial maintenance management system, which DPWT then ana-
lyzes and passes to MPWT. In turn, after further data analysis (by the Public 
Works and Transport Institute, which reports directly to the minister), the 
 central MPWT then allocates road maintenance funds, in renegotiation 
with  provincial departments. 
If DPWT analysis indicates any problems or specifi c challenges, the rel-
evant provincial branch itself is charged with proposing a plan of action, 
to be approved by the central ministry. By the same logic, the district is 
supposed to report problems to the province. MPWT thus shows signs of 
being a “learning” organization that is fl exible in adapting to incoming 
information and adjusts policy and management accordingly. For example, 
provincial units are tasked with analyzing their own data and develop-
ing solutions for identifi ed problems. In addition, in implementing major 
changes in the late 1990s, MPWT piloted approaches in four provinces and 
modifi ed them accordingly. The quality of contracted-out road construc-
tion and maintenance is also closely supervised by the district-level OPWT, 
which reports to the provincial-level DPWT. Maintenance contracts with 
private sector enterprises are typically over three years, with their continu-
ation and renewal predicated on measured performance. 
In short, MPWT has the capacity and tools to put together, analyze, and 
plan and allocate resources on the basis of evidence. The Road Maintenance 
System analyzes road conditions, traffi c volumes, and populations served. 
It enables the costing of development scenarios as well as the identifi ca-
tion of maintenance needs on the basis of projected available funds. The 
system provides fi nancial evidence to aid decision making between further 
road expansion (increasing capital assets) and road maintenance (protect-
ing capital assets). MPWT uses evidence-based analysis to propose and 
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bolster its plans and role within the broader political arena. The institu-
tion thus maintains a thorough data collection and analysis system, with 
decisions around sector strategy and implementation made on the basis of 
these relatively sophisticated tools. In other words, the agency practices 
evidence-based decision making and emphasizes the institutionalization of 
systematic tools for effective administrative and political management.
Challenges
MPWT appears to have gained a great deal of legitimacy and public trust 
from its successes in extending the road network. Now that minimal road 
access needs have been exceeded, however, there is an increasing sense 
among the public that road quality is not as good as it should be. In other 
words, many villagers expressed the feeling that MPWT’s emphasis on the 
quantity of roads was negatively affecting the quality of construction. 
Capacity at the provincial level was reported to have improved mark-
edly over the past decade, through a concerted capacity-building push. 
Yet, observers noted that district-level capacity still requires a great deal 
of upgrading. Focus groups at the village level revealed that users have 
mixed views on district-level OPWTs. Road users respect the staff’s techni-
cal capacity, but believe that OPWTs tend not to enforce quality standards 
strictly enough through supervision of construction companies. Interviews 
with frontline MPWT staff emphasized gaps in human resource and tech-
nical capacities, confi rming that district-level units are undercapacitated to 
perform their decentralized supervision responsibilities. 
New fi nancing and construction models are emerging in the road 
 sector. One new approach is for private sector construction companies 
to take on the fi nancing liability for building new roads, with contrac-
tual commitments from the government to repay the fi rm upon comple-
tion in tranches over fi ve years.27 This model appears to be particularly 
popular at the  provincial  government level, where governors can sign off 
on projects below 5 billion kip. But there appears to be some concern 
developing at the senior level about the accumulating fi nancial liability 
for  government in light of this new approach to road construction. In 
addition to the evolving  build- operate-transfer model of fi nancing, there 
is a  resource-for- infrastructure model emerging, whereby roads are built 
in exchange for natural resource  concessions. For example, in Sekong 
Province, there appear to be agreements to compensate private sector 
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companies upgrading provincial roads (a US$12 billion project) with coal 
ore and timber from the province. Provincial governors are powerful on 
this matter, and the government has yet to develop a systematic, country-
wide strategy for such construction models. 
 There seem to be barriers to entry to the private sector in road con-
struction and maintenance, in the sense that those companies most well-
connected to Party leaders are those that will most likely succeed in any 
meaningful way. The military is involved in some major construction 
companies and is especially likely to have a role in road construction 
and maintenance contracts associated with natural resource concessions. 
Increasingly, too, bids are tendered under international competitive bid-
ding, which means they are usually won by Vietnamese and Chinese com-
panies instead of Lao companies. Lao subcontractors on these projects get 
squeezed, as the foreign companies retain the bulk of the profi ts. This was 
identifi ed as problematic from the point of view of trying to build local 
enterprises with appropriate capacity.
With the exception of reporting to donors, the ministry seems to employ 
relatively limited forms of external accountability. For example, it neither 
uses client hotlines or systematic grievance processes; nor does it appear 
to canvass the public regularly to determine citizens’ demand for road 
services. Villagers expressed dissatisfaction regarding MPWT’s communi-
cation systems, pointing out that they were often left in the dark about 
progress on projects, since consultations during road construction involved 
only village authorities and not public forums. This indicates that the insti-
tution may need to improve its communication and interface with clients 
throughout the hierarchy. Yet, the provincial units of MPWT work in close 
collaboration with provincial governors’ offi ces, potentially reducing the 
need for direct client consultation.
Conclusion
The road sector has been crucial to Lao PDR’s modernization and socio-
economic development, especially after the country embarked on eco-
nomic liberalization reforms in 1986. LPRP, recognizing the sociopolitical 
and economic benefi ts of road building, has prioritized the sector from the 
inception of the Lao PDR in 1975. The MPWT has built its institutional 
success on the basis of this mandate and the resources that have come with 
it. The agency has demonstrated a remarkable ability to operate within 
LAO PDR CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT • 175
its immediate external environment and manage its internal  institutional 
workings in creative ways that meet two meta-level objectives. First, 
MPWT has proven adept, even indispensable, in ensuring that the Lao 
political elite’s goals of state building and modernization can be met. 
Second, the agency has astutely managed other elements of its external and 
internal environment in ways that have enhanced its ability to deliver on 
its institutional mandate. 
In meeting these two high-level goals, three especially striking causal 
dimensions of MPWT’s institutional success stand out. First, in the 
broader context of the administrative and economic reforms introduced 
with NEM, MPWT has skillfully retained sector policy making and plan-
ning primacy, while delegating implementation through decentralization 
to the provincial units of the ministry and commercialization of road 
construction and maintenance to private sector partners. MPWT has 
thus evolved from being a direct service provider to an institution that 
sets policy for and manages service provision but does not implement it 
directly.
Second, MPWT has astutely managed the high level of donor fund-
ing and support in the sector by retaining the driver’s seat and ensuring 
country ownership of policy making, capacity building, and analytical 
tools and systems. Donors have been essential in the sector for introduc-
ing new ideas, models, and skills; they have demonstrated the fruits of 
a sustained and focused partnership with committed counterparts. The 
donor-supported Road Maintenance System itself is a major factor in 
the success of needs analysis and planning in the sector. Most crucially, 
however, MPWT has experimented with these inputs so as to learn from 
them and adapt them to the Lao context and to meet Lao administra-
tive and political goals. Partly as a result of its close partnership with 
donors, MPWT emphasizes evidence-based decision making and sector 
management, improving its effectiveness in delivering on its mandate 
and enhancing its legitimacy in the broader institutional and political 
arena.
Finally, MPWT has astutely implemented creative, bureaucratic modifi -
cations that enable it to push against the constraints of the Lao administra-
tive system. Such innovative adaptations include a sophisticated in-house 
personnel management system, as well as the leadership’s and overall min-
istry’s emphasis on learning-by-doing, personal and team initiative and 
performance measures, and an evidence-based, problem-solving approach 
to the implementation of sector policy.
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Notes
 1. Prior to 2006, MPWT was the Ministry of Communication, Transport, 
Post and Construction (MCTPC). MPWT consists of six departments: the 
Department of Civil Aviation, Department of Housing and Urban Planning, 
Department of Inland Waterways, Department of Planning and Cooperation, 
Department of Roads, and Department of Transport. 
 2. See Gwilliams (2007), ADB (2010), and SHER Consulting Engineers (2010) 
for further detail on these challenges and the technical and fi nancial complexi-
ties associated with them.
 3. Data from National Statistics Center (2008).
 4. Road Department Statistics, 2000–10, Ministry of Public Works and Transport.
 5. Road Department Statistics, 2000–10, Ministry of Public Works and Transport.
 6. Barma (2002) provides details on the Lao road sector in the 1980s and 
1990s, along with an assessment of the institutional development impact of 
International Development Association (IDA) lending in the sector.
 7. The other four sectors LPRP viewed as pillars of socialist modernization, to 
which all villages should have access, were electricity, health, education, and 
water.
 8. MPWT’s share of public expenditure peaked in 2005/06 at 48 percent; subse-
quently, the government set a cap of 35 percent on the MPWT portion.
 9. Law on Public Roads (Government of the Lao PDR 1999).
 10. RMF was created as an entity within the organizational structure of MPWT. 
It is supervised and directed by an advisory board, which comprises public 
and private sector representatives, appointed by the prime minister, from 
the Ministry of Finance, MPWT, provincial authorities, the Lao National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, private and state-owned road and 
 passenger transport operators, and the general public. RMF coordinates 
with MPWT’s Road Administration Department on fi nancial support for 
national road maintenance and with the Local Roads Division on local 
roads (ADB 2010).
 11. The share was calculated based on RMF revenue and expenditure summa-
ries from 2002–08. RMF was largely supported by donors in its fi rst year; 
by 2008, 91 percent of its revenues came from government tax sources. Total 
revenues tripled from 2002 to 2008.
 12. By Decree 09/PM, January 2001.
 13. This decentralization initiative was being discussed as early as 1997 but was 
formalized later by Prime Minister’s Decree 01 (2000) and operationalized 
even later through the 2003 Law on Local Administration (Government of 
the Lao PDR 2003). In the road sector, the decentralization process preceded 
countrywide reforms, being implemented through the 1999 Law on Public 
Roads (Government of the Lao PDR 1999).
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 14. Gwilliams (2007) provides more details on this delegated implementation 
system.
 15. Each of these companies was originally named after the road they were 
charged with constructing. Hence, SOE names such as Road Construction 
Company #8 (designated to build Road 8).
 16.  This devolution was undertaken under the Law on Public Roads (Government 
of the Lao PDR 1999).
 17. Senior offi cial in Champassak Province (February 1, 2012).
 18. It appears that the practice is more common in the richer provinces and those 
connected with Thailand and Vietnam.
 19. In the case of the latter road, Vientiane’s 450-Year Road, the government agreed 
that a private company would provide the fi nancing for road  construction. The 
government, in turn, plans to “convert land assets into  capital” by later selling 
commercially attractive plots on either side of the road for development and to 
thereby cover the costs of road construction. See http://laovoices.com / new-six
-lane-road-gets-green-light/. 
 20. Interviews with district-level OPWT offi cial and front-line technical staff. 
 21. Government public expenditure records, 2008/09, and data from Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, ODA Annual Reports (2000, 2007, 2010).
 22. World Bank (2010) provides details of Lao PDR’s civil service human resource 
management system, including compensation policies and practices. 
 23. Earlier assessments (e.g., Barma 2002) were less sanguine on this point.
 24. Interview with road construction company representative.
 25. Interview with senior MPWT offi cial (February 9, 2012).
 26. It was noted that contract staff (nonpermanent civil servants) are essential 
to getting the work of the ministry done; these contract workers can be later 
converted to government employment if they are under 35 years of age.
 27. World Bank (2012) provides a detailed assessment of these new fi nancing and 
construction models.
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SIERRA LEONE 
P A R T  I I I

The unique provenance of Sierra Leone, combined with its ethnic distri-
bution, has had a determining infl uence on the country’s sociopolitical 
development. Founded in the late eighteenth century as a safe haven for 
freed and escaped slaves, the settlement of Freetown and its immediate 
peninsular area were brought under direct British control in 1808 as the 
Sierra Leone Colony. The settlers, the Krios, were at fi rst detached from 
the peoples of the interior, but a trading relationship developed between 
them and, increasingly, other forms of societal interaction. In 1896, Britain 
declared a protectorate over the Colony’s hinterlands, delineating the 
greater  country’s boundaries. 
Sierra Leone was dominated by two large ethnic groups, the Temne 
and the Mende, and two numerous but smaller groups, the Limba and the 
Kono. With eventual universal suffrage, the relationships between these 
groups (plus the Krios) would characterize the local political environment. 
Throughout the pre-independence period, however, the critical  factor 
was the colonial government’s policy of remote, indirect rule of the 
Protectorate. Paramount chiefs were favored or replaced to contain dis-
sent and maintain allegiance under the watch of district commissioners. 
The chiefs were generally unimpeded in exercising their traditional writs. 
Concerted modernization efforts were largely confi ned to Freetown and 
the Western Area, where educational development and the establishment 
of a professional civil service were particularly notable. The stark opportu-
nity and entitlement divide between the old settlement and the hinterland 
persisted into the modern era.
181
The Institution-Building Context in 
Sierra Leone
Marco Larizza and Brendan Glynn
C H A P T E R  7
182 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
Since Independence
Political Movements: 1970s
Before and after the country’s independence, Dr. Milton Margai’s Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was ascendant on the local political scene. 
Margai became the fi rst prime minister, but he was soon opposed by Siaka 
Stevens, who formed the All People’s Congress (APC). Ethnic fault lines 
became even more pronounced, with Mendes attaching themselves largely 
to the SLPP and Temnes and Limbas to the APC. 
Army interventions emerged as a regular feature, with coups in 1967 
and 1968. The 1968 coup reestablished Stevens in power after his ear-
lier parliamentary victory. In the following decade, Stevens consolidated 
the APC position but increasingly in the form of personal power and 
self-aggrandizement. In 1971, Stevens became the executive president the 
Republic of Sierra Leone. The abolition of local government the following 
year accentuated the entrenchment of clientelism, as Stevens gave preferen-
tial treatment to individual Paramount Chiefs in return for their quiescence 
at the national level. In 1978, a referendum approved Stevens’ proposal for 
a new, one-party constitution.
Economic Problems: 1980s
Coinciding with this stage of the centralization of power, incremental 
deterioration of the economy set in. Particularly far-reaching in their 
effects were the depletion, and regime plunder, of alluvial diamonds and 
the closure of the iron ore mine in Marampa. The situation was com-
pounded by an accelerated exodus of qualifi ed civil servants and the 
undermining of the morale of those who stayed in their posts. The regime 
required that all civil servants be members of the party. The once meri-
tocratic civil service became more and more politicized, and there was 
an effective exclusion of Mendes in senior posts. Meanwhile, as indirect 
taxes dropped, expansionary fi scal and monetary policies were used to 
stimulate economic activity. The widening gap in the budget was fi nanced 
through the heavy use of short-term debt, which furthered the downward 
trajectory of economic decline. 
The government sought external multilateral support in 1989; 
resources for economic and administrative reform were mobilized by the 
World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank. However, the degrada-
tion of the state apparatus had reached crisis proportions, and discontent 
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was mounting, notably in the hinterland, where, after years of central 
neglect and patrimonial politics, the power elite was about to reap a bitter 
harvest. In particular, the mood of the rural youth was becoming increas-
ingly volatile. Their dissatisfaction was stoked by their marginalization, 
and the frequent extraction of their labor by individual paramount chiefs. 
Civil War: 1990s
The fi rst incursion of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) across the 
border from Liberia took place in March 1991. The incursion sparked the 
decade-long civil war, which capitalized on the widespread disenchantment 
in the country. While the insurgents gathered numbers to their ranks and 
gained territory, Freetown was not directly affected by the violence. But the 
diminution of the authority of the government was such that an unplanned 
revolt by junior army offi cers was able to topple the APC government. 
With the continuing relative immunity of the capital and the Western 
Area from rebel attacks, the newly installed National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC) junta was able to function in a comparatively authori-
tative fashion. The position of the NPRC was helped by the presence in 
Freetown of troops from the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In addition, the continuation of external 
support allowed the maintenance of core services, as did the residual pro-
fessional loyalty and skills in clusters of the public service, for  example 
at the Ministry of Finance. The junta’s internal cohesion remained brit-
tle, however, and in 1996 it ceded the political space to allow for new 
elections. 
At this juncture, APC’s reputation was at its lowest, and APC was seen 
as the party that had caused the breakdown of the state and the coming 
of the civil war. SLPP, under Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, was able to deliver 
its traditional southern and eastern vote while benefi ting suffi ciently from 
disaffected former APC voters elsewhere in the country. However, when 
SLPP assumed offi ce, the internal insurgency was still unresolved and dis-
gruntlement continued in the army. Following a coup the next year, a new 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) junta was installed. Kabbah 
retreated to run a parallel government across the Freetown harbor, pro-
tected by ECOMOG. In February 1998, Nigerian troops marched into 
Freetown and expelled the junta. In January 1999, a new incursion into 
the city environs was launched by AFRC and Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) combined forces.
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After the Civil War: 2000s
The war was declared over in early 2002. By that time, between 20,000 
and 70,000 Sierra Leoneans had been killed and thousands more had 
been maimed or displaced. The country’s infrastructure was devastated 
and economic activity severely derailed. The SLPP government and the 
Kabbah presidency were returned again in the same year. They faced not 
only the challenge of reconstruction, but also the general transformational 
issue of poverty reduction in of one of the most impoverished countries in 
the world. Even by 2009, the United Nations Human Development Index 
ranked Sierra Leone at 180, with only Afghanistan and Niger behind. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme, in Sierra 
Leone, life expectancy at birth was 47 years, the adult literacy rate was 
38 percent, and the combined primary and secondary school enrollment 
rate was 45 percent.
The Economy
On the positive side, the country’s abundant mineral resources and poten-
tial in agriculture and fi sheries prefi gured considerably increased external 
earnings. Likewise, donor commitments were rapidly increased, and a 
skills infl ow was presaged by the willingness of members of the diaspora 
to return or invest in the country. Furthermore, refl ecting the traditionally 
high levels of education and loyalty in professional and technical niches in 
Sierra Leone, the government had an enduring pool of expertise available 
to it. This was augmented (for example, in the Ministry of Finance) by spe-
cialized technical assistance. On the policy front, the government sought 
to address the underlying causes of war by focusing on youth dislocation 
and the reintroduction of elected local government and its integration into 
decentralized service delivery. 
Political Change
Progress was identifi able in the key policy areas, but the government was 
increasingly regarded as self-serving, complacent, and tolerant of corrup-
tion. Remarkably, the northern elite had regrouped around what had been 
considered the discredited political vehicle of the APC. A new leader, Ernest 
Koroma, pushed the renewed brand strongly and particularly assailed cor-
ruption at high levels. Another factor in the next (2007) election was the 
emergence of a rival, southern-oriented party, the People’s Movement for 
Democratic Change (PMDC). In a reverse of the situation 11 years earlier, 
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APC was able to deliver the vote in the northern and western zones (plus 
in Kono by way of alliances), while SLPP’s traditional vote was dissipated 
or not mobilized. The election marked the fi rst in a post-confl ict country 
in Africa in which an incumbent party was defeated and (prompted by 
signifi cant external pressure) respected the outcome. 
Economic Growth
Sierra Leone’s economic growth since the end of the civil war has been 
impressive. In the early years, there was a surge in economic growth 
of more than 10 percent, followed by an average annualized rate of 
7.3  percent in 2004–06. The growth rate fl attened as oil and food prices 
increased after the 2008 crisis, but it remained above 5 percent. As the 
2010 Public Expenditure Review (PER) emphasized, this trend bodes 
well for the realization of several of the goals of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP II). The PER also noted that the authorities suc-
cessfully adjusted their fi scal stance to the reduced levels of net external 
assistance in the period. What is more, there has been marked progress 
in public fi nancial management and concerted efforts on reform since 
2004 have brought Sierra Leone up to the level of regional averages on 
respective indicators.
Social Challenges
In the social sphere, however, the sustained growth has not translated effec-
tively into improved indices. The poverty headcount has declined, but it is 
still around the 60 percent mark (World Bank 2010). Pro-poor spending 
has continued to increase, but, the Decentralised Service Delivery Project 
II PAD, 2012, observes the following: “… Human development and ser-
vice delivery outcomes have shown only modest improvements. In all three 
sectors, which are of particular concern vis-à-vis HD outcomes, health, 
education, water and sanitation, Sierra Leone falls signifi cantly short of 
the Millennium Development Goals.”1 The government’s commitment in 
these areas has remained fi rm, nonetheless, as does its decentralization 
policy for service delivery through the community planning, administra-
tive, and monitoring systems of the local councils. As covenanted, the 
central  government is continuing to channel at least 30 percent of its 
domestic revenues (less wages, interest, and some statutory transfers) to 
subnational government. In his parliamentary address, following his (and 
APC’s)  election victories in December 2012, President Koroma reasserted 
the  government’s adherence to these policy commitments.
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Political Economy
The 2012 elections were carried out peacefully and with Electoral 
Commission and international validation. However, although the 
processes of formal electoral democracy have thus been solidifi ed— 
representing a signifi cant achievement—a number of substantial nega-
tivities remain in the political economy environment. It is characterized 
by embedded structures of patrimonialism, in which politicians at all 
levels are involved in private rent-seeking and channeling private goods 
to support groups or  individuals. Such mechanisms, working against any 
notion of collective public interest, reached their high point under the 
Stevens regime, followed by that of his nominee, Momoh. The military 
interregnums did little to change the  situation (although the client profi le 
changed). After those regimes, an elected, civilian government returned, 
but the successive regimes continued the focus on mobilizing their core 
ethnic support as a fi rst priority. 
The corrosive effects of these patrimonial mores are evident. As 
Robinson (2008) notes: 
[P]roperty rights are insecure. People only have property because patrons 
allow them to have it, but such rights are always conditional and can be 
withdrawn….Moreover, laws are selectively applied with no concept of 
the rule of law or equality before the law which of course are completely 
inconsistent with how clientelism is dispensed. In a patrimonial regime 
you have rights if you are a client of the patron and otherwise you do 
not. Third, … patrimonial regimes create distortions in market prices to 
create rents which can then be politically allocated…. Finally, patrimo-
nialism undermines the coherence of the bureaucracy. This is because 
the bureaucracy represents a potential source of political opposition to 
patrons.
M ajor players in the system are the chiefs, particularly the 149 
 paramount chiefs. Tellingly, in 2002, when their prestige was at a low 
ebb, the Kabbah government avoided the opportunity of reform of chief-
tainship and signaled their full reinstallation as the key local power bro-
kers. Land allocation, most critically, has remained their preserve, as has 
the collection (for supposed later co-sharing with the local councils) of 
the local development tax. Furthermore, the infl uence of the paramount 
chiefs is still situationally important in diamond and mineral rich areas. If 
 anything, the position of the chiefs has been reinforced over time. With the 
adoption of the National Decentralisation Policy in 2010, the designation 
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of the local councils as the “highest political authorities” in their respective 
territories contained in the 2004 Local Government Act was adjusted to 
read the “highest developmental authorities.” Clearly, the core chief-ruling 
party nexus in the system of patrimonialism has an enduring robustness 
based on mutual interest.
Countertrends
The tendency to tailor measures in line with the pattern of private incen-
tives and to perpetuate the benefi cial order is further evidenced by the par-
tial retreat on decentralization represented by the reintroduction of district 
commissioners; the effective curtailment of parliamentary oversight; and 
(in the current APC tenure) the continuing domination of the Cabinet by 
northern personages. 
These negative, historical continuities are exposed to countertrends, 
however, which augur well potentially for a shift in the current and-
persistent paradigm. First, there is a voluble, open press and media 
environment despite ongoing attempts to muzzle journalists and com-
mentators. Second, other channels of social accountability and political 
expression are opening up, notably as a result of the decentralization 
process. An aspect of this is that the war, to some degree, promoted 
greater community consciousness and voice, more so in the worst-
affected zones. Third, political allegiances, although largely stereotypi-
cal, are not immutable. Importantly, the swing vote can be posited as 
increasing, including owing to accelerated urbanization in the Freetown 
area (although this could serve to marginalize the hinterland again). 
Finally, rapid economic developments—prominently related to the 
extractive industries in the immediate future—will inevitably reverber-
ate in societal change, which will not be fully amenable to the marshal-
ling of elites for their own interests. 
Note
 1. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP 
/IB/2012/08/24/000356161_20120824004236/Rendered/INDEX/720570PJP
R0v1003550August016020120.txt.
188 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
References
Robinson, James. 2008. “Governance and Political Economy Constraints to 
World Bank CAS Priorities in Sierra Leone.” Research Paper, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
World Bank. 2010. “Joint Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Sierra 
Leone.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
189
Sierra Leone is heavily dependent on external assistance. Institutional 
capacity is generally weak but some pockets of effectiveness do exist. The 
history of the country has been marked by a steady decline since 1961 
and by widening ethnic, regional, and economic cleavages. The country’s 
political economy has been marked by the prevalence of patrimonial poli-
tics and confl ict. Despite new forces that have emerged and greater politi-
cal inclusiveness, political competition continues to rely on ethnic-based 
clientelism.
The stark deterioration of the administrative capacity prior to the 
confl ict and the efforts to sustain the state during the civil war generated 
consistent (domestic and external) efforts to prioritize the institutional 
building of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). 
Signaling transparency and technical capability in public fi nancial man-
agement was the keystone of the government’s strategy to attract external 
 support, which has signifi cantly risen since 2000.
Freetown and the Western Peninsula remained relatively isolated from 
the attacks of the rebels and the core government functions were not at 
risk, except at the end of the confl ict in 1998–99. This made it possible 
for development partners to maintain their support and assistance to 
MoFED throughout the war. The fi nancing of external consultants and 
local  technical assistants by development partners enabled MoFED to 
recruit and retain key personnel. During the confl ict and in its aftermath, 
a critical mass of technical staff stayed with the institution. This continuity 
contributed to preserve institutional memory and lay the foundations for 
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and Economic Development
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future reforms, but also increased the institutional capacity and credibility 
of commitments with external partners. 
In recent years, the institution has benefi ted from increasingly coordi-
nated efforts by donors and the simplifi cation of reporting requirements. 
For example, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund has fi nanced the Institutional 
Reform and Capacity Building Project and the Integrated Public Financial 
Management Reform Program. Another example is the establishment of an 
annual Performance Assessment Framework to inform and guide  budget 
support. However, the strong infl uence of donors has at times translated 
into disruptive isomorphic pressures.
Taking advantage of this context, MoFED has undertaken various 
structural changes, introduced a new information system, updated pro-
cesses, and improved communication channels with government clients 
and partner agencies. Notably, since 2007, the ministry has considerably 
enhanced its presence in the line ministries through the deployment of 
 budget offi cers, procurement offi cers, and internal audit personnel in all 
ministries, departments, and agencies (MDA) and local councils.
Institutional Success
After emerging from a protracted confl ict and decades of state weakness, 
the MoFED made signifi cant progress in building its institutional capac-
ity, improving results in macroeconomic and public fi nance management, 
and increasing its legitimacy. Various reforms have included  strengthening 
existing  departments, implementing business process reform, updating 
legal and regulatory frameworks, and developing new structures and 
institutions.
Moreover, in the past 15 years, the ministry has proved it has signifi cant 
resilience in withstanding confl ict, coup d’états, a change of ruling party, 
volatility in offi cial assistance, and a turbulent international fi nancial envi-
ronment. The ministry has consistently improved its credibility and legiti-
macy vis-à-vis external and domestic stakeholders, further strengthening 
its relations with clients and partners.
Results 
Since 2002, MoFED has achieved measurable and gradually improving 
results with respect to a sizeable portion of its core mandate. The minis-
try has exhibited sustained improvements in key areas, including budget 
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formulation, execution, and accounting; procurement practices;  internal 
and external audits; and coordination with stakeholders and clients. 
Although tax collection has increased, its comparatively low levels remain 
a signifi cant problem. Other challenges include improving fi scal discipline 
and the credibility of budgets. The low credibility of the budgets stems 
from the fact that offi cial assistance is often unpredictable.
MoFED’s performance is comparable to other Sub-Saharan African 
countries and low-income economies in most indicators (see fi gure 8.1 and 
fi gure 8.2.) Sierra Leone outperforms these countries in terms of budget 
management and soundness of intergovernmental relations. It lags in terms 
of internal audit, macroeconomic management, and revenue administra-
tion. However, Sierra Leone’s scores are markedly higher than those of 
other post-confl ict countries in the region.
Sierra Leone’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
scores show that the country is above the International Development 
Source: Brumby et al. 2010.
Note: Scores from 0 to 5.
Figure 8.1. Performance of Key Central Finance Agency Functions in Sierra Leone 
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Association (IDA) average on dimensions such as macroeconomic 
 management, fi scal policy, debt management, quality of budget and 
fi nancial management, and transparency (table 8.1). The areas in which 
the country lags are related to the effi ciency of revenue mobilization. The 
quality of public administration is comparable to the average for IDA 
Source: PEFA Secretariat.
Note: PEFA = Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability. Scores from 1 to 4.
Figure 8.2. PEFA Score in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo 
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Table 8.1. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Scores, 2005 and 2010 
Dimension
Sierra Leone Average
2005 2010 2005 2010
1. Macroeconomic management 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.7
2. Fiscal policy 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5
3. Debt policy 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4
13. Quality of budget and fi nancial management 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.3
14. Effi ciency of revenue mobilization 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.5
16.  Transparency, accountability, and corruption 
in the public sector 2.5 3.0 2.9 2.9
Source: World Bank (2011).
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countries and has not registered any signifi cant improvement since CPIA 
started being collected.
Importantly, MoFED has increased the transparency of the budget 
process and revenue allocations. Between 2007 and 2010, 10 scores 
improved in the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 
indicators and in three areas—comprehensiveness of the information in 
the  budget, transparency of intergovernmental fi scal relations, and avail-
ability of information in the service delivery units—received the maxi-
mum score (see annex 8A.3). The frequency and accuracy of reporting of 
government debt, expenditure, and revenues have also improved substan-
tially. There is a new cadre of budget offi cers in line ministries reporting 
to the Budget Bureau, the rollout of the Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS) is ongoing (100 percent of national expen-
ditures processed, 65 percent in real time), and the timeliness of fi nancial 
reporting and audit is increasing. In parallel, new legislation and changes 
in implementation mechanisms have positively impacted the procurement 
environment. 
The reorganization of revenue administration and the introduction 
of the goods and services tax have led to a fi vefold increase in tax rev-
enues since 2002 (see fi gure 8.3). Although several challenges related to 
macroeconomic management remain, the overall defi cit excluding grants 
has decreased from 18 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001 
to 6 percent in 2007. External assistance, in the form of budget support, 
Source: MoFED (2011).
Figure 8.3. Tax Revenue, 2000–10
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allowed the government to fi ll the fi scal gap and reduce the defi cit to 
1  percent of GDP by 2007. In 2008 and 2009, the defi cit widened as a 
result of the food crisis to 3 percent with grants and 10 percent exclud-
ing grants. This represented a setback, but performance has bettered 
since 2010. In addition, fi gure 8.4 shows that expenditures have stabilized 
but with a similar setback in the latter part of the 2000s.
Legitimacy
Clients (MDAs and local governments) and external partners largely agree 
that MoFED is a capable institution. Its relationship with clients and the 
frequency of communication have greatly improved with the deployment 
of accountants, budget offi cers, and internal auditors in all major MDAs 
and local councils. MoFED clients have highlighted the greater transpar-
ency and timeliness in the transfer of resources, although many challenges 
remain in terms of budget credibility, but they acknowledge that this is 
largely outside the control of MoFED. The ministry is seen by the majority 
of its clients as a strategic partner in building relations with development 
partners. The assurances related to fi nancial management and procurement 
given by the ministry are generally considered a major contribution to the 
line ministries’ mandate. Donors’ willingness to use budget support also 
refl ects the level of trust that exists in the processes put in place during the 
past decade. 
Source: West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), ECOWAS, WAEMU convergence criteria, 2001–09.
Figure 8.4. Total Expenditure/GDP, 2001–09
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Resilience
The integration of local technical assistants (LTAs) into the permanent 
staff and improving the remuneration and skills of civil servants remain 
major problems. But the resilience of MoFED is evidenced in the fact that 
the ministry continued to function even when the government was ousted 
in 1998 during the attacks on Freetown. The ministry has been able to 
withstand several changes in political leadership, a change in governing 
party, and various external shocks. More recently, the ministry has been 
able to endure exogenous shocks created by the food crisis and the interna-
tional fi nancial downturn (and its rippling effects for development aid) by 
adapting to changing circumstances.
Sociopolitical and Historical Context: State Retraction and Confl ict
Starting in the late 1970s, an incremental deterioration of the economic 
and political landscape led to weakened state capacity. The drain of qual-
ifi ed civil servants resulted in a stark weakening of MoFED’s functioning. 
The depletion of alluvial diamonds and the closure of the iron ore mine 
in Marampa had far-reaching effects on the economy. As indirect taxes 
dropped, expansionary fi scal and monetary policies were used to stim-
ulate economic activity. The widening gap in the budget was fi nanced 
Source: World Bank Indicators, 2011.
 Figure 8.5. GNI per capita, 1980–2010
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through heavy use of short-term debt (World Bank 1979), which set 
the country on a downward trajectory of economic decline, as shown in 
fi gure 8.5.
Unsound economic policies and the widespread corruption and pre-
dation of the Stevens government led to a sharp decline in public reve-
nues. Public revenues started to drop circa 1975 and a decade later they 
 represented less than 5 percent of GDP. Figure 8.6 illustrates the negative 
trend in revenue mobilization that only started to revert in the late 1980s. 
The precipitous decline in public revenues forced the government to cut 
back public expenditures to 16 percent of GDP. The adjustment trans-
lated into the breakdown of public services during the 1980s and a dwin-
dling social and economic infrastructure, which drastically reduced living 
standards. 
The decline of salaries, amid worsening economic conditions, was 
the main factor behind the deterioration of the quality of the civil ser-
vice (Bates 2008). As employees worked fewer hours and resorted to 
other activities to meet their basic needs, absenteeism was rampant 
and the level of corruption rose as citizens had to bribe offi cials to 
access services (Bates 2008). In the Ministry of Finance and in other 
central agencies, the drain of professional and technical skills height-
ened. The limitations of Sierra Leone’s labor market at that time and 
later the uncertainty and instability created by the confl ict motivated 
many qualifi ed individuals to leave the country, resulting in a severe 
Sources: Adapted from Bates (2008) and World Bank Indicators, 2011.
 Figure 8.6. Government Revenues Excluding Grants, 1975–2010 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
5
10
15
20
%
 o
f G
D
P
SIERRA LEONE CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT • 197
weakening of the civil service across the board. The wage bill reached 
its lowest point in 1989, representing 6 percent of recurrent expendi-
tures (World Bank 1993). 
President Stevens had introduced a new constitution, transform-
ing Sierra Leone into a one-party state with the All People’s Congress 
(APC) as the sole legal party in 1978. The regime required that all 
civil servants be members of the party. The once meritocratic civil ser-
vice became more and more politicized and several senior and experi-
enced staff members were driven away. Given that historically Mendes 
have not been supporters of APC, the requirement also meant that in 
practice they were excluded from senior civil service positions from 
then on.1
In 1989, faced with decaying public sector institutions and acute 
deterioration in the delivery of basic services, the government sought 
external support. With the restoration of normal fi nancial relations with 
the donor community, multilateral agencies provided new fi nancing 
(see  fi gure 8.7 and fi gure 8.8). The government agreed with the World 
Bank on a Salary Rationalization Program designed to adjust the real 
income for civil servants and improve career streams. Between April 1992 
and October 1993, the World Bank approved three projects in succes-
sion to support the reform program, namely the Reconstruction Import 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2011. 
 Figure 8.7. Net ODA as a Share of GNI in Sierra Leone, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Low-Income Countries, 1960–2010
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Credit, the Public Sector Management Support Project (PSMSP), and the 
Structural Adjustment Credit. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the African Development Bank also resumed their support and, as a 
result, concerted and sustained efforts to improve the performance of the 
Ministry of Finance were initiated.
In the following decade, the government undertook several steps to 
lay down the foundations of effective public expenditure management 
(see annexes 8A.1–8A.3). A new budgeting system was adopted in 
1994, including unifying recurrent expenditures with development and 
capital outlays. A computerized accounting system was introduced to 
improve expenditure control and monitoring of the budget implementa-
tion and the  allocations of social and economic sectors were improved 
substantially (World Bank 2002). The projects provided several offi ces 
and units with experts, local contract personnel (LTAs), equipment, and 
 training for local staff—including Budget and Expenditure Controls, the 
Accountant General’s Offi ce, Economic Affairs, Procurement Offi ce, and 
Aid Coordination. PSMSP also provided fi nancing and staff for a new 
unit—the Economic Policy Research Unit—with the goal of improving 
macroeconomic analysis and forecasting to provide a stronger  foundation 
for the budget process.2
Source: World Development Indicators, 2011.
Note: ODA = offi cial development assistance.
Figure 8.8. Net ODA and Net ODA per Capita in Sierra Leone, 1960–2010
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The geography of the war meant that Freetown in the Western Peninsula 
remained relatively insulated from the attacks of the rebels and the core 
government functions were at relatively lower risk. This in turn made it 
possible for development partners to maintain their support and assistance 
to MoFED throughout the war years. Although there was fi ghting in the 
outskirts of the city on several occasions, the capital remained insulated 
from the violence for the most part.3
In May 1997, after the government announced a plan to rationalize the 
supply of rice to the military, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
formed a junta led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma and ousted President 
Kabbah. Kabbah was airlifted to Conakry (Guinea), where he established 
and ran a parallel government in exile with most of his cabinet. After the 
coup, there were days of pillaging by soldiers. The Ministry of Finance was 
looted and torched. The ministry moved to a rented building in a nearby 
area and continued operating. Nine months later, in February 1998, 
Nigerian troops marched into Freetown, expelled the junta, and restored 
order; the Kabbah government was restored about a month later. Then 
again in January 1999, a combined Armed Forces Revolutionary Council–
Revolutionary United Front onslaught seized part of Freetown but was 
driven out after weeks of bitter fi ghting. In its wake, there were 5,000 
dead and the city was devastated. Fighting continued for months outside 
Freetown before the confl ict was fi nally declared over in January 2002.
Throughout the confl ict, the appointment of consultants and the recruit-
ment of highly qualifi ed nationals allowed the budget process and public 
expenditures to continue. Despite the setbacks in 1997 and 1999, when 
valuable personnel were lost and most of the equipment and systems were 
destroyed, reporting of government expenditure and revenues continued 
(World Bank 2002). A team of consultants and employees were able to 
reconstruct the records and databases by comparing and consolidating 
information sets from hard copies and printouts, backups on fl oppy disks, 
and the few laptops that escaped the destruction. It was a prolonged and 
tedious exercise and continued for several years after the war.
In the aftermath of the war, rapid mobilization of human resources 
was possible thanks to the human capacity and a diaspora with strong 
links to the country that provided a pool of skilled individuals who could 
fi ll positions in the ministry. Sierra Leone counts with some of the oldest 
and best regarded higher education institutions of West Africa. Education 
had been a priority after independence and while fragility and confl ict 
had severely damaged its quality, there are still remnants. Before the war, 
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these institutions attracted students from other former British colonies in 
the region and were the door for nationals to continue higher education 
in the foreign institutions with which the university was affi liated. Because 
of this, Sierra Leone counted with more professionals than other countries 
in the region.
External Operational Environment: Solving Governance Challenges 
Through Dialogue and Interagency Coordination
In a context of turbulent socioeconomic conditions and scarce domestic 
resources, the external operational environment in which MoFED fi nds 
itself has been largely marked by signifi cant dependence on the support 
received by donors prior, during, and after the war. The ongoing and con-
tinuous assistance was critical in laying down the foundations for future 
reforms and increasing the credibility of the ministry to scale up programs. 
At the same time, large amounts of external resources channeled through 
the ministry were accompanied by accountability mechanisms and report-
ing requirements that signifi cantly shaped interactions with other govern-
ment agencies and branches and, more recently, citizens.
Donor fragmentation in the provision of technical assistance to the min-
istry was fi rst addressed through informal coordination and later formal-
ized through the use of multi-donor trust funds. The ongoing Integrated 
Public Financial Management Reform Program, supporting public fi nance 
reforms, is the most recent example of how donor coordination has 
evolved. Other instruments that have improved MoFED’s capacity to max-
imize donor funding include the Development Assistance Coordination 
Offi ce (DACO), which largely benefi ted from the provision of additional 
human resources after the 2007 restructuring, and, more recently, from the 
establishment of an annual Performance Assessment Framework to inform 
and guide budget support.
Building External Accountability and Outreach
The connections between citizens and MoFED have changed over time. 
External audits and anticorruption controls have slowly improved. 
Citizens have more direct and indirect access to fi scal information, 
but interactions between civil society and MoFED are still relatively 
 limited. For example, the Government Budgeting and Accountability 
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Act of 2005 provides for civil society to be part of the District Budget 
Oversight Committees. However, these committees have not been able 
to exercise supervision functions effectively because of the delays with 
which districts share fi nancial information. The vibrancy of the Budget 
Advocacy Coalition—which brings together all nongovernmental orga-
nizations working on public expenditure transparency—is certainly 
another positive sign. However, civil society organizations still face sig-
nifi cant challenges in capacity and technical expertise to engage mean-
ingfully with MoFED and in having timely access to information. Since 
2011, MoFED has increased its efforts to improve communication with 
civil society and used its own resources to provide funding to the coali-
tion for  capacity-building activities. Nevertheless, this has been in part 
done to comply with the requirements of Integrated Public Financial 
Management Reform Program. 
Recently, the Annual Public Accounts by the Accountant General and 
their audit have been brought up to date, after a delay of several years. 
A further improvement in transparency and accountability is the publi-
cation of unaudited quarterly fi nancial statements by the Accountant 
General, which has become a regular practice in recent years. A review of 
the legal provisions on the requirements, timing, and procedures for the 
submission of accounts to parliament is currently in progress to make them 
more consistent with international best practice.
Since 1990, MoFED has been monitored by development partners 
through formal and informal mechanisms. The successive programs, proj-
ects, and interventions have included structural benchmarks, prior actions 
for effectiveness, and tranche disbursement conditions or triggers that 
had to be met by the government to continue receiving external support. 
Because of the country’s heavy dependence on external assistance, develop-
ment partners have been infl uential. It is important to note that many local 
technical assistants and consultants report directly or indirectly to donors.
Through the merger of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Development and Economic Planning, the subsequent strengthening of the 
Development Assistance Coordination Offi ce, and the issuing of an Aid 
Policy, the government has sought to streamline and structure its engage-
ment and interaction with donors. Development partners have informally 
coordinated since the early 1990s. Yet the introduction of a single insti-
tutional structure for the management of disbursements from donor pro-
gram funds has led to a greater rationalizat ion of technical assistance and 
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support. Regular joint meetings with development partners are held to 
discuss donor assistance and the achievements and challenges of various 
programs.
Reestablishing a Relationship with Clients and Partners
Since 2004, MoFED has developed a strategy for outreach to clients. To 
increase and facilitate day-to-day interactions, the ministry has deployed 
accountants, budget offi cers, and internal auditors in all the major MDAs 
to improve their capacity for public fi nancial management and facilitate 
information exchange. MoFED’s clients are unanimous that this strategy is 
a positive development. In the words of the permanent secretary of a client 
ministry: “They are no longer the desk type. They move, they come, the 
director [of Budget] comes, the budget offi cer.” The clients also stressed 
that there have been signifi cant improvements in the timeliness of release of 
funds, processing of transactions, and payments and there is a somewhat 
improved predictability of the budget that has enhanced their ability to 
plan and implement their respective programs.
Furthermore, the role of the ministry in facilitating access to donor 
funding and the support received during the preparation of projects has 
been identifi ed as an important service. Transparency in public fi nance 
management was seen as critical to give assurance to donors and, there-
fore, increase access to external assistance.
Most of the clients who were consulted expressed trust in the techni-
cal capacity of the ministry. However, many stated that the Ministry has 
not done enough to increase domestic revenues and lamented that their 
agencies are not given greater priority in budgetary allocations. The acute 
fi nancial constraints that line ministries face are a source of discontent. 
In addition, some of the MDAs continue to have to go to the Accountant 
General’s Department to process transactions and payments either because 
the IFMIS has not yet been rolled out to them or because there are still 
technical problems in its functioning that are yet to be resolved.
On the macroeconomic side, the creation of additional coordination 
mechanisms has been seen by counterpart organizations as a positive 
development. The establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee and 
an ancillary technical committee in 2008 reportedly increased coordina-
tion among the key agencies of monetary policy management. The gov-
ernor of the Bank of Sierra Leone chairs the Monetary Policy Committee, 
whose membership includes the Financial Secretary of MoFED, the 
Commissioner-General of the National Revenue Authority (NRA), and 
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the Statistician General. With a similar arrangement at the technical level, 
the Net Domestic Financing Committee meets weekly to monitor the 
Treasury’s short-term cash fl ow situation and the implied domestic borrow-
ing requirements within the macroeconomic framework. A Macroeconomic 
Forecasting Working Group was established in 2008.
Coping with Isomorphic Infl uences
The institutional design of MoFED follows a similar model as that found 
in ministries of fi nance in the region and across the world. Development 
partners have played a great part in the ministry’s becoming increasingly 
similar to those of other countries and introducing good practice models 
for public fi nance management. 
By the accounts of the current and former members of staff of the 
ministry, the institution’s structure has been transformed by various 
mechanisms. These align closely with the ones described by Dimaggio 
and Powell (1983), that is, they are coercive, mimetic, or normative iso-
morphic change. Isomorphism results from formal and informal pres-
sures exerted by entities on which the organization is dependent. For 
example, the enactment of certain legislation, the creation of specialized 
units, or the strengthening of existing ones in the ministry have often 
been linked directly to support programs from Sierra Leone’s major 
bilateral and multilateral budget support partners. Disbursement has 
often been conditioned on prior actions related to such reforms. The 
strengthening of the Accountant General’s Department; the restruc-
turing of the Economic Policy and Research Unit (EPRU) in the early 
1990s; the creation of the Public Debt Unit, the Internal Audit Units, 
and the Local Government Finance Department; and more recently the 
merger with the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning have 
all at one time or the another been included as conditions for various 
programs.
In addition, many of the changes were the result of supply-driven ini-
tiatives by development partners that specialize in certain areas. By imi-
tating others that appear to be successful, the organization has sought 
to reduce uncertainty and signal credibility to external and domestic 
actors. One illustration of this is the establishment of a separate Public 
Debt Management Unit that was largely the result of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and African Development Bank program. This division later 
received support from the Commonwealth Secretariat to improve the 
recording of debt and coordination with the Bank of Sierra Leone with 
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the introduction of a Debt Recording and Management System in the 
1990s. MoFED’s internal organization and functions were taken from 
other countries.
At the same time, personnel rotation; secondments to other institutions, 
including international fi nancial institutions; and training have contributed 
to the diffusion of professional norms and beliefs about what the proper 
structures for a central fi nance agency are. All these elements have contrib-
uted to increase isomorphic pressures.
Internal Institutional Workings: Focusing on Effi ciency and Balancing 
Short-Term Needs with Sustained Development
The ministry has undergone several structural changes since the end of the 
war, which are summarized in table 8.2. The most recent change is the merger 
with the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning. The merger is 
Table 8.2. Milestones of MoFED
Year
Sociopolitical
context
External operating 
environment Internal institutional workings
1989 Reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations
1990 World Bank–fi nanced 
Salary Rationalization 
Program
1991 Revolutionary United Front 
began a campaign against 
the government and civil war
New constitution adopting 
multiparty system
1992 President Joseph Momoh 
ousted in military coup 
led by Captain Valentine 
Strasser
World Bank–fi nanced 
Public Sector 
Management Support 
Project (PSMSP I)
Introduction of LTAs
1993 ECOMOG established World Bank–fi nanced 
Structural 
Adjustment Credit
1994 Establishment of Economic 
Policy Research Unit
Computerized accounting 
system introduced
1996 Strasser ousted in military coup
Kabbah elected president
(continued next page)
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Table 8.2. Milestones of MoFED (continued)
Year
Sociopolitical
context
External operating 
environment Internal institutional workings
1997 President Kabbah deposed 
by army
The Commonwealth suspends 
Sierra Leone and United 
Nations Security Council 
imposes sanctions
1998 Nigerian-led ECOMOG drives 
rebels from Freetown and 
restores Kabbah as president
European Union–
fi nanced institutional 
strengthening of the 
Ministry of Finance
Valuable personnel lost and 
equipment and systems 
destroyed
1999 Rebels seize part of Freetown, 
leaving vast destruction
Lome peace agreement
ECOMOG fi ghts rebels in the 
outskirts of Freetown
2000 Disarmament of rebels begins; 
army regains control of 
rebel-held areas
Reconstruction of Treasury 
Building
2002 Kabbah is reelected and Sierra 
Leone Peoples Party wins 
majority in Parliament
World Bank–fi nanced 
Public Sector 
Management Support 
Project (PSMS II)
National Revenue 
Authority Act
Adoption and development 
of MTEF
Reorganization of Central 
Statistics Offi ce
Establishment of National 
Revenue Authority
2004 First local elections in more 
than three decades
Multi-donor 
institutional reform 
and capacity building 
Public Procurement Act
Local Government Act
Audit Service Act
IFMIS implementation begins
Preparation of fi scal 
decentralization
2005 United Nations assistance 
mission established
90% of the country’s $1.6 
billion debt written off
Government Budgeting 
and Accountability 
Act
Statistics of Sierra Leone, 
National Authorizing 
Offi ce, and National Public 
Procurement Authority 
established
2006
2007 Ernest Bai Koroma wins the 
presidency and All People’s 
Congress wins a majority in 
Parliament
Debt management unit 
established 
Financial management 
regulations issued
2008 Local elections Aid policy issued
2009 Merger of planning and fi nance 
ministries
Integration of DACO, public 
fi nancial management 
reform and local government 
fi nance department
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on World Bank (2002, 2009), Tavakoli (2010), and interviews with MoFED.
Note: ECOMOG = Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, LTA = local technical 
assistant, MTEF = Medium Term Expenditure Framework, DACO = Development Assistance Coordination Offi ce.
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the third attempt at bringing the fi nance and economic planning functions 
of the public sector together.4 Whereas structurally the lines of demarcation 
among the constituent components of the two entities remained unaltered in 
all three cases, which in turn made it easier to break the two wings, this was 
the fi rst time that both institutions have been placed under the same roof. 
An exception is the Development Assistance Coordination Offi ce, which 
has been unifi ed. A number of challenges remain to integrate planning and 
fi nance functions effectively. Since 2007, the ministry has considerably 
enhanced its presence in the line ministries through the deployment of bud-
get offi cers, procurement offi cers, and internal audit personnel, in addition 
to the traditional presence of the Accountant General’s Department staff in 
all MDAs.
 Currently, the ministry has 13 departments, divisions, and units.5 There 
are several semi-autonomous agencies, including the National Revenue 
Administration, the National Public Procurement Authority, Statistics 
of Sierra Leone, and the National Authorizing Offi ce. The large number 
of departments and units is the result of the merger and isomorphism. 
Similarly, the introduction of semi-autonomous agencies has been driven 
by donor advice and the adoption of best practice models.
The reforms have been the result of bottom-up and top-down changes. 
On the one hand, some units emerged from the creation of groups that 
specialized in one function and were later formalized as a separate division. 
On the other hand, new units were created as a result of provisions in dif-
ferent pieces of legislation.
Benefi tting from Continuity in Leadership
Over the years, a critical mass of technical staff stayed in MoFED (or 
returned to it after signifi cant professional experience abroad). This con-
tinuity in human resources not only contributed to preserve institutional 
memory, but also increased the institutional capacity and, therefore, the 
credibility of commitments with external partners. Moreover, this factor 
implied that a strong and effective leadership emerged from the institution 
itself (more precisely, within the LTA cadre introduced in the ministry). The 
cases of the former Minister of Finance (former Financial Secretary until 
his appointment to the IMF) and the current Financial Secretary are only 
the better-known ones.
Among the staff, there is a strong sense of identity with the ministry 
and its mission. This sentiment is shared by individuals who used to work 
at the ministry and are now in other line agencies occupying positions of 
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responsibility, such as permanent secretary. The esprit de corps appears to 
be stronger among LTAs that share similar professional training and career 
paths. Thus far, LTAs have had strong incentive to support reform and 
innovations. Although the sense of belonging and commitment is strong, 
there are still tensions created by the dual pay system for civil servants 
and LTAs and in some of the units that formerly belonged to the Ministry 
of Planning and Economic Development. The latter institution benefi t-
ted from capacity-building support but mainly through short-term train-
ing and had relied almost exclusively on civil servants, short-term (mostly 
external) consultants, and one or two longer-term external consultants to 
carry out its functions.6 As a result, there is a visible disparity in capacity 
and in the number of LTAs working in the fi nance and planning branches 
of MoFED, which often creates a sense of neglect among the staff of units 
that have received less additional support.
Using Short-Term Solutions and Parallel Systems to 
Bridge Capacity Gaps
The role of the ministry as the main government counterpart of devel-
opment partners meant that it became the pilot for many public sector 
management reform programs. This created additional space for the insti-
tution to design and implement reforms and insulated it to some extent 
from the prevailing practices or problems of the public sector. Since the 
mid-1990s, the ministry has strived to improve its information systems 
on a number of fronts, including macroeconomic modeling; debt record-
ing; and monitoring, budgeting, accounting, and cash management. The 
early support of the IMF and the World Bank focused on improving the 
ministry’s systems to collect data on national accounts statistics and per-
form macroeconomic and revenue forecasting. More recently, the ministry 
has taken steps to integrate information systems and give access to other 
institutions, such as the Central Bank. Through the rollout of the IFMIS 
project, the timeliness and accuracy of fi nancial information has improved 
considerably.
The ministry has introduced several strategies to improve internal com-
munication, including a newsletter for staff. Several divisions issue regular 
bulletins and other materials. Formal communication has been improved 
through the simplifi cation and automation of processes. At the same time, 
the small size of the units makes informal communication easier. Larger 
departments, such as the Accountant General’s Department, have regu-
lar town hall meetings, including personnel deployed in line ministries. 
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The head of the Budget Bureau also holds frequent meetings with the 
 de-concentrated personnel.
One distinctive characteristic of the MoFED is that it has a relatively 
high number of contract personnel, known as LTAs, in line management 
positions. The contract staff, representing 39 percent of all staff, provides 
the bulk of the institution’s skilled workforce. The ministry’s workforce 
comprises 49 employees in grades 1–6, 26 in grades 7–13, and 34 LTAs 
(six of which were formerly contracted by the Department for International 
Development, DfID) (see fi gure 8.9). In addition, the Accountant General’s 
Department has 319 staff and nine LTAs, of which the majority are char-
tered accountants.
The fi nancing of external consultants and local technical assistants by 
development partners allowed MoFED to recruit and retain critical per-
sonnel during the precipitous deterioration of its once-capable civil service. 
The core elements of the current model and human resource management 
practices can be traced back to the early 1990s with the second World 
Bank Public Sector Management Project. Having these personnel in place 
gave assurance to donors that the ministry was able to absorb funding and 
put in place the basis for future reforms. In doing so, it ensured the conti-
nuity in the fl ows of external assistance to the government in critical times. 
The experience of other post-confl ict countries that followed a different 
path might indeed suggest that this model provided an important asset for 
institutional performance.
Source: Authors’ update based on GHK 2008.
Figure 8.9. Staff by Grades and Contractors of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development
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During the 1970s and 1980s, the largest loss was in technical grades 
6–10. Rather than trying to address this issue systematically, successive 
governments and donors tended to adopt ad hoc measures in response 
to the immediate needs and pressures to enable the ministry to per-
form its core functions. Sierra Leonean diaspora and skilled personnel 
available outside the country were attracted to work in the civil service 
through more compet itive donor-supported salaries. Table 8.3 shows 
that six of the departments and divisions are headed by contracted per-
sonnel. Presently, LTAs outnumber professional civil servants. LTAs are 
on average younger than civil servants in grades 11–13 and are more 
qualifi ed. Almost all LTAs have a bachelor’s degree, a third of contract 
staff has professional qualifi cations, and half has postgraduate quali-
fi cations (GHK 2008). Moreover, there are considerable disparities in 
the monthly remuneration between the professional grades in the civil 
service (US$119 to US$1,391) and contract personnel (US$ 1,744 to 
US$2,500).
MoFED has resorted to the use of LTA positions as a way of attract-
ing qualifi ed professionals. The ministry faces high competition from 
the  private sector for accountants and economists, especially from the 
expanding banking sector and the semi-autonomous agencies that offer 
more  competitive salaries. However, the ministry attracts individuals for 
its access to training, better working hours, exposure to international 
networking, and professional exchange opportunities. The ministry also 
offers status and social recognition to its employees. Civil servants seek 
 Table 8.3. Distribution of Local Technical Assistants in the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development 
LTA AGD BD EPRU IAU PDU PFMRU RT PIU Total
Director 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 7
Deputy Director 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Principal 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Senior 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Accountants/economists/IT 5 3 3 2 3 7 1 1 25
Technician/assistant accountant 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 5
Offi ce assistant 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4
Total 9 4 7 3 4 12 1 5 45
Source: Authors’ update based on GHK (2008). 
Note: AGD = Accountant General’s Department, BD = Budget Department, EPRU = Economic Policy 
and Research Unit, IAU = Internal Audit Unit, LTA = local technical assistant, PDU = Public Debt Unit, 
PFMRU = Public Finance Management Reform Unit, RT = Revenue and Tax Policy Unit, PIU = Project 
Implementation Unit, IT = Information Technology.
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to join MoFED and have access to senior positions in other agencies after 
having gained some experience in the sector.
Being largely funded by donor projects, LTA staff has been subjected 
to external accountability mechanisms to monitor their performance. For 
example, LTA staff has to provide monthly progress reports to the relevant 
project implementation unit (PIU). These accountability mechanisms—
relatively strong, especially if compared with endemically weak country 
performance appraisal systems—might have contributed to the enhanced 
capacity of MoFED to achieve measurable and gradually improving results 
toward its core mandate. 
The Public Financial Management Reform Unit (PFMRU) has been 
tasked with coordinating the implementation of institutional and business 
process reforms in public fi nancial management, including the manage-
ment and coordination of the Integrated Public Financial Management 
Reform Program. PFMRU supports reforms in the line ministries and 
the local councils in the areas of public fi nancial management, which has 
gone a long way in addressing administrative barriers in the relationship 
between the ministry and its clients. PFMRU was created in 2004 under 
the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project and was housed 
with the rest of the project-supported departments (including the Local 
Government Finance Department) outside of the Ministry of Finance. 
PFMRU and the Local Government Finance Department have been inte-
grated and moved into the ministry.
In 2010, a quality assurance assessment mechanism was introduced by 
the Internal Audit Unit. Although this reporting instrument is still in its 
infancy, its introduction is noteworthy as it has the potential to enforce 
better monitoring practices within the ministry and provide the foundation 
for a broader—and still missing—performance assessment process at the 
unit and ideally the staff level.
Challenges
Since 2009, MoFED has covered the cost of LTAs that were previously 
fi nanced through projects or direct support from donors. Currently, LTAs 
account for 85 percent of the ministry’s wage bill if the accountant  general’s 
department is excluded. This raises questions about the affordability of 
increasing civil servant wages or expanding the number of LTAs. Although 
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MoFED’s personnel costs amount to less than a percentage point of the 
total public service wage bill, the absorption of LTAs may set a prece dent 
for other ministries with a large number of contract staff and have unin-
tended consequences for fi scal discipline.
The use of LTAs has been effective in rapidly bringing in skills and expe-
rience. LTAs were recruited into different units within MoFED by DfID, 
the European Union, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank 
as a short-term solution to address capacity gaps. However, the parallel 
system has created tensions and has been highly divisive within the staff 
in an otherwise cohesive culture. Civil servants deplore not only the remu-
neration gap, but also lesser access to long-term training opportunities and 
therefore fewer prospects for career advancement. As a result, civil ser-
vants are reluctant to contribute in the work and collaborate with LTAs. 
On the other hand, contract staff has no tenure and have more and more 
 frequent reporting requirements than civil servants.
There have been demonstration effects from the better performing 
departments to the rest of the ministry. Many old and new units adopted 
a model centered on the use of LTAs and greater mechanisms to assess 
performance and recompense personnel. These demonstration effects were 
stronger in the fi nance wing. Indeed, fi nance seems to have benefi ted from 
this model much more than the development and planning side, which has 
been somehow marginalized—according to the staff working in it—or less 
capable to capture the opportunities when they arose—according to other 
external observers and colleagues from the fi nance units.
Despite the merger, a stark difference seems to persist in the level of 
institutional performance between the fi nancial and planning wings, with 
the latter clearly lagging behind. It is not clear to what extent this situa-
tion is the result of less human capital available in key planning units or 
rather a consequence of a deliberate choice by the political leadership to 
prioritize the key objective of macroeconomic stability. Preliminary evi-
dence indicates that turnover rates are higher in the planning units than 
in the fi nance units, perhaps suggesting lower retention capacity and rela-
tively less attractive working conditions. The case of the central planning 
unit, with an average of 10 percent turnover over the past four years, is an 
interesting example.
The ministry is considering several transitional arrangements to integrate 
LTAs as permanent staff. There are some additional challenges. Donors have 
employed LTAs, and their remuneration and benefi t packages have varied 
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depending on the development partner that funded them and the timing of 
the recruitment. In addition, there is a need to consider the reintegration 
within the grade and pay revisions that the government is undertaking.
Conclusion and Operational Insights
MoFED’s institutional development is the result of a mix of short-term 
and long-term interventions and technical assistance. Although many 
challenges remain related to the integration of the contract personnel and 
civil servants, improving procurement practices, and external oversight, 
the short-term measures allowed Sierra Leone to put in place the mini-
mum components necessary for effective public fi nance management. 
At the same time, it ensured the continuation of core functions during the 
confl ict and in the immediate aftermath. Long-term engagement on areas 
such as budgeting, cash management, fi scal reporting and accounting, 
and automation of processes has built on those foundations and relied on 
the human capital and the partnerships created by earlier interventions.
Moving forward, it is important to highlight and consider the elements 
of the LTA model that should be transferred to a new human resource 
management system. These include competitive recruitment, competitive 
remuneration, built-in accountability and reporting systems, and opportu-
nities for training and continuing learning. Providing incentives for perfor-
mance needs to be accompanied by adequate compensation and systems 
that continue to attract technically capable staff. Moreover, existing staff 
must be equipped to respond to new incentives and opportunities.
Increasing donor coordination and reducing reporting mechanisms 
appears to be another important element from this case. The use of bud-
get support appears to have been effective in further fostering change and 
providing a clear framework for accountability that allows the ministry to 
transmit the requirements to other key stakeholders.
Relevant Legislation and Offi cial Documents
Aid Policy, 2008
An Agenda for Change, Second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP-II), 
2008-2012
Budget Call Circular, 2011
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Note: The gray boxes are semi-autonomous agencies. OFS = Offi ce of the Finance Secretary, ICT = Information 
and Communication Technology, SSL = Statistics of Sierra Leone, NPPA = National Public Procurement Authority, 
NRA = National Revenue Authority, PFM = Public Financial Management; SLICOM = Sierra Leone Insurance 
Commission, M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation, DACO = Development Assistance Coordination Offi ce.
Figure 8A.1. Organogram of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development
Budget Speech, 2011
Financial Management Regulations, 1998, 2007
Government Development Grants Program, Revised Operations Manual, 
August 2006
Local Government Act, 2004
National Revenue Authority Act, 2003
Public Procurement Act, 2004
The Government Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005
MoFED. Organisational Framework for Effective Functioning of the New 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoFED. 2010. Explanatory Notes on the New Organogram
Annex 8A
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Table 8A.2. Development Partner Support to Public Finance 
Management
Donor Projects supporting public fi nance management
African Development Bank Technical assistance to Accountant General
Technical assistance to the Audit Service 
Technical assistance on Public Financial Management and the 
Public Debt Management Unit
Commonwealth Secretariat Technical assistance to the Public Debt Management Unit
International Monetary Fund Technical assistance 
Balance of Payment Support under the PRGF
Debt Relief 
Department for International 
Development
Support to the Auditor General
Technical Assistance to the National Commission for 
Privatization
Technical assistance on records management
Technical assistance to Anti-Corruption Commission
Technical assistance in the implementation of the National 
Action Plan and PFM aspects of budget support
Support to the National Revenue Authority
World Bank Public Investment Program 1992/93–1994/9
Reconstruction Import Credit 1992
Public Sector Management Project I and II 1993–2004
Structural Adjustment Credit 1993–1999
Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project 2004–2011 
(supported public fi nancial management reforms, Integrated 
Financial Management Information System introduction and 
rollout, and fi scal decentralization) 
European Union Technical assistance to the Accountant General’s Department
Technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance
Multi-Donor Trust Funds, 
World Bank, Department for 
International Development, 
European Union
Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project 2004–2011
Budget support
World Bank, Department for 
International Development, 
European Union, African 
Development Bank
Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Program 
2009–2013
United Nations Development 
Programme
Technical assistance to Aid Coordinating
Technical assistance to Planning 
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Indicator dimension 2007 2010
A. PFM OUT-TURNS: Credibility of the budget 
PI-1 Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared with original approved budget B B
PI-2 Composition of expenditure out-turn compared with original approved 
budget C C
PI-3 Aggregate revenue out-turn compared with original approved budget B C
PI-4 Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears 0 D+
B. KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: Comprehensiveness and Transparency
PI-5 Classifi cation of the budget A C
PI-6 Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation C A
PI-7 Extent of unreported government operations 0 0
PI-8 Transparency of intergovernmental fi scal relations B A
PI-9 Oversight of aggregate fi scal risk from other public sector entities C C+
PI-10 Public access to key fi scal information B B
C. BUDGET CYCLE
C(i) Policy-Based Budgeting
PI-11 Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process C+ D+
PI-12 Multiyear perspective in fi scal planning, expenditure policy, and budgeting D+ C
C(ii) Predictability and Control in Budget Execution
PI-13 Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities C+ B
PI-14 Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment C B
PI-15 Effectiveness in collection of tax payments D+ D+
PI-16 Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures C+ C+
PI-17 Recording and management of cash balances, debt, and guarantees C+ C+↑
PI-18 Effectiveness of payroll controls D+ D+
PI-19 Competition, value for money, and controls in procurement C C+
PI-20 Effectiveness of internal controls for nonsalary expenditure C+ C+
PI-21 Effectiveness of internal audit D+ D+↑
C(iii) Accounting, Recording, and Reporting
PI-22 Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation C B
PI-23 Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units A A
PI-24 Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports C+ B+
PI-25 Quality and timeliness of annual fi nancial statements D+ C+
C(iv) External Scrutiny and Audit
PI-26 Scope, nature, and follow-up of external audit D+ C
PI-27 Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law C+ C+
PI-28 Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports D+ D+↑
D. DONOR PRACTICES
D-1 Predictability of direct budget support C+ D
D-2 Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on 
project and program aid D+ D+
D-3 Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures D D
Source: PEFA Secretariat, 2010.
Note: 0 = no score.
Table 8A.3. PEFA Scores, 2007 and 2010
216 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
Notes
 1. Section (4) of the 1978 Constitution enumerated the offi ces for which All 
People’s Congress membership was a prerequisite as being: (a) principal 
representatives of Sierra Leone abroad, (b) the Commissioner of Police, 
(c) the commanders of the armed forces, (d) permanent secretaries, (e) the 
secretaries to the president and the vice president, (f) the secretary to 
the Cabinet, (g) the Financial Secretary, (h) the secretary to the Foreign 
Minister, (i) the Establishment Secretary (who is the personnel manager of 
the government), (j) the Development Secretary, (k) the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, (l) the Solicitor-General, and (m) the Administrator and 
Registrar-General.
 2. External funding has continued to increase, and in 2009 budget support con-
stituted a third of recurrent expenditures (IMF 2010). In 2010, Sierra Leone 
received the second largest allocation of offi cial development assistance as a 
share of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank Indicators, 2011).
 3. Liberia offers a relevant comparison. Monrovia was relatively more vulner-
able to attack and became the main battleground for most of the war years. 
Unlike MoFED, the Ministry of Finance of Liberia had to start from almost 
zero in 2005/2006, relying mostly on the use of international consultants in 
early post-confl ict program implementation.
 4. The two attempts took place from 1992 to 1993 and from 1998 to 1999. 
Under the military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council created the 
one-year Department of Finance, Development and Economic Planning on 
takeover in April 1992. Later, in March 1998, President Kabbah attempted to 
integrate the two entities. That lasted about 15 months and broke up again in 
late 1999. 
 5. These are Administration, Economic Policy and Research, Information 
and Communications Technology, Accountant General, Central Planning 
Monitoring and Evaluation, Development Assistance Coordinating, Regional 
Integration and South-South Cooperation, Budget Bureau, Debt Management, 
Revenue and Tax Policy, Public Financial Management Reform, the Local 
Government Finance Department, and Internal Audit.
 6. These were the chief technical advisers fi elded by the United Nations system 
at the Central Statistics Offi ce between 1989 and 1992; around the same time, 
until 1994, there was a chief technical adviser in the Ministry of Development 
and Economic Planning. Some argued that the counterpart arrangement had 
limited impact on sustainability and transfer of knowledge. However, several 
civil servants were trained during that period, including at least four statis-
ticians and two development planning offi cers. The problem was retaining 
them; at least two are currently employed in the United Nations system while 
three are in the United Kingdom and the United States.
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This chapter analyzes the second case study of successful institutions in 
Sierra Leone: the local councils. This case has been identifi ed on the basis of 
early consultations and interviews with the Sierra Leone country  manager 
and selected members of the Sierra Leone country team. The  ultimate 
objective of the chapter is to provide context-specifi c narratives of the 
paths to institutional development while articulating a compelling investi-
gation and rigorous empirical test of the underlying research hypotheses of 
the Institutions Taking Root Project. Set against these hypotheses, the case 
of Sierra Leone is notable and instructive.
Although it was ambitious in its expectations, the reestablishment of local 
councils had no guaranteed prospects of success. On the one hand, overt 
and covert opposition could be anticipated from an array of  self-interested 
parties concerned about their potential loss of control of resources. On the 
other hand, the fragility of the postconfl ict institutional architecture cre-
ated additional challenges. First, in 2002, the presence of the state out-
side Freetown peninsula had collapsed and had to be rebuilt from scratch. 
Second, the dearth of human capital at the national and local levels was 
a massive impediment for any large-scale interventions aiming to restore 
local governance. Third, the institutional and collective memory of the local 
government system in the country was buried under more than 30 years 
of hypercentralized rule, further undermining local capacity to implement 
decentralization reform. 
Despite these countervailing forces, the new disposition for local govern-
ment has taken on a momentum and maturity, cementing its institutional 
Sierra Leone Case Study: Local Councils
Marco Larizza and Brendan Glynn
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presence in the architecture of the state. The institution of local councils 
has become embedded in the sociopolitical structure. As refl ected in three 
peaceful rounds of local elections (2004, 2008, and 2012), in the eyes of the 
population, there is a sense of growing legitimacy of the elected structures 
and avenues for the expression of development priorities. A  frequently 
expressed view across the focus group discussions was that on matters 
related to community development, the population automatically refers to 
the council and places its expectations in it. 
Success has been determined within a particular confi guration of situ-
ational factors. Opportunities that were presented were acted on purpose-
fully but not necessarily with consistent regard to the longer-term strategy. 
Progress has often been fi tful and threats abide, not least in the vagaries of 
party politics and the broader political sphere. 
The chapter is organized as follows: it describes the research design, data 
sources, and sampling strategy of the study. It then describes the institu-
tional context in Sierra Leone, with a special focus on the contextual factors 
that bear relevance for the institution-building process of the local councils 
(including the history of local government). The degree of success is con-
sidered across three key dimensions: results, legitimacy, and durability. The 
chapter then highlights the key factors driving the success and how the pro-
cess was managed, and it outlines critical, pending challenges. The chapter 
concludes by considering possible policy implications and key lessons that 
can be drawn from the Sierra Leone experience for future efforts to support 
institution-building processes in postconfl ict and fragile states.
Research Design: Data, Sources, and Sampling Strategy
The subject case study of the chapter represents an effort to document 
and assess empirically the degree of institutional success achieved by the 
institution of local councils. The case study takes advantage of a rich set 
of  background studies carried out by researchers and development practi-
tioners in Sierra Leone. These secondary sources are complemented with 
intensive fi eldwork and interviews carried out in the country between 
June 13 and July 4, 2011.
Semistructured focus group discussions were undertaken in a sample of 
four local councils (Port Loko District, Bo Town, Bo District, and Kono 
District). To identify the sample group (from 19 local councils), the team 
followed a two-stage approach. First, a few situational dimensions were 
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taken into consideration. The issue of geographical spread in the Sierra 
Leonean context is especially important as ethnicity strongly accords (out-
side the capital) with specifi c locational zones. In turn, this correlates with 
dominant political party allegiance, with the exception of a few notable 
areas, such as the capital city, Freetown. A provincial distribution accord-
ingly provided an appropriate ethnic and party preference representation. 
In addition, urban and district councils were included in the sample. This 
approach was considered critical to maximize within-country variation 
and enhance the analytical leverage. 
Second, the criterion of success (durability, results, and legitimacy) 
was applied by reference to the data available from the National Public 
Service Survey (NPS, 2005–2008) and combined with the results of the 
Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment System reports 
(Dec-Sec 2006, 2010, 2012). Although the dimension of durability could 
not be used as a selection criterion (all the local councils were established 
at the same time), combined used of NPS and Comprehensive Local 
Government Performance Assessment System (CLoGPAS) data allowed 
the team to capture the councils that have been overachievers (i.e., ranked 
above the median) in capacity to deliver results and legitimacy before the 
ordinary citizens. Overlaying the success measures on the earlier criteria 
produced the selection shown in table 9.1.
History and Development of Local Government in Sierra Leone 
Local government has been an integral part of governance in Sierra Leone 
since the colonial era. Under colonial rule, the British authorities estab-
lished a strong political and administrative divide between the colony 
(Freetown and the Western Area) and the protectorate (represented by the 
three modern provinces). The colony was ruled directly by a locally elected 
Table 9.1. Overachiever Local Councils and Their Classifi cation against 
Contextual Dimension
Local council Location Party affi liation Province Ethnicity
Port Loko District Council Rural APC dominant Northern Temne/Limba
Kono District Council Rural APC dominant Eastern Kono
Bo Town Council Urban SLPP dominant Southern Mende
Bo District Council Rural SLPP dominant Southern Mende
Source: Glynn, Larizza, and Viñuela (2011).
Note: APC = All People’s Congress; SLPP = Sierra Leone Peoples Party.
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council and governor representing the British monarch. The protectorate 
was designed as a sphere of “indirect rule” in which district commissioners 
were responsible for the administration of the districts in close collabora-
tion with traditional authorities (paramount chiefs and their networks of 
subchiefs and chiefdom functionaries).1 
The symbiotic relationship between the Sierra Leone Peoples Party 
(SLPP) and the chiefs is crucial to understand why the traditional authori-
ties survived the colonial period (Chaves and Robinson 2011, 5). At inde-
pendence (1961), SLPP quickly put in place a political strategy deeply 
rooted in colonial institutions. On the one hand, the modern administra-
tive arrangements established by the British were strengthened by assign-
ing additional tasks to district councils,2 including development of the 
respective local communities. On the other hand, the system of indirect 
rule remained largely intact, meaning the chieftaincy system survived. The 
conservation of the traditional authority structures in the postcolonial era 
helped to keep the formal state small and thus amenable to oligarchic con-
trol. It also enabled chiefs to accumulate considerable power as political 
brokers and thus served as a suppressant of mass political mobilization.
In 1972, the district councils were abolished by the president of the 
All People’s Congress (APC), Siaka Stevens, because they were said to be 
highly corrupt and politicized (Tangri 1978). Their dissolution resulted in 
the transfer of their infrastructure and staff to the central government’s 
provincial administration under the supervision of the provincial secretary 
and district offi cers (Zhou 2009, 29). 
Although chiefs became increasingly active in the collection of revenues, 
basic services at the local level were undersupplied and heavily dependent 
on the support of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
and the rule of paramount chiefs was perceived as being increasingly arbi-
trary and predatory.3 Combined with the overcentralization of power in 
the hands of a single party in Freetown, the APC, the authoritarian tenden-
cies of the chiefs magnifi ed popular discontent, marginalized wide sectors 
of the population, and provided a ready opening for youth conscription 
into the fi ghting rebel factions, eventually bringing the country to civil war 
(Reno 1995; Richards 1996; Hanlon 2004; Krijn 2011).
The revival of elected local government was a declared (yet 
 unfulfi lled) policy of military and civilian governments during the 
civil war. An early rationale was set out in the consultancy study com-
missioned by the National Provisional Ruling Council and led by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 (Zwanikken, 
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Olowu, and Chiviya 1994). Later, through the enunciation of a strat-
egy on “Good Governance and Public Sector Reform” by the new SLPP 
government, an agenda for decentralization by devolution was initially 
designed (Government of Sierra Leone 1996, 1997). However, the escala-
tion of confl ict overtook these plans, and the opportunity to implement the 
policy intent did not materialize until the end of the war in 2002. 
The political economy of the civil war—with its deep-rooted urban-
rural divide—deeply affected the collective memory of the population. The 
war generated large, popular demands, and pressures on the postconfl ict 
SLPP-led government to defuse social tensions by reestablishing the state 
presence outside the Western Peninsula. This urgency to deliver a rapid 
peace dividend throughout the country implied that effective state capacity 
would have to be built in parallel at the central and local levels. 
The view of decentralization as a national priority for Sierra Leone’s 
peace-building efforts was widely shared among the international com-
munity. Soon after the Peace Accord, the government’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper formalized this view by defi ning decentralization as a key 
strategy for promoting good governance, consolidating peace, and reduc-
ing poverty (Government of Sierra Leone 2005, 81; 2002).
A government Task Force on Decentralisation (nominally chaired by the 
vice-president) coordinated expert seminars and public consultations on 
decentralization reforms in late 2003. The Department for International 
Development (DfID), UNDP, and World Bank provided consultants at this 
stage to facilitate discussions on a number of key policy issues that thus far 
had been neglected by the task force. The discussions dealt primarily with 
intergovernmental fi scal relations and accountability arrangements. 
The consultation process led to the drafting of the Local Government 
Act (LGA), ratifi ed by the parliament in February 2004. The 2004 LGA 
radically reshaped the administrative, functional, and fi scal intergovern-
mental relationships between the central government and the subnational 
authorities. Parallel to the reestablishment of 19 democratically elected 
local councils, the 2004 LGA put in place a clear sequence of decentral-
ization reforms with a progressive devolution of powers in a four-year 
 transition period.
The reestablishment of local councils in 2004 was combined with a 
sustained attempt to re-legitimize the institution of the paramount chiefs 
(Sawyer 2008). The national government and the donors were deeply 
divided on their understanding of the role that the chieftaincy should play 
in the postconfl ict local government system. On the one hand, the SLPP-led 
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government “viewed local councils fi rst and foremost as development agen-
cies. It had no intention of removing the hierarchy of paramount, section 
and village chiefs from their role as the state’s primary agents for maintain-
ing social order in rural areas” (Fanthorpe, Lavali, and Sesay 2011, 53). 
On the other hand, the donors were convinced that the institution of the 
chieftaincy was deeply implicated in the governance failings that had led to 
the war, that it was undergoing a terminal crisis of popular legitimacy, and 
that a modern and democratic system of local government was urgently 
needed to ensure that chiefs were not given the opportunity to capture the 
decentralization process (Jackson 2007).4
The 2004 LGA did not fully address the relationships between the 
local councils and the chieftaincy system. The implicit choice was rather 
to postpone the resolution of these tensions, under the assumption that 
doing so would have enabled donors and government to bypass politi-
cally sensitive issues and focus instead on the technical modalities of 
the decentralization implementation process. Although this approach 
worked for a fast-track and technical reform program, the hybrid 
arrangements it generated contributed to growing tensions between the 
two local authorities. 
External Operational Environment
Since 2004, the process of formal interactions and negotiations between 
the institution of local councils and its bureaucratic principal (the central 
government) has been marked by substantial fi nancial dependence on the 
center. Given the small revenue base at the local level, the vast majority of 
funding for local councils comes from central government transfers, in the 
form of grants tied to specifi c sector expenditures. Transfers as a share of 
the central government’s nonsalary, noninterest expenditures have steadily 
increased over time, from 4.9 percent in 2005 to 11.9 percent in 2009 
(Srivastava and Larizza 2011, 144–45). Despite this progress, however, 
evidence from the focus group discussions suggests that transfers to local 
councils are still often delayed, undermining the local councils’ capacity to 
perform their service delivery functions.5
Partially as a consequence of persistent funding gaps from the  central 
government, the historical evolution of the local councils has been shaped 
by the constant and increasingly coordinated technical and fi nancial 
 support received from the international community, namely from the 
World Bank, European Commission, and DfID. The Institutional Reform 
and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) represented the key instrument of 
SIERRA LEONE CASE STUDY: LOCAL COUNCILS • 225
the coordinated donor response to support decentralization and the local 
council institutional development and capacity-building process.
The main formal rules that defi ne how the institution of local  councils 
interacts with the broader socio-political environment are defi ned in the 
2004 Local Government Act (and its statutory instruments) and, more 
recently, the National Decentralisation Policy (approved in 2010). These 
legislative and policy documents establish the mandate and functions of 
the local councils, defi ning their powers and responsibilities. The docu-
ments also defi ne the obligations of local councils to other governmental 
agencies and  institutions, including the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development (MLGRD), the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MoFED), and the other ministries, departments, and agen-
cies (MDAs).6 MLGRD is the chief bureaucratic principal charged with 
policy, monitoring, and inspecting local councils. MoFED is responsible 
for the intergovernmental fi scal transfer system and the fi nancial probity 
of local councils.
Another formal channel of accountability is through the parliament. 
As indicated in fi gure 9.1, the relationship between the parliament and 
the local councils is defi ned as hierarchical because Sierra Leone remains 
a unitary state and fi nancing is overwhelmingly through the approval and 
accountability system of the center (therefore also subject to scrutiny of 
committees and the full parliament). The relationship with individual 
members of parliament, however, has been characterized by confl ict and 
competition for access to fi nancial resources. According to the focus group 
discussions, local councils have come under pressure from members of par-
liament for a share of the political credit for the decentralization program 
(Fanthorpe, Lavali, and Sesay 2011, 18).
Aside from the formal rules, other laws and informal practices persist 
that are inconsistent with the provision of the Local Government Acts (or 
duplicate them) and have not been repealed. This is especially the case of 
the various laws governing the chieftaincy (box 9.1). The laws and practices 
refl ect the clouded bifurcation of powers that can suit political interests.
The chiefdom councils are required by the 2004 LGA to collect the 
community levies (fi xed by council resolution) and to hand over a pre-
cept of 60 percent of the total to the local councils. However, in 2008 the 
Ministry of Local Government issued a directive stating that no local coun-
cils’ precept should be collected for 2008. A subsequent directive in 2009 
further interfered with the formal revenue-sharing process by imposing a 
variable rate of transfer between 5 percent and 20 percent. The proceeds 
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for councils from this source have been reduced signifi cantly as a result. 
This has increased tensions between the councils and the chiefdoms, which 
were already aggravated by the sharing of mineral licensing proceeds and 
the perspectives on the role of the chiefs vis-à-vis the ward and council 
elected structures. 
Source: MLGRD; National Decentralization Policy.
Note: The solid arrows indicate relationships legislatively defi ned as hierarchical; the dotted lines identify 
relationships between functionally interdependent agencies. Development partners and NGOs are depicted 
as separate entities as they are outside the government structure. MoFED = Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development; LGFD = Local Government Finance Department; MLGRD = Ministry of Local Government 
and Rural Development; Dec-Sec = Decentralization Secretariat; MDA = ministries, departments, and 
agencies; LGFC = Local Government Finance Committee; LGSC = Local Government Services Commission; 
PCC = Provincial Coordinating Committee; NGO = nongovernmental organization. 
Figure 9.1. Key Stakeholders of Local Councils
Office of the President (cabinet)
Interministerial Committee
(Decentralization)
MoFED
(LGFD)
MLGRD
(Dec-Sec)
MDAs
LGFC LGSC PCC
Provincial
secretariat
District
officers
19 Local
Councils 
Traditional authorities:
149 chiefdomsWard committees
National and
international NGOs Development partners
Parliament
SIERRA LEONE CASE STUDY: LOCAL COUNCILS • 227
BOX 9.1
Mapping the Structure of Local Traditional Authorities
Each of Sierra Leone’s 149 chiefdoms is ruled by a single paramount chief who is consid-
ered the top authority in his or her chiefdom. The position of paramount chieftaincy 
and its associated responsibilities are established by law in a series of acts, many of 
them predating independence, and are enshrined in the 1991 national constitution. The 
roles of paramount chiefs can be delineated as follows (the last three in consultation 
with chiefdom committees and chairpersons of local courts): (a) uphold and maintain 
the traditions, customs, and practices of the chiefdom; (b) serve as the custodians of the 
land for the people of the chiefdom; (c) settle disputes; (d) maintain law and order; and 
(e) deal with land and customary and traditional matters in the chiefdom.
In practice, the chief is the primary representative of his or her chiefdom to outsiders 
having any dealings with the chiefdom, including NGOs and other development agents, 
government representatives, politicians, and mining companies and other commercial 
interests. Paramount chiefs also play a major role in resolving disputes. Chiefs no longer 
have the legal right to operate a court, but they are allowed to mediate or arbitrate and 
often still adjudicate, despite the legal prohibition. 
Paramount chiefs are elected for life by chiefdom councilors, and candidates must 
come from a ruling family or ruling house. There is no formal or written list of ruling 
houses—the set of acceptable lineages is entirely local knowledge—and the system has 
never been institutionalized.
Underneath the paramount chiefs is a structure of subordinate chiefs, village chiefs, 
and section chiefs, all of which are automatically members of the council, along with a 
member of parliament who comes from the chieftaincy and other elites. The electorate 
is extremely elitist (Chaves and Robinson 2011). These functionaries are somewhat 
less formally mandated than the paramount chief, although many are recognized 
by legislation, and all are considered offi cial by local community members. Some 
(specifi cally chiefdom treasury clerks and court clerks) are employed as civil servants by 
the central government. Others are paid a salary from the chiefdom coffers. 
Town chiefs have the primary responsibility for strangers (nonresidents) who are 
visiting the community. Customary law dictates that strangers must report to the town 
chief on arrival in a community and that residents must report any strangers whom 
they have brought into the town. These reports generally are seen as security measures. 
Town chiefs sometimes are responsible for collecting tax revenue, which they pass on 
(continued next page)
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Figure 9.2 summarizes the major historical landmarks and the time line 
of key events in the external operational environment that have shaped 
the institutional development and evolutionary trajectory of local councils. 
Internal Institutional Workings
The elected council is the corporate legal authority in its jurisdiction for 
the establishment of plans and budgets, the transaction of business related 
to the consequential activities, and the accounting requirements of higher 
national authorities. Council business is led by the chairperson or mayor 
to section chiefs and the chiefdom treasury clerk, often receiving a rebate equivalent to 
a percentage of the revenue collected.
Section chiefs, in turn, resolve cases brought to them, but they may hear larger or 
more important cases—or different types of cases—than their town-level colleagues. 
For instance, the household survey found that just 17 percent of all cases, but 28  percent 
of land disputes, were reported fi rst to the section chief. For land disputes, section 
chiefs were the second most used authority after village chiefs. Section chiefs are usu-
ally involved in tax collection and chiefdom decision making.
Sources: Manning (2009); Chavez and Robinson (2011).
BOX 9.1 (continued)
Figure 9.2. Timeline of the Decentralization Process in Sierra Leone
Note: LGA = Local Government Act; DfID = Department of International Development; IDA = International 
Development Association; MLGRD = Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.
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and supported by a deputy (both post holders are remunerated). The exec-
utive power is shared with local councilors, and all major decisions are 
subject to the approval of the full council. Moreover, operational commit-
tees oversee specifi c segments of council activity (e.g., fi nance and adminis-
tration, development, education, and health).
Ward committees represent an essential channel for upward and down-
ward communication with local residents. However, they are hampered in 
particular by mobility constraints among their often-scattered communi-
ties. Nevertheless, the representation of popular views through the ward 
committee members, with the ward councilor as chair, to the council itself 
was characterized as effective. Communities would vote (through a stone 
game) when priorities on development were being conveyed. However, 
it was accepted that other political factors and infl uences also came into 
play in ultimate decision making. Where it was reported, the practice of 
rotating council meetings around the districts was aiding more effective 
communication. 
More generally, the focus group discussions reported instances of out-
reach campaigns with the public in all four cases, with local radio being the 
premier method. This is consistent with the fi ndings of the NPS surveys, 
according to which local radio is the greatest single source of information 
on the development plans of local councils, followed by family members 
and traditional authorities (IRCBP 2010). 
The 2004 LGA established elected local councils as the highest political 
authorities in their localities (although the 2010 National Decentralisation 
Policy changed this formulation).7 Local councils are required to operate 
under democratic principles, to be open about council business, prudent in 
fi nancial management, and responsive to citizens’ needs. Under the  current 
framework, as defi ned by the LGA statutory instruments, local councils 
have responsibility for the delivery of primary and junior secondary educa-
tion, primary and secondary health care, rural water supply, sanitation, 
waste management, agriculture, youth services, social assistance, and fi re-
fi ghting services. Central ministries and agencies retain the responsibility 
for strategic planning, setting of standards, quality control, and  monitoring. 
The central government retains the responsibility for salary payments and 
human resource management of sector staff seconded to local councils and 
facility-level staff, as well as procurement of certain priority commodities, 
such as textbooks and drugs.
Day-to-day council affairs are managed by the chief administrator who is 
responsible for the necessary technical support in each support (non sector) 
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area. The chief administrator is currently supported in this manner by the fol-
lowing personnel: deputy, fi nance offi cer, accountant, procurement offi cer, 
monitoring and evaluation offi cer, development planner, human resources 
offi cer, engineer, and internal auditor.8 Service delivery is organized around 
the sector areas related to state responsibilities at the national level.
According to the LGA, all 19 councils are required to set up sector com-
mittees to ensure direct oversight of the services as they devolve. There are 
also provincial coordinating committees for wards, chiefdoms, and districts, 
led by a central government regional minister. Typically each council area will 
have a director for agriculture, education, health, and so forth, with dedicated 
technical staff distributed in accordance with national norms ( fi gure 9.3). 
Where urban councils are surrounded territorially by district councils, the 
sector directors provide services for each. In addition, some services are orga-
nized on a regional basis (e.g., social welfare, youth, and sports). 
Intersector allocations are fi xed (tied grants).9 However, the allocations 
are subject to the discretionary decisions of local councils on the basis 
of priorities defi ned in the development plans. Consequently, the annual 
Figure 9.3. Organogram of Local Government Structure
Source: MLGRD.
Note: LC = local council.
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council budgeting round becomes the fulcrum for local council discussions 
of sector priorities. Due weight in this process is accorded to the sector 
inputs (which are seen as articulating national policy standards and tar-
gets), the views of the councilors (refl ecting community preferences), and 
an accepted common view that emerges in the annual budget cycle.
Once the annual budget is approved, an integrated approach to the man-
agement of its disbursement similarly applies. Quarterly allocations arrive to 
the councils’ designated accounts. Sectors are informed of available alloca-
tions. Public expenditure tracking survey forms are drawn up, accompanied 
by concept notes, and then scrutinized against internal priorities and the 
annual budget provisions. Individual sector activities are then funded by 
cash advances unless a procurement process is involved, followed by the fi ll-
ing of invoices. No subsequent advances are made in the absence of returns. 
In the event of end-of-year sector balances, however, rollovers are permitted. 
Presentation of the consolidated council accounts is the responsibility 
of the chief administrator and the fi nance offi cer under the 2005 Financial 
Administration Regulations. MoFED requires adequate quarterly returns 
to be submitted before approval of new fl ows. Similarly, annual accounts 
are prepared, submitted, and subsequently audited. A new fi nancial 
 management system utilizing the same codes as the national chart of 
accounts was introduced in January 2009. Independent budget and fi nance 
oversight committees are in place (and legally mandated) and function 
with variable effectiveness. 
Over time, the capacity of local councils to attract skilled staff has 
improved. According to some observers, the physical presence of decentral-
ized political power (the local council) combined with the direct  observation 
of the growing fi scal and administrative autonomy of the LGA, generated 
incentives for civil servants to join the local government structure, further 
strengthening the availability of critical human resource skills at the local 
level. These incentives complemented other material  benefi ts, such as pro-
motion opportunities and better salary levels (this was especially the case 
for the appointment of chief administrators).10
The Parameters of Institutional Success
Local councils are fully staffed with core skills in the areas of develop-
ment planning, internal auditing, monitoring, and evaluation and pro-
curement. Local councils hold regular meetings and produce minutes, 
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participatory development planning has taken root, accounts are com-
pleted on time and regularly audited, and fi nancial information is dis-
closed. Figure 9.4 shows the number of councils that met (or partially 
met) each of the seven minimum conditions captured by the CloGPAS 
assessment. Between 2006 and 2011, there were signifi cant improvements 
in all core functions of the local councils, with remarkable achievements 
in areas such as budget and accounting and functional capacity, where all 
19 local councils fully met the minimum conditions. Since 2008, a slight 
deterioration has been recorded for project implementation and develop-
ment planning. 
Over time, local councils have implemented several rounds of 
 capacity-building activities for local staff in the areas of participatory plan-
ning, budgeting, fi nancial management, and project management. This has 
helped ensure that local governments are staffed with skilled individuals 
who are able to manage resources in accordance with the new regulations. 
Signifi cant progress has been made in laying sound foundations of public 
fi nancial management systems. The latest Public Expenditure and Financial 
Figure 9.4. Performance of Local Councils across Critical Functions
Source: Dec-Sec (2006, 2010, 2012). 
Note: Data for procurement were not yet available in 2011.
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Accountability (PEFA) report provides evidence consistent with this analy-
sis, showing that in 2010 local councils received the highest scores on key 
dimensions of budget execution and accounting practices, scoring higher 
on these dimensions than the national government, as shown in table 9.2 
(GoSL 2011). All 19 local councils today use a simplifi ed Petra system that 
interfaces with the central government’s chart of accounts and is managed 
through an integrated fi nancial management information system. Other 
notable actions on transparency have been implemented, such as the post-
ing on notice boards at local council offi ces of relevant fi nancial informa-
tion on a monthly basis.
Notable improvements were achieved in the availability of basic services 
between 2005 and 2008 (the period covered by available household survey 
data). However, the improvements were not consistent across the board, 
with some sectors making more progress than others. For instance, the 
number of rural households within 30 minutes of a primary school rose 
from 68 percent to 74 percent. An even larger improvement was seen in the 
number of rural households within one hour of a clinic, which rose from 
48 percent to 61 percent. The single largest improvement was households 
with access to water, which increased from 61 percent to about 81  percent 
(an increase of about 30 percent).11 Moreover, signifi cant subnational vari-
ation across local councils remains (IRCBP 2010).12 Qualitative evidence 
from the focus group discussions suggests that variances in LGA perfor-
mance across service delivery and other critical functions are likely to be 
a function of organizational factors (including local leadership and avail-
ability of qualifi ed personnel) and independent of the devolution of powers 
and responsibilities per se. 
Finally, evidence suggests that traditionally marginalized groups, such 
as women and ethnic minorities, have been the largest benefi ciaries of the 
new space for political participation guaranteed by the local councils. 
While in 2004 women occupied 12.7 percent of council seats, in 2008 
this increased to 18 percent, a higher rate of representation relative to 
Table 9.2. Performance of Local Councils across Critical Functions
Indicator National Subnational
Participation in the budget process D+ C
Effectiveness of payroll controls D+ C+
Competition and controls in procurement C+ A
Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation B B+
Percentage of aid managed by use of national procedures D A
Source: PEFA 2010.
234 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
the 12 percent share of women’s seats in the national parliament (NEC 
2008b). This positive trend is confi rmed by the rate of participation of 
women candidates in local versus national elections: in the national elec-
tions in 2007, 11 percent of total candidates running for parliamentary 
seats were women; this percentage increased to 17 percent in the 2008 
local elections (Zhou 2009).
Legitimacy
Over time, the institution of local councils—and their political leadership 
in particular—has acquired a growing level of infl uence and legitimacy 
in the political arena. This is, in part, the product of the increased deci-
sion  making (devolved functions) and administrative power (local capac-
ity) that the local councils have acquired over time. And in part, it is the 
 consequence of direct accountability channels established with the local 
communities through three rounds of local elections. In particular, the 
deselection of inactive former councilors and the increased level of elec-
toral competition from 2004 to 2008 attest to the anchoring of local 
representational  politics. Notably, the second round of elections in 2008 
attracted more candidates, which was an indication of greater interest in 
the local councils, and the number of uncontested wards dropped from 84 
to 38 (Zhou 2009).
As a byproduct of these enhanced accountability channels and the 
increased capacity of local service provisions, local communities now look 
to the local council as the key actor in the development of their communi-
ties. This has been a consistent fi nding across the sample of local coun-
cils. The most frequent illustration in support of this position was the 
rehabilitation during the past seven years of the physical stock for service 
delivery (health centers and schools). During the focus group discussions, 
reference was also made to road improvements and the increased certifi -
cation of public works by local councils, bringing quality improvement. 
Diversifi cation in agriculture and support to the business approach in the 
sector were also cited across the sample of local councils.
A striking point was the case of Kono District Council, where its spe-
cifi c character as among the most heavily damaged and isolated districts 
during the war seems to have given rise to greater interpersonal trust, 
social cohesion, and community action. In other words, the fresh mem-
ory of violence and brutal devastation left by the war acted as a mobi-
lizing force at the local level, accounting for the increased engagement 
of citizens in setting development priorities and promoting consensual 
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(rather than confrontational) social attitudes. These results provide 
additional support to a growing body of fi eld research that consistently 
shows that exposure to violence and civil war may increase citizens’ 
willingness to engage in  collective action and other social activities. 
For example, Bellows and Miguel (2009, 17–19) fi nd that individuals 
whose households directly experienced more intense war violence are 
more likely to attend community meetings, join local political and com-
munity groups, and vote. This study suggests that war has had posi-
tive, long-lasting effects on citizens’ participation in collective action, 
a greater level of local political mobilization, and greater capacity for 
collective action. Likewise, Sacks and Larizza (2012) fi nd that in Sierra 
Leone, respondents who live in areas that were particularly affected by 
the war are more likely to view their local government councilors as 
trustworthy. 
Evidence from the 2008 National Public Service Household Survey 
largely confi rms the positive trends reported in the focus groups. For 
example, respondents were asked how they perceived the local councils 
in terms of honesty and responsiveness to the needs of their commu-
nity. Overall, 64 percent of respondents in 2008 said they believed the 
local council cared about the needs of their community—a substan-
tial increase from 37 percent in 2007. As indicated in the NPS house-
hold survey, signifi cant subnational variation exists, from 51 percent 
in Western Area Rural District to 85 percent in Kailahun. When asked 
if they could trust local councilors, on average 49 percent of respon-
dents in 2008 trusted local councilors, a large increase compared with 
26 percent in 2007 (IRCBP 2010). Moreover, local councils made the 
largest gains among political institutions between 2007 and 2008. As 
shown in table 9.3, local political authorities are more trusted by citi-
zens than national government offi cials and are perceived as being more 
responsive.
Table 9.3. Changes in Relative Rankings of Central and Local Government
Percent
Measure
Local council Central government
2005 2007 2008 2005 2007 2008
Respondents who think government is 
responsive to their community’s needs 52 37 66 39 45 52
Respondents who trust government offi cials 43 34 49 33 42 44
Source: IRCBP (2011).
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The NPS household survey also asked citizens how well they thought 
the local council would perform if it received a large sum of money 
(500  million leones or about US$170,000) to complete a project in their 
area. Remarkably, 75 percent of respondents in 2008 gave a positive 
response. Kono, Tonkolili, and Bonthe Town scored best on this indica-
tor, with a score of 2.1 on a scale of 0 to 3. Moyamba and Kenema Town 
scored the worst on this indicator (1.6). These fi gures represent a substan-
tial improvement compared with 2007 (IRCBP 2010). 
However, citizens’ trust and support are not unconditional. On the con-
trary, evidence from a recent study suggests that the quality of basic public 
services—combined with the administrative competence or perceived hon-
esty of local government—is what really matters to shape citizens’ atti-
tudes toward political authorities (Sacks and Larizza 2012). These fi ndings 
suggest that ordinary citizens can be vigilant in monitoring government 
 performance at the local level, rewarding better performing councilors 
with a higher level of trustworthiness.
Durability and Resilience
Seven years after the decentralization process was launched, the institution 
of local councils has arguably taken fi rm root, leading several observers to 
suggest that it would be diffi cult to reverse the process and reconcentrate 
power at the center. In particular, the active presence of the international 
community, whose interests are generally aligned in supporting the decen-
tralization process, is perceived as a guarantee against the replication of 
the prewar political dynamics, such as the dismantling of local councils 
that took place in 1972. According to Robinson (2010, 17–18), the pres-
ence of the international community has substantially constrained the 
ability of the APC government to engage in the type of overt manipulation 
of the chieftaincy system it used after 1967. And international presence 
might have prompted the national elites to adapt to the changed environ-
ment by leaving the local councils in place and engaging in divide-and-rule 
politics.
However, recent developments suggest that pressures might be building 
to weaken the authority and independence of the local councils, casting 
some doubt on the long-term resilience of subnational government. The 
policy environment in which the local councils are embedded might change 
signifi cantly in the near future, exposing them to potentially destabiliz-
ing forces. In particular, the recent reintroduction of the district offi cers in 
2010 (following the approval of the National Decentralisation Policy) and 
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the downgrading of the political status of the local councils provide some 
evidence of a new containment strategy. This strategy is designed to protect 
the interests of the national elites and undermine the emerging political 
power at the subnational level (Srivastava and Larizza 2011). 
Drivers of Success and Its Navigation 
The drivers of success for the reestablishment of local councils in Sierra 
Leone start fi rst with managing the legacy of the war. Large demands and 
pressures were generated in the aftermath of the confl ict for a rapid peace 
dividend in the form of a reestablished state presence and improved access 
to basic services outside the Western peninsula. These popular demands 
were common across a broad spectrum of societal groups and prominent 
civic and offi cial actors. 
Moreover, in Sierra Leone, the postconfl ict environment was more 
favorable relative to other cases of countries emerging from war, because 
there was no perceived need to facilitate the peaceful coexistence of for-
mer warring factions. As Fanthorpe, Lavali, and Sesay (2011, 52) state, 
“None of the leading factions in the Sierra Leonean confl ict became 
major players in peacetime politics….” This implied that protracted 
debates and tense negotiations that delayed the process of institution 
building in other countries (such as Kosovo or Sudan, for example) were 
absent in Sierra Leone, making it easier to focus on the technical and 
policy aspects of the subnational institution-building process. In other 
words, an authorizing environment emerged that enabled rapid align-
ment of national and international interests and quickly mobilized donor 
support.
Since the 2002 elections, the prewar parties (SLPP and APC) have reoc-
cupied the formal political space almost exclusively. Nevertheless, the elites 
recognized that their legitimacy was tainted. They had an imperative to 
be seen to be committed to the amelioration of the horrors endured dur-
ing the abandonment of whole swaths of the population during the war. 
Decentralization provided a ready political platform to both, meshing with 
the policy promptings of the international community.
Notwithstanding the continuing governmental deference to the tra-
ditional authorities related to securing votes, a window of opportunity 
existed immediately after the peace settlement to move the new structure 
of local councils forward.
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Navigating the Decentralization Agenda in the External Environment
There was a sequencing of decentralization reforms and devolution of 
functions. This sequencing approach featured the establishment of demo-
cratically elected authorities fi rst, and subsequently the progressive devolu-
tion of fi scal and administrative functions. The approach was critical to the 
success of the local councils because their progressive empowerment—via 
increased resources and administrative decision-making power—steadily 
enhanced the accountability relationship with the citizens. It also generated 
demand for services and thereby shaped the incentives for local authorities 
to deliver and improve the quality of local services.
Steering the Fast-Track Approach
The approval of critical legislation before the validation of national decen-
tralization policy prevented delays at the implementation stage in two ways: 
(1) There was de facto blocking of interference by resistance groups (such 
as line ministries) in the critical start-up period; and (2) The space was 
minimized for confl icting interpretations (such as the potential confl icts 
between the chieftaincy system and local councils) that could derail the 
process. Furthermore, the late elaboration of the National Decentralisation 
Policy (approved by the cabinet in December 2010) made it possible to 
benefi t from the experience of the early period and quickly identify specifi c 
requirements for additional legislative harmonization and change.
Deadlines were set to guide the devolution process. The deadlines were 
instrumental in keeping up the momentum of the decentralization process 
and mobilizing demands for sustained capacity-building efforts at the local 
level.
Quick wins were demonstrated. The Decentralization Secretariat in 
its early days applied itself to raising the visibility of the decentraliza-
tion  process and linking in the communities. A prominent vehicle for this 
was the “rapid results initiative,” which combined community awareness 
building with the execution and oversight of prioritized works projects 
over a 100-day period (Zhou 2009). 
The magnitude of donor support was critical to ensure strong resource 
commitment and support capacity-building initiatives targeting local 
councils. The modality of donor support was particularly instrumental to 
achieve rapid results and establish solid foundations for the institutional 
development of local councils. The modality encompassed the use of highly 
skilled, donor-funded local technical assistant (LTA) positions within 
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IRCBP’s critical implementing agencies, the Project Coordination Unit, the 
Local Government Finance Department (LGFD), and the Decentralisation 
Secretariat (Dec-Sec). In particular, Dec-Sec and LGFD provided the appro-
priate vanguard organizational structure that, along with strong legislative 
momentum, acted as a solid catalyst for the institutional reform process. 
Moreover, because they are funded by donor projects, LTA staffs have been 
subjected to external accountability mechanisms to monitor their perfor-
mance.13 This in turn has facilitated the relationships of the local councils 
with donors. And it has enabled their support of the institutional develop-
ment of local councils by channeling large amounts of fi nancial resources 
(through the Local Government Finance Committee), as well as by provid-
ing effective monitoring and an intensive capacity-building program.
Building Matching Dynamics in the Internal Environment
To take fi rm root, the decentralization project not only had to be sculpted 
in line with the possibilities presented by the external environment, it also 
needed a workable and capacitated internal framework. The progressive 
establishment of the capabilities of the local councils was facilitated by 
some critical interventions at timely junctures of the decentralization pro-
cess, which are described in the following:
Clear Articulation of the Formal Mandate of the Local Councils. It was 
critical to generate over time established, standard operating procedures 
(particularly in planning, budgeting, and accounting), which in turn have 
built robustness in institutional management. Moreover, the focus group 
discussions confi rmed that core and sector staff members show a good 
grasp of the mission and goals of the institution. 
Rolling Transfer of Qualifi ed Personnel to Local Councils. Local council 
staff has been engaged on a staged basis: fi rst chief administrators and 
fi nance offi cers on transfer from the civil service, then procurement and 
monitoring and evaluation offi cers, then development planners and inter-
nal auditors, then engineers and human resources offi cers, and so forth. 
This staged process allowed for the gradual building of capacity at the 
local level, with observable impacts on institutional performance. The 
posting of staff outside Freetown raised issues of incentives but (modestly) 
preferential pay rates helped, as did the appeal of more direct infl uence on 
institutional workings.
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Mobilization of Advisors at the Council Level. From their inception, the 
new local councils had available to them the  full-time advice of the council 
coaches (later designated as resident technical facilitators) who were hired 
directly by Dec-Sec. These in turn were backstopped by regional coordina-
tors and the human resources specialists at Dec-Sec.
Investment in Capacity Building. Sustained capacity building—as described 
above and through the foregoing and the training and equipping program 
for staff and elected offi cials—is refl ected in the steady improvement of 
institutional performance. Not only the council staff, but also the elected 
offi cials have benefi ted from training interventions that further strength-
ened the identifi cation with emerging council processes.
Presence of Political and Technical Leadership. Combined with the 
 availability of skilled staff, leadership has emerged as a critical driver 
of performance across the sample of four local councils. Where council 
chairs or chief administrators have demonstrated clear-cut leadership 
and where well-skilled staff was available, the effects on perfor-
mance have been manifest and translated into positive organizational 
impulses. Bo City provides a good example of the far-reaching impact 
of  leadership on performance, local development outcomes,14 and effec-
tive tax  administration (Jibao and Pritchard 2011; Fanthorpe, Lavali, 
and Sesay 2011).
Objectively-Based Systems Bolstering the Decentralization Process. A 
strong, early push to the credibility of the decentralization agenda was 
provided by the design and installation of the intergovernmental fi nancial 
transfer system. Based on international best practice on criteria and dis-
tribution formulas, all parties accepted its objectivity and transparency. 
Likewise, the installation of CLoGPAS, as an evidence-based tool for local 
council performance, and the regularized national public service surveys 
underpin the advancement of decentralization overall. The robust nature 
of these monitoring systems has obviated the threat of serious contes-
tation and generally insulated Dec-Sec and the involved ministries from 
dispute. 
Communications and Outreach Activities. The focus group participants 
consistently reported that local council interaction with the local commu-
nity was at a good level. The growing concentration of outreach activities 
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to the public by the local councils (both legally required and self-generated) 
has brought positive returns in terms of citizen support to and identifi ca-
tion with the local government system. 
Party Politics as an Additional Driver of Local Councils’ Institutional 
Performance. In some cases, the informal pressures created by the con-
frontational and polarized nature of the party system have also cre-
ated some unexpected outcomes, acting as incentives for local councils 
to implement critical reforms for the management and collection of 
local revenues. A recent study, covering four city councils, on the politi-
cal economy of local tax reforms fi nds that the perception of fear that 
central government transfers might have been delayed or withheld for 
political reasons against opposition-controlled local government has 
shaped the behavior of local authorities (Jibao and Prichard 2011). This 
perception has created incentives for enacting tax reforms, with the 
ultimate goal to enhance fi nancial autonomy and overall institutional 
performance. 
Outstanding Challenges
Local councils remain highly dependent on grants from the national gov-
ernment. Although the volume of these grants has increased over time 
and a larger proportion of budgeted amounts are now being transferred, 
the lack of fi nancial autonomy leaves the local councils vulnerable to the 
whims of the national government. For instance, several of the focus group 
participants mentioned the late arrival of quarterly transfers from the cen-
tral government as disruptive to the planned delivery of services. A par-
ticular problem arose in the agricultural sector where the fl ow of funds 
was signifi cantly out of kilter with the pattern of seasonal needs in the 
subsectors. Increased property tax revenue (the case of Bo City council is a 
model in this regard) suggests potential for the future, but the magnitude of 
the revenue base is insuffi cient to break the dependence on central transfers 
(Jibao and Pritchard 2011). 
In addition to the problem of local councils’ structural dependency on 
the center, since 2009, the Ministry of Local Government has played a 
role in altering the share of local tax collected by the paramount chiefs 
and remitted to the local councils, lowering the amount of local tax pre-
cept and laying down a range of 5–20 percent. Despite the government’s 
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declared intention to strengthen the institution of chieftaincy by providing 
additional resources, the focus group discussions consistently reported a 
sense of frustration among chairpersons and local councilors over a deci-
sion they perceived as unjust and contrary to the provision of the law.15 
These election-driven political dynamics have the potential to derail the 
evolutionary process and represent a serious threat to the survival of the 
institution, as they are likely to undermine the capacity of local councils 
to perform their designated functions with suffi cient fi nancial autonomy 
(Srivastava and Larizza 2011). 
The relationship between the paramount chiefs and the local councils 
and their respective domains and functions continues to be marked by 
tensions. As the chieftaincy retains allegiance and legitimacy (including 
by way of constitutional provision), however, a modus vivendi needs to 
apply between all traditional and local modern authorities. Government 
obfuscation on this issue, in the opinion of Robinson (2010, 5), can be 
seen as part of a larger political strategy whose ultimate objective was “to 
create a dysfunctional and quite incoherent set of institutions with local 
councils under-resourced, dependent on the central state for funding and 
in confl ict with the paramount chiefs or other elements of the chieftaincy 
institutions.” In other words, national elites followed a “divide-and-rule” 
strategy to ensure that neither the paramount chiefs nor the local councils 
would have the opportunity to become strong enough to challenge the 
center’s hold on political power. 
Relations with MDA and the line ministries vary across the spectrum. 
In general, cooperation on cross-sector monitoring of outputs is improv-
ing, but contradictions between sector and decentralization legislation still 
need to be resolved by a process of harmonization. Aspects of minimum 
national standards also need consistent work, sector by sector. 
A critical aspect of the interactions between the councils and the MDAs 
is the prevailing situation of control over locally operational staff and the 
lack of a clear demarcation of employer and employee relations. This con-
tinues to be a source of tensions and frustration and militates against orga-
nizational effectiveness, as widely refl ected in the focus group  discussions. 
The National Decentralisation Policy (approved in 2010) foresees direct 
employment and control of all locally based personnel devolved to the 
councils by 2016,16 but in the interim, there is clearly an issue of account-
ability that limits the capacity of local councils to perform their devolved 
functions. Moreover, even with the handling of human resource matters 
for the restricted number of core staff (currently fewer than 200), serious 
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incidents have arisen related chiefl y to councilor (importantly chairperson) 
attitudes toward individual staff as well as offi cer-to-offi cer tensions. High 
transfer rates of core staff (notably chief administrators) refl ect this trend. 
There is a lack of coordination between the respective monitoring 
and evaluation processes related to service delivery and adherence to and 
level of completion of council plans. Sector and council monitoring and 
 evaluation—through the appointed offi cer—appear to be conducted in 
disconnected channels. Even the intentions behind establishing district 
monitoring and evaluation committees with formal sector representa-
tion (apparently following a directive from the Development Assistance 
Coordination Offi ce in October 2009) have been frustrated, as meet-
ings are irregularly convened (some actors are not even aware of this 
 proposal). Admittedly, it is not the intention to devolve sector monitor-
ing and  evaluation—as in the new center-local disposition, this remains 
a core function of MDAs—nevertheless, although relevant personnel see 
the sense and mutual benefi t of close coordination, efforts in that direction 
have been hampered.
In terms of integrating service delivery in an LGA area, diffi culties  persist 
with the activities of NGOs (in some sectors, there might be 15–25 agen-
cies working in an area). Although there is always some level of operational 
contact with these bodies, the sharing of plans is generally unsatisfactory. 
NGOs are only required to register at the national level with MoFED. They 
are encouraged to have working agreements with the councils, but in real-
ity, a small minority does. Several participants in the focus groups reported 
these relationships as depending entirely on the particular organization’s 
willingness to cooperate. Some (e.g., World Vision) were reluctant to do so, 
while others (e.g., Welthungerhilfe) spontaneously came to the councils on 
all planning and implementation matters.17 A similar situation pertains with 
regard to offi cially supported national programs, with the United Nations 
Children’s Fund, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, and 
the National Commission for Social Action activities all cited during inter-
views and focus group discussions as operating in some considerable degree 
of isolation from council annual plans. Expenditure tracking is also prob-
lematic. The offi cial national Council Annual Plan may note a commitment 
from a particular source (e.g., the Food and Agriculture Organization), but 
there will be no itemization of budgeted expenditure. Financial statements 
on these programs are not copied to local fi nance personnel as a rule.
In 2010, the government reintroduced the position of district offi cers, 
adding an additional layer of policy oversight and control on the activities 
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of local councils. However, the lack of clarity in the defi nition of functions 
and authority of district offi cers has led several observers to raise concerns 
that the district offi cers might abuse their authority over local councils and 
increase the control of the central government. Even prior to this develop-
ment, the infl uence of the three provincial secretariats (where the district 
offi cers report) has not been viewed as contributing to local development. 
Over time, tensions have developed between the donor-funded contract 
staff and regular civil servants, hampering organizational effectiveness. 
This has been especially the case in MLGRD, where Dec-Sec was only 
formally included in the ministry and instead remained de facto largely 
autonomous and independent from it. This situation generates the risk 
that skilled contract staff will not be attracted and retained in the civil 
service, weakening the process of local councils’ institutional development 
and undermining the long-term sustainability of capacity-building efforts. 
A similar risk exists at the local level where the local councils have had 
 diffi culty in recruiting and retaining capable staff for key positions. 
 Policy Implications and Conclusions
The reestablishment and institutional development of local councils in 
Sierra Leone has followed a fast-track approach, similar to the “big bang” 
decentralization reform program initiative of the World Bank and other 
donors in 1999 in post-Suharto Indonesia. Like in Indonesia, the objective 
was to cement institutional reforms while the political climate remained 
favorable (World Bank 2003). However, the Sierra Leone experience has 
differed from that in other countries, especially in the following ways:
1. In Sierra Leone, few efforts (if any) were made to reform the institu-
tion of the chieftaincy after the introduction of LGA in 2004. This 
approach was substantially different from the experience of other 
African countries, where the traditional authorities were the target of 
legislative initiatives that aimed to reduce their executive and admin-
istrative powers and subject them to the authority of “modern” local 
government systems.18 
2. The law-based sequencing and time-tabling of devolution gave the 
process signifi cant impetus, underpinned by early mobilization of per-
sonnel capacity. This is a stark difference compared with other decen-
tralized countries in Africa where the resistance to devolution has 
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been much stronger and no formal deadlines have been  established. 
The case of Burkina Faso and, more generally, the experience of 
Francophone African states have followed a more gradual and slow 
process (USAID 2010). 
The above analysis suggests that, rather than refl ecting other countries’ 
experience (international isomorphism), the design and development of 
the institution of local councils in Sierra Leone has been largely shaped by 
the socio-political environment emerging from the war, as well as from the 
peculiar organizational culture and social norms inherited from the colo-
nial period and the pre-1972 decentralization experience. This “domestic 
isomorphism” is evident in the similarities between the 2004 LGA and 
the old District Council Ordinance (of 1950), as well as in the legacies of 
the “indirect rule” system and the way those legacies shaped the relation-
ship between the district councils and the chiefdoms in the post-confl ict 
context.
Notwithstanding the preceding observations, the successful experience 
of local councils in Sierra Leone does offer a few interesting lessons that 
can inform future efforts to build successful institutions in other post-
confl ict and fragile settings. At the same time, the case of Sierra Leone 
raises interesting questions on the extent to which this historical experience 
can be replicated elsewhere. For instance, the creation of donor-funded 
 implementing agencies and the use of LTA staff was a unique approach 
that facilitated the institutional development of the local councils. The 
presence of competitively-recruited contract staff acted as a solid cata-
lyst for the decentralization reform process and accounts for the positive 
results achieved by the local councils over time. However, the long-term 
sustainability of this approach remains an issue of concern. This requires 
further refl ection on the benefi ts and potential trade-offs associated with 
this model of donor intervention and the extent to which the approach fol-
lowed in Sierra Leone could be replicated in other post-confl ict and fragile 
countries.
The Sierra Leone experience also shows how the historical, social, and 
political environment provides critical opportunities to support the efforts 
of local councils to achieve successful outcomes. In particular, the post-
confl ict environment was conducive to the devolution of power and func-
tions to subnational authorities, given the legacies of the civil war and 
the quick alignment of international (donor) and national interests. To the 
extent that other countries do not share a similar enabling environment, 
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it might be diffi cult to replicate a similar process of institutional transfor-
mation and success. 
Finally, the experience of the local councils suggests that the trajectory 
of the institutional reform process is heavily infl uenced by the degree to 
which the incentives of various actors play out. In Sierra Leone, the success 
of the local councils might itself have been responsible for a strong reac-
tion from the central government, whose recent decisions refl ect an effort 
to contain—rather than support—the process of institutional development 
of the local councils (Srivastava and Larizza 2011). A central lesson emerg-
ing from these political economy dynamics refers to the critical role that 
the international community should play while providing support to local 
councils. In Sierra Leone, such support has so far been crucial to mitigate 
the risks for institutional reversals (recentralization of powers and func-
tions) while also helping local authorities in their effort to perform their 
devolved functions and meet citizens’ expectations. 
Notes
 1. Sierra Leone is divided into 149 chiefdoms, each ruled by a single paramount 
chief, considered the top authority in his or her chiefdom. Paramount chiefs 
rule through a network of sub-chiefs and chiefdom functionaries at the chief-
dom, section (each chiefdom is divided into 5–15 sections), and town or  village 
level. 
 2. District councils were categorized in three types: (1) city council (Freetown, the 
capital); (2) town council (Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Koidu New Sembehun, and 
Bonthe); and (3) district council (Bombali, Koinadugu, Port Loko, Kambia, 
Tonkolili, Kono, Kenema, Bo, Pujehun, Bonthe, Moyamba, Kailahun, and 
Western Area Rural) (Zhou 2009, 29).
 3. Much of the exploitation of the people by the chiefs had related to their pre-
rogative to identify those who were indigenous to the chiefdom (indigenes) 
and guarantee their rights to local residence, land use, and political and legal 
representation (Fanthorpe and Sesay 2009). 
 4. In 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone requested fi nancial support from 
DfID to build houses for the chiefs. Given the earlier poor practices of chief-
dom governance and the legitimacy defi cit of the chiefs, DfID and other 
donors pressured the Government of Sierra Leone to initiate chiefdom 
reforms. Public consultations were held in a dozen localities, reporting strong 
demand for democratic reform rather than the abolition of the chiefdom sys-
tem (Fanthorpe 2006). Acting on this basis, DfID provided support for the 
Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme. 
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 5. Available cross-country data confi rm this perception: Sierra Leone continues 
to lag behind other decentralizing countries in the region, where transfers to 
subnational governments are about 24 percent of the total revenues collected 
(see Bahl and Wallace (2004, 5); Searle (2009)). Moreover, in absolute terms, 
actual transfers remain low and local councils are still underfunded relative to 
the devolved functions (Srivastava and Larizza 2011). 
 6. In the case of MLGRD, however, the accountability relationship has been 
indirect, as the oversight and policy functions have been implemented by the 
donor-funded Decentralization Secretariat. Despite the fact that this body 
was conceived as a transitional implementing entity, the persistent delays and 
failed efforts to mainstream the functions of Dec-Sec staff into the activities of 
MLGRD continue to create confusion about the central agency to which the 
local councils are ultimately accountable. 
 7. According to the Decentralization Policy (Government of Sierra Leone 2010a), 
the local councils are no longer identifi ed as the highest political authority; 
instead, they are described as the highest developmental authority.
 8. Under LGA, the responsibilities of the local council chief administrator include 
to “supervise and coordinate the activities of the other staff and Departments 
of the local council” and to “ensure that staff performance standards are met.” 
In actuality, however, the bulk of staff operating locally is working in the sec-
tors, and their posting is still done by the parent sector ministry directly along 
with their other personnel management (e.g., recruitment, promotion, disci-
plining, and so forth). The local council is only a direct employer in the case of 
the core staff, currently 10 offi cers (with plans for four more). All the human 
resources issues pertaining to the core staff are channeled through the human 
resources offi cer of the council to the chief administrator on the basis of the 
provisions of a new manual and under the aegis of the Local Government 
Services Commission (LGSC). 
 9. Currently, the vast majority of local councils’ funding comes from central 
government transfers, in the form of grants tied to specifi c expenditures for 
devolved functions and administrative costs. The vertical allocation (total 
funds fl owing to local councils) and horizontal distribution arrangements are 
to refl ect capacity considerations and represent the sum of all sector-specifi c 
vertical allocations for devolved functions. Each sector allocation is deter-
mined through negotiations between LGFD, each line ministry, and the Budget 
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. Once the size of the vertical envelope for 
each sector is established, the horizontal distribution (between local councils) 
is done on the basis of formulas that take into account equity, simplicity, trans-
parency, stability, and budget autonomy.
 10. When the local councils launched the competitive process for hiring core 
administrative and technical staff, several civil servants—centrally appointed 
and accountable to the central MDAs—decided to apply and become 
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locally appointed public servants. Although promotions and salary increases 
were clearly a driving force, evidence suggests that the perception of being 
closer to the decision-making authority, and therefore being more able to infl u-
ence and to some extent scrutinize the decision-making process itself, played a 
role in the decision to move. 
 11. It is diffi cult to establish any stringent causal link between the reestablish-
ment of local councils and general improvement in public services observed 
in Sierra Leone, if only because there are no equivalent data on the quality 
of such services before 2004. However, it is worth observing that areas that 
have had the largest reduction in geographical distance to political power—a 
direct byproduct of decentralization, measured as the distance to Freetown 
minus the distance to the council headquarters—have usually experienced 
the largest gains in service quality. Based on this and other tests, Foster and 
Glennester conclude that “decentralization has been compatible with consis-
tent improvements in public service delivery” (Foster and Glennester 2009, 
83–84).
 12. Survey data are available from the authors on request.
 13. This included, for example, monthly progress reports to the relevant  project 
implementation unit. These accountability relationships were relatively strong, 
especially compared with the endemically weak country systems for apprais-
ing performance.
 14. Bo City Council experienced a signifi cant growth in own source revenues 
from systemizing the property tax regime (there has been a fourfold increase 
in annual fl ows). This in turn has allowed important discretionary spending 
on health facilities, support for educational improvements, and solid waste 
management. 
 15. According to the 2004 LGA, negotiations had to be conducted between para-
mount chiefs and local councils to defi ne the share of local tax. As a result of 
these negotiations, a 40/60 rule had become standard practice.
 16. This is an expression of assurance on the side of central authority regarding 
the institutional capability of local councils, but there is no certainty that the 
staff devolution will be achieved by the target deadline.
 17. There are some remarkable successful cases. For example, in Bo District, a 
project under European Union funding was cited as being designed and run in 
exemplary fashion.
 18. For example, the Constitution of Uganda (adopted in 1995) states explic-
itly that “a traditional leader or cultural leader shall not have or exer-
cise any administrative, legislative or executive powers of government or 
local government.” In Ghana, successive governments have taken measures 
to ensure that chieftaincy operates within the confi nes of the civil soci-
ety; however, infl uential chiefs may remain in national politics (Fanthorpe, 
Lavali, and Sesay 2011, 59).
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Occupying the eastern half of the island of Timor, Timor-Leste is a small 
country with a population of about 1.2 million. Relying heavily on petro-
leum production, the country achieved lower middle-income status in 
2011. Yet poverty remains persistently high, particularly in the rural areas 
where the majority of the population lives. This chapter provides the back-
ground context for three cases of successful institutional development 
described in the following chapters—the Ministry of Health, the Ministry 
of Social Solidarity, and the Central Bank.
Tumultuous History
Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony for 400 years. Following a civil war 
that was brief but left deep psychological marks, the country declared 
 independence from Portugal in November 1975, only to be invaded within 
days by neighboring Indonesia. The 24-year occupation that followed is 
estimated to have caused the deaths of up to one-third of the population. 
The Timorese maintained a staunch resistance against the occupation 
through military, civilian, and diaspora diplomatic actions. Following the 
fall of President Suharto in 1998, Indonesia allowed a referendum in 1999, 
giving the territory a choice between autonomous status within Indonesia 
and independence. When the overwhelming majority of the population 
voted for independence, the outcome was met with a campaign of vio-
lence that left more than 1,000 people dead, the majority of the population 
The Institution-Building Context in 
Timor-Leste
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displaced, and most of the private and public infrastructure in ruins. Nearly 
all public records were destroyed. Indonesian civil servants fl ed the terri-
tory, leaving the country with few educated professionals.
A multilateral peacekeeping force was deployed, after which the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was estab-
lished with supreme executive, judicial, and legislative authority. Timorese 
leaders guided and informed policy making throughout the UNTAET 
period, and near the end of UNTAET’s mission its cabinet consisted almost 
entirely of Timorese. The election of a constituent assembly in 2001, the 
adoption of a constitution that year, and presidential  elections in 2002 
paved the way for the restoration of Timor-Leste’s independence on 
May 20, 2002. The Constituent Assembly became the National Parliament, 
and the fi rst constitutional government was sworn in under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. The United Nations Mission of Support 
in East Timor was created, and succeeded in 2005 by the United Nations 
Offi ce in Timor-Leste.
In April 2006, the country was shaken by an eruption of large-scale 
 violence. A third of the army was dismissed amid complaints by the rank 
and fi le from the west of the country of discrimination by commanders 
who hailed mostly from the eastern region. Fighting broke out, followed 
by widespread violence and looting in the capital, Dili, much of it associ-
ated with youth gangs. The police forces essentially imploded, with police 
offi cers retreating around geographical and kinship loyalties. Government 
authority buckled under the pressure of escalating social tensions. Some 
40 people lost their lives and more than 100,000 people were displaced. 
Although the violence was sparked by division within the armed forces, 
it was fed by a host of complex historical, social, and economic factors. 
These included decades-old enmities between political elites; disillusion-
ment with the economic constraints at independence, such as widespread 
poverty and unemployment; disaffection with a government that was led 
by diaspora fi gures and appeared distant from the needs of ordinary  people; 
and the surfacing of identities around easterners and westerners and their 
purported roles in the resistance against the Indonesian occupation.
International troops were called in to restore order, and Prime Minister 
Alkatiri was forced to resign in June 2006. He was replaced by then Foreign 
Minister and Nobel Peace laureate Jose Ramos-Horta. Parliamentary 
and presidential elections were held in 2007. Ramos-Horta was elected 
president and former president and independence leader Jose Alexandre 
‘Xanana’ Gusmao became prime minister. Insecurity and community-level 
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fi ghting lasted well into 2007, and there was an attempt to assassinate 
President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao in 2008. For much of 
2006 and 2007, government services were badly disrupted, with the excep-
tion of a few agencies, such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity, which responded surprisingly effectively to the crisis. 
The country has since credibly emerged from the crisis, reestablished 
political stability, and generated a new confi dence in the state. Largely 
peaceful democratic elections for president and parliament were held 
in 2012, followed by an orderly transition to a new government. The 
United Nations Integrated Mission for Timor-Leste and the International 
Stabilization Force, both deployed following the 2006 crisis, completed 
their missions in December 2012. 
Contrasting Visions: Building the State versus Building Trust
There is a considerable contrast between the visions embodied by UNTAET 
and the fi rst government and that of the governments that arose after the 
2006 Crisis. Following its deployment in 1999–2000, UNTAET achieved 
important humanitarian goals, such as the reintegration of more than 
200,000 people who had taken refuge in West Timor, as well as reigniting 
essential fi nancial, economic, and social public services, including educa-
tion and health. UNTAET also chaperoned the formation of the country’s 
constitutional foundations and organized its fi rst parliamentary and presi-
dential elections. 
The fi rst post-independence government was primarily concerned with 
building the state, and elaborating its legal and administrative architec-
ture at the national and subnational levels. It focused heavily on secur-
ing the international agreements underpinning petroleum production in 
new maritime oil fi elds. This additional petroleum production generated 
a considerable increase in public revenues starting in 2005. The govern-
ment established petroleum revenue management architecture, including a 
Petroleum Fund that is widely considered international best practice. With 
a design drawing from the Norwegian experience, the Petroleum Fund is 
intended to provide transparency and accountability on the use of public 
revenues, protect public fi nances from income volatility, and help strike 
the appropriate balance between current spending and savings for future 
generations. Withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund are guided by the esti-
mated sustainable income. 
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However, the effectiveness of the fi rst government was curtailed by low 
capacity in public fi nancial management and an excruciatingly slow execu-
tion of national budgets. The government underestimated the effect on 
households of the massive economic disruption that followed the with-
drawal of the Indonesian administrative and private sector presence and 
the yo-yo economic effect of the buildup and subsequent draw-down of the 
United Nations presence. The Alkatiri government had a distinct aversion 
to social protection programs, considering them a disincentive to produc-
tive private initiative and reminiscent of Indonesian rule. By contrast, the 
Gusmao governments deployed the petroleum-generated public expendi-
tures to secure peace.
From 2007 to 2012, Gusmao’s fi rst term, the government concentrated 
on resolving grievances and rebuilding public trust. It provided payouts 
to those who registered the original grievances that precipitated the 2006 
 crisis and to those who had been displaced and lost their homes. It estab-
lished a generous, if poorly targeted, social protection system, including 
a system of cash transfers to address the demands of the veterans of the 
resistance, as well as the needs of the elderly, the disabled, and poor fami-
lies. It rapidly increased expenditures in highly visible areas, such as power 
supply, and distributed funds in districts and subdistricts for smaller infra-
structure, to create jobs and support the nascent private sector through 
contracts. 
To fi nance this largesse, the government is drawing double the estimated 
sustainable income from the Petroleum Fund, with budgets approximately 
10 times what they were in 2002 through 2006. This large expansion in 
public spending has generated jobs and created a visible urban middle 
class, with increases in living standards slowly becoming apparent in rural 
areas as well. However, it has led to double-digit infl ation and puts fi scal 
sustainability at risk, especially since the quality of public spending and 
investments is considered uneven. Rapidly increasing public spending in the 
face of still weak public institutions also raises concerns over corruption; 
Timor-Leste’s standing in governance rankings has deteriorated. Growth is 
largely driven by public spending, while agriculture, the primary source of 
income for most households, remains characterized by low productivity, 
contributing to persistent poverty and food insecurity in rural areas. 
Although Timor-Leste’s development path remains complex and 
uncertain, more than a decade after the restoration of independence, the 
 country can lay claim to several defi ning accomplishments: at least seven 
years without a relapse to violence; two free, fair, and democratic national 
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parliamentary elections; a sharp increase in gross domestic product per 
capita; and improvements in human development. Underlying these 
achievements are institutional developments that have enabled these gains. 
 The following chapters track the ingredients of three particular institu-
tional experiences that have contributed to Timor-Leste’s transition: the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Solidarity, and the Central Bank. 
The tracking is done with a pedagogic intent, to unravel the underpinnings 
of their success. In doing so, two features become particularly clear. First, 
there is no linear path to success; institutional development is idiosyncratic 
and full of fi ts and starts. Second, despite variation in a given macro con-
text, several elements can help in raising or enhancing development pros-
pects and enable institutions to take root in a context in which the odds 
are against them. 
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Timor-Leste Case Study: Ministry of 
Social Solidarity
Catherine Anderson
The experience of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) is not a case of 
conventional institutional development. The MSS largely exists to address 
the country’s complex social vulnerabilities,1 and much of its early success 
is attributed to its role in guiding the country from crisis to recovery. In 
delivering on its mandate, the MSS has acted to secure legitimacy in the 
eyes of its clients and citizenry, building a bridge between government and 
society and forging the basis of a new social contract. 
Tracing the development of the MSS from Timor-Leste’s referendum to 
late 2011, this chapter examines how and why, in an otherwise challeng-
ing, low-capacity environment, the MSS was able to deliver on its policy 
commitments in credible ways (see annex 11A for a timeline of MSS mile-
stones). In doing so, the chapter describes how the core underpinnings 
of the ministry’s success have emerged in the three concentric circles that 
constitute its operating environment: the sociopolitical context in which 
it functions, its relationships with its clients and the external environ-
ment, and its inner institutional workings. This introduction highlights key 
The chapter expands on a mission aide-memoire (December 2012); it is based on the research 
and interviews drawn from two in-country visits during October 12 to November 4, 2011, 
and November 15 to 18, 2011, and a series of regional focus groups completed by Josh 
Trinidad and Fidelis Magalhaes during November 2011 to January 2012. The mission is 
grateful to Riltom Borges and Sebastião do Rego Guterres for their assistance and to Sofi a 
Cason and Ben Larke for their technical inputs.
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elements of that approach and outlines the causal argument that will be 
elaborated in the sections that follow. 
The MSS is essentially a product and an agent of the sociopolitical con-
text in which it functions, and this has substantially contributed to its suc-
cess. Seizing the opportunities afforded to it, the MSS and its predecessor, 
the Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion (MLCR), responded 
to the complex social responsibilities attributed to them by directing MSS 
resources toward three priorities: social reintegration and recovery from 
crisis, connecting state and society through the engagement of village chiefs 
(chefes de suco) and the adoption of traditional practices, and develop-
ing institutional capacity. As a consequence of these actions, the ministry 
stands out, not only for its social responsiveness in a fraught sociopolitical 
context, but also for its customized approach and the manner in which it 
has overcome the constraints of its inner workings.
The MSS has encountered tough and intractable challenges on its 
path to institutional development. These challenges have involved man-
aging complex client demands and citizen expectations, building trust 
in fractured and traumatized societal conditions, and expanding embry-
onic capabilities to deliver results alongside a spike in social spending. 
Like most institutional development trajectories in fragile and confl ict-
affected situations (FCS), the MSS’s institutional development path has 
not been linear, and it could well regress. The persistence of chronic 
poverty, hunger, and malnutrition and the fragility of the country’s 
social conditions are sobering and indicate that much is yet to be done 
to consolidate early gains and set the ministry on the defi nitive path of 
reducing poverty. A large proportion of the population remains suscep-
tible to falling into poverty because of chronic human and administra-
tive vulnerabilities, yet the ministry lacks a coherent poverty reduction 
strategy. At the same time, the rapid escalation of veterans’ pensions 
threatens to outpace the fi nancial sustainability of MSS programs, and 
ineffi cient and poor resource targeting have blunted the engagement of 
youth and children as vulnerable groups. Absent targeted policy and 
administrative improvements, these essential challenges suggest that the 
MSS’s initial success could unravel as quickly as it was accomplished. 
Mindful of the struggles that lie ahead and taking a longitudinal view 
of the MSS’s development, this chapter describes the distinctive features of 
its initial success to identify tractable lessons for institutional development 
 practitioners operating in an FCS.
TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY • 263
Institutional Success
Widely credited with having guided the country from crisis to recovery, the 
ministry’s initial success is attributed to three factors: its crisis response in 
2006, its expanded delivery of social benefi ts to Timor-Leste’s vulnerable 
and expectant citizenry, and its efforts to connect state and society and to 
manage the country’s social problems through local-level confl ict resolu-
tion and social dialogue. Recognizing that Timor-Leste has enjoyed just 
10 years of independence and that institutional transformation is a genera-
tional project (World Bank 2011b), this chapter focuses on the ministry’s 
early accomplishments across three vectors of success—results, legitimacy, 
and resilience. As it proceeds, this chapter points to the internal and exter-
nal factors that have contributed to the emergence of these capabilities in 
the period from the referendum to 2011. At the same time, it refl ects on the 
policy and operational challenges that still lie ahead as the MSS continues 
on its path of institutional development. 
Results
Within two years of the 2006 Crisis and with more than one-tenth of the 
country’s population internally displaced, the ministry’s recovery and rein-
tegration program, Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru, decommissioned 65 camps for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 6 transitional shelters across the 
country. It built 14,700 homes, and distributed more than US$37.8  million 
in Phase I and II recovery and reintegration packages to 16,500  families 
(MSS 2009b). A critical measure of the ministry’s success under this 
reintegration program is that there were no repeat incidents of violence. 
Complaints regarding eligibility or payments were handled case by case, 
and decisions were full and fi nal. 
The ministry’s social transfer programs—including the Mother’s Purse 
(Bolsa da Mãe),2 the Elderly Pension Program, and the Disability Pension 
Program—have delivered social benefi ts to an estimated one-third of the 
 population, more than 40 percent of whom constitute Timor-Leste’s most 
poor (see fi gure 11.1; World Bank 2013, ch. 5).3 In 2011, social assistance 
spending prevented a rise in the percentage of households with per capita 
monthly consumption of only US$32 from 40 to 45 percent,4 although 
this came at a disproportionately higher cost compared with the country’s 
regional neighbors and was largely due to the Elderly Pension Program 
(World Bank 2013).5 The MSS’s social payments are not substantial 
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monetary sums and, with the exception of the elderly pension, poor tar-
geting blunts the potential poverty impact of these programs. The equity, 
administrative effi ciency, and long-term sustainability of these programs are 
also uneven and need to be addressed to enhance program performance and 
impacts in the long run.6 Yet these programs have injected much-needed 
fi nancial support into local communities that had not received  government 
assistance before, and urban-rural coverage among benefi ciaries is even. 
The Bolsa de Mãe has expanded incrementally year on year since its 
introduction (see table 11.1) and in a regionally equitable way although it 
is only partially pro-poor and payments do not always reach Timor-Leste’s 
most poor. A policy change, introduced in 2011, promises to improve the 
ability of the program to account for the overall socioeconomic conditions 
of  benefi ciaries and their families (for example, number of dependents in 
the family and family livelihoods). It also aims to improve the accuracy 
and transparency of the targeting system (World Bank 2013, 66). It is not 
yet clear whether these policy and administrative changes will have their 
desired impacts, but they have signaled the MSS’s commitment to build on 
Table 11.1. Social Transfer Benefi ciaries, by Program, 2009–12 
Program 2009 2010  2011 2012
Bolsa de Mãe 8,723 13,458 13,908 15,000
Elderly pension
72,675
83,645 84,623 84,569
Disability pension 4,154 5,539 5,558
Veteran’s pension 3,976 9,102 10,953 27,960
Total benefi ciaries 89,063 110,146 125,892 142,831
Source: Information provided by the Directorate of Social Assistance, MSS.
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Figure 11.1. Social Transfer Benefi ciaries, by Program, 2011
Source: National Statistics Institute 2011b.
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the early gains of its social transfer programs and to examine their perfor-
mance critically.
It is not possible to gauge the direct impact of MSS social transfers, 
but the data show some interesting trends. Focus group participants 
and interviewees almost unanimously reported that the Bolsa de Mãe 
had improved their quality of life and helped them to meet their basic 
needs. Education-related expenses—shoes, notebooks, pens, uniforms, and 
school fees—were among the most frequently self-reported expenditures of 
the Bolsa de Mãe payments. There was greater variation in the use of the 
elderly and disability benefi ts, and food was the most common expenditure 
item (table 11.2).7
In 2008 the MSS began to pay monthly pensions to veterans and their 
surviving family members, and in 2011 it honored 236 veterans by award-
ing them new uniforms and rank badges.8 By the end of that same year, 
10,911 pensions had been paid to veterans and the families of martyrs 
(see table 11.3). Of the 76,068 former combatants initially registered, 
12,540 received pensions and one-off payments in 2008, a further 1,847 in 
March 2011, and as many as 23,324 in December 2011 (15,502 of these 
were one-off payments). According to projected estimates, some 22,000 
were to receive pensions and one-off benefi ts in 2012.9
Legitimacy
“We have faith in MSS because they help our kids, even if just a little. 
It counts.”
—Focus group discussion with Bolsa de Mãe recipients, Oecusse 2011
The ministry has gained substantial legitimacy over the years, and this 
is largely attributable to its response to the 2006 Crisis and to its role as 
broker of social stability and a new social contract. Several interviewees 
observed that the MSS has helped to build a bridge between the govern-
ment and communities where such ties did not previously exist. 
Table 11.2. Primary Use of Social Assistance Benefi ts as Reported by Households, 2011
Percent of benefi ciaries
Program Food Health Education
Purchase of 
livestock assets Other
Mother’s purse 0.0 6.0 91.1 0 2.9
Elderly pension 88.4 13.4 28.1 6.4 10.7
Disability pension 77.9 7.6 5.0 4.3 5.1
Source: Timor-Leste Social Protection Survey, 2011.
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With an initial budget of only US$100,000 in 2002, any early results 
achieved by the MSS (then the MLCR) were diffi cult to gauge against the 
immense needs of the population.10 Yet the humanitarian emergency cre-
ated by the events of 2006, together with the spike in government spending 
that soon followed, created an opportunity for the MSS to demonstrate its 
capabilities and secure popular trust.
The 2006 Crisis prompted the MSS to strengthen and deepen its inner 
workings—its leadership and management skills, its shared sense of vision 
among staff, and its learning and adaptation capabilities. It also sharpened 
the ministry’s responsiveness to its clients and citizenry and improved the 
quality of its interaction with Timor-Leste’s political elites, civil society, and 
development partners. According to MSS staff, the ministry is now highly 
regarded, and many had received personal thanks for their work from 
the relatives of MSS benefi ciaries.11 As one social animator put it, “It is 
[shown] in the people’s behavior toward us. Many appreciate our work.”12 
MSS social transfers benefi t 143,000 individuals directly and as much as 
33 percent of the population indirectly (World Bank 2013, ch. 5). In a con-
text of severe social instability, the symbolic value of these transfers cannot 
Table 11.3. Benefi ciaries of Veterans’ Pensions, by Type of Benefi t, 2008–12
US$ unless otherwise noted
Type of pension 2008 2009 2010 2011 Projected 2012
Superior pensions
Number of benefi ciaries 7 10 13 14 15
Amount per month 750 750 750 750 750
Special retirements
Number of benefi ciaries 211 235 236 236 735
Roster 1 amount/month 340–550 460–575 460–575 460–575 460–575
Roster 2 amount/month 255–340 345–460 345–460 345–460 345–460
Special subsistence pensions
Number of benefi ciaries 190 269 313 395 7,651
Amount per month 85–120 276–345 276–345 276–345 276–345
Survival pensions
Number of benefi ciaries 1,593 3,455 8,427 10,266 13,801
Amount per month 120–287.50 230–287.50 230–287.50 230–287.50 230–287.50
One-off payments
Number of benefi ciaries 0 0 0 0 15,502
Amount of payment (US$) 0 0 0 0 1,380
Total recipients 2,011 3,969 9,456 10,911 22,202 pensions 
+ 15,502 one-
off payments
Total budget (US$, millions) 3.5 15 45.4 37.6 123.1
Source: Information provided by the Secretariat of Veterans Affairs, MSS. 
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be overstated—even though many of these benefi ts constitute a small fi nan-
cial contribution to household spending.13 MSS payments are often the 
only form of fi nancial support that benefi ciaries receive from government, 
and this has reinforced popular trust and conveyed the message that the 
government is considering citizens’ interests. 
But the MSS’s legitimacy is not solely the result of prodigious cash trans-
fers. Its interactions and social connectivity with Timorese communities are 
more tangible and consistent than those of almost any other government 
entity, except the Ministry of Health. In particular, the MSS’s adoption 
of customary models of authority, decision making, and dispute resolu-
tion has served to embed its programs and presence at a village level, rein-
forcing its legitimacy in the eyes of the community. A group of chefes de 
suco and subvillage chiefs (chefes de aldeia) interviewed for this case study 
remarked, “The [ministry’s] work is to establish the peace, to come and 
talk about the problems in our community, the unresolved problems.”14 
The MSS has secured credibility despite chronic administrative con-
straints, which speaks to the strength of its performance. Focus group 
participants recalled several instances in which irregularities in the data 
management and verifi cation system had left eligible benefi ciaries unpaid. 
Yet many shared the view expressed by one chefe de suco, “Despite all the 
problems and obstacles, the community trusts the MSS system … They did 
a lot of work … It is not like they are not helping the communities. They 
deliver a service and look after communities.”15
Resilience and Durability
An important measure of the ministry’s resilience and durability is that it 
has maintained a consistent institutional development trajectory despite a 
change of government and minister and national unrest. All of the managers 
recruited by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) and by the First Constitutional Government were retained by the 
MSS through the transition, establishing a baseline of institutional memory. 
The ministry’s programs have also gained durability over time due to the 
popular legitimacy that they claim. Echoing what seems to be a broadening 
consensus, Minister Maria (Micato) Fernandes Alves remarked,16 “While 
the structure of the ministry could change with the change of government, 
its mission is enshrined in the Constitution and it is embedded in pop-
ular consciousness and expectation—it will be impossible to change the 
 ministry’s program.” Representing 8 percent of the overall state budget, it 
is becoming increasingly clear that social transfers will be the mainstay of a 
successful social ministry for the foreseeable future, although adjustments 
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will be needed to ensure the fi scal sustainability of veterans’ pensions 
(World Bank 2013).
A fi nal and fi tting attribute of the ministry’s durability is seen in the 
institutional integration of its social dialogue and crisis response  capability. 
A recent evaluation of the HHF program found that the ministry’s  crisis 
responsiveness and its Social Dialogue Program (SDP) have become an 
intrinsic part of the ministry’s functioning. Previously fi nanced by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and conceived as a 
tool to facilitate the reintegration of IDPs, the SDP was recently reconsti-
tuted as a permanent Peace-Building Unit (PBU) in the MSS to respond to 
the root causes of confl ict that may not have been fully addressed.17 The 
government fi nances the unit, and PBU advisers (previously consultants) 
have been absorbed into the civil service payroll, pointing to the ministry’s 
continued evolution and contextual fi t.
Institutional Context
At its inception, the MSS faced several challenges. Timor-Leste’s diffi cult 
history had left the country with a population that was highly vulnerable 
and poor. When East Timor was occupied in 1975, it became Indonesia’s 
27th province, but it did not enjoy the social benefi ts afforded to other 
provinces in the country at the time.18 Indonesia had invested little in the 
population’s welfare, and any investments tended to be targeted toward 
sustaining the Indonesian bureaucracy and maintaining its security and 
control (Knezevic 2005). The province was heavily dependent on exter-
nal transfers to fi nance the public sector, and these constituted roughly 
85 percent of recurrent and capital expenditures (World Bank 1999, 2). 
But even with these transfers, by 1999, the poverty rate among Timorese 
was more than double that of Indonesians, having worsened as a result of 
the fi nancial crisis and a drought in 1998 (Pedereson and Arneberg 1999). 
In 1999—the year of the referendum—the situation deteriorated rapidly. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) had shrunk an estimated 38 percent, unem-
ployment had soared, particularly in the urban areas, and the prices of fuel 
and other basic goods had risen steeply, partially refl ecting the removal of 
subsidies. With the steep decline in incomes and based on a poverty mea-
sure that is highly sensitive to income changes, around half of the popula-
tion in East Timor was poor (United Nations 2000, para. 24).
Preparations for the transition to independence had begun months prior 
to the referendum, but the destruction and humanitarian crisis that fol-
lowed had not been anticipated and consumed the lion’s share of social 
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service resources provided by the United Nations. The United Nations 
organized an interim government, established a Department of Social 
Affairs, and set about resolving the country’s emergency. On indepen-
dence, a new Secretariat of State for Labour and Community Reinsertion 
(SSLCR) was formed with responsibility for youth affairs, labor, and voca-
tion training and a small social services portfolio. The SSLCR had few 
resources or political capital—only 27 staff members, an annual budget of 
US$100,000, and no authority to vote in the Council of Ministers.
As the euphoria of independence dissipated, social pressure on the 
Timorese administration mounted, and acted as potential lightning rods 
for future instability and confl ict. Veterans of the resistance were eager 
for their independence dividend, youth were eager for gainful employment 
and educational opportunities, and decades of resistance had rendered a 
large percentage of the population highly vulnerable, widowed, and dis-
abled. IDPs would later join the ranks of those with a social grievance or 
claim against the state, as they became caught in the crossfi re of sharpening 
perceptions of social inequity. 
In 2005, the SSLCR became a ministry (the MLCR), increasing its polit-
ical leverage. A Secretariat of State for Veterans Affairs was soon added 
to the ministry’s already diffi cult portfolio,19 but even then, the minis-
try’s annual operating budget increased only modestly—to US$500,000 
 annually—and this was needed to fi nance 100 staff and operational activi-
ties.20 Timor-Leste’s simmering social pressures remained unmet. 
Prior to 2006, there was no social security system in Timor-Leste, social 
welfare was left largely to the family, the church, and welfare groups, and 
poverty was increasing.21 In 2001, 39.7 percent of the population was 
affected by poverty, and by 2006 the fi gure had reached 44 percent.22 Per 
capita incomes were about 20 percent lower in real terms than they were 
in 2002, and unemployment stood at 23 percent overall and 40 percent for 
youth (58 percent for ages 15–19 years old; National Statistics Institute 
2006). Although not the primary driver of the 2006 unrest, Timor-Leste’s 
poor social and human development conditions fueled identity divisions 
and deepened social grievances.
Timor-Leste had experienced social tensions before—veterans marches 
in Dili pre-2002, youth riots shortly after independence, and a church-led 
demonstration in 2005—but not on the scale seen in 2006. That year, the 
violence quickly escalated. It triggered panic in the population and caused 
widespread displacement, it paralyzed the government, and it brought 
the economy to a virtual standstill. To a large extent, these events were 
rooted in perceived discrimination within the national security forces, but 
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the ensuing instability provided fertile ground to revive historical rivalries. 
Retribution and political violence spiraled.23
Parliamentary elections in 2007 saw a heated political contest. A promi-
nent new opposition, the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction 
(CNRT) was established by a former leader of the Timorese resistance, Xanana 
Gusmão. The CNRT campaigned to restore peace and stability through the 
reintegration of IDPs and crisis recovery, to alleviate poverty, to pay social 
transfers (including veterans’ pensions), and to adopt more open government. 
Election results were inconclusive, but the three largest opposition groups came 
together to form a new coalition government24—the Alliance of Parliament. 
During this period of transition, the decision was made to have the 
Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion lead the country’s social 
reintegration and recovery, expand its social services, and develop con-
fl ict resolution capabilities, under a new mandate as the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity. The MSS also shed two portfolios—youth affairs and labor—
as they were thought to be better served by new entities: the Secretariat 
of State for Youth and Sport and the Secretariat of State for Professional 
Training and Employment. 
In 2008 the Ministry of Social Solidarity launched its fl agship national 
recovery strategy, the HHF, in an effort to reintegrate the nearly 150,000 
individuals who had become internally displaced as a result of the Crisis 
(IDMC 2009).25 It also began several direct social transfer programs (the 
Bolsa de Mãe, the Elderly Pension Program, and the Disability Pension 
Program) and initiated veterans’ pensions, enlarging its program of social 
assistance and targeting key population groups. Later that same year, the 
MSS extended its reach into local communities through the creation of 
district and subdistrict posts staffed by child protection offi cers and social 
animators. By 2010 the ministry had successfully closed all 65 camps 
for the internally displaced, and their inhabitants had returned home or 
relocated to other parts of the country. The HHF had distributed more 
than US$50 million to 17,000 households, successfully channeling these 
resources through the state budget (Bulgalski 2010, 20–21). By 2011, 
MSS social benefi ts were reaching nearly one-third of the population 
both directly and indirectly (National Statistics Institute 2011b).
In the sections that follow, this work provides a more granular account 
of the means by which the MSS has navigated its complex external oper-
ating environment and overcome binding internal constraints to achieve 
results. At the same time, it underlines the very many challenges that still 
lie ahead if the ministry is to galvanise its initial gains.
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Managing Client Demands and Citizen Expectations
The MSS carries hefty social responsibilities and is subject to competing 
political claims and infl uence by pressure groups, including from political 
leaders,26 veterans and the children of martyrs, current and former IDPs, 
and community leaders, such as chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia. Several 
factors have enabled the MSS to navigate this sensitive terrain: an astute 
leadership, adherence to legal mandate, effi cient use and management of 
donor inputs, and interactive and communicative engagement with the 
ministry’s clients. The ministry’s active solicitation of community feedback 
has also enabled the MSS to learn by doing and to evolve. 
Social and Political Pressure
The ministry’s role in guiding the country from crisis to stability has 
enabled it to secure high-level support for its work, while at the same 
time shielding it from corrosive political infl uence. Few political elites 
wanted  responsibility for the diffi cult task of reintegrating IDPs, manag-
ing veterans’ affairs, or delivering social assistance in a deeply divided and 
poor polity. This afforded the MSS the space that it needed to formulate 
policy and deliver in ways that it deemed equitable and expedient. 
Initial attempts by the Fretilin-led government to resolve the country’s 
social and political divisions had proven unsuccessful. The government 
was reluctant to use cash payments to encourage people to return home 
and was ideologically opposed to the idea of direct social transfers. By 
contrast, the new coalition government considered that solving the coun-
try’s social divisions and reintegrating tens of thousands of IDPs required 
immediate and durable solutions. Cash transfers were seen as instrumen-
tal, and the MSS soon found itself responsible for resolving the country’s 
emerging social and political divisions through direct social transfers, 
social reintegration, and dialogue. IDP payments, veterans’ pensions, the 
Bolsa de Mãe, and the elderly and disability pensions would prove central 
to this strategy of enabling social stability.
IDPs held particular sway over the government during the period of 
instability and posed a signifi cant threat to public safety and security. To 
reduce the threat and facilitate reintegration, the government compen-
sated IDPs for damage to or loss of property and initiated a process of 
social  dialogue.27 An initial payment of US$4,500 for each family reduced 
the political leverage of IDPs, although some returned to make further 
claims on the ministry, arguing that their initial payment was inadequate.28 
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The MSS’s initial decision had been full and fi nal, but the prime minister 
ultimately intervened to call for a second payment of US$500 to compen-
sate former IDPs for the loss of their removable assets.
Shortly after IDP compensation was paid, the MSS initiated a series 
of additional transfer programs—the Bolsa de Mãe, the Elderly Pension 
Program, and the Disability Pension Program—to begin to address the 
country’s social vulnerabilities. At the time of writing, the MSS was imple-
menting four major cash transfer programs that reached more than one-
quarter of the population (both directly and indirectly), fi nanced by a 
budget that would increase to US$128 million in 2012 (see fi gure 11.2; 
World Bank 2013, 30).29 In 2011 social assistance spending prevented the 
percentage of households with per capita monthly consumption of US$32 
from rising from 40–45 percent (World Bank 2013, ch. 5).
Although the 2006 Crisis has long since passed, the MSS continues to 
face complex social and political pressures. Veterans arguably constitute the 
most infl uential of the MSS’s persistent pressure groups;30 and they exercise 
their infl uence through the Secretariat of State for Veterans Affairs, which 
was constituted to represent their interests. The former commander of the 
Falintil forces31 and current prime minister, Xanana Gusmão, has helped 
to raise the profi le of the secretariat and ensure that its activities feature as 
among the ministry’s priorities. According to Secretary Marito dos Reis, 
“Because of the role of the struggle in history, [the government] always 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0
50
100
150
U
S$
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
Veterans
IDPs, and 
humanitarian aid
Disaster reliefElderly and disabled
Bolsa de Mãe and 
child protection
Figure 11.2. Social Transfer Allocations in the State Budget, 2008–12
Source: Ministry of Finance 2012.
Note: IDP = Internally Displaced Person.
TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY: MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY • 273
tries to show tolerance and fi nds ways to help.”32 This is clearly refl ected in 
the allocation of social transfers, with more than 60 percent of the MSS’s 
total allocation of social transfers directed toward payments to veterans 
(World Bank 2013, 43). As of 2012, transfers to veterans constituted more 
than half of all social assistance spending and accounted for 5 percent of 
the total national budget and 7 percent of non-oil GDP, rendering veterans’ 
pensions a considerable drain on the MSS’s budget and a threat to the sus-
tainability of MSS programs (World Bank 2013, 38).
The MSS is developing a reputation for identifying, representing, and 
responding to the interests of vulnerable and marginalized groups in ways 
that seek to tackle the underlying causes of their vulnerability, for example, 
through cash transfers with health and educational conditions. Besides the 
Ministry of Health, few other ministries represent the interests of vulnerable 
groups in the way that the MSS does, although the voice and policy infl u-
ence of these groups remain limited.33 One civil society group remarked, 
“Despite a conscious attempt to promote participation and inclusion, an 
ordinary citizen who is not part of a social pressure group can be left out of 
the social transfer process.” It is also clear that a mismatch exists between 
results and expectations. The recipients of elderly and disability pensions 
and Bolsa de Mãe benefi ts who participated in this research welcomed 
MSS support, although the majority of participants also remarked that 
the value of MSS benefi ts—in particular, the elderly pension and the Bolsa 
de Mãe benefi ts, which are US$30 and US$5 per month, respectively—is 
inadequate and less than what they need to live.34 Many of these activities 
have yet to reach scale in terms of coverage. At the time of writing and in 
light of mounting evidence that the Bolsa de Mãe and other social assis-
tance programs are not meeting poverty or coverage targets (World Bank 
2013, 3), the MSS is taking steps to adapt its programs to address the needs 
of Timor-Leste’s most vulnerable and to better contribute to the reduction 
of poverty.
The Function of Leadership
The MSS has been led by ministers that were committed to delivering and 
deepening results. Appointed in 2002, the fi rst secretary of state for labor 
and solidarity, Arsenio Bano, was inexperienced in government but per-
formed well and was politically astute. He communicated well and soon 
developed the trust and confi dence of the prime minister. Initially nonparti-
san, Secretary Bano joined the ruling party Fretilin in 2005. Later that same 
year, the secretariat was renamed the Ministry of Labour and Community 
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Reinsertion, and Secretary Bano was elevated to the position of minister. 
When interviewed, the former minister remarked, “In Timor-Leste, if you 
wanted to be infl uential, you needed to know where you sit in political 
terms.”
Succeeding Minister Bano, Maria (Micato) Fernandes Alves was 
appointed minister of a reconfi gured Ministry of Social Solidarity under 
the Fourth Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste. Minister Alves 
brought much legitimacy to the ministerial offi ce due to her credentials as 
a member of the clandestine resistance and her leading role in the Timorese 
women’s equality movement as founder of Fokupers.35 She was also expe-
rienced in government, having served as adviser for the promotion of 
equality to Timor-Leste’s fi rst prime minister, and she was known for tak-
ing a principled position on matters of policy.36 Her charismatic legitimacy 
insulated the ministry from political interference and created space for the 
MSS to deliver results in a way that was seen as impartial. 
The minister had a strong reputation as a technocrat, with a good 
grasp of policy details. She worked hard to model professionalism and 
to maintain a nonpartisan ministry, developing strong bonds of trust and 
confi dence with her senior managers and fostering a commitment to social 
service among staff. Contrary to the experiences in other Timorese minis-
tries, Minister Alves was open to varying political affi liations among staff37 
and reinforced impartiality through a common vision and consistent mes-
saging from the top. A much repeated refrain among staff at the ministry 
was, “This is the time to liberate our people from poverty” or, to use a 
football analogy, “We may each wear different jerseys, but in the end we all 
have a job.” This shared purpose and vision motivated staff to transcend 
party lines and model professionalism.
Priorities and Mandate
The Crisis of 2006 punctuated the MSS’s development and sharpened its 
institutional identity, policies, and mandate. The MSS (then the MLCR) 
had run some small-scale social assistance programs in the early years of its 
operations,38 providing a handful of family subsidies, food packages, and 
other nonfi nancial items to those experiencing the most extreme effects of 
poverty. But the First Constitutional Government was opposed to mak-
ing direct cash payments to vulnerable groups, and the ministry focused 
largely on labor policy and vocational training. When the 2006 Crisis hit, 
work on less critical aspects of the ministry’s mandate (including labor, 
employment, and vocational training) were temporarily suspended, and all 
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available resources were dedicated to managing the recovery, social reinte-
gration, and security. 
Despite volatile sociopolitical conditions, the ministry managed crisis 
conditions by judiciously mobilizing and deploying resources and learning 
by doing to deliver results. According to former minister Arsenio Bano, 
“The activities of the MSS could not wait for the development of the state, 
the ministry was under urgency to deliver, and we just worked with what 
was there.”39 Recalling events, the director of social assistance remarked, 
“Crise nian kadi ami nia kakutak [The crisis sharpened our knives].”40 
In 2007, following national elections, the new government formalized 
and embedded social assistance priorities and made several institutional 
adjustments. The MSS acquired responsibility for natural disasters from 
the Ministry of the Interior, and several directorates became secretariats. 
Youth affairs became an independent secretariat of state, and the MSS also 
gained a new portfolio of social services to address the issue of contribut-
ing and noncontributing pensions for the elderly and veterans.
Although highly susceptible to social and political infl uence, the MSS 
acts within the limits of its mandate and uses legal and policy instruments 
to manage demands from pressure groups. This has strengthened the 
ministry’s internal functioning and its ability to deliver results. It has also 
enabled the MSS to avoid overloading its operational capabilities. Two 
particular experiences highlight the kinds of pressure that can be brought 
to bear on the ministry and the ministry’s response. 
One involves a community evicted by the Ministry of Justice in 2010 
for occupying state-owned land in Aitarak Laran, Dili. The group did not 
claim title to the land but instead erected an IDP camp in front of the 
Offi ce of the President, proclaiming themselves to be internally displaced 
and demanding fi nancial compensation from the ministry. The Ministry 
of Justice had already paid US$2,000 to each family as compensation for 
their resettlement, but the community wanted compensation equivalent to 
that paid to IDPs—that is, US$4,500 per family. Despite overtures to the 
prime minister and threats that the group would create a disturbance dur-
ing the national elections, the MSS maintained the position that compensa-
tion for eviction and resettlement was the remit of the Ministry of Justice. 
No further compensation was paid by the MSS, and these IDPs remained 
in the camp. 
A second incident, in early 2011, involved a dispute between youth 
groups in Zumalai that led to the burning of homes in the village. The 
 ministry was quick to respond by distributing food and nonfood items, 
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but the community felt that the assistance was inadequate. In a letter 
to Parliament, the disputants requested that the MSS pay an additional 
US$2,000 to each household as fi nancial compensation. The MSS was 
steadfast in its refusal to make compensatory payments, in line with its 
policy of providing only nonfi nancial assistance in such cases.
Learning and Adaptation
The MSS has demonstrated an impressive ability to learn, adapt, and 
respond to client feedback, in line with a building-block approach to insti-
tutional development. Learning and adaptation are achieved through pro-
gram reviews and the direct solicitation of client feedback. 
Two particular programs—the Bolsa de Mãe and the Social Dialogue 
Program—exemplify this approach. The director of social assistance and 
manager of the Bolsa de Mãe recalled,41 “Orphanages had grown like 
mushrooms in the rainy season, not because parents had died, but because 
some parents were unable to care for their children. A conditional cash 
transfer was our attempt to provide a solution.” The program’s eligibil-
ity criteria initially targeted individual children within a household, but 
members of the public complained that the formula was discriminatory 
and poorly accounted for the circumstances in which people lived and for 
Timor-Leste’s traditional social obligations. The eligibility criteria for the 
Bolsa de Mãe were subsequently adjusted to account for socio-familial con-
ditions as well as the individual circumstances of the benefi ciary. Eligibility 
is now established through a vulnerability-scoring exercise, and vulner-
ability is measured against a series of indicators, which include household 
income, assets, and number of dependents. Households will be resurveyed 
every two years to identify changes in vulnerability, and those no longer 
eligible will be phased out (World Bank 2013, 28).
Conceived in 2008, the initial goal of the SDP was to reintegrate IDPs 
into their respective communities, and this was achieved within the fi rst 
two years. Riding on its success, social dialogue teams found themselves 
called on to mediate an increasing range of local grievances ranging 
from historical revenge killings to land and property disputes and battles 
between youth and martial arts groups. According to SDP staff, the meth-
odology adopted by the program assists disputants to identify commonali-
ties between them, which helps them to break down inaccurate perceptions 
and differences. By November 2010, demand for the SDP had broadened 
so extensively that the program was absorbed into the MSS’s permanent 
institutional structure (see box 11.1).
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The ministry’s role in social mediation and dialogue is increasingly 
highly regarded, in large part because of the success of the SDP. But this 
success creates more demand for MSS services, which brings with it more 
responsibility and greater challenges. At the time of writing, the ministry 
had been designated hefty land dispute resolution functions under the draft 
land law regime, without prior consultation. The president initially vetoed 
the regime, and the package of laws went back to Parliament for review. 
Should it be approved, it will add to the already onerous burden carried 
by the ministry.
A defi ning characteristic of the MSS, scarcely practiced elsewhere in 
Timor-Leste, is the ministry’s experience of leading operations with policy 
as well as law. The ministry has pilot-tested and adopted several policies, 
including the Bolsa de Mãe and its natural disaster management programs, 
BOX 11.1
Social Dialogue Program
In July 2008 the Social Dialogue Program was established to assist IDP families to reinte-
grate into communities where they were no longer welcome or where others had occu-
pied their homes. Initially the SDP was implemented through fi ve MSS/UNDP  subdistrict 
dialogue teams that were regionally located (Same, Suai, Bobonaro, Baucau, and Dili), and 
it was coordinated by a central team. Two additional teams were established in 2009.
The aim was to replicate the dialogue model adopted during the Truth and 
Reconciliation Process in Timor-Leste, with some distinctions. The role of the dialogue 
team was to identify problems between IDPs and receiving communities and to assist in 
repairing any broken infrastructure. Teams would work with traditional and community 
leaders and youth representatives and would adopt local traditional practices—tara 
bandu, nahe biti bo’ot, or lulu biti—where necessary or practical.
At the time of writing, the SDP had facilitated 770 mediations, including as many as 
80 large-scale community dialogue meetings, many of which were attended by high-
ranking offi cials (the president, prime minister, and minister). During the course of these 
many interactions, disputes mediated by the dialogue teams evolved from those linked 
to reintegration to more protected historical confl icts and, in some cases, to grievances 
against the state. According to members of the dialogue team, the MSS’s impartial yet 
participatory approach and its respect for local methods and practices have rendered 
the SDP a legitimate and credible confl ict resolution mechanism in the eyes of com-
munity populations. The SDP is now a permanent fi xture in the ministry.
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in the absence of a law. This has afforded the MSS the fl exibility that it has 
needed to develop its programs interactively and in response to community 
feedback, as is particularly evident in the case of the Bolsa de Mãe and the 
SDP. This approach has not been adopted across the ministry writ large,42 
and yet the experience of the MSS suggests that it allows an institution to 
adapt and adjust its policy or programs to accommodate contextual condi-
tions and to improve program performance.
Building Trust through Social Values and Traditions
“The success of the ministry is predicated on staff who have come to 
understand that what they do has meaning.”
—Minister of Social Solidarity, November 2011
The MSS is not modeled on the social affairs ministry of any other country; 
it is homegrown.43 Its mandate is based on Article 56 of the Constitution: 
“Everyone is entitled to social assistance and security in accordance with 
the law,” and this is further reinforced by a series of complementary provi-
sions.44 Taken together, the mandate of the ministry is to alleviate the suf-
fering of Timor-Leste’s vulnerable population and assist particular interest 
groups, including veterans of the resistance and their families, youth, the 
elderly, and the disabled.45 
Several of the ministry’s policies are infl uenced by policies from else-
where. The Bolsa de Mãe is an adaptation of Brazil’s conditional cash 
transfer programs (the Bolsa Familia and the Bolsa Escola).46 The pen-
sion schemes are an adaptation of similar pay-as-you-go models found in 
Portugal and Northern Europe.47 But policy alignments aside, the MSS is 
unlike any other institution. Its mandate and programs were created in 
direct response to Timor-Leste’s unique sociopolitical conditions, and this 
has proven an important attribute of the ministry’s development, legiti-
macy, and resilience. The MSS’s mandate is deeply internalized by MSS 
staff and powerfully resonates with Timor-Leste’s citizenry, some of whom 
feel a sense of entitlement to state support in recognition for their service 
to the resistance.
In the months and years following the 2006 Crisis, and as part of efforts 
to break with the past and more directly engage the populous, the ministry 
extended its subnational capabilities and presence and worked to estab-
lish links with Timor-Leste’s legitimate traditional leaders.48 These efforts 
were intended to facilitate reintegration activities, and to assist with the 
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administration of the Bolsa de Mãe and pensions for the elderly and dis-
abled. Expanding the state’s reach, these efforts to acknowledge and forge 
links with local leaders proved to be a crucial fi rst step toward addressing 
the state-society gap that had persisted for years. 
Working with Communities and Refl ecting Sociocultural Traditions
Efforts to connect with communities by adopting practices that are con-
sistent with Timor-Leste’s strong social traditions are a major source of 
legitimacy for the MSS. Prior to 2008, despite nearly six years of inde-
pendence, the government was scarcely present beyond the districts. 
By 2011, chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia were playing a prominent 
role in administering social transfers: facilitating public communications 
about MSS programs, identifying and registering benefi ciaries, and in 
some cases, assisting with the distribution of cash payments. Traditional 
leaders have sometimes also worked with the ministry’s new subdistrict 
and community- level representatives—a cadre of social animators and 
child protection offi cers—to monitor and manage social grievances.49 At 
the same time, the MSS’s Social Dialogue Program (box 11.1) has adopted 
elements of traditional law (tara bandu) and practices and procedures for 
resolving disputes (for example, spreading of the large mat ceremony or 
nahe biti bo’ot).50 It works with the Timorese traditional elders, the lia 
na’in, in the process.51 The model of tara bandu adopted varies accord-
ing to the practices or tradition of the community involved, but it is not 
uncommon for the process to involve the invocation of spirits or cleans-
ing rituals to absolve individuals of wrongdoing and stigma. Several MSS 
staff (and many focus group participants) said that the ministry’s success 
is largely attributable to the involvement of chefes de suco and the regular 
community dialogues that the ministry has led. 
Working with chefes de suco, chefes de aldeia, and lia na’in has con-
nected the government with local communities, but it also has raised some 
challenges. A handful of focus group participants complained that chefes 
de suco do not always pass on information and tend to prioritize their 
relatives in the allocation of MSS benefi ts. The research team was unable 
to verify or validate these claims, but a pilot social network analysis con-
ducted as part of a recent World Bank study in the subdistrict of Laleia 
found that benefi ciaries with a kinship relationship to the chefes de suco or 
chefes de aldeia were eight times more likely to learn about and register for 
benefi ts during the fi rst year than those without kinship ties (World Bank 
2011a). In other cases, chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia were reportedly 
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demanding payments before adding individuals to benefi ciary lists.52 The 
MSS’s relationship with lia na’in has encountered fewer diffi culties than 
those with chefes de suco or chefes de aldeia, as they are not responsible for 
assessing eligibility for MSS social benefi ts. Rather, their role is to appraise 
the dialogue and community engagement procedure adopted to ensure that 
it is acceptable to the community’s ancestors and spirits.53
Although chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia are tasked with imple-
menting government policies and assessing eligibility for social transfers, 
they are unable to challenge the resulting decisions, which effectively alien-
ates their chiefl y problem-solving functions and authority. Chefes de suco 
meet with their subdistrict focal points, but these meetings are irregular, 
and top-down communication fl ows render them largely disempowered. 
One chefe de suco complained, “The community is always here protesting 
that I am not looking after them, and I have told them that if I was the one 
making the decision, they would have had their money a long time ago. But 
I have no power over it.”54 Another chefe de suco remarked that chefes de 
suco are nonpartisan, and yet their role is increasingly seen as representa-
tive of the government, which raises several questions: What will happen if 
the government changes?55 What will be the future role of chefes de suco?56 
Will they be seen as political?
The MSS’s engagement with chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia is still in 
its early stages, and the interaction of the state with these local traditional 
structures raises as many challenges as it does benefi ts. The graduated reach 
of the state into domains of community governance is likely to weaken 
the legitimacy of traditional institutions, which have remained compara-
bly stable since independence, even if they have had limited resources and 
infl uence in respect of state authority. Despite these challenges, the MSS’s 
engagement with Timor-Leste’s traditional elders and customary decision 
makers has enhanced the ministry’s interaction and connectivity with local 
communities. It has also instrumentalized the role of chefes de suco and 
chefes de aldeia as they begin to act as intermediaries between the com-
munity and the government.
Building Communication Links
The ministry lacks a formal communications strategy for many of its pro-
grams. Yet it effectively uses the local media and a combination of con-
sultations, public communication, and outreach to engage the public on 
ministry priorities and programs. Information sharing improved during 
the events of 2006 as the MSS (then the MLRC) and often the minister 
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himself met with prominent community leaders, interest groups (IDPs, 
 veterans), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and partners to coor-
dinate a crisis response, share information, and gather feedback. The MSS 
retained these coordination and consultation mechanisms. They are still in 
use today.
Meetings with prominent constituencies such as veterans and IDPs are 
regularly televised, and MSS directors are expected to convey information 
on MSS programs through radio broadcasts. Here again, chefes de suco act 
as conduits for public information, although some of them do not play the 
role well. Bulletins that inform citizens about changes in MSS policies or 
the outcomes of social benefi t applications are posted in local newspapers 
and on community notice boards, but top-down communication to the 
village level is still weak, and the chefes de suco do not always have access 
to program information.
Despite variable experiences, community awareness of the ministry’s 
mandate and mission has improved on account of repeat visits by the MSS 
to local communities. The engagement of chefes de suco in the MSS’s SDP 
and in the identifi cation of benefi ciaries for the ministry’s array of social 
transfer programs is generating more dynamic communication between 
the MSS, community leaders, and marginalized and vulnerable groups. 
The experience has shown that community leaders are engaging more and 
more with the MSS as they better understand the process, and this contrib-
utes to the deepening of MSS policies and programs and institutional legiti-
macy at the village level. At the same time, the risk of procedural capture 
is also well known—chefes de suco sometimes privilege their own family 
members—and the MSS is managing their involvement carefully. 
Capacity to Deliver
Founded as a secretariat of state, the MSS initially commanded limited 
political weight and had fewer resources and capacities than other minis-
tries. Yet it soon earned the respect of its peers and, by 2011, was consid-
ered among Timor-Leste’s leading institutions due to its proven ability to 
solve social problems. 
This section examines the factors that enabled the MSS to overcome 
the binding constraints of its inner workings and to enhance and expand 
its capacity to deliver services and achieve positive social outcomes. 
Four factors stand out as contributing to the ministry’s performance and 
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development: an emphasis on bridging gaps in service delivery through 
effective allocation and use of donor and NGO resources; an empha-
sis on soft norms as the foundations of internal capacity; a phased and 
graduated approach to development, even in the context of an infl ux of 
resources; and the use of vertical and horizontal accountabilities to disci-
pline performance.
Bridging Service Delivery Gaps
The MSS has forged important links with partners (donors and NGOs) and 
effectively deployed their skills and resources to bridge service delivery gaps 
and to respond to crisis. It is mandated by the Constitution to manage and 
supervise NGOs that work in the public interest (Article 56.3), and it has 
built long-term partnerships (with the International Labour Organization, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women) in the areas of labor and vocational training and social 
protection and in the provision of support to vulnerable children and the 
disabled. Both Ministers Bano and Alves are credited with taking charge of 
donor and NGO relations, directing partner resources, persuading donors 
to tow the ministry’s policy line, and shielding the ministry from undue 
donor infl uence. At no time was this more evident than during the 2006 
Crisis, when ministerial leadership was particularly strong. The MSS reg-
isters and fi nances NGOs to deliver public services and administers these 
arrangements through a system of block grants, which is in line with the 
approach adopted across government.57
The MSS has proven adept at capturing and converting donor resources, 
deciding who is to do what, and scaling up and coordinating the recov-
ery (including implementation of the HHF), and donors and NGOs have 
responded well.58 Mutual trust and confi dence run high, except in the area 
of child protection, where ministry performance lags. Partnerships and 
coordination are typically managed through specialized working groups, 
including a Child Protection Network and, since 2006, task forces dedi-
cated to water and sanitation and other activities. 
In the context of rapidly accumulating revenues from hydrocarbons, the 
MSS is becoming less and less dependent on donors for fi nancial aid. As 
a result, donors and international and national NGOs wield less infl uence 
over MSS policies and operations than they do over other line ministries. 
In 2011, 6.6 percent of the MSS’s total budget was provided by donors 
 (compared with 17.6 percent in education and 50 percent in health).59 
The bulk of this money was used to fund humanitarian assistance and 
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peace-building activities, including establishment of the ministry’s new 
Peace-Building Unit. However, despite diminished fi nancial dependence, 
the MSS will continue to rely on the technical expertise of its partners for 
some time.60 
Delegation and Empowerment
The ministry has developed a strident and informed middle management 
through an iterative approach that has built on existing staff skills (many 
of which were acquired before independence), and it continues to shape 
and sharpen those skills through training and the progressive  delegation 
of tasks.61 The events of 2006 disciplined management skills as they 
demanded lateral thinking, timely and decisive decision making, integrity, 
and commitment. During the course of this research, several donors spoke 
of the tough, disciplined stance of the ministry’s directors, particularly in 
the areas of social security and social assistance. They have grown increas-
ingly confi dent in making decisions and managing complex programs, 
such as the Bolsa de Mãe and the SDP. 
The minister, secretaries of state, and middle management have estab-
lished and maintain confi dence in one another through regular vertical 
and horizontal communication and strong information fl ows. Directors 
remarked that Minister Alves “listens to her staff, technical or otherwise.” 
She also relies on them to issue press releases and make public statements 
on her behalf and to respond to complex policy and operational matters as 
they arise. Weekly Consultative Councils are widely attended (by directors, 
secretaries of state, the director general, and the minister). These provide an 
opportunity for management to discuss policy issues and to agree on minis-
try priorities and annual plans of action. They also provide an opportunity 
for managers to update their colleagues on their respective programs. Free 
and frank discussion and collaborative problem solving are encouraged.
Authority and Reporting
Reporting lines and authority are strictly enforced within the ministry, 
which is not always the norm in a Timorese agency. Typically in Timor-
Leste, as in other FCSs, ministry advisers (national and international) enjoy 
privileged access to their respective ministers and function largely on the 
basis of personalized exchange. In the MSS, advisers are required to follow 
designated reporting lines. Donors also tend to engage with the MSS at the 
level of secretariat of state, leaving the minister free from the encumbrances 
of donor coordination and excessive bureaucracy. 
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Subnational staff (social animators, child protection offi cers, and MSS 
regional coordinators) report to the national center in Dili, copying rel-
evant district administrators. The same staff are also in close contact with 
chefes de suco who, again, are expected to share the information that 
they receive with their villages. A demand-side accountability mechanism 
exists through these backward and forward linkages, although, with weak 
top-down communication and dependence on the commitment and per-
formance of each chefe de suco, it does not yet function in the way envi-
sioned. The ministry convenes at least two meetings in Dili each year with 
all national and subnational staff,62 and has a system for rotating district 
staff to Dili for national-level exposure to the ministry and other public 
agencies. 
Adopting a Building-Block Approach
Both ministers have taken a graduated approach to the ministry’s develop-
ment, but in different ways. Minister Bano sought to establish a nucleus 
of basic institutional and human capacities and a regional presence before 
developing the ministry’s technical expertise. Institutional and skills devel-
opment continued under the stewardship of Minister Alves, but the 2006 
Crisis punctuated this process in important ways, altering the ministry’s 
institutional development priorities. Minister Alves initially set a two-year 
emergency recovery period and followed this with a three-year consoli-
dation phase that was dedicated to expanding the MSS’s pool of social 
transfer benefi ciaries and to enabling systems reform to improve data man-
agement and targeting.
Since 2005 and the inception of the MSS, the ministry has sought to 
develop and expand its frontline services in a graduated way, down to 
the districts and subdistricts. The recruitment of social animators and 
child protection offi cers63 in the districts and subdistricts in 2008 and the 
 modest yet incremental purchase of operating capital, goods, and services 
(for example, offi ce space, motorcycles, food, and fuel) enabled the MSS to 
establish a district and community presence.
Contrasting the ministry’s graduated approach to its frontline service 
delivery, its budget has expanded year on year and by almost 600 percent 
since 2008. This spike in the ministry’s budget has been used to fund crisis 
management and recovery, veterans’ pensions, and direct social transfers. 
It has also fi nanced the rapid expansion of benefi ciaries and payments over 
the past three years. 
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The social assistance allocation for 2012 constituted approximately 
9 percent of the national budget, more than any other sector besides infra-
structure,64 although this was a relative decline from its peak in 2009, which 
saw a fi vefold increase in the state budget and a tremendous allocation for 
infrastructure. Of the total budget, 8 percent was allocated to social assis-
tance activities led by the MSS. Indeed, the MSS’s social assistance spend-
ing has continued to rise in absolute terms, from US$22 million in 2008 
to US$121 million in 2012 (World Bank 2013, 37). Recent analysis shows 
that, when the budget for payments to veterans is excluded, the pattern 
looks considerably more varied (World Bank 2013, 37); again, payments 
to veterans constitute a serious fi scal sustainability risk and far outstrip the 
allocation for other social benefi t programs in the MSS. The rapid jump in 
budgetary resources allocated to the ministry had the potential to paralyze 
the MSS, given its limited capacity for absorption. Yet the ministry has 
maintained a strong and consistent track record in cash-based execution, 
ranking second or third among Timorese ministries, including with spend-
ing down to the subdistricts (97 percent execution in 2010).65 At the same 
time, the MSS continues to expand its results-based performance. 
Despite showing basic capacities to spend, making direct cash payments 
does not equate with effectively converting revenues into public goods. 
The MSS’s overall track record in planning and budgeting is suboptimal. 
Planning (particularly bottom-up) and budget links are still weak, as they 
are across government, and volatility in the government’s procurement 
policy strains the ministry’s ability to consolidate its procurement capacity. 
Directors currently have a US$5,000 limit on procurement, and repeat 
cycles of devolution and retrenchment in procurement authority have 
introduced volatility and undermined effi ciency in the system, confusing 
staff and rendering them subject to cycles of re-learning.
Implementing Vertical and Horizontal Accountability
The ministry sees itself as being vertically and horizontally accountable 
to the political leadership and Timorese citizenry and has adopted several 
mechanisms to fulfi ll its fi duciary functions. The minister interacts with 
the Council of Ministers, reporting on progress in program implementa-
tion. The exchange is free and frank, and the minister openly discusses the 
challenges faced. In line with her principled approach, Minister Alves does 
not shy away from tough policy debates with political heavyweights in the 
Council of Ministers.66 
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The ministry conducts independent audits of its programs and accounts 
(although not all of these are readily available).67 It also institutes internal dis-
ciplinary measures in cases of malfeasance, which is not common  practice in a 
Timorese institution. One director and two senior staff were recently removed, 
and some 21 staff under temporary contracts with the HHF did not have 
their contracts renewed due to questionable administrative practices. Two 
further disciplinary actions were taken against Oecusse-based staff found to 
be falsifying data and making fraudulent elderly and disabled payments. 
In many respects, the MSS is seen as transparent and makes good use 
of community radio and public notice boards to convey information about 
public policies and programs. But the ministry lacks a unifi ed database for 
storing data on MSS programs, and this renders effective case management 
and monitoring diffi cult. One chefe de suco (Lalawa) complained that the 
MSS lists of recipients of the Bolsa de Mãe and elderly pensions are inaccu-
rate and cited incidents of people actively misleading MSS staff, for example, 
by taking children from other people’s homes to show more dependents or by 
falsifying dates of birth.68 The same chefe de suco reported that he knew of 
several cases in which Indonesian citizens had crossed the border from West 
Timor to Timor-Leste to claim MSS benefi ts.69 In other cases, the MSS did 
not verify the lists of benefi ciaries prepared by chefes de suco and chefes de 
aldeia, simply taking them on trust. In all, the HHF has encountered several 
administrative problems, ranging from the falsifi cation and manipulation 
of data to the preferential and politicized allocation of payments, some of 
which were either executed or facilitated by MSS staff. The MSS has signaled 
its intention to tackle these problems by making improvements in several 
ways—in its verifi cation and data-processing systems, through the develop-
ment of an integrated database and through the creation of links between 
accountability and staff performance—but progress is slow (MSS 2009a).70 
The ministry has taken an impressive stance on handling IDP com-
plaints, adopting case-by-case management and making all decisions 
 public, but the absence of a system for appeals has fragmented the pro-
cess. Some cases are referred to the Offi ce of the Provedor (Ombudsman) 
for Justice and Human Rights for investigation; some are brought by 
individuals and community groups directly to members of Parliament 
and the prime minister, which typically results in the case being referred 
back to the MSS and, on occasion, to the minister for her response.71 Ad 
hoc systems for registering citizen complaints exist in the districts (with 
social animators), but these are poorly managed, and complaints often 
go unattended.72
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Recruiting Locally and Building on Existing Resources
With severely depleted human resources at independence, the MSS was 
fortunate to recruit several staff with prior social work experience. At 
the same time, it has taken steps to produce a pipeline of newly qualifi ed 
recruits. Around 50 percent of MSS respondents for this research had been 
trained (mostly in Indonesia) and previously worked as social workers, 
child protection offi cers, or youth and community liaisons during the occu-
pation and prior to joining the MSS. Similarly, almost all members of the 
social dialogue teams had experience conducting community dialogues.73 
In 2002, the MSS introduced a regional recruitment policy to ensure 
that new recruits (each child protection offi cer, each social animator, and 
every member of the social dialogue teams) were recruited from and reside 
in the regions in which they work. This regional affi nity is an important 
feature of the MSS’s confl ict prevention and resolution policy and pro-
vides a foundation of trust between MSS staff and local communities. Also 
important is that all of the directors appointed after the referendum and by 
the First Constitutional Government retained their management position 
through a change of government and ministry leadership, establishing a 
foundation of institutional knowledge within the ministry.
The ministry has conducted baseline assessments of staff capacity 
(self-assessments) and complements these with external assessments of 
its strengths and weaknesses. South-South exchanges have also helped. 
The ministry launched a South-South Cooperation Program, sending 
select SDP staff to Ethiopia to gain experience in a fragile state. Other 
staff members have been sent to attend confl ict and mediation trainings 
in Oslo and Geneva. The caliber of these training programs is report-
edly high, and the confl ict resolution approaches that are acquired are 
adapted and routinely applied in Timor-Leste. The MSS has forged a 
partnership with the National University of Timor-Leste and is helping 
it to formulate a social service master’s program to generate a domestic 
supply of social workers.
The ministry is not autonomous in human resource management; the 
Civil Service Commission is responsible for civil service recruitment and has 
the fi nal say on staff discipline, but the relationship works well and the min-
istry can make recommendations on proposed recruitment or dismissal to 
the commission. MSS staff expressed few of the frustrations expressed by the 
staff of other ministries about the commission’s protracted recruitment pro-
cedures. Performance reviews of MSS staff are conducted every six months, 
in line with the requirements of the civil service regime, and disciplinary 
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actions are taken in cases of underperformance. Improvements in staff per-
formance are slow to materialize due to weak incentives in the Timorese civil 
service, although again, the 2006 Crisis served to improve staff performance.
Analysis of Causal Factors
To conclude, Timor-Leste is fortunate to have large hydrocarbon reserves, 
which have afforded the ministry the fi scal reserves it has needed to tackle 
the country’s social divisions through direct social transfers. But the 
 ministry’s success is due to more than the prodigious use of cash transfers. 
The MSS has used the opportunities afforded to it to overcome the binding 
constraints of its internal and external operating environments to deliver 
results, gain legitimacy, and build durability and resilience.
The MSS proved capable of tackling three particular challenges that it 
faced early on: meeting client demand and citizen expectations, responding 
to a crisis and rebuilding trust between the state and society, and enhanc-
ing and expanding its capabilities to deliver results in a highly constrained 
institutional and operational context. As the preceding schematic and 
granular analysis has shown, the following factors have contributed to the 
ministry’s initial success in a causal way.
First, the MSS has leveraged its agency as an institution for recovery and 
change to manage tremendous client demands and citizen expectations in 
its pathway to development. Charismatic leaders have steered the MSS to 
deliver what was needed in ways that were nonpartisan and built trust. At 
the same time, the MSS has judiciously managed competing priorities by 
adhering to the bounds of its mandate and resisting being drawn into tasks 
outside of its competence. Equally important ingredients of the ministry’s 
success and its ability to meet client demands are that the ministry has led 
with policies and not law, enabling incremental policy adjustments; it has 
embraced innovation and learned by doing, as seen in the SDP and in the 
Bolsa de Mãe; and it has actively solicited and internalized client feedback. 
This combination of actions and approaches has ensured the relevance, 
credibility, and durability of MSS programs.
Second, the Crisis of 2006 proved a watershed for the MSS’s  development, 
which sharpened the ministry’s focus toward addressing the country’s social 
vulnerabilities and securing citizens’ trust. It also produced a ministry capa-
ble of leading the country from crisis to recovery through a combination 
of social dialogue, direct social transfers, and community engagement. 
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The content of its programs—the HHF, the Veterans’ Pension Program, 
Bolsa de Mãe, the Elderly Pension Program, and the Disability Pension 
Program—were a direct response to Timor-Leste’s distinct social condi-
tions and deeply resonated with Timorese concerns. The Crisis disciplined 
internal management capacities and improved performance, particularly in 
those instances where there was a high risk of a return to violence, as was 
the case with reintegrating IDPs. The MSS collaborated with local leaders 
(chefes de suco, chefes de aldeia, and  traditional elders) to socialize MSS 
programs; combined outreach, consultation, and public communications; 
and adopted local traditional practices (tara bandu and nahe biti bo’ot) to 
extend the ministry’s reach and resolve local confl icts. These efforts secured 
MSS legitimacy and ensured that MSS programs are socially embedded at 
the community level. In this light, the Crisis shaped the ministry’s ability to 
deliver results and triggered citizen-state connectivity—which was built on 
the MSS’s legitimacy—where it had previously not existed.
As perhaps best put by the minister, “The success of the ministry is 
not simply down to the end result; it is a process, built on those who 
laid the foundation in the past.”74 The ministry’s approach to enhanc-
ing and expanding its service delivery capacities was phased and adap-
tive, providing the basis for a sustained development trajectory, even as 
the ministry’s responsibilities and resources increased tenfold. Here again, 
this case study presents further evidence that the supplementary ingredi-
ents of institutional success are the manner in which the MSS effectively 
commanded the resources and capabilities of its partners, emphasized 
soft norms  (leadership and management, shared vision, and integrity), and 
empowered managers to make tough decisions.
Challenges
The MSS’s overall performance is impressive, but challenges persist. Left 
unaddressed, these risk eroding the ministry’s capacity to deliver results 
and its hard-earned legitimacy and resilience.
Although leading the country’s stabilization and recovery, the essential 
challenge facing the MSS is that its current social assistance programs are 
not well targeted to addressing poverty. Recent analysis shows that, despite 
a rapid escalation of social assistance spending, the benefi ts of the MSS’s 
cash transfer programs are not reaching the majority of Timor-Leste’s 
poor. Its social transfers are largely categorical—that is, they are targeted 
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to  specifi c groups (elderly and disabled, war veterans, and vulnerable 
 households)—and this does not correspond with the country’s poverty pro-
fi le across the board.75 Benefi ts are skewed: while 60 percent of the poor 
and 56 percent of the extreme poor are not receiving any assistance from 
the MSS’s four primary cash transfer programs, 23 percent of the popula-
tion in the wealthiest quintile are benefi ting (World Bank 2013, 50–53).76
For Timor-Leste, expanding the pool of eligible benefi ciaries in a pro-
poor way and making payments at scale and to all eligible benefi ciaries are 
necessary to realize measurable welfare and poverty impacts at levels com-
mensurate with the MSS’s current level of social spending. This requires 
policy reforms and improved systems and administration. Program moni-
toring tools exist—databases, verifi cation systems, monitoring and evalu-
ation, grievance redress mechanisms, and operational reviews—but these 
are ad hoc and performance is uneven (World Bank 2013, 57).77 The gov-
ernment has signaled its commitment to reform, but real improvements 
have been limited.78 
Veterans’ pensions also present a particularly bifurcating challenge for 
the MSS. Verifi cation and payment of veterans’ pensions lag,79 but these 
pensions could quickly become unsustainable if they continue to expand. 
As the country’s future revenues come under increasing strain—which may 
happen in the near term given current rates of spending and delays in the 
development of Greater Sunrise80—diffi cult choices will need to be made 
about the MSS’s social priorities (World Bank 2013).
The relative success of the MSS’s social transfer regime was unexpected, 
given systemic administrative weaknesses across government at the time 
and the risks of political capture. But MSS performance in other areas, 
particularly in the delivery of social services (for example, child protection) 
and in the management of domestic violence cases, lags behind its perfor-
mance in cash payments. Ministry resources are stretched and thinning; 
social transfers increased 600 percent between 2008 and 2011, but staffi ng 
levels remained fl at, and resource budgets did not expand as quickly as 
the decentralization of functions. District and subdistrict staff carry hefty 
responsibilities and are overextended.81 
Managing the country’s social problems will continue to be diffi cult. 
Part of this involves mediating historical confl icts while avoiding the pitfalls 
of becoming the go-to ministry for all of the country’s social grievances. 
Popular and political expectations of the ministry have increased along with 
its initial success; the downside risk is that the responsibilities of the min-
istry will continue to expand despite the thinness of its human resources.82 
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Particularly worrying is the wide perception that the MSS compensates 
grievances with cash, and this view will be diffi cult to stem. 
In the end, managing the surge of popular and political expectations 
of the ministry requires strong political leadership from the prime minis-
ter, the minister, and partner ministries. Yet the designation of more and 
more complex tasks to the MSS, including management of land disputes, 
suggests that this need is not yet well understood, and there is much to be 
said for efforts to twin national priorities and public messaging with the 
ministry’s existing capabilities to allow the MSS to continue to manage and 
meet popular demand.
Annex 11A Ministry of Social Solidarity Milestones
1975  Indonesian occupation
1976  Timor-Leste offi cially annexed as 27th province of Indonesia
1999  Referendum for independence, widespread destruction at hands of Indonesian militia
  United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and Department 
of Social Affairs created
  50 percent of population under poverty line
2002  Timor-Leste gains independence
  Secretariat of State for Labor and Solidarity created Arsenio Bano appointed secretary
2005  Secretariat of State for Labor and Solidarity becomes a ministry
  Secretariat of State for Veterans Affairs created in Secretariat of State for Labor 
and Solidarity
2006  Timor-Leste social and political crisis, 130,000 displaced
2007  First parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste since independence and new coalition 
government formed
  Ministry of Social Solidarity established, and Dona Micato appointed minister
2008  Together Building the Future (Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru, HHF), the Mother’s Purse 
Program (Bolsa da Mãe), the Elderly (Idosos) Pension Program, and the Disability 
(Invalidos) Pension Program launched
2009  Payment of veterans’ pensions begins
  Last internally displaced persons camp closes
2010  Review of Bolsa de Mãe, in collaboration with the Bureau for Confl ict Prevention and 
Recovery, the UNDP, and the World Bank to improve targeting and management 
information systems
2011  Social Security Law approved in the Council of Ministers
2012  Meeting “MSS 10-Year Review: Looking Back; 10 Years since Independence”
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Notes
 1. The Department of Social Affairs, established under the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor, had focused principally on pro-
viding humanitarian assistance, but the department was disbanded on 
 independence, and two independent social ministries (health and education) 
and a Secretariat of State for Labor and Solidarity (SSLS) were created. The 
SSLS was given responsibility for youth affairs, labor, and vocational train-
ing and acquired a small social services portfolio. In 2005, the secretariat of 
state became a ministry, and the veteran’s affairs portfolio was placed under 
a new Secretariat of State for Veterans Affairs. The SSLS mandate was broad, 
and yet it emphasized labor and vocational training. Constrained by scarce 
resources, social services tended to lag, except in the areas of child protection 
and humanitarian assistance, where donors were particularly active. 
 2. The Bolsa de Mãe is a cash transfer program established in 2008 that pays 
benefi ts to female-headed households to address hardship. The payment 
of benefi ts is conditional on enrollment in and completion of each level of 
schooling. 
 3. This fi gure includes direct and indirect benefi ciaries—that is, individuals living 
in a household in which at least one member is receiving a benefi t.
 4. At the time of report preparation, an updated poverty estimate and profi le for 
Timor-Leste were not available. In order to conduct impact analysis of social 
assistance, it was therefore necessary to select an alternative subset of the 
population. The alternative subset selected was the poorest 40 percent of the 
population in terms of total per capita expenditure. This threshold is designed 
exclusively to identify key poverty characteristics and to estimate the extent 
of poverty reduction from the main cash transfer programs and should not 
be confused with the offi cial poverty line used for the statistical purposes of 
counting the poor. In the absence of an offi cial poverty estimate for 2011, the 
underlying indicator of living standards is total per capita expenditure derived 
from total household expenditure reported in the most recent Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (National Statistics Institute 2011a).
 5. In Timor-Leste, 15 percent of GDP secured a 5 percent poverty reduc-
tion, while an average of 1 percent of GDP achieved a poverty reduction 
of 3.0, 0.9, and 0.1 percent in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Cambodia, 
respectively.
 6. For example, 60 percent of the total social assistance budget is consumed by 
payments to veterans. This assistance is overly generous toward too few ben-
efi ciaries to have a sizable impact on poverty. At the same time, 86 percent of 
the elderly are receiving elderly benefi ts. It is thought that the 5 percentage 
point reduction in poverty is almost entirely a result of elderly benefi ts, as only 
14 percent of the disabled are receiving their disability entitlement.
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 7. Although education is free in Timor-Leste, there are fees for exams in addition 
to costs for transportation and school-related activities. 
 8. It was further said, “A remarkable delegation of 70 Indonesian offi cials 
attended, led by the serving defense minister, armed forces chief, and 
 former vice president, Try Sutrisno, who had been head of the military 
when Xanana Gusmão had been captured.” See International Crisis Group 
(2011, 13).
 9. Superior pensions are payable to a small number of veterans distinguished 
for their outstanding contribution to the struggle, including the president 
and prime minister, among others. Special retirement pensions are payable 
to veterans who served 8–14 years full-time in the struggle for national inde-
pendence and to veterans incapable of working due to physical or mental 
disabilities resulting from their participation in the struggle. Subsistence pen-
sions are payable to veterans with at least 15 years of full-time participation 
in the struggle for national independence, with Roster 1 allocated to those 
with 20 or more years of service and Roster II to those with 15–20 years 
of service. Survival pensions are payable to the surviving spouse, orphans 
(regardless of age), parents, or siblings of National Liberation veteran com-
batants who died as a result of their participation in the struggle or who were 
benefi ciaries of either the special subsistence or special retirement pensions 
and have since died.
 10. MSS advisers tasked with reintegrating IDPs after the 2006 Crisis cited several 
obstacles, including the security threat posed by rebel leader Alfredo Reinado 
and his men. The killing of Alfredo Reinado helped to restore security and sta-
bility in the country, while the benefi ts provided under the MSS reintegration 
program provided the means for people to get on with life.
 11. Interview with Silvia Cardosos, MSS social animator for Cristo Rei, Dili, 
October 28, 2011. She had helped to secure the school fee for a young girl 
whose father subsequently thanked her for her work. In another example, the 
social animator in Same reported that the family of a young girl who had been 
sexually abused had offered their thanks for his efforts to engage child protec-
tion. Other family members were less pleased. 
 12. Interview with MSS social animator, Dili, October 28, 2011.
 13. The share of assistance relative to household expenditure varies considerably 
across programs. In the case of Bolsa de Mãe, the value of the benefi t rela-
tive to household expenditure is low and represents only 2.7 percent of the 
total household budget for households in the bottom 20 percent. By contrast, 
 veterans’ pensions are the most generous benefi ts, representing 152 percent of 
the total household budget (World Bank 2013, 53).
 14. Focus group discussion with chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia, Bidau 
Santana, December 15, 2011.
 15. Interview with the chefes de suco, Kosta Village, Oecusse, 2011. 
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 16. At the time of writing, Maria (Micato) Fernandes Alves was incumbent minis-
ter, and all references to the minister in this study refer to her. 
 17. Interview, UNDP, Dili, October 12, 2011. At the time of writing, the 2012 
Annual Action Plan for the ministry committed a substantial pillar of its 
work to preventing and minimizing up to 90 confl icts at the community level, 
including through understanding the root causes of confl ict and mediation and 
dialogue to resolve identifi ed confl icts.
 18. See http://geosite.jankrogh.com/borders/other/timor—leste.htm.
 19. The ministry became responsible for the Commission for Tribute to 
Ex-Combatants of National Liberation.
 20. Interview with former minister of labor and community reinsertion, October 
21, 2011.
 21. Poverty was then defi ned by the capacity to buy food and nonfood items to 
meet consumption requirements, which was equivalent to earnings of less 
than US$0.55 per day. The 2006–07 budget foreshadowed specifi c benefi ts to 
veterans who fought in the resistance; basic housing was offered to veterans 
(US$1 million allocated), and pension payments (US$2 million allocated) were 
to start in August 2006. But social assistance was still limited and provided 
only palliative relief to those few most acutely in need (Ministry of Planning 
and Finance 2006).
 22. In the Timor-Leste Human Development Report (UNDP 2006), poverty is 
defi ned as living on less than US$1 per day.
 23. Remarkably, and in a context of considerable threats to public safety and 
security, the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labour and Community 
Reconciliation were among the few ministries that continued operating, indi-
cating their strength.
 24. The new coalition involved the National Congress for Timorese 
Reconstruction, the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the 
Timorese Democratic Social Association.
 25. The HHF did more than propose the reintegration of IDPs; several com-
ponents aimed to address the underlying determinants of vulnerability—
that is, security, livelihoods, and social protection—and included a confl ict 
 prevention and dialogue program to facilitate IDP reintegration and rebuild 
trust within communities and between communities and the government. 
The transitional budget for October–December 2007 allocated US$2 million 
to support the displaced, and this was spent mainly on replacement tents and 
tarpaulins, health, drainage, and preparations for the wet season. A further 
US$15 million was allocated in 2008, but only for reintegration, and this 
proved inadequate. In the end, the HHF was unable to deliver the compre-
hensive solution that it had presented, and important elements of the plan 
were dropped, including the option to resettle in another location, owing to 
a  failure on the part of the Ministry of Justice to make state land available. 
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Political will to deliver a whole-of-government response apparently dwin-
dled as the complex reality of a comprehensive solution sank in. Leadership 
by the vice prime minister was weak, and several of the key ministries des-
ignated responsibilities under the recovery strategy failed to deliver on their 
designated tasks.
 26. The prime minister has had a particular interest in seeing his electoral commit-
ments met and in satiating the demands of veterans. Other political elites—for 
example, the president, other ministers, and parliamentarians—have made 
political commitments, including, in the case of the president and vice prime 
minister, promises to the poor. Focus group participants spoke repeatedly 
of the president, vice prime minister (as responsible for social affairs across 
 government), and other senior political leaders passing through villages prom-
ising assistance.
 27. Focus group discussion with IDPs in Bidau Santana, December 15, 2011. 
When they were asked if they thought the MSS did a good job, participants 
responded, “They did a good job, 100 percent.”
 28. The one-off payments had been intended as full and fi nal and were several 
times more than the annual per capita income in the country at the time paid. 
The MSS managed IDP complaints on a case-by-case basis, but, at some point, 
the prime minister intervened and committed the ministry to making a second 
one-off payment to compensate the same IDPs for the loss of their removable 
assets. 
 29. Although the MSS is the government’s primary social assistance provider, it is 
by no means the only one. Several additional funds established in other parts 
of the government provide social assistance, including a Food Security Fund 
run by the Ministry of Tourism and Commerce, a School Feeding Program in 
the Ministry of Education, and a labor-based Public Works Program under 
the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment. However, 
approximately three-quarters of all social assistance spending is concentrated 
in MSS programs.
 30. Veterans’ primary interests are in recognizing their service to the resistance, 
which is done through medal ceremonies and monetary awards.
 31. Falintil was the military front of the resistance.
 32. Interview November 2011.
 33. Vulnerable groups, as refl ected in the focus groups, want to be relieved from 
the rigors of poverty. They look to the government for the provision of basic 
necessities and for support to recover from natural disasters when these occur. 
Focus group discussion with MSS dialogue participants, Babulo Village, 
Aliambata, November 24, 2011.
 34. Focus group participant views in Bairro Pité Village, Dili, October 31, 2011, 
and Oesono Sub-village, Oecusse, December 22, 2011. Recent World Bank 
data confi rm that the Bolsa de Mãe is not having an appreciable impact on 
296 • INSTITUTIONS TAKING ROOT
poverty (World Bank 2013, 3), although the same research also shows that the 
elderly and disability pensions do refl ect international standards.
 35. Established in 1997, Fokupers investigates women’s human rights violations 
and provides support, including counseling, to women political prisoners, 
wives of political prisoners, war widows, and survivors of violence against 
women.
 36. Minister Alves was a founding member of Fokupers, while the former minis-
ter was a former director of an NGO consortium, the NGO Forum. In 2006, 
the minister, who was then adviser to the prime minister on the promotion of 
equality, resigned from the government to protest its poor crisis management. 
She was then entrusted by the former president (now prime minister) to coor-
dinate the Simu Malu—a National Dialogue for Reconciliation. Simu Malu 
was initially intended to restore security and trust at the community level to 
create an enabling environment for return, including through the use of cus-
tomary peace-building activities. See Trinidad and Castro (2007, 34). The 
national dialogue met with limited success, largely because there was a lack 
of resources and unclear division of roles and responsibilities, yet it almost 
certainly contributed to the minister’s appointment in 2007.
 37. The minister and many directors are opposition Fretilin party members, while 
several secretaries of state and mid-level staff are drawn from other promi-
nent political parties or associations, including Fretilin Mudança, Alliance of 
Parliament, and Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste.
 38. Ministerio do Trabalho e Reinserção Comunidade.
 39. Interview 2011.
 40. Interview of the Director of Social Assistance, Carmen da Cruz, November 
2011.
 41. Interview 2011.
 42. At the time of writing, the social security scheme in the Directorate of Social 
Security was awaiting passage of a law.
 43. The MSS’s predecessor, the MLCR, was similar to a ministry in Mozambique. 
 44. The Constitution of the Democractic Republic of Timor-Leste provides for the 
establishment of a social security system (Section 56) and support for veterans 
of the resistance and their survivor families (Section 11), children, youth, the 
elderly, and the disabled (Sections 18–21, respectively).
 45. Section 11, para. 18–21, of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste.
 46. The Brazilian Poverty Center on Cash Transfers provides advice and guidance 
to the MSS to improve the calculations and implementation of the Bolsa de 
Mãe program. 
 47. In social security, there are two principal types of systems: capitalization and 
pay-as-you-go. The minister and MSS management decided that pay-as-you-go 
(as in Portugal and Northern Europe) was best suited to the Timorese context. 
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 48. Including chefes de suco, chefes de aldeia, and traditional elders (lia na’in).
 49. Recruited in 2008, MSS social animators are community-level representatives 
principally tasked with managing payments to veterans and to the families of 
martyrs, cases of child abuse, and administration of Bolsa de Mãe. 
 50. Tara bandu are traditional laws used by communities in Timor-Leste to regu-
late relations between people and groups as well as between people and the 
environment. In the Tara Bandu process, communities set out the procedures 
and methods allowed when using or harvesting natural resources and the 
 penalties for those who violate them.
 51. Lia na’in are literally the “keepers or masters of words.” They are traditional 
elders or spiritual leaders who come to the offi ce by lineage or heritage. The 
methods used to resolve disputes vary depending on the nature of the problem. 
Compensation and the use of traditional procedures for resolving disputes are 
common. The traditional procedures tend to be used where there are ongoing 
family relations. The mediation process secures agreement to use the tradi-
tional process. It is said that social dialogue works well in Timor-Leste because 
of the social and cultural context. These mechanisms are familiar to and used 
by many.
 52. Focus group participants in Suco Costa reported, “In Situa Sae people must 
give money to the chefes de suco or chefes de aldeia to register their names,” 
and there were similar allegations in other villages. 
 53. Traditional elders in Timor-Leste are seen as ancestral custodians and conduits 
of the spirit world.
 54. Interview, chefe de suco, Costa Village, December 2011.
 55. According to Timor-Leste’s 2009 Law on Community Authorities, the suco is 
a “community organization,” and suco leaders, although publicly elected, are 
not part of the government structure. They consult with the Ministry of State 
Administration and Territorial Management on all activities specifi cally falling 
within its mandate; social protection is not among these activities.
 56. Chefe de suco from Lalawa.
 57. The MSS signs individual memorandums of understanding with each 
NGO. According to MSS staff, the ministry conducts rigorous monitor-
ing and evaluation exercises every three months to assess NGO results, 
although at least one MSS adviser suggested that these exercises are of 
questionable quality.
 58. The ministry has been known to undertake policy research and invite donors 
to share policy options through multi-donor working groups. For example, the 
World Bank, International Labour Organization, and the Australian Agency 
for International Development have been invited to give presentations on vari-
ous social security models.
 59. The MSS received 3.5 percent of the total share of development partner sup-
port, compared with 8.7 and 5.6 percent for health and education, respectively. 
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This comprised 19 development partner projects with a combined value of 
US$6.9 million out of an overall MSS budget of US$104,678 million (that is, 
6.6 percent; Ministry of Finance 2011, 29).
 60. The law requires the MSS to work with other government agencies in the 
execution of some of its tasks, such as the Ministry of Justice for data verifi -
cation; the National Police (Policia National Timor-Leste) for reintegration 
and community-level security; and the ministries of infrastructure, health, 
and fi nance for support for disaster and crisis recovery and the allocation 
of fi nancial resources. The strength of these relationships varies and is not 
seen as decisive in the ministry’s overall performance. Coordination has not 
always worked well and depends heavily on the leadership and resources 
of the partner ministry. MSS staff complain that some ministries see social 
issues as the responsibility of the MSS alone and disregard obvious inter-
agency links. The HHF suffered from the informal nature of its coordination 
mechanisms and the ad hoc manner in which messages were communicated 
to lower-level civil servants across government. However, the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Education impressively mobilized lower-level 
civil servants to provide in-camp education and health facilities following 
the Crisis of 2006 (MSS 2009a, 8). However, the Bolsa de Mãe, Elderly 
Pension Program, and Disability Pension Program each encountered prob-
lems verifying data held by other government ministries. A more positive 
experience is seen in the SDP, which has worked well with the Land and 
Property Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and the National Police, but 
not so well with others.
 61. This was particularly true under the leadership of Minister Bano, where the 
early foundations of the MSS’s middle-management capacities were laid. 
Minister Micato has continued and deepened this approach.
 62. Ministry staff report that these are typically well attended; staff in the fi eld 
report that they have easy access to the leadership in Dili. Summary of focus 
group discussions, January 2012.
 63. To give an example of MSS resourcing, the Manufahi region has three child 
protection offi cers and seven social animators.
 64. Approximately three-quarters of social assistance spending is concentrated in 
MSS-delivered programs. In 2012, the MSS was allocated 8 percent of the 
total budget, compared with 6 percent for the Ministry of Education, 3 percent 
for the Ministry of Health, and 1 percent for the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (World Bank 2013, 37).
 65. The remaining 3 percent was attributed to data inconsistencies.
 66. A popular anecdote circulating in Timor-Leste is that the minister successfully 
pushed back on political pressure from the prime minister and other senior 
ministers to expedite IDP removal and close the camps, successfully advocat-
ing for a phased and more carefully managed approach.
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 67. A handful of audit reports are publicly available on the government’s new 
transparency portal, in line with the commitment of the Ministry of Finance 
to make government data more readily available, although not all MSS audits 
are public. See http://www.transparency.gov.tl/english.html. The government’s 
transparency portal provides real-time information on budget execution, 
together with data on aid assistance, government procurements, and govern-
ment results, although the latter are less regularly updated.
 68. Interview with the chefe de suco, Lalawa.
 69. This particular chefe de suco has since taken the initiative to develop his 
own lists to cross-reference MSS registrants with those receiving payments, 
to counter the trend in falsifying claims, and to assist MSS in resolving data 
discrepancies. 
 70. Although still at a nascent stage, the ministry is in the process of instituting 
important internal controls, which it is hoped will reduce the incidence of 
problem cases. Internal audit, the integration of intra- and inter-ministry data-
bases, and building individual accountability into staff performance results are 
among the measures to try to achieve this. 
 71. Interview with the International Organisation for Migration country represen-
tative, October 14, 2011.
 72. Interview with the social animator from the subdistrict of Lautem, October 2011.
 73. Among members of the Ermera social dialogue team, one had been the coor-
dinator of a youth group, while another had worked with the Fundação Alola 
and had a sound basis of experience in dealing with sexual assault and domes-
tic violence cases in local communities.
 74. Interview November 2011.
 75. The programs for the elderly and disabled are designed as social security to 
provide a basic subsistence income. By contrast, Bolsa de Mãe aims to allevi-
ate poverty and create opportunities for upward mobility for its benefi ciaries, 
focusing specifi cally on families in need. See World Bank (2013, 66).
 76. A recent analysis of expenditure suggests three reasons why the MSS’s existing 
social transfers have not better targeted poverty (World Bank 2013, 57). First, 
71 percent of MSS transfers are consumed by payments to veterans, which 
are overly generous toward too few benefi ciaries to have a sizable impact on 
poverty. Second, categorical targeting overlaps with the incidence of poverty 
but leaves out a large proportion of the population, particularly youth. Third, 
although MSS programs, especially Bolsa de Mãe, could reduce poverty, they 
are too small in coverage and in the size of the benefi t relative to the poverty 
gap to affect poverty status. 
 77. At the time of writing, the MSS was in the process of creating a unifi ed man-
agement information system and databases (excluding the database on veter-
ans) and was exploring options to improve targeting, payment reconciliation, 
and information management. 
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 78. The MSS’s administrative capabilities and its inner workings are nascent 
and fragile, despite early signs of functionality. Improved communications 
(between central and subnational levels of the MSS, between villages and the 
ministry, and within communities), together with improved inter-government 
planning and integrity in fi scal management, will be needed to expand and 
deepen the MSS’s presence and performance. As it is, information goes up 
but rarely trickles down, and social transfer applicants are often ill-informed 
about the outcome of their claims.
 79. Some 200,000 veterans, clandestinos, and their surviving family members are 
now registered, but only 12,540 are receiving benefi ts. This has caused disap-
pointment for many veterans and a sense that government policy is incon-
sistent and opaque. Clandestinos refer to members of the unarmed civilian 
resistance.
 80. Greater Sunrise is Timor-Leste’s largest hydrocarbon reserve, which sits across 
two territorial boundaries—that of Timor-Leste and that of Australia. Greater 
Sunrise is not yet under development.
 81. Several of the social animators interviewed were overwhelmed by the sensitiv-
ity, complexity, and sheer number of complaints or incidents emerging. Child 
protection offi cers are responsible for managing sensitive social issues, includ-
ing violence (gender-based violence), abuse, and exploitation, and they moni-
tor cases and accompany clients to the courts and through the questioning 
process. They also monitor shelters and child welfare institutions, participate 
in subdistrict working groups for women and children, and provide emer-
gency assistance as needed, as in the case of Zumalai Village. Similarly, social 
animators respond to cases of child abuse and administer Bolsa de Mãe and 
veteran’s payments. They are not responsible for resolving individual cases, 
but they are responsible for monitoring, reporting, and referring cases, and the 
quality and depth of their qualifi cations and experience vary hugely. They also 
have limited resources for shuttling between dispersed communities to solve 
problems. 
 82. The ministry was designated hefty dispute resolution functions under the 
draft land law regime, without being consulted. The president initially 
vetoed the regime, and the package of laws went back to Parliament for 
review. Should it be approved, it will add to the already onerous burden car-
ried by the ministry.
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Timor-Leste Case Study: Ministry of Health
Catherine Anderson
The Timorese Ministry of Health (MoH) is a frontline health service 
 institution that has shown credible results in a fraught and fragile coun-
try context. The ministry (formerly the Interim Health Authority or IHA) 
faced acute and particular challenges to begin. Yet it made good on the 
opportunities afforded to it to avert excess mortality, reduce high rates of 
infant and maternal mortality, halve the incidence of malaria, and provide 
basic health services at the village level. Through these and later achieve-
ments, the ministry gained the trust of a previously disenfranchised popu-
lation and galvanized its durability and resilience.
In contributing to a volume examining positive institutional experi-
ences, this chapter examines how and why, in an otherwise low-capacity, 
low-income country, the MoH has maintained and deepened its posi-
tive development trajectory over time. As in the other cases, this chapter 
describes how the core underpinnings of its success are found in the three 
concentric circles that constitute its operating environment: the sociopoliti-
cal context in which it emerged and continues to function, its interaction 
with clients and external relationships, and its inner institutional workings 
The chapter expands on a mission aide-memoire (December 2012) and is based on the 
research and interviews drawn from two in-country visits during October 12 to November 
4, 2011, and November 15 to 18, 2011. A series of regional focus groups, completed by Josh 
Trinidad and Fidelis Magalhaes during November 2011 to January 2012, provided contribu-
tory inputs. The mission is grateful to Riltom Borges for administrative assistance and to the 
World Bank East Asia Pacifi c health sector team and Tanya Wells-Brown for their review and 
inputs.
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(World Bank 2011a). Unlike the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), which 
took root in its response to the 2006 Crisis, the MoH’s early success is a 
product of steady and consistent development and an ability to stay the 
course through periods of social dislocation, tension, and confl ict. 
From its inception at independence, the ministry’s role and func-
tions were clear, but it had to make diffi cult choices to begin to address 
its health sector priorities, and to decide the sequencing of activities 
and resourcing. Among those decisions, health offi cials grappled with 
 questions of how to build the foundations for health sector recovery, 
while at the same time responding to the humanitarian emergency and 
chronic health conditions that were unfolding across the country. To a 
large extent, it is the trade-offs and policy choices made by health admin-
istrators during this period and up to independence that determined the 
agency’s future success.1 From the early years of the MoH’s functioning 
and through deliberate efforts to deepen and expand its institutional 
 performance, the ministry has maintained a steady path toward creating 
an integrated, results-oriented institution that is led by and for Timorese 
and responds to the unique and diffi cult conditions facing the country. 
The MoH has long stood out as an institution that other Timorese 
 ministries have wanted to emulate, in large part due to its early accom-
plishments. Yet there was no watershed for the MoH, and its future 
 success remains uncertain. It exhibited strong performance in planning 
and  management in the period from the referendum to 2006, and many 
of its early efforts have yielded visible dividends. But its performance 
has fl uctuated in recent years. Persistently high rates of malnutrition and 
maternal mortality are worrying, and the ministry’s positive institutional 
trajectory is setback by deteriorating planning and budget links, volatil-
ity in  procurement, human resource constraints, and political interference. 
Under these conditions, the future test for the ministry will be its resilience 
and  durability in the context of increasingly politicized budgeting and 
administrative uncertainty. Despite this uncertainty, looking back at the 
sector’s initial recovery, several features stand out as having contributed to 
the MoH’s early ability to deliver results and secure legitimacy where there 
was previously popular mistrust. Many of these achievements are rooted 
in the ministry’s policy priorities and in its social and human capital and 
warrant deliberate attention, but before highlighting the MoH’s develop-
mental attributes, this chapter examines the ministry’s record and situates 
its development in context.
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Institutional Success
The Timorese Ministry of Health has produced impressive health status 
results and expanded health service coverage in the past 10 years. There 
is considerable rural-urban and inter-district variation, and the ministry’s 
performance has slowed in recent years,2 yet early Timorization and the 
delivery of impartial and expanded health services have raised popular 
confi dence that the system essentially works, despite its dysfunctions. 
Timorese see the system as their own. This section examines the MoH’s 
results and the depth of its credibility and resilience. 
Results
Several of Timor-Leste’s health indicators had already begun to improve 
before independence. Communicable diseases had risen following referen-
dum violence, but excess mortality due to chronic health conditions had 
been avoided. There was a reduction in infant mortality and in maternal 
mortality also, though to a lesser extent (fi gures 12.1 and 12.2). Infant 
mortality declined from 126 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 1989–90 
to 60 in 1999–2003. There were similar improvements in the rate of under-
fi ve mortality, which declined from 165 to 83 deaths per 1,000 live births 
in the same period. This trajectory apparently continued after indepen-
dence, although the quality and content of the data are subject to consider-
able variation across sources. 
A recent Timor-Leste Demographic Health Survey (TLDHS) shows 
dramatic improvements in health indicators in the eight-year period to 
2009/10, particularly in child health and immunization coverage, although 
there is variation among districts. Under-fi ve child mortality declined from 
83 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1999–2003 to 64 in 2005–09, the largest 
reduction in under-fi ve mortality by a country worldwide at any time in the 
period between 1990 and 2010.3 This improvement was driven largely by 
a decline in the infant mortality rate, which fell from 60 to 45 deaths per 
1,000 live births between 2005 and 2009/10. 
Maternal mortality declined steadily from 880 maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births in 2003 to 557 in 2009/10, although again the data 
are subject to large confi dence intervals and Timor-Leste’s maternal mor-
tality rate still ranks among the highest in the world.4 Vaccination cover-
age improved signifi cantly; the percentage of children who are vaccinated 
nearly tripled, from 18 percent in 2003 to approximately 53 percent in 
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Figure 12.2. Infant Mortality Rates, by District, 2010
Source: National Statistics Institute 2010.
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2009/10,5 and the World Health Organization (WHO) cites a more than 
75 percent decrease in the incidence of malaria in 2000–11.6 
Access to health services has improved signifi cantly since the 
Indonesian occupation. Before the referendum, Timorese were  typically 
obliged to pay for health services. Today, health services are free of 
charge, except after hours, and coverage has expanded, with temporary 
clinics now providing services at the village level where they had previ-
ously only operated in subdistricts. Rosser (2007, 132) reports, “From 
a state of utter devastation in late 1999, by mid-2004 an estimated 
87  percent of the population had a health facility within two hours 
walking distance from home, and these facilities were within two hours 
driving time of a hospital in 10 out of 12 districts.” As of 2010, there 
were 193 health posts, 66 community health centers in the subdistricts 
(an additional 26 in the nongovernment sector), and 442 Integrated 
Community Health System (SISCA) village posts operational through-
out the country (World Bank 2013,5; Ministry of Health 2010a). Five 
regional referral hospitals (in Baucau, Maliana, Maubisse, Oecusse, and 
Suai7) and the Guido Valadares National Hospital in Dili were also pro-
viding specialized care and referral services, lessening the need to trans-
fer patients to Dili.
Timor-Leste has seen improved family planning and birth spacing 
practices, which may be attributable in part to health promotion and 
 awareness-raising activities. The government has carefully navigated rela-
tions with the Church, which was previously opposed to public campaigns 
on family planning practices, and reached an important compromise that 
has allowed for targeted advice on birth spacing practices. A fall in the 
estimated total fertility rate from 7.8 children per woman in 2003 to 
5.7 in 2009 is consistent with a reported increase in the use of modern 
contraceptive methods from 7 to 21 percent (Ministry of Health 2010a), 
although these reported improvements should be read with some caution 
as the data are not directly comparable across years. In 2003, interviewees 
were defi ned as “ever married women” while, in 2009, interviewees were 
drawn from a pool of women of reproductive age. There is also consider-
able variation by district. 
Legitimacy 
Strong results are the primary source of the ministry’s legitimacy. There 
are no formal public opinion polls of the health sector in Timor-Leste, 
but it is said that “by 2006, wherever one would travel in Timor-Leste to 
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ask people which public service had become most effective, the answer 
was unanimously, health” (World Bank 2008). The initial mandate of the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
was to administer the country, and this involved monitoring the perfor-
mance of Timorese health workers and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that were providing emergency relief services. UNTAET carried 
out its mandate, often at great personal risk of violence. These actions 
conferred considerable legitimacy on the IHA from the start (Tulloch et 
al. 2003, 22). The IHA’s legitimacy deepened as public health services 
became more visible through the introduction of mobile services and the 
reopening of clinics and referral hospitals. That health services are free 
and people do not to have to travel far to receive attention for minor 
illnesses has accentuated positive perceptions of the MoH. Focus group 
participants expressed their broad satisfaction with the MoH despite 
the fact that some clinics are not functioning, and the stock of medic-
inal supplies is low and irregular. Focus group participants remarked, 
“We are happy with the services. We get better after the treatment, and 
they treat us well.”8 Several participants ranked the MoH highly for its 
performance.
Timorese poorly trusted and underutilized health services during the 
Indonesian occupation, but utilization rates increased steadily after inde-
pendence. The World Bank reports that total outpatient visits increased 
from 1.4 per capita in 2006 to 2.0 in 2010 and inpatient admissions 
increased from 1.4 per capita in 2008 to 2.1 in 2010 (World Bank 2011b). 
Requests for birth attendants have also risen. According to the 2009/10 
TLDHS, 30 percent of births were attended by a skilled health professional, 
up from 19 percent in 2003, while 22 percent of deliveries occurred in a 
health care facility, up from 10  percent in 2003, although a large disparity 
exists between rural (12 percent) and urban (53 percent) areas. The propor-
tion of women receiving antenatal care from a skilled provider rose from 
61 percent in 2003 to 86 percent in 2010 (National Statistics Institute 2006, 
2010; World Bank 2013). 
Increased utilization could be attributed to improved access to health 
services, although the remarks of some focus group participants suggest 
that it may also refl ect increased trust in public health providers. The data 
are equivocal, and it is diffi cult to establish clear links between citizen 
trust and increased utilization rates. In drawing on a subsample of the 
Timor-Leste Standards of Living Survey 2007, Zwi et al. (2009) observe, 
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“The primary reason for not seeking treatment was ascertained, and two 
reasons emerged as most important: not serious enough (45.6  percent) 
and health facility too far (36.7 percent). Other reasons, such as a 
health worker not being present (3.1 percent) or the lack of transport 
(2.6  percent), were less frequently cited.” By contrast, according to the 
2010 Demographic Health Survey, 96 percent of women reported one 
or more problems in accessing services, and the non-availability of drugs 
(87  percent) or a health care provider (82 percent) featured as among pri-
ority concerns (National Statistics Institute 2010). Women also expressed 
concern about obtaining permission to go for treatment (23 percent) or 
securing money for treatment (35 percent). At the same time, an inverse 
correlation exists between popular trust and the use of public health ser-
vices and the use of traditional health practices. Where access to public 
health services and trust improve, people reduce their use of traditional 
health practices. Data collected during focus group discussions suggest 
that increasing numbers of people are visiting qualifi ed health workers 
(midwives and nurses) and birth attendants and are coming to the hospi-
tal instead of using Sharman or traditional methods.9 
Timorese believe that health workers and the health system should 
operate in the interests of the entire community; they expect profes-
sionalism, commitment, and equal access to services, and the ministry is 
meeting these expectations (Ministry of Health 2007, 3). According to 
focus group participants, “Health workers respond swiftly to calls from 
the community. They come to the village even at night when there is an 
emergency.”10 Health outcomes show high levels of regional variation, 
and a handful of anecdotal reports suggest that some health workers 
are providing family members with privileged access to health services, 
but there is no evidence of regional bias or prejudice. The professional-
ism, neutrality, and service orientation of ministry staff during the 2006 
Crisis and their determination to avoid being drawn into the confl ict have 
further reinforced the population’s trust. The continuity of health sup-
port during punctuated periods of violence and humanitarian emergency, 
together with the incremental and socially connective nature of health 
sector development, not only assisted Timor-Leste to avert a deeper 
health crisis, but also elevated the ministry’s legitimacy in the eyes of its 
constituency. In the words of a focus group participant, “People respect 
[public health professionals]; they really respect them … People see them 
as a second God for us.”
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Resilience
“During the political crisis of 2006, amid spikes of violence and enduring 
displacement of people, the Ministry of Health continued to deliver critical 
services and demonstrated that the Government was ‘in charge’ by manag-
ing inputs from external partners and promoting health sector neutrality in 
ways that helped mitigate the confl ict and its consequences.” 
—Asante et al. 2011 
Given Timor-Leste’s precarious health conditions and the devastation 
wrought on its health system following the 1999 referendum, its initial 
recovery is in some respects extraordinary. The MoH’s continued function-
ing throughout the 2006 Crisis and in the wake of a change of minister 
and government in 2007 is further evidence of its durability and resilience. 
According to one senior health specialist, staff gained confi dence following 
the 2006 Crisis. No major outbreaks of disease occurred, and the ministry 
has largely managed small malaria epidemics and outbreaks of dengue ever 
since. Ironically, for many internally displaced persons (IDPs) residing in 
camps across Dili, food, water and sanitation, and essential health services 
proved more accessible in the camps than they had been in the communi-
ties before the 2006 Crisis,11 and the ministry found itself trying to encour-
age people to use the routine services provided through community health 
centers as an alternative (Zwi et al. 2007, 8). By all accounts, the 2006 
Crisis sharpened the ministry’s emergency and disaster responsiveness and 
its ability to deliver basic health services, while at the same time reinforcing 
its professionalism, impartiality, and service orientation. 
The ministry has increased its overall budget and readied a pipeline 
of qualifi ed human resources to expand and deepen its capabilities as a 
healthcare provider—all of which speaks to its increased durability. At 
independence, the Interim Health Authority had a budget of US$5  million 
per year, fi nanced by Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA). By 2009, 
the  government fi nanced 60 percent of health expenditure, and donors 
fi nanced 40 percent. Between 2005 and 2012, the health budget increased 
more than threefold from US$14 million to US$51 million in real terms 
(including the budget for autonomous health agencies), although the 
health sector allocation as a share of the budget consistently declined from 
10.8 percent in 2005 to 3.7 percent in fi scal 2011 during the same period, 
and is projected to drop to 2.5 percent in 2012. In parallel with fi scal 
expansion, the MoH has trained and is preparing to absorb a large supply 
of health specialists to support Timor-Leste’s increasingly complex health 
needs (Ministry of Health 2010b).
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Institutional and Sector Context
According to the World Bank–United Nations Joint Assessment Mission 
(JAM), East Timor was among the poorest regions in the archipelago, with 
health conditions in 1997–98 similar to those in other developing countries 
(World Bank 1999). The primary causes of death (pneumonia, malaria, 
diarrhea, and associated malnutrition) were endemic, and the incidence of 
tuberculosis was very high. Life expectancy was low, at 55–58 years. Infant 
and under-fi ve mortality was high compared with Indonesian averages at 
that time, at 85 and 124 deaths per 1,000 births, respectively (World Bank 
1999). A skilled birth attendant (doctor or midwife) attended less than 
a quarter of all births, contributing to high rates of maternal mortality 
(Rosser 2007, 123). 
The Indonesians had constructed an extensive system of government 
hospitals, clinics, and health posts, staffed by about 160 doctors and 
2,000 nurses and midwives (World Bank 2002). The majority of managers 
within the system were Indonesian; Timorese tended to provide nursing 
services. The focal point of the system was the community health center 
(puskesmas). Located in each of the subdistricts, community health centers 
provided curative, preventative, and promotional services and coordinated 
outreach activities through health subcenters, mobile clinics, and village 
midwives. These activities included national programs in maternal and 
child health, family planning activities, and campaigns against malaria and 
tuberculosis. Tertiary care was provided through eight small district hospi-
tals, a central referral hospital in Dili, and the Central Health Laboratory. 
The provincial health department was responsible for oversight, but most 
key policy and programmatic decisions were made in Jakarta (World Bank 
1999; Morris 2001).
According to Rosser (2007, 123),
Although the Indonesian Government fi nanced the development of the 
health system during its 24-year occupation, the system did not perform 
well. It was chronically underfunded compared with other provinces, 
public subsidies were not allocated in a pro-poor way, and health ser-
vices were of poor quality and unresponsive to the needs and demands 
of the population. Quality assurance systems and the regulatory frame-
work were inadequate, and it did not produce adequate information for 
planning and evaluation purposes. [Health services were underutilized] 
with just over one outpatient visit per capita per year, and the number 
of outpatient visits per staff member per day employed in the health 
system was less than fi ve, both fi gures low by international standards 
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(World Bank 2000, 2002). The low rate of utilization suggests that the 
East Timorese either lacked confi dence in the health system or faced seri-
ous barriers to accessing health services. Some have argued that the fact 
that the vast majority of doctors and senior health offi cials in the territory 
were non-Timorese engendered a lack of trust in the system among the 
East Timorese.
Already precarious, health conditions deteriorated rapidly during the 
referendum violence of 1999 and the social emergency that followed. Some 
610,000 people, constituting nearly two-thirds of the population, were 
 displaced, and the health system effectively collapsed. Estimates  suggest that 
75 percent of the health infrastructure was destroyed (World Bank 2009, 1), 
and whatever remained was looted or seriously damaged, including most 
equipment and supplies. It was three weeks before health services were rein-
stated.12 Few doctors remained in Timor-Leste after the  referendum—many 
had fl ed to Indonesia—and the Timorese public health system retained 
fewer than 30 doctors and 1 specialist surgeon (Tulloch et al. 2003, 1–2). 
The remaining clinicians and nurses collaborated with international emer-
gency relief NGOs and faith-based organizations to provide basic and 
emergency care.
In October 1999, a World Bank-United Nations Joint Assessment 
Mission (JAM) reported that only 18 percent of children aged 12–23 
months were fully immunized against the six major childhood diseases: 
tuberculosis, diphtheria, pertussis, polio, tetanus, and measles. Childhood 
malnutrition was severe, with 44 percent of children under age fi ve 
underweight (14 percent severely) and 48 percent stunted (27 percent 
severely), putting the country at considerable risk of health crises. With 
52 percent of the population under 15 years of age and a fertility rate as 
high as 7.8 children per woman, user demands on Timor-Leste’s public 
health system were set to expand dramatically. 
Timor-Leste’s IHA was created in February 2000, six months after the 
referendum. The IHA brought together 16 Timorese health profession-
als at the national level, together with another 13 in the districts and 6 
UNTAET health staff.13 A new Department of Social Affairs and Division 
of Health Services later replaced the IHA and continued functioning until 
the Ministry of Health was established under the second transition admin-
istration in September 2001. By the end of 2001, the MoH had recruited 
more than 800 staff and established district health management teams 
across the country to lead public health services delivery and ensure that 
government health facilities were adequately staffed. By independence in 
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2002, Timor-Leste’s health sector was functioning at close to 80 percent 
of what it had been under the Indonesian administration. 
Overcoming Systems Constraints
Timor-Leste’s tough external conditions are characterized by inhospitable 
physical and spatial terrain, isolated mountainous regions, and widely scat-
tered populations that are often inaccessible during the rains. The humanitar-
ian emergency, which was triggered by the events of 1999, caused extensive 
damage to physical infrastructure and saw the exodus of health profession-
als across the border into West Timor. Facing chronic health conditions and 
severe systems constraints, diffi cult choices had to be made about health 
 sector priorities and prospective sites for delivering health  services. Three 
decisions would prove particularly crucial to the MoH’s recovery and resil-
ience down the line: building back and innovating from the bottom up, 
leveraging partnerships to provide service delivery functions, and devel-
oping the ministry’s policy and institutional framework while delivering 
emergency services. This section examines the quality and content of those 
decisions and refl ects on the lessons learned from the ministry’s approach.
Rebuilding from the Bottom up and Deconcentration 
Rosser (2007, 128) remarks, “In the weeks following the referendum, as 
the emergency was unfolding in Dili and in the country’s regions, emer-
gency health service delivery and the resumption of basic health services 
began locally, in communities, through a network of mobile clinics and 
the revival of community health posts.” The introduction of the SISCA in 
2008 continued to build on this bottom-up approach (box 12.1).
UNTAET’s initial task had been to conduct a headcount of frontline 
health workers and a health survey. It did this through a Joint Health 
Working Group, which was created to tackle health sector priorities and 
to bring together United Nations agencies, the NGO community, and 
Timorese health professionals (Tulloch et al. 2003). The health practitio-
ners who had remained in Timor-Leste through the violence continued to 
work in local communities, without pay, until UNTAET began recruiting 
staff in August 2001.14 These clinicians, including many who were nurses 
during the Indonesian administration, documented their daily activities, 
and the data (together with the results of an initial health survey) were 
used to inform the development of future MoH protocols. Informed by 
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the priorities identifi ed in the health survey, emphasis was also given to 
the delivery of high-priority programs—immunization, tuberculosis, and 
nutrition and health promotion campaigns (Rosser 2007).
Timor-Leste’s IHA was the fi rst of Timor-Leste’s public agencies to 
deconcentrate its activities and collect data from the  bottom-up data 
collection and planning, and this contributed to the early expansion of 
health sector coverage. The IHA was quick to establish district health 
management teams and district health boards to enable community par-
ticipation in decisions, to respond to the humanitarian emergency, and to 
renew the delivery of basic health services at a regional level. The IHA 
created a small grants facility to disburse funds to district health posts 
and clinics and, where it lacked the capabilities to provide services, it 
innovated and contracted them out. A decision to contract out medical 
procurement to a private fi rm, Crown Agents, proved highly successful 
and salvaged a badly compromised medical supply chain, although sub-
sequent incarnations of this semi-autonomous agency would later raise 
some problems.
Leveraging Partnerships and Early Timorization
The IHA’s partnership with NGOs and faith-based and humanitarian 
organizations, together with its strong relationships with donors, was a 
BOX 12.1
SISCA: An Integrated Community Health System
In 2008, an Integrated Community Health System (Sistema Integrado de Saúde 
Comunitaria or SISCA) was instituted by the MoH to deliver health services to remote 
populations. SISCA is a nationwide program, which consists of monthly outreach visits 
and an integrated service delivery platform designed to promote health awareness and 
deliver a wide range of basic health services and immunization programs to communities. 
Some 442 SISCAs currently operate across the country and are run by subdistrict health 
staff and a cadre of volunteers. The SISCA is typically well regarded by local communities, 
although the rapid expansion of health posts and services has outstripped the ministry’s 
human, physical (especially pharmaceutical), and fi nancial capacities, compromising the 
ministry’s ability to ensure that these service posts are functioning well.
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hallmark of the sector early on and strengthened the IHA’s (and the minis-
try’s) crisis response capacity. According to Rosser (2007, 136–37),  several 
benefi ts fl owed from the ministry’s partnerships, not least of which was the 
shared understanding of the health problems facing the territory, which 
followed the extensive data collected for the JAM and the establishment 
of baselines in 1999 and 2000. The public health system  experienced 
temporary paralysis following the referendum and prior to the arrival of 
UNTAET, yet more than 100 international NGOs (including faith-based 
and humanitarian organizations) responded to the emergency, reestablish-
ing essential services and curbing further loss of life (Roland and Cliffe 
2002, 12). Mindful of its limited ability to deliver services, the IHA (then 
administered by the United Nations) was quick to formalize this arrange-
ment, signing several memoranda of understanding to ensure that each 
district would benefi t from the health services of at least one NGO. These 
emergency health service providers proved to be a huge asset to the IHA; 
they employed local staff, mostly nurses who had worked under the 
Indonesian administration, and bridged the gaps in basic, emergency, and 
hospital health care services. With these partners actively providing health 
services locally, the IHA could focus on building the health sector frame-
work and systems. The strengths of health service providers lay in their 
commitment and willingness to work in remote areas under tough condi-
tions, their operational self-suffi ciency, and their ability to respond rapidly. 
According to Tulloch et al. (2003, 26), “Their contribution to saving lives 
and to preventing suffering in East Timor was substantial.” 
The IHA’s strategy of leveraging the skills and resources of international 
NGOs to fi ll service delivery gaps was not without challenges. The high 
turnover of staff and the relative lack of experience of some individuals 
made things diffi cult (Tulloch et al. 2003, 26). Several years later, during 
the 2006 crisis, the experience of the MoH was again similar. As in 1999, 
the rapid and coordinated response of emergency health service providers 
to the 2006 Crisis bolstered the government’s ability to avoid the outbreak 
of disease and in some cases enhanced the quality of health services avail-
able to these same communities.15 Many IDPs experienced better water 
and sanitation and improved access to health services during the 2006 
Crisis than they had during periods of stability in their own communities. 
In both 1999 and 2006, donors (largely the European Union) fi nanced 
health service providers and acted under the leadership and  direction of 
the IHA and later the ministry. This proved essential to the partnership’s 
effective functioning. 
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The decision to collaborate with non-state health service providers and 
the continuity of health service delivery in the weeks and months follow-
ing the referendum prevented the deterioration of already desperate health 
conditions and bolstered popular perceptions of the IHA. The collabora-
tion also provided an opportunity for the ministry to deepen its perfor-
mance and legitimacy, on the basis of gains made through this partnership. 
But the arrangement proved too costly for donors and, foreshadowing 
a transition, the interim head of the IHA called on Timorese practitio-
ners to take charge of health service delivery themselves. Practitioners 
responded well, and, by December 2001, a phase-out strategy for NGOs 
was established. 
The decision to terminate emergency NGO services and Timorize man-
agement of the health sector was highly controversial. NGOs protested, 
and the United Nations was initially concerned that the IHA would prove 
ill-equipped to deliver, but in the end United Nations administrators 
supported the decision and the phase-out proceeded. According to then 
 minister Dr. Rui Maria de Araujo, services did not falter. Indeed, services 
improved as staff and clinicians rose to the challenge.16 
Today the MoH has its own service delivery model and crisis response 
strategy, but NGOs continue to play an important role in three areas: 
promoting health behavior change, promoting community use of public 
health services, and providing logistical support for effective delivery of 
the Integrated Community Health System (SISCA). MoH–NGO relations 
are managed through the Department of Partnership Management at the 
ministry. Building on an earlier precedent, NGOs are required to sign a 
memorandum of understanding with the ministry to defi ne the district 
in which they will work and the scope of their activities. A total of 56 
NGOs are registered. They tend to work either in health promotion or 
on specifi c projects—such as HIV/AIDS (human immunodefi ciency virus/
acquired immunodefi ciency syndrome) or family planning.17 The principal 
challenge for the ministry lies in effectively monitoring their activities, a 
task that is proving diffi cult because of their increasing numbers (Da Silva 
2010, 18). 
The generous and coordinated support of donors is an equally promi-
nent feature of Timor-Leste’s health sector recovery. Donors fi nanced 
100 percent of the health sector budget from 1999 until 2002.18 An initial 
outlay of US$10 million helped to rebuild core health infrastructure. And 
although external fi nancing for the health sector has declined quite rapidly, 
from 52.5 percent of total health expenditures in 2005 to only 28 percent 
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in 2008 (WHO 2010) and 22 percent (US$13.2 million) in 2012, donors 
are still important partners to the MoH. The substantial and consistent 
stream of ODA over the years has buoyed Timor-Leste’s health sector 
responsiveness and resourced the ministry’s institutional development. An 
effort was made to ensure coordination through a sectorwide approach 
(SWAp), although the merits and constraints of Timor-Leste’s SWAp 
remain somewhat contested. Several respondents observed that the SWAp 
did not prevent donors from pursuing their own interests and that effi cacy 
has deteriorated over the years. The contrasting view is that it reduced the 
duplication of donor activities and focused donor attention on an agreed 
set of priorities and performance indicators. 
Balancing Policy Priorities
A particular feature of health sector administration in the early years was 
its dual-track approach. One focus was on operations and efforts to avert 
the escalation of a health crisis and resume basic health services locally 
while rehabilitating service delivery capacity; the other was on national 
policy, planning, and institutional development, including the creation of a 
medium-term expenditure framework. In practical terms, striking this bal-
ance meant managing a tricky combination of emergency and basic health 
services delivery, with preventive care and informed health sector develop-
ment, by creating a system and service that could evolve, adapt, and adjust. 
This dual-track approach—building short-term confi dence while striving 
for medium-term development—was reproduced as policy guidance in the 
World Development Report 2011 (World Bank 2011c). 
Against considerable odds, and under assertive foreign and Timorese 
leadership, Timor-Leste’s health system successfully averted a national 
health crisis and extensive loss of life following the referendum. At the 
same time, it laid the foundations for the sector’s coherent national and 
subnational development (United Nations 2000, 60). The IHA’s per-
formance in the period to independence was thus marked by several 
important achievements. Access to basic services was restored, immu-
nization programs were renewed, a tuberculosis program was started, 
and a basic health services package was drafted to provide for the deliv-
ery of health services through newly rehabilitated and equipped health 
centers. Several institutional plans—for example, for human resource 
development, capacity building, and health training—were also crafted. 
A civil works program was launched to construct more clinics, and a 
central medical store and a consultancy for managing an autonomous 
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medical supply system were initiated (Tulloch et al. 2003, 2). This would 
ensure that drug supplies were reasonably well secured and based on an 
approved drug list. 
Having successfully recovered from a health emergency and having 
launched a coordinated strategy for health sector development, the minis-
try shifted its efforts toward consolidating these initial gains by improving 
the quality and coverage of health services and developing referral and 
specialized services. More recently, the MoH’s development is reaching still 
further by deepening the effi cient and effective public fi nancial manage-
ment and decentralized service delivery. 
Timorese took charge of service delivery in the ministry early on; they 
developed administrative systems and focused on strategic policy develop-
ment, including in the areas of health service delivery and human resources 
development. These efforts would pay important dividends. The health 
policy framework introduced in June 2002 enabled the MoH to lead the 
formation of policy in a context of international crowding. It also gave 
the ministry the space that it needed to defi ne sectoral priorities and shift 
emphasis toward medium-term institutional development goals as the 
emergency period came to a close. The ministry’s phased and iterative 
approach would prove central to its initial performance, recovery, and sub-
sequent institutional development. 
Confronting Historical Legacies and “Building Back Better”
Building an effi cient and effective public health system has required con-
tending with several historical legacies. Particularly challenging was the 
culture of centralized and personalized administration, popular distrust of 
health services, and poor health behavior. The ministry has employed a 
range of tools and acted to mediate and manage these pressures.
Social and Political Interests
The MoH is subject to external pressures and has typically managed them 
through a combination of leadership and negotiation. As a frontline service 
provider, it is accountable to an extensive network of primary and second-
ary health care benefi ciaries who want health services that are accessible 
(within walking distance) and free of charge.19 Respondents also expressed 
a rising demand for improved quality of care and medicines that are better 
tailored to needs.20 
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Remarkably, in a highly personalized culture of public administra-
tion, the MoH was initially insulated from the country’s prevailing politi-
cal economy, largely due to the actions of its fi rst minister, Rui Maria de 
Araujo. Minister Araujo was a highly experienced clinician with robust 
public health qualifi cations. His vision was to create an integrated, 
 evidence-based, and performance-oriented health system.21 He worked 
well with international donors and made good use of ODA, which earned 
him respect among his peers. His successor, Minister Martins, hailed from 
the ranks of a local NGO, but he was also an experienced clinician with 
a good reputation for his efforts in the struggle against tuberculosis. Both 
ministers were nonpartisan and held resistance credentials, having prac-
ticed either as a surgeon or as a clinician during the Indonesian occupation. 
However, they held different standings within Timor-Leste’s sociopolitical 
hierarchy, which had implications for the MoH. 
During his term in offi ce, Minister Araujo was politically independent 
and sought assurance from the prime minister that the ministry would 
not be subject to political interference. This insulated the ministry from 
corrosive political forces and afforded the minister the autonomy he 
needed to establish an impartial and functioning agency. Following his 
departure in 2007, the MoH was increasingly subject to political  infl uence 
and lacked the political capital needed in the Council of Ministers to 
infl uence budgetary allocations. The MoH’s budget declined, from an 
average of 10–12 percent of the state budget under the fi rst constitu-
tional government to 3.7 percent in 2011 and a projected 2.5  percent 
in 2012. 
Among other infl uential pressure groups, the Church and NGOs are 
prominent in the ministry’s functioning. The Church played an impor-
tant historical role in health service delivery during the occupation and 
during Timor-Leste’s health and humanitarian emergencies. The MoH 
manages its relationship with the Church very carefully, mindful that 
it has a broad constituency of support. In the early years after indepen-
dence, the Church took a strong pro-life stance on health sector policy, 
refusing to condone sex education or family planning (including the use 
of contraception). This opposition undermined government efforts to 
stem the country’s high birth rates. A breakthrough occurred in 2007 
when the Church and the government fi nally agreed on a family planning 
policy centered on “birth  spacing” practices.22 Birth rates dropped from 
7.7 children per woman in 2003 to 5.7 in 2009/10, although it is diffi cult 
to draw direct comparisons as the data sets differ.23 Health promotion 
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campaigns and other factors may have contributed to declining birth 
rates. Nonetheless, the government-Church relationship and the policy 
dialogue that stems from it have allowed the MoH to do its job (National 
Statistics Institute 2010). 
Two recent developments—the elaboration of an Overseas Referral 
Program and the National Priority Program (NPP)—have heightened 
political pressures on the ministry and are proving a challenge. The NPP 
is a dual-accountability instrument that was adopted by the government 
of Timor-Leste in 2008 and serves as a coordinating and reporting instru-
ment. To the extent that it brings government and donors to the table 
to examine progress in health sector development, the NPP has some 
relevance, although there are questions about the extent to which it pro-
duces results or contributes to improved MoH performance. The MoH 
is a partner to priority number fi ve—social services and localized service 
delivery—and has used the NPP to track implementation and sharpen 
reporting.24 The ministry’s apparent ability to withstand the policy and 
political infl uence that can accompany dual-accountability instruments 
imported by donors further suggests that it is less permeable than it 
once was. 
Vision and Esprit de Corps
Together with a constitutional right to health, the Timor-Leste Strategic 
Development Plan 2011–2030 speaks of “transitioning Timor-Leste from 
a low-income to an upper-middle-income country, with a healthy, well-
educated, and safe population by 2030.” The aim is to have a doctor for 
every 1,000 inhabitants by 2020, including a doctor in each subdistrict and 
potentially in each suco by 2012. This strategy aligns with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)25 and prioritizes public health as the basis on 
which to build the country’s social capital. Yet the Strategic Development 
Plan is a small part of what drives the ministry.
The ministry’s mission is deeply internalized by staff who convey 
a strong esprit de corps and service orientation. Like the MSS, this 
is the result of targeted and consistent messaging by senior manage-
ment and among colleagues at various levels (national, district, and 
subdistrict). More interesting, however, is that this mission is built 
on an existing code of ethics among Timorese health workers, which 
demands that public health services be delivered with impartiality and 
professionalism. One staff member remarked that MoH staff see their 
 country as being in a stage of rebuilding and are proud to be making 
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a contribution, despite low salaries.26 The recent spike in government 
spending and increasingly uneven trend in the payment of salaries and 
consultant fees, which sees some consultants earn vastly more than 
others, could soon alter that ethos, and not all accounts of staff per-
formance are positive. A handful of focus group participants spoke of 
rude MoH staff and commented on the lack of empathy for patients 
among hospital nurses and birthing attendants.27 According to Zwi 
et al. (2009), the anger and blame exhibited by health workers dis-
courage  people from visiting clinics, and this has contributed to low 
 utilization rates among women. 
Isomorphism and Building Back Better
The MoH has not adopted the institutional development model of 
another health agency, but it does aspire to meet international standards 
in primary health care, preventive and curative medicine, and health edu-
cation. Partners to the ministry have introduced WHO evidenced-based 
and  guiding protocols, such as those for the integrated management 
of childhood illness and the emergency management of obstetric care, 
and MoH programs do exhibit a degree of isomorphism. The SISCA 
is similar to the Indonesian system of health posts—the Posyandu—
albeit with some distinctions. The SISCA delivers primary health care 
services (curative and preventive) and conducts health promotion activi-
ties across the community as a whole, while the Posyandu focuses more 
closely on child and maternal health.28 Clinicians have also tended to 
revert to Indonesian and Portuguese protocols for  guidance when they 
need it.
Although several features of MoH policy and practice are isomor-
phic, the architects of Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Health made a con-
scious decision not to recreate the project-based, vertical health system 
constructed by the Indonesians. Rather, the goal was to create an inte-
grated, evidence-based, performance-oriented system,29 and this contrib-
uted to the MoH’s coherence and results orientation that would later 
develop. Targets were set, and staff focused their energies on meeting 
those goals. It also enabled Timorese to see the health sector as their 
own. Removal of the Indonesian user-pays requirement was just one 
measure of that result. One focus group participant remarked, “During 
Indonesian times, it was all about money. If you pay well, you get a good 
service. Now we do not have to pay for the medicines. We do not have 
to pay for anything.”30 
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Timorese Ownership and Local Engagement
Timor-Leste’s various public health entities have long enjoyed good working 
relations with donors and non-state health service providers, particularly 
in times of crisis, and they collaborate in all stages of health sector develop-
ment. Initially this was achieved through a Joint Health Working Group, 
which set the minimum standards for the IHA and the sector. Successive 
ministers have also reinforced Timorese ownership. Minister Araujo was 
determined to put Timorese staff in charge, and Minister Martins took this 
approach still further. 
In January 2007, Minister Martins reclaimed responsibility for health 
sector coordination, a role previously played by the World Bank, and took 
an increasingly arm’s-length approach to working with donors, in line with 
an overall trend in government-donor relations that had accompanied 
diminished reliance on ODA. As a result, few donors saw the new Health 
Sector Strategic Plan at its inception, and many fi nd it diffi cult to meet with 
the minister, fueling perceptions that he is aloof toward development part-
ners. According to some donors, the change in roles weakened coordina-
tion, yet internal accounts suggest that this decision was taken in response 
to the donor’s top-down, supply-driven approach and persistent critique of 
ministry performance.31 In the minister’s words, “The Ministry of Health 
is like a child learning to walk—we are fed up of constantly being scolded 
every time we do something wrong—you would not do that to a child.”32 
To a large extent, the early and progressive deepening of Timorese owner-
ship of health sector development, despite heavy external infl uence from 
donors, could be attributed to the ministry’s growing institutional strength 
and resilience.
The MoH recognizes that engaging local communities is central to 
effective health service delivery. It has consistently expanded its presence in 
local communities and works more and more closely with chefes de sucos 
and chefes de aldeia (village and sub-village chiefs, respectively), engag-
ing them as health intermediaries. Chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia are 
involved in strengthening community health practices, promoting partici-
pation in SISCA, and validating child vaccination programs for the Bolsa 
de Mae (Mother’s Purse Program).33 The MoH also recruits locally, as did 
the IHA before it. MoH staff are recruited from the districts in which they 
work and are known to host communities, which has served to restore 
trust between the community and health workers. Although this was not 
an offi cial policy at the outset, it proved a practical solution to a logistical 
problem and was adopted as formal UNTAET policy in 2002. 
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Chefes de suco and chefes de aldeia are purveyors of health  information, 
although some neglect to share that information with their communities, 
and the quality and effectiveness of community access to health  information 
widely varies. MoH–community engagement through chefe de sucos and 
chefe de aldeias is a relatively new phenomenon, and chefes are still devel-
oping an understanding of the health system and adjusting to their new 
role. One director of a district health center reported, “When the time 
has come for implementation at the grassroots, without the assistance and 
participation of community leaders, implementation is not really good, the 
community does not come; or if they [communities] do come, this is not 
due to the participation from leaders, but as a result of health workers 
going there to mobilize communities.”34 
Community health volunteers (PSFs) support the local implementation 
of SISCA, extending the MoH’s reach. Modeled on a similar experience 
from Thailand, PSFs play an important role in administering vaccines, 
weighing children, and supporting clinicians. They are paid a small stipend 
(US$5 per month). The original concept was that voluntary staff would be 
identifi ed in an open application process and then interviewed and chosen 
for the role. But in practice, there is no formal recruitment mechanism, and 
volunteers are typically selected by chefes de suco or chefes de aldeia. The 
experience with PSFs is double-edged, they may be an important contribu-
tion to community health service provision, yet the stipends paid to them 
are inadequate and sometimes do not even reach them, resulting in a high 
turnover of volunteers.
Poor health practices are signifi cant constraints on the effective delivery 
of health services in Timor-Leste, and traditional health practices (matan-
dok) are an enduring feature of health culture. The ministry has taken the 
diffi cult step of reconciling parallel health systems by validating the role 
of traditional health practices and treatments. In one popular case, the 
ministry issued a formal certifi cate of recognition and provided a small 
grant to a traditional healer for his bone treatment center in Alas, Same.35 
Traditional birth attendants still play a role in birthing, but formal health 
service utilization rates are rising, albeit slowly—from 1.4 total outpatient 
visits per capita in 2006 to 2.0 in 2010 and from 1.4 inpatient admissions 
per 100 in the population in 2008 and 2.1 in 2010 (World Bank 2011b). 
Requests for nontraditional birth attendants have increased, and focus 
group participants reported that the use of traditional health practices is 
declining. According to the 2009/10 TLDHS, 30 percent of births were 
attended by a skilled health professional, up from 18 percent in 2003.
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Deepening Performance and Quality
“What is the reason behind the success of the ministry? Good staff, good 
planning, great commitment, and a lot of money.”
—Celestina da Costa Alves, director, Viqueque District Health Center
Highly educated, experienced clinicians have led Timor-Leste’s MoH, 
and the IHA before it, carefully articulating a sector vision. Yet poorly 
functioning systems have hampered the MoH’s performance and remain 
a challenge. Benefi ting from strong leadership and a vision, ministers and 
staff have sought to overcome the binding constraints of the ministry’s 
internal systems through the empowerment of middle managers, results-
oriented performance, and fi scal innovation. Partnerships and training 
as well as incremental improvements in data collection and information 
management have accompanied the ministry’s development. This section 
examines the manner in which the ministry has used the opportunities and 
resources afforded to it to overcome the constraints of its inner workings. 
At the same time, it refl ects on future challenges. 
Managing Leadership Change
Timor-Leste’s IHA and ministry have experienced varying styles of leader-
ship, and these have contributed to the ministry’s results and functioning 
in different ways. Before independence, Jim Tulloch led the IHA, taking 
diffi cult yet practical decisions to guide health sector recovery in crisis con-
ditions.36 Minister Araujo and Minister Martins differed in their focus and 
approach. Minister Araujo focused on delivering primary and secondary 
health services and establishing the ministry’s operating frameworks and 
planning system, relying heavily on the performance of his managers. By 
contrast, Minister Martins focused on rolling out the SISCA and research 
and development, often bypassing systems and giving limited direction to 
staff on how best to operationalize ministry programs. Even so, he built on 
the initial foundations of the ministry, expanded basic services coverage, 
deepened Timorese ownership, and made use of the pipeline of human 
resources offered by the professional development program in Cuba. 
Minister Martins largely retained the staff he had inherited and secured 
their trust, bolstering the ministry’s institutional memory, although he did 
reshuffl e his cadre of managers (fi gure 12.3).37 Ministry staff have remained 
loyal to both ministers despite the change in leadership style and focus. 
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Figure 12.3. Organization Chart of the Ministry of Health
Source: Ministry of Health, http://www.moh.gov.tl.
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Building a Health Sector Workforce 
The health sector workforce was decimated by the withdrawal of 
Indonesian health personnel. Of 135 doctors who had been working in the 
region during the Indonesian occupation, only 30 remained, and low levels 
of qualifi ed human resources are still a major constraint on the ministry’s 
performance. The rapid response of emergency health workers and NGOs 
to the referendum violence, together with the arrival of 230 Cuban doctors 
in 2004, gave the sector a critically needed boost. The MoH’s early and 
aggressive capacity building also made an important contribution to the 
MoH’s future development. 
According to the MoH, there are now 1,400 permanent employees and 
300 vacancies in the health sector.38 But, with a fragmented and incomplete 
health information system, it is diffi cult to get a comprehensive picture 
of the size and structure of the health sector workforce (Dewdney et al. 
2009). As of 2007, there were some 50 senior managers or directors 
(grade-level 6 or above) and at least 130 middle-management personnel at 
grade-level 5 or above (Asante et al. 2011, 3). Each of the ministry’s direc-
tors interviewed for this case study had been a nurse or a health adminis-
trator during the occupation, although management capacities were still 
weak after the referendum. Basic management skills further developed 
through steady and consistent empowerment and under crisis conditions. 
Several MoH and hospital directors, together with district chiefs, received 
training to sharpen their management capabilities, although funding gaps 
affected the functioning of these programs39 and management skills remain 
highly uneven. 
District health centers are still run by district health management teams, 
and these tend to be well resourced, but the staff often lack suitable skills. 
Resourcing subdistrict health posts and clinics and staffi ng the SISCA are 
particularly diffi cult, and many services continue to be supported by NGOs 
and the Cuban Medical Brigade (see box 12.2). District health centers pro-
pose candidates for recruitment to health posts and take recommendations 
from chefes de suco, but it is diffi cult to fi ll vacancies. The ministry has 
adopted a top-up policy to incentivize health professionals to work in more 
remote regions. The policy provides an additional 40 percent allowance 
for staff working in extremely remote regions, 25 percent for those in very 
remote regions, and 15 percent for those in remote regions—but the policy 
is failing to have a major impact.40 There are simply too few health profes-
sionals left in Timor-Leste to recruit, and when staff are sent abroad to 
study, their posts often remain unfi lled.
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MoH partners have fi nanced extensive professional development 
schemes, and these have produced mixed results but important lessons. 
The biggest complaints are that there is no follow-through, training is not 
linked to the allocation of posts or assignments, and there is no on-the-job 
mentoring. Emergency management of obstetric care, for example—a 
model rolled out by the United Nations Population Fund—trains mid-
wives to perform normal deliveries and to recognize complications and 
the need for back-up or referral. But many deliveries are in private homes, 
and midwives rarely feel competent or confi dent to practice these skills in 
the absence of supervision or while working alone. Supervision is needed 
but, again, fi nding health workers willing to spend long periods of time 
working in remote locations is diffi cult, and the MoH is poorly equipped 
to support health supervisors on lengthy regional visits.41 
With tight human resource constraints, the ministry has found a sig-
nifi cant source of strength in its overseas professional development part-
nerships. In the early recovery period, while the European Commission 
and World Bank were revitalizing Timor-Leste’s critical health infrastruc-
ture, Australia, Cuba, and China sponsored their own health specialists to 
work in Timor-Leste. Australia and Cuba further fi nanced two long-term 
overseas professional development programs to train cadres of skilled and 
BOX 12.2
Cuban Medical Brigade
Launched in 2004, the Cuban Scholarship Program affords Timorese the opportu-
nity to study medicine and allied health at the undergraduate or postgraduate level 
in Cuba. Selected candidates are required to study Spanish prior to commenc-
ing the course. More than 700 Timorese students have attended the program. The 
fi rst cohort of 18 fully qualifi ed doctors returned to Timor-Leste in 2010; they are 
working in the public health system. By November 2011, in just one district, a further 
69 Timorese medical students had returned from Cuba and were studying at Suai 
Hospital, with another 130 students scheduled to arrive in 2012. Returning students 
complete their fi nal year of studies in Timor-Leste, through the National University 
of Timor-Leste, and undertake internships at the referral hospitals to expose them to 
Timorese conditions. 
Source: http://www.moh.gov.tl.
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specialized Timorese physicians. The Australian program was fi nanced by 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). It was 
embedded in the National Hospital—Guido Valadares National Hospital—
and staffed by the Royal Australian College of Surgeons. Based on a capac-
ity substitution model, the initiative placed Timorese specialists in overseas 
training programs, while a rotating cadre of Australian surgeons provided 
specialized clinical services in Timor-Leste. According to respondents, the 
program did not follow conventional capacity development models, and 
yet it has proven vastly more successful than the conventional one-on-one 
adviser models adopted elsewhere in the health sector. 
Since 2004, Cuba has also deployed more than 200 doctors known 
as the Cuban Medical Brigade to deliver frontline health services in the 
subdistricts of Timor-Leste. Rotated every two years, these doctors have 
boosted health service delivery—including in the most remote parts of 
the country—and delivered in practicum training42 to returning Timorese 
doctors and nurses. The Cuban Medical Brigade was key to service deliv-
ery during the 2006 Crisis and is the product of a long and productive 
partnership forged between the governments of Timor-Leste and Cuba on 
Timorese independence.
 The Cuban and Australian professional development programs con-
stitute an important and timely pipeline of skilled resources for the minis-
try, yet the deployment of new doctors and health professionals across the 
country will continue to test human resource management capacities for 
some time. (World Bank 2013, 3). 
Managing Performance
For the Ministry of Health, as with any agency in an FCS, it is diffi cult 
to recruit and motivate competent staff when salaries are not competitive 
and systems are dysfunctional. Despite these powerful disincentives, in 
the early years after independence, the MoH had a strong reputation for 
open and constructive internal communication, effective delegation of 
tasks, and productive training. Professional development, performance, 
and integrity were important tenets of the ministry’s human resource 
management. “Good people were hired and bad people were fi red,”43 
irrespective of dysfunctional administrative systems, and this largely 
remains the case, although weaknesses are emerging. 
Staff performance is reportedly assessed against six monthly targets, in 
line with a government-wide performance monitoring and management 
framework. Similarly district and subdistrict staff report monthly and each 
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trimester, although it is not clear whether these reports constitute perfor-
mance assessments, data collection exercises, or methods to track and 
analyze service targets and impacts.44 The ministry is collecting data and 
monitoring and evaluating its programs, although performance tends to 
be uneven. A local data implementation plan exists, but it is not utilized, 
and MoH programs—for example, the SISCAs—are sometimes run with-
out data being captured, weakening the ministry’s ability to monitor and 
measure performance results. The case study team was unable to verify the 
quality of the ministry’s monitoring and evaluation model. 
The Civil Service Commission leads personnel administration across 
government, although MoH supervisors meet regularly with their staff 
and review staff performance.45 Like the MSS, several disciplinary cases 
generated by the Offi ce of Internal Audit and Discipline (an internal unit 
within the MoH)46 suggest that the MoH is serious about performance 
management.
Improving Internal and External Communication
The MoH has a mixed record on public information and communication 
systems. It has sponsored extensive health promotion and behavior change 
campaigns over the years, including for example, on the importance of 
immunization and the merits of using treated bed nets to prevent malaria, 
and the MoH has actively solicited the support of NGOs as campaign part-
ners. Health promotion campaigns are often conducted door-to-door or 
through national television and radio broadcasts, and some say that these 
have led to increased use of health services,47 although few clients have 
knowledge of the way in which the health system functions. It was not 
commonly known, for example, that clinics provide primary health care 
services, while hospitals tackle secondary and more complex health issues. 
Basic internal information systems and verbal communications are 
used to align policy and planning, although the results tend to be uneven. 
The minister holds monthly meetings with all management staff (includ-
ing district chiefs) to elaborate joint plans, report back on policy and 
program implementation, and solve problems. Similarly weekly board 
meetings involving the minister, vice minister, director general, and direc-
tors offer a regular opportunity for management to raise and resolve 
operational concerns. Overall, however, poor communication fl ows 
between directorates within the ministry hinder the implementation of 
health policy, and the role of the director general and health management 
information systems are underutilized.48
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Communications between health posts, health centers, and referral 
hospitals are weak. In 2001, regular contact with fi eld staff was enabled 
through a radio network. This health information system was credited with 
containing an outbreak of measles in the Ermera District in mid-2002, 
but several informants remarked that two-way communication links, par-
ticularly with the subdistricts, have weakened in recent years. District and 
community health centers report upward to the national and district cen-
ters, yet information and communications rarely fl ow back,49 and while 
the ministry also meets regularly (bimonthly) with hospital staff and the 
autonomous institutions, referral hospitals do not interact or communicate 
well with district and subdistrict health posts. In the process of conducting 
this research, it became evident that hospital staff consider primary and 
secondary health care facilities to be distinct parts of the system. 
Specializing through Autonomous Service Units and Referrals 
Timor-Leste established several autonomous institutions and a system of 
referrals to deepen its capacity to provide specialized health services. This 
network of autonomous institutions includes fi ve regional hospitals (in Dili, 
Maliana, Baucau, Suai, and Maubisse), a semi-autonomous pharmaceuti-
cal supply agency (SAMES),50 the National Laboratory, and the Institute of 
Health Sciences and has deepened the ministry’s capacity for evidence-based 
policy and programming as well as service delivery.51 Several of these institu-
tions have received a sizable funding pledge from donors, enabling them to 
operate with some independence.52 Although their relations with the MoH 
vary (the MoH–SAMES relationship has proven particularly diffi cult), the 
autonomous regional hospitals reportedly interact well with the MoH. 
The proliferation of autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions 
is not of itself a panacea for specialized service delivery in Timor-Leste. 
The form and functioning of many of these institutions are still in fl ux, 
and many retain limited budgetary autonomy and rely on the ministry’s 
resources and priorities, which constrains their development.53 This is 
particularly true of the referral hospitals. Yet the creation and function-
ing of specialized clinical services and a system of  referrals—to which was 
recently added the Institute of Health Sciences—have enhanced health sec-
tor effi ciency and specialization. 
Adapting Financial Management
The Ministry of Health was long regarded as effective in planning and 
budgeting, although there were some early challenges. Initial delays in 
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budgetary decisions kept funds from reaching the districts, and this con-
strained the implementation of work programs in district health centers. 
Donors fi lled the gap, but the delays strained the system and dimin-
ished user confi dence. In later years, public fi nance management in the 
MoH saw some innovations, including the Pasta Mutin, which is dis-
cussed in the section that follows. Overall, however, and particularly in 
recent years, MoH performance in public fi nance management has been 
uneven. Planning dysfunctions (the lack of national-subnational links), 
increased politicization of the budget, and fl uctuations in the national 
procurement policy (including debilitating disconnects between the sys-
tems of donors and the MoH) have heightened the ministry’s administra-
tive dysfunctions. 
Building on the MoH’s early experience with the use of block grants 
to fi nance basic service delivery, in 2008 the ministry introduced the 
White Pouch Program (Pasta Mutin) to ease the fl ow of funds from 
the center to the districts. The program provides a monthly allocation, 
which allows districts to make small health sector investments and to 
undertake communication and outreach programs. Several subnational 
health offi cials remarked that the Pasta Mutin has given them fi nan-
cial and operational independence. So its purpose is instrumental, but 
it also has its drawbacks. The funding does not correlate with identifi ed 
needs and is not tied to the delivery of specifi c activities or results (World 
Bank 2011b). Funds are apportioned evenly between clinics and health 
posts, even though they serve different demographics.54 Consistent with 
reports of increased politicization of the ministry’s budget,55 allocations 
have also become increasingly unpredictable in recent months, stunting 
service delivery capacities and leaving clinicians and administrative staff 
with inadequate resources to do their jobs. Lags in expenditure reconcili-
ation have further caused the Ministry of Finance to withhold advances 
to clinics.
Despite enviable bottom-up planning and prioritization and fi scal trans-
fer innovations early on, the links between planning and budgeting are 
unraveling, straining health sector performance. The disconnect between 
national and subnational systems is deepening, resulting in poorly costed, 
ineffective local plans and severe budget shortfalls. In 2010 and 2011, 
district health budgets were spent by September, crippling health service 
 delivery.56 Budgetary shortfalls also affect autonomous health entities, 
where the ministry still retains planning control.57 Hospital staff contrib-
ute to ministry plans, but the resulting budget rarely correlates with their 
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inputs, in either recurrent or minor capital allocations.58 This compromises 
hospital management, frequently leaves them short on basic operating 
costs (for fuel, transportation, and medical supplies), and renders the new 
and “state of the art” hospital facilities diffi cult to maintain.59 
Between 2005 and 2010, the MoH’s budget increased 150 percent in 
real terms, from US$14 million to US$35.6 million (see fi gure 12.4), but 
shrank as an overall share of the state budget (see fi gure 12.5; World Bank 
2011b). Under the fi rst constitutional government, health sector budgetary 
allocations were consistently 10–12 percent of the total state budget, but 
the budgetary allocation for the health sector decreased to 3.7  percent in 
2011 and is expected to drop further to just 2.5 percent in 2012, leaving 
the districts and subdistricts particularly hard hit. According to the director 
general of the MoH, “In terms of the national budget, we feel that we are 
an orphan.”60 
Budgetary allocations for logistical and medical supplies, especially 
transportation, fuel, and pharmaceuticals, are increasingly subject to 
political intervention and tend to be substantially lower than what is 
Figure 12.4. MoH Budget Allocations, 2005–10
Source: World Bank 2011b.
* Current estimate.
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anticipated and needed. Budgetary allocations for goods and services 
decreased from about 59 percent of the overall health sector allocation in 
2008 to 30  percent in 2012 (World Bank 2013), while salary and wages 
increased as a result of hiring additional staff in 2010 to fi ll vacancies in 
the districts and hospitals (World Bank 2013). This has led to a shortage 
of basic medicines in the districts and villages and has inhibited the abil-
ity of health services to reach more isolated communities. Focus group 
participants complained that the SISCA only distributes three kinds of 
 medicines—Paracetamol, Cotri, and Cloroquim61—and that these are used 
to treat all kinds of illnesses. According to MoH clients, “We have many 
well-trained medics but not enough medication,”62 and the range of medi-
cines distributed is limited. 
The budget is based on input, and this served the IHA well during the 
emergency period and during the implementation of the Basic Services 
Package, which required budgetary fl exibility. But it has constrained the 
ministry’s development ever since. Funds do not follow the ministry’s 
Figure 12.5. MoH Allocation as a Share of the Overall State Budget, 2005–10
Source: World Bank 2011b.
* Current estimate.
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Health Sector Plan and inadequately track program developments, 
 weakening accountability for results. Innovating to manage constraints, 
the Directorate of Finance and Planning developed a hybrid budget model 
that was part program and part input based to overcome the constraints 
of existing budgetary practices. The model was a results-based system 
that allowed staff to simulate program components of the budget, but 
after responsible staff moved, the model was no longer used. 
In 2006 the procurement threshold for the MoH was between 
US$50,000 and US$100,000. As with other line ministries, including the 
MSS, this increased to US$1 million just prior to 2010, but has been repeat-
edly changed since, devolving and retrenching authority in a cyclical fash-
ion, each time requiring procedural changes.63 Procurement challenges are 
exacerbated by the fact that different donors adopt different procurement 
models and the ministry is highly permeable to procurement infl uence. 
The United Nations uses a single-envelope model, as does the MoH, while 
SAMES has adopted the World Bank’s two-envelope bidding system.64 
This dual system has caused signifi cant procurement delays for the gov-
ernment, as donors challenge the use of different envelopes. The impasse 
reached the point at which the MoH asked its donor—in this instance the 
World Bank—not to interfere with the ministry’s administrative practice.65
Causal Factors
The Ministry of Health faced considerable challenges on inception: 
chronic health conditions and system constraints; an Indonesian legacy, 
which had corroded popular trust in public services and projectized health 
services delivery; and a health service that lacked staff and had a history 
of underperforming. The physical and human destruction wrought on 
Timor-Leste in 1999 had not been anticipated. Yet the policy decisions 
made during this emergency period shaped the institution’s capacity to 
deliver results and determined its successful development trajectory. 
Heavily infl uenced by deplorable health conditions and a deepen-
ing humanitarian crisis, foreign and Timorese administrators took sev-
eral defi ning decisions early on—to leverage a large body of NGO and 
donor resources to bridge service delivery gaps, to prioritize emergency 
and basic health service delivery locally, and to build an institutional 
and policy framework around these efforts. The vision to create an inte-
grated performance- and results-oriented ministry from the ground up, 
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using Timorese capacities and resources, provided the foundation for the 
 ministry’s coherent health sector development and established a basis of 
trust. Timorese communities saw and felt the impact of these decisions, 
and this buoyed the ministry’s legitimacy early on. The dual effect of bal-
ancing emergency and basic health service delivery with preventive care 
and long-term sector development provided immediate relief to the popu-
lation (Tulloch et al. 2003).66 At the same time, it informed the devel-
opment of a health sector framework, creating space for the strategy to 
evolve, adapt, and adjust. 
With the immediate humanitarian and health crisis averted, future 
health ministers could prioritize the expansion of health service coverage 
and the development of specialist and referral services. At the same time, 
the ministry doubled-down to overcome internal constraints and deepen 
the ministry’s performance by fostering an already strong esprit de corps 
among staff, reinforcing that mission through consistent messaging from 
the top and the empowerment of middle managers. Partnerships between 
Timor-Leste, Cuba, and Australia (through AusAID) brought a large 
cadre of qualifi ed Cuban doctors and a rotating pool of Australian sur-
geons to Timor-Leste. The Cuban and Australian doctors provided pri-
mary and specialized health services, while enabling scores of Timorese 
clinicians to be trained to meet future health sector demands. 
Besides these programmatic and technocratic advances, perhaps the 
most striking aspect of Timor-Leste’s health sector development is the 
credibility and trust that have been built with the population over time 
and through various strategies. Ministry staff and clinicians have fos-
tered local trust by making themselves visible locally and by working 
in diffi cult and isolated conditions, even during violent historical junc-
tures and often in the context of direct personal threats to the safety and 
security of attending clinicians.67 Similarly, the decision to rebuild the 
health sector from the ground up and to strengthen the delivery of health 
services by recruiting and empowering local Timorese staff, almost from 
the start, enabled the ministry to connect with local communities. The 
presence of SISCA at the subdistrict and village levels in recent years 
has heightened the ministry’s profi le and deepened its legitimacy further 
among village populations. Through the engagement of chefes de suco 
and chefes de aldeia in the organization and administration of SISCA, the 
MoH has been able to extend its operations and enhance its interaction 
with previously underserviced constituencies, working with intermediar-
ies that communities largely understand and trust.68 
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Challenges
Despite the impressive renewal of a previously distrusted and dysfunctional 
health system, challenges in health services coverage, the quality of those 
services, and administrative functioning persist and threaten to weaken the 
ministry’s future performance and prospects. 
The ministry has been particularly successful in executing primary 
technical functions—that is, in treating serious illnesses and preventing 
and managing communicable diseases through vaccinations and primary 
health care in the districts.69 These are fi elds in which Timorese clinicians 
have historically also exceled. By contrast, however, “soft functions”—
such as the development of middle-management capacities, monitoring 
and supervision, health management information, and efforts to change 
health behaviors—are taking longer to develop, although they are gaining 
ground. Soft functions are intrinsically more diffi cult to tackle, particu-
larly in environments where performance incentives are weak.70 
Gaps in the supply of qualifi ed human resources constitute the single 
biggest binding constraint on consistent and effective health sector  delivery. 
The MoH’s strategic vision is highly ambitious, all existing human resources 
are committed, and these are still inadequate. Mechanisms such as training 
programs that are established in the referral hospitals and that are fi nanced 
by donors and supported by the National University of Timor-Leste prom-
ise a pipeline of skilled human resources in the future, but human resource 
needs are immediate. A cadre of returning doctors could see the ratio of 
doctors to population increase, but not enough to achieve the ministry’s 
target of 1 doctor per 10,000 persons (World Bank 2011b, 3). There are 
also concerns about the sector’s near-term capacity to absorb a new stream 
of doctors, who are likely to place a considerable strain on already limited 
fi nancial and pharmaceutical resources. 
Predictable, well-resourced health service delivery that is spatially 
 distributed is needed in the villages. SISCA is the basis for the minis-
try’s expanded health service delivery, but it has several weaknesses. The 
 program was planned and resourced according to density and not spatial 
distribution, and the end result is that more remote communities still  suffer 
from a lack of access to basic health services. Focus group participants 
complained that SISCA operations are inconsistent and not always deliv-
ered on schedule; when the rains come, the SISCA simply stops visiting the 
more isolated regions.71 
Yet perhaps the most salient challenge facing the ministry is found in the 
arteries of the institutional system—planning and  budgeting. Increasingly 
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poor links between plans and budgets are corroding national-subnational 
ties, weakening procurement and service delivery capacities, and result-
ing in uneven health services performance. The same problems are also 
stunting the functioning of the sector’s autonomous institutions, such as 
the district health centers, the community health centers, and the referral 
hospitals. 
Not discounting measurable and marked achievements, weak links 
between plans and budgets, human resource constraints, and inconsistent 
or unreliable frontline service delivery at the village level each need to be 
tackled for the ministry to continue to move forward.
Annex 12A Ministry of Health Milestones
1975  Indonesian occupation 
1976   Timor-Leste offi cially annexed as 27th province of Indonesia
1999   Referendum for independence
  Widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis: 610,000 displaced, 75 percent of 
health system destroyed, 30 doctors and specialists remain
  UNTAET and Department of Social Affairs created
  50 percent of population under poverty line
2000  Interim Health Authority established, 16 national health staff and 13 district health 
 professionals recruited
2001  Ministry of Health created, 800 staff and district health management teams appointed
  NGO emergency health care strategy phase-out concluded
2002   Timor-Leste gains independence 
  Dr. Rui Maria de Araujo appointed minister 
  New heath policy framework established
2006  Timor-Leste social and political crisis: 130,000 displaced
2007   First parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste since independence
  New coalition government formed 
  Dr. Nelson Martins appointed minister of health 
2008  Integrated Community Health System (Sistema Integrado de Saúde Comunitaria, 
SISCA) initiated
  Health Sector Strategic Plan–Support Project (HSSP-SP) launched
2009  IDP reintegration complete, health crisis averted
2010  Cuban-trained Timorese doctors start returning
2011  Health Sector Strategy 2010–30 produced 
  New HSSP adopted
2012   HSSP–SP Phase II launched
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Notes
 1. Focus group discussion, Fatuberliu. 
 2. For example, the under-fi ve mortality rate is higher in rural areas than in urban 
areas: 87 deaths per 1,000 live births in rural areas compared with 61 in urban 
areas. (National Statistics Institute 2010). 
 3. As reported by the Child Health Epidemiology Reference Group; http://www 
.unicef.org/media/fi les/Child_Mortality_Report_2011_Final.pdf.
 4. WHO data, which are based on interagency estimates for the period 
1990–2008, indicate that the maternal mortality rate has declined in Timor-
Leste (from 650 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 370 in 2008). 
 5. The proportion of children aged 12–23 months who have received DPT3 
increased from 56 percent in 2003 to 66 percent in 2009/10 and measles 
 vaccination increased from 47 percent in 2003 to 68 percent in 2009/10 
(World Bank 2013, 4).
 6. http://www.who.int/malaria/publications/country-profi les/profi le_tls_en.pdf.
 7. The hospitals in Maubisse, Maliana, and Oecusse were fi nanced under 
European Commission grants, Suai and Baucau were government fi nanced, 
and Dili was fi nanced jointly. 
 8. Focus group discussion (three women and three men 35–60 years old), 
Umaberloi Village, November 24, 2011. 
 9. Summary of key fi ndings from the focus groups. 
 10. Focus group discussion, Beacu, Viqueque, November 22, 2011. 
 11. Focus group discussion, Beacu, Viqueque, November 22, 2011.
 12. Interview with the former minister of health, Dr. Rui Maria de Araujo, October 
25, 2011. 
 13. The IHA comprised 16 senior Timorese health professionals in Dili and 1 in 
each district, along with a small number of international experts (Roland and 
Cliffe 2002; Tulloch et al. 2003).
 14. Former district-level health practitioners report that, between 1999 and 2001, 
staff at the health posts in the subdistricts were given three kilos of rice each 
month as compensation for service rendered and that, whenever they had 
more critical patients, they called the International Force for East Timor.
 15. One public health sector specialist observed that donors often channel money 
to health during an emergency, as it is the easiest and quickest route. If donors 
had been able to channel money through the MoH, health service providers 
would have been able to respond without NGO support.
 16. Interview with the former minister of health, Dr. Rui Araujo, October 25, 2011.
 17. The MoH recently signed fi ve memoranda of understanding with Care 
International, Oxfam UK, Child Fund, Healthnet, and Medico do Mundos 
to support nutrition and SISCA implementation in Timor-Leste (Ministry of 
Health 2010a). 
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 18. The European Commission, World Bank, Australian Agency for International 
Development, U.S. Agency for International Development, Portugal, Cuba, China, 
and United Nations agencies (World Health Organization, United Nations 
Children’s Fund, United Nations Population Fund, and the Global Fund).
 19. Community representatives (village chiefs and sub-village chiefs) strongly 
endorse the views of their constituencies and have a role in disseminating pub-
lic health information and mobilizing their communities to use public health 
systems. However, as with the MSS, their performance as health care interme-
diaries varies widely because of inexperience or lack of commitment. 
 20. Focus group discussions, Beacu and Fatuberliu.
 21. Interview with former minister of health, Dr. Rui Araujo, October 25, 2011.
 22. Birth spacing is a natural method of family planning that encourages women to 
defer having their fi rst child and to allow more than two years space between 
children.
 23. Data for 2003 are drawn from ever-married women, while data for 2009 are 
drawn from all women over the age of 15 years.
 24. According to the MoH and adviser informants, MoH attendance at the joint 
quarterly meetings of the NPP was patchy. The MoH had already estab-
lished planning and coordination structures (including a health sector plan, a 
medium-term expenditure framework, and a sector-wide approach) and saw 
the NPP as duplicative. But as the NPP gained legitimacy and permanence, the 
MoH scaled up its engagement. 
 25. The health MDGs include combating malaria, tuberculosis, and other dis-
eases (MDG 6); reducing child mortality (MDG 4); improving maternal 
health (MDG 5); expanding access to safe water and sanitation to half the 
population (MDG 7); halving the proportion of people suffering from hunger 
(MDG 1); and improving access to essential medicines (MDG 8).
 26. Interview 2011.
 27. Interview with Dr. Bourdaloue F. Moniz, director general of the Referral 
Hospital Maliana, and focus group discussion, Memo Subdistrict, Maliana, 
November 9, 2011.
 28. The posyandu targets pregnant mothers and mothers with preschool children.
 29. Tulloch et al. (2003) and interview with the former minister of health, Dr. Rui 
Araujo, October 25, 2011. 
 30. Interview with the director general of the district hospital in Maliana, 
November 9, 2011. 
 31. Tensions were particularly heightened with the change of government in 
2007 because of the perception that development partners tended to pursue 
their own agendas and did not listen to the changing needs of the ministry. 
At the time, the government was fi ghting fi res on several fronts, with people 
in camps, a pharmaceutical emergency, and ministries still trying to reorganize 
following the elections. 
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 32. Timor-Leste development partners meeting.
 33. Interviews with Ministry of Finance staff, October 2011. 
 34. Interview with Celestina da Costa Alves, director of the Viqueque Health Center.
 35. Focus group discussion, Caicassa Subdistrict, Fatuberliu, Same, November 17, 
2011.
 36. Mr. Tulloch worked with Dr. Sergio Lobo, an experienced surgeon, who was 
then reengaged to prepare the national Health Sector Strategic Plan and, in 
late 2012, was himself appointed minister. 
 37. An overwhelming majority of management staff informants were outwardly 
loyal to both ministers, while at the same time acknowledging the differences 
in their leadership styles.
 38. Interview with the director of human resources, MoH, October 20, 2011. 
According to the World Bank human development team, there are some 3,000 
clinical and nonclinical health workers, including permanent and nonperma-
nent staff (or contractors). 
 39. Interview with MoH staff, October–November 2011.
 40. When interviewed, Same district health staff suggested that more appropriate 
incentives and three-year bonds for new staff recruited locally to health posts 
were needed to try to address existing human resource gaps.
 41. USAID is exploring options to establish regional health support centers.
 42. “In practicum” training means practical or on-the-job training in house or in 
residence.
 43. Interview with former minister of health, Dr. Rui Araujo, October 25, 2011. 
 44. The case study team noted public performance targets and tracking in each of 
the district and subdistrict health posts visited.
 45. Compared with the MSS, MoH staff consider themselves somewhat con-
strained by delays in Public Services Commission processes. 
 46. Interviews with the director general and director of community health ser-
vices, December 2011.
 47. Most focus group participants had been exposed to MoH and NGO health 
promotion campaigns, particularly related to child and maternal health, 
HIV/AIDS, and basic sanitation.
 48. Interview, November 2011.
 49. Interview in the community health center, Laleia.
 50. An autonomous procurement agency, it has fi ve directors and a director gen-
eral and reports to a fi scal board (two members of which are appointed by the 
MoH and one by the Ministry of Finance). The director general reports to the 
minister of health and is appointed by the Council of Ministers. It is a political 
appointment. 
 51. An Institute of Health Sciences is tasked with ensuring that programming 
research, baseline surveys, and evaluations are vetted through an ethics com-
mittee consisting of academics, Church offi cials, and medical doctors. It was 
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initially diffi cult to secure donor funding for the offi ce, but AusAID, WHO, 
and the World Bank each provide contributory fi nancing. This research cabi-
net is an example of a technically sound, semi-autonomous institution embed-
ded in the MoH that complements health sector developments (Martins and 
Hawkins 2012).
 52. This is particularly true of SAMES, the creation of which was successfully 
contracted out, and the regional hospitals, which were constructed largely by 
donors.
 53. The National Laboratory and Institute of Health Sciences have particularly 
good interaction with the MoH, likely because of the minister’s research orien-
tation. By contrast, the relationship between the ministry and SAMES has long 
been diffi cult, as SAMES wants more autonomy from MoH infl uence over its 
policies, program, and budget. The same holds true between the MoH and the 
referral hospitals. Again, these institutions regularly interact and seem to enjoy 
positive relations, yet senior management staff at the hospitals were clearly 
frustrated and felt operationally constrained by the fi nancial control retained 
by the ministry (interview with Dr. Horacio Sarmento da Costa, director of 
Maubisse Referral Hospital, November 15, 2011).
 54. The same is not true of referral hospitals, which are allocated budgets accord-
ing to population size. 
 55. Initially, district health centers received US$15,000 per month, and commu-
nity health centers received US$1,500 per month. Community health centers 
now receive US$1,000 every quarter, while district fi scal envelopes oscillate 
wildly, with districts often receiving much less than the US$15,000 monthly 
stipend they once received. 
 56. Interview with former head of planning, now portfolio manager of Global 
Fund, November 18, 2011.
 57. The regional hospitals are supervised by regional supervisors who visit from 
time to time.
 58. At the time of the interview, funding constraints at Suai Hospital were severe, 
with only US$32,000 remaining in the budget allocation for July to December 
2011. Added to that, the region was desperately short on water, and there 
was a view that a special source of water needed to be safeguard to ensure the 
continued functioning of the hospital.
 59. The hospital has surgery, radiology, pharmacy, and emergency laboratory 
capacity. 
 60. Interview, November 2011.
 61. One commentator noted that this may be a result of the protocols of the 
Cubans, rather than the availability of stock, as the Cubans are known to 
overprescribe and not follow treatment protocols, which contributes to 
stock-outs.
 62. Focus group discussion, Beacu, Viqueque, November 22, 2011.
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 63. In 2010, a Central Procurement Hub was created to procure all items 
above US$3 million; anything below that threshold was to be procured 
by the  ministry. The Central Procurement Hub functioned for three 
months before procurement reverted to the ministries, and a Procurement 
Commission was then given responsibility for all procurements above 
US$1 million.
 64. The World Bank typically adopts the two-envelope bidding system, in which 
technical qualifi cations are specifi ed in one and costs in the other. The United 
Nations uses a one-envelope system, subsuming both requirements into one 
package. MoH procurement staff are aware of the diffi culties inherent in 
the two-envelope system, as it indirectly precludes small fi rms, and talks are 
under way to adopt single-envelope bidding, but there is variation across 
health sector institutions, and it will take time to adopt a single-envelope 
system.
 65. The country’s underdeveloped procurement regime has invited the prolif-
eration of donor procurement systems, leading to confusion and favoritism 
of some methods. The procurement law was generated by the Ministry of 
Finance, which procures very little and did not consider the needs of line min-
istries that procure large quantities of goods and equipment. Future efforts 
should focus on strengthening line ministries alongside the Ministry of Finance 
in basic public fi nancial management. 
 66. This approach is in line with notions of building short-term capacity together 
with medium-term development.
 67. This has had important impacts for the ministry’s performance, resilience, and 
social credibility down the line. 
 68. Although shortcomings in how SISCA was planned have raised imple-
mentation diffi culties and although the real results of community-level 
 service delivery are not yet clear, focus group participants and community 
informants vigorously advocated the merits of SISCA. This suggests that 
SISCA plays an important role in building confi dence between citizens and 
the MoH. 
 69. Suai Hospital has existed since the Indonesia era, although it was formerly 
an internment clinic and did not do operations. Following the referendum, 
the clinic provided emergency operations (Cesarean sections) with help from 
Medecins San Frontiéres SF, and then the New Zealand and Slovakian military 
hospitals were mostly used. Mobile clinics were used to serve the subdistricts. 
Suai Hospital was established in 2003.
 70. Most district-level managers interviewed as part of this lessons-learned 
review are qualifi ed and practicing health clinicians, but few were quali-
fi ed in  management, leaving subnational health centers short on manage-
ment skills. One of the proposals put forward in the National Health 
Workforce Plan 2007–2015 is that district health managers and their 
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deputies have both a clinical background and suitable management cre-
dentials (Heldel et al. 2007). 
 71. This was the experience of the subdistrict of Bobonaro, which the research 
team visited.
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 C H A P T E R  1 3
Timor-Leste Case Study: The Central Bank 
of Timor-Leste
Lorena Viñuela
Emerging from a 24-year struggle and the widespread violence and 
 destruction that followed the 1999 referendum, Timor-Leste’s economic 
challenges were daunting. A decade later, the young nation has made impor-
tant strides toward reconstructing its economy and physical  infrastructure. 
The Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) played a critical role in the 
transition to independent economic management. 
The institution, formally transformed into the Central Bank in September 
2011, is responsible for holding government accounts, making payments, 
licensing banks and insurance companies, compiling and publishing mon-
etary and banking statistics and other economic information, managing 
the operations of the Petroleum Fund, and issuing centavo coins. These 
functions were previously carried out by BPA (2001–11) and the Central 
Payments Offi ce (CPO) (2000–01), which had been created by the United 
Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999 
and administered the country until 2002.
Having recorded important successes along its development, the orga-
nization stands out in a context in which most public agencies are weak. 
Among other achievements, BPA was the fi rst public agency to staff all 
middle and senior management positions with nationals, a process known 
also as “Timorization.” When the country adopted the U.S. dollar as the 
national currency, it took BPA less than a year to replace the many cur-
rencies that were being used. More important, BPA, and later the Central 
Bank, has managed with good results the high-profi le Petroleum Fund and 
the banking system through turbulent economic and political conditions. 
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The organization has supported the rapid adoption of international 
 standards in the banking sector and the dissemination of technology to sup-
port them.
The key elements driving success have been early and uninterrupted 
assistance from development partners, a simple institutional and legal 
framework, reliance on a building-block approach for organizational 
development, sustained emphasis on improving the capacity of national 
staff and organizational learning, and stability of middle and senior man-
agement. The consistent fi nancial and technical support from donors and 
the government has given the institution the space and resources to pursue 
capacity building at a steady pace. At the same time, senior and middle 
management have strongly supported the institutional development road-
map and kept a consistent focus on reaching milestones and, ultimately, 
the goal of becoming a fully independent central bank. Early successes 
have contributed to creating a strong organizational identity and culture, 
including demonstrating the importance and benefi ts of transparency and 
reaching out to stakeholders.
The early development of the institution was the result of the tempo-
rary alignment of the priorities between the transitional government and 
those of the agency. During the fi rst years of independent life, the Timorese 
government prioritized the adoption of international best practices and 
creating a lean public sector. This approach, favored by the transitional 
administration and shaped by the experiences of the returning diaspora, 
placed an important emphasis in laying the foundations for an independent 
central bank and the transparent management of revenues from the then 
nascent oil sector. For the governing elite, having an independent central 
bank had important symbolic implications for the nation-building project. 
This ensured the support of all political camps. BPA was fully capitalized 
in July 2005, demonstrating the government’s strong commitment to the 
institutional development roadmap.
Despite its many achievements, however, the Central Bank continues 
to face important challenges in managing rising infl ation. In the absence 
of monetary policy, its role remains limited. Rising public revenue, driven 
by increases in oil production and prices, has created strong political pres-
sures to expand spending and led to the revision of the architecture of the 
Petroleum Fund. The planned, large-scale public investments and the ever-
increasing withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund add to these challenges. 
In addition, the fi nancial services sector remains underdeveloped, and there 
is little credit culture or access in the country.
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Institutional Success
When the Central Payments Offi ce (later converted into the Banking and 
Payments Authority) was created in 2000 to act as a quasi-central bank, 
UNTAET confronted daunting diffi culties. In addition to the complete 
destruction of physical infrastructure and reliable means of communica-
tion, there were almost no locals with the required skills or experience in 
banking. Multiple currencies were circulating in the country (Australian 
dollar, Indonesian rupiah, Portuguese escudo, American dollar) and 
being exchanged in informal markets. There was a small nascent bank-
ing sector, but its costs and risks were high. In that setting, most pay-
ments were, and still are, made in cash and to individuals. A few years 
later, when the country established the Petroleum Fund, there was con-
siderable uncertainty about the capacity of the organization to manage 
it. The institution tackled these challenges and built its credibility in a 
relatively short period of time. This section discusses some of the main 
achievements of the organization related to results and legitimacy as well 
as how it has forged resilience in the face of a rapidly changing political 
environment.
Results
The main areas in which the organization has exhibited sustained improve-
ments are currency management, legal and organizational infrastructure 
for the supervision of the banking and insurance sectors, and the perfor-
mance of the Petroleum Fund. One of the fi rst achievements of BPA was 
the introduction of the U.S. dollar as the only currency with legal status in 
Timor-Leste. The task required personnel to visit all districts and villages. 
The BPA launched a wide-reaching but low-cost sensitization campaign 
that took place between August 2001 and April 2002. The U.S. dollar had 
been selected by the transitional government because it was expected to 
support low infl ation and low interest rates. The staff member that led this 
process described it as being “a success well beyond our original expec-
tations” (interview with senior staff, November 2011). In approximately 
eight months, the use of the U.S. dollar was general and almost the exclu-
sive means of payment in the country, as it is today. According to senior 
staff members, this experience decisively shaped the manner in which the 
institution approached the public and its communication strategy, inculcat-
ing the importance of reaching the population beyond Dili. The dollariza-
tion program also contributed to building a lasting sense of achievement.
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Shortly after, BPA started producing Timorese coins. Despite its limited 
economic implications, this event constituted a symbolic milestone for the 
organization and the government. The 2002–03 annual report refers to 
this event as an “excellent reason to feel proud, having contributed, albeit 
on a small scale, to the history of Timor-Leste, because the fi rst emission 
of currency in a newly independent country is a unique occurrence that 
cannot be repeated” (BPA 2002–03 Annual Report).
The organization worked closely with the government and parliament 
to develop policy and legislation on the areas of the treasury, payment 
transactions, insurance, licensing, and anti–money laundering, which are 
important pillars for the development of the fi nancial sector of a country. 
The then-BPA was actively involved in setting up the resource wealth man-
agement framework.
While building the legal framework for its operation, the organization 
developed systems and put together teams and divisions in charge of their 
implementation. In 2008, an automated credit registry was introduced 
with the goal of improving the quality of credit assessments and reducing 
risks in lending. New rules on the settlement of large-value transactions 
(Clearing and Settlement of Interbank Card Transactions) were imple-
mented through the establishment of a clearing house, enabling the pro-
cessing of payments in the same day starting in 2004. According to client 
banks, this innovation has allowed them to prevent fraud and deal with 
diffi cult cases in a timely manner.
Despite the remaining challenges in extending access to fi nance and 
improving fi nancial literacy, the Timorese banking system has grown 
(table 13.1). Credit to the private sector has increased in areas such as 
 construction, trade, fi nance, and individual loans (Central Bank 2011). 
The existing foreign bank branches belong to profi table parent banks, 
some of the key indicators are presented in table 13.2. Foreign ownership 
Table 13.1. Financial Soundness Indicators, 2009–11
Percent
Indicator 2009 2010 2011
Return on assets 1.73 0.31 0.58
NPLs/total loans 32.1 41.7 39.1
Total provisions/NPLs 162.6 131.7 125.4
Loans/deposits 38.4 36.5 43.0
Sources: Central Bank 2011; IMF 2012a.
Note: NPL = nonperforming loan.
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of the banks has contributed to a more rapid adoption of international 
standards in the services provided and the dissemination of technology to 
support them in collaboration with BPA. 
The overall condition of the banking system is positive and considered 
“healthy” (IMF 2012a). By 2012, foreign assets (mostly in the Petroleum 
Fund) have risen to US$500 million, which is equivalent to 170 months 
of imports (see fi gure 13.1). The amount of deposits in commercial banks 
grew from US$58.5 million in 2002 to US$344.4 million in 2012, mainly 
driven by rising public receipts from the oil sector. Credit to the private 
sector is slowly increasing, currently representing 13 percent of non-oil 
gross domestic product (GDP) (IMF 2012a) (table 13.2). The volume of 
credit in the fi rst quarter of 2012 was US$133.3 million, which is more 
than ten times that of 2002 (see fi gure 13.2). The rate of nonperforming 
Table 13.2. Parent Bank Financial Soundness Indicators, 2011
Capital adequacy ratio ANZ Bank Mandiri Caixa Geral de Depositos
Total 12.1 13.4 12.3
Return on equity 15.3 24.4 4.1
Return on assets 1.0 3.4 0.3
Source: IMF (2012a).
 Figure 13.1. Total Assets, 2004–12
Source: Central Bank 2012.
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loans is relatively high, but they are fully covered by provisions against 
potential losses (Central Bank/BPA 2011). Concurrently, the percentage 
of money that banks are placing abroad has decreased as a consequence 
of the higher number of domestic loans. See also tables 13A.1 and 13A.2 
in the annex.
According to the Petroleum Law, all the taxes and revenues from the 
oil industry are deposited in the Petroleum Fund and channeled through 
the budget. Since its inception in 2005, the Petroleum Fund’s holdings 
have grown geometrically. New projects coming online in the Timor Sea 
and high international oil prices have led to a steady increase in revenues. 
Starting with a balance of US$250 million dollars, the Petroleum Fund had 
reached more than US$10.3 billion by the fi rst quarter of 2012. BPA was 
directly involved in the process of limited diversifi cation of the investment 
strategy for the Petroleum Fund and in selecting its managers.1
Annual withdrawals are subject to a ceiling based on the Estimated 
Sustainable Income (ESI). However, since 2008 the government, with the 
approval of parliament, has made withdrawals exceeding the ESI.2 Budget 
execution has accelerated in recent years, with expenditures going from 
US$65 million in 2005 to US$1.2 billion in 2011 (see fi gures 13.3 and 13.4). 
Since then, the government has pursued an aggressive policy to increase 
budget execution and capital investment, while strengthening basic fi nan-
cial management and delegating procurement authority to line ministries.
Source: Central Bank 2012.
 Figure 13.2. Loan Performance, 2004–12
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 Figure 13.3. Government Capital and Current Expenditures, 2005–12
Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste.
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 Figure 13.4. Government Revenue and Expenditure, 2000–11
Source: IMF 2012b.
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Importantly, the institution has managed and adapted to an ever-growing 
volume of operations ranging from processing and clearing checks and 
interbank payment orders, the execution of domestic and international 
payments related to government activities, payments to civil servants, and 
importing and distributing currency. Almost from the beginning, the agency 
used real-time accounting, and developed information management systems 
that have allowed it to closely control its transactions. This was achieved 
despite the diffi culties arising from the changing characteristics from CPO to 
BPA and the constraints in the environment. In addition, the institution has 
made considerable progress in areas that are still not fully developed in most 
 government agencies, such as statistics, internal audit, and procurement.
The Central Bank has successfully handled the drastic increase in gov-
ernment transactions and has maintained transparent reporting on all 
aspects of the management of the Petroleum Fund. In fact, in 2010 Timor-
Leste was declared compliant with the terms of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, which aims to increase the accountability of gov-
ernments and companies in resource management throughout the world. 
Timor-Leste was the third country in the world to achieve that status.
Another dimension in which the organization has been successful is in 
collecting data, completing balance of payments and annual reports on 
time, and sharing all publications publicly. BPA started collecting eco-
nomic statistics and publishing them in various formats, including the 
Economics Bulletin. Most of the publications are available in multiple 
languages. Importantly, since 2008 the institution has been in compliance 
with the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) standard report forms, 
and national statistics are now published regularly in the International 
Financial Statistics database.
Legitimacy
The Central Bank’s legitimacy is crystallized in the positive reputation that 
it enjoys among domestic and international stakeholders and partners alike. 
The fact that the institution acts within a delimited and clear legal frame-
work provides it with an important source of procedural legitimacy. The 
institution is governed by a board that represents all major  stakeholders. Its 
legitimacy also derives from the active outreach campaigns that the orga-
nization carries out to engage the public, members of parliament, and civil 
society about its role. The institution has made efforts to be  transparent 
to the public,  publishing its monetary statistics in local newspapers and 
through its quarterly bulletin, which is available in all offi cial languages. 
TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY: THE CENTRAL BANK OF TIMOR-LESTE • 355
In the face of prohibitive interest rates, the Central Bank is looking to 
expand microlending programs in rural areas, which could be a future 
source of local legitimacy.
The institution has contributed to reaching a wider swath of the popu-
lation across various regional and socioeconomic divides by expanding 
fi nancial services. Banks and microfi nance institutions have been licensed 
to operate in nine districts (of 13). Public education about dollarization has 
been an effective means of bringing the institution closer to citizens, as the 
2009 BPA report describes.3 
International legitimacy is refl ected in investments by several interna-
tional banks that have set up operations in the country. The Central Bank’s 
increasing capacity and its compliance with international norms have earned 
recognition from the IMF. Two years after its establishment, the Petroleum 
Fund was ranked the third most transparent and sound sovereign wealth 
fund in the world (Truman 2008). Although the current rating has dropped 
because of concerns about the lack of enforcement of the ESI, the Petroleum 
Fund is still considered among the most transparent in the world.
Resilience
BPA has withstood signifi cant challenges in the past decade. The institu-
tion went through a leadership transition in 2004 with the fi rst Timorese 
assuming the top management role. BPA was the fi rst organization in 
the country to have all senior management positions fi lled with nation-
als. Initially funded by donors, through UNTAET, the institution is now 
fully capitalized by the government and independent from external fi nan-
cial assistance. Importantly, the institution has continued to make progress 
amid economic and political instability. 
The organization was able to anticipate risks associated with the inter-
national fi nancial crisis and effectively protect the domestic fi nancial 
 system. The 2008–09 Annual Report describes this:
The fi nancial year of 2008/09 has been a year of opportunity as well as 
challenges for the BPA as a juvenile institution which is trying to learn 
from the experiences and addressed the challenges ahead. The … fi nancial 
crisis has given BPA the opportunity to learn from its peers on how to 
address the distress. The lessons learnt have been enormous not only in 
relation to the areas where a central bank has to deal with but the most 
important things are a proper institutional setting to deal with the  distress.
(BPA Annual Report 2008/2009)
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Sociopolitical and Historical Context: Locking in a Roadmap for 
Autonomy
In its short life, the Central Bank has continued to expand and adapt its 
mandate and strategies to the evolving political-economic context and the 
overall institutional evolution of the government. Building on the cred-
ibility and capacity generated by early achievements, the institution has 
been able to safeguard its autonomy and gain standing as a technically 
competent organization. 
Timor-Leste is undergoing a simultaneous process of nation building 
and transition to democracy. The consolidation of a democratic regime 
confronts important problems, including divisions among the elite on 
what the national development project should be and how to achieve it. 
The Offi ce of the Prime Minister has concentrated more power, with a 
strong role in the allocation of public funds. The Parliament remains rela-
tively weak and marginalized in the policy-making process. The general 
lack of capability of state institutions and their vulnerability to partisan 
manipulation serve to feed grievances and create windows for opportu-
nistic behavior. After an intense process of capacity building in the early 
post-independence period, institutional capacity appears to have stabilized 
at a fairly low level. The country’s score for quality of public administra-
tion in the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment has 
remained unchanged since 2006. Some progress has been made on the side 
of macroeconomic management and fi scal policy, especially in relation to 
capacity building on public fi nancial management. 
Against this backdrop, the Central Bank stands out as an institution 
that has achieved steady development and displayed consistent results in 
its performance. The organization has continued to stress its political and 
economic independence and carefully positioned itself vis-à-vis the chang-
ing government policy on the Petroleum Fund. 
Early in 2000, UNTAET laid the technical foundations of a macroeco-
nomic management framework, establishing the Central Fiscal Authority 
(CFA) to act as the treasury, collecting revenues from customs and tax, and 
developing a fi rst budget covering all state expenditures. UNTAET created 
the Central Payments Offi ce to handle payments for the administration. 
The bases of a regulatory framework for the supervision of a banking sys-
tem were also introduced. CPO was the nucleus of what would become the 
Banking and Payments Authority and later the Central Bank. During the 
TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY: THE CENTRAL BANK OF TIMOR-LESTE • 357
transition to an independent government, BPA led the process of dollariza-
tion and issuing of the Timorese coins. 
The establishment of the Petroleum Fund in 2005 gave BPA a more cen-
tral role in the economic management of the country. The Petroleum Fund 
was created to manage the considerable revenues that the country receives 
from the extraction of oil and gas in the Joint Petroleum Development 
Area that Australia and Timor-Leste share. The main objectives were to 
smooth public expenditures to mitigate negative economic impacts and 
ensure intergenerational equity in the use of the resources. Following the 
Norwegian model, the Petroleum Fund was designed to ensure transpar-
ency and discourage off-budget spending. According the Petroleum Law, 
all withdrawals from the fund are to be transferred directly to the national 
budget, and the amount should be determined by a formula that estimates 
the sustainable level of consumption. Managing the fund has since been 
one of the main activities of BPA. 
Initially, the country faced important challenges in building the cred-
ibility of the Petroleum Fund. The 2006 Crisis cast additional doubt on the 
economic prospects of the country. Nonetheless, a year later, the Peterson 
Institute ranked Timor-Leste’s sovereign wealth fund as the third best in 
the world in terms of governance and management performance. During 
2006 and 2007, the institution continued to invest in capacity in collabora-
tion with the IMF and the Bank of Portugal and Bank Indonesia. It worked 
with the government to pass important pieces of legislation, including 
regulations on banking and insurance. In the words of the then-General 
Manager, referring to the crisis, “Despite the storm the boat was taken to 
harbor safe” (interview with senior staff, November 2011).
Concerned with maintaining political stability and building citizen 
support for state institutions, the Gusmão administration has consider-
ably scaled up public spending and prioritized investment in infrastruc-
ture and social sectors. In particular, there have been considerable efforts 
to assist internally displaced persons by providing them with cash set-
tlements and other forms of aid. In 2009, a referendum package was 
approved to promote small infrastructure projects in all districts and to 
promote the local private sector and short-term employment. The gov-
ernment also introduced several cash transfer programs and pensions for 
elderly and disabled persons. And it has taken several steps to revise the 
architecture of wealth management introduced in 2005 by the Petroleum 
Law and launched a strategic plan to diversify the economy. The 2012 
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budget included capital investment to total US$958 million, representing 
45 percent of the 2011 spending and twice the level of ESI established by 
the Petroleum Law.
The institution has played a crucial role the identifi cation of poten-
tial external managers and the defi nition of the terms of reference 
and transparency requirements. In 2009, the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) was entrusted to manage a fi fth of the balance of the 
Petroleum Fund to invest it in sovereign and supranational bonds in 
euros, U.S. dollars, Australian dollars, British pounds, and Japanese yen. 
In 2010, Schroeder Investment Management was selected as the fi rst 
equity manager to invest 4 percent of the Petroleum Fund in global 
stocks. The rest of the funds continue to be managed internally by the 
Central Bank. In March 2012, the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank announced that up to 20 percent of the fund will be progressively 
invested in equity. 
In September 2011, BPA became the Central Bank of Timor-Leste. The 
new organic law (No. 5/2011) gave broader powers and autonomy to the 
new central bank. The entity is to be managed by a governor supported 
by two deputy governors and a board of directors. Abraão Vasconselos, 
who previously was general manager of BPA since 2004, was appointed 
as the fi rst governor. The transformation of BPA into the Central Bank of 
Timor-Leste was seen as an important step in the completion of the macro-
economic management architecture of the country.
BPA and its successor have been important advocates of the Petroleum 
Fund’s architecture and the need to protect it from individual or group polit-
ical and economic interests. The institution uses its regular press releases 
and press conferences, as well as its communications with the government, 
as a means to stress its position regarding macroeconomic management. 
For example, at the inaugural ceremony of the Central Bank, the governor 
underscored the need “to advance Accountability and Transparency, defi n-
ing the powers conferred by its functions as Central Bank and allowing the 
process of supervision by the Public” (Governor’s Speech at the Inaugural 
Ceremony, September 2011).
The unique circumstances under which the organization was estab-
lished and the fact that, for many years, external partners had signifi cant 
infl uence, created an environment that was conducive for its development. 
The visibility of the Petroleum Fund has guaranteed the continuing sup-
port and interest of international fi nance institutions and bilateral donors. 
In addition, having an independent central bank is an important marker in 
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the process of state building and, therefore, consistent with the goals of the 
elites and the government. However, the new resource wealth management 
structure could have negative consequences in the long term and limit the 
role of the Central Bank in economic policy. 
External Operational Environment: Securing Autonomy and Building 
Relationships with Stakeholders
Whereas the operating environment of public administration in Timor-
Leste has been turbulent and marked with change, BPA and the central 
bank have been largely sheltered from it. The institutional setup insulates 
the agency from the political economy context and grants it considerable 
independence. The institution has the strong backing of international stake-
holders and banks.
Isomorphic infl uences are visible. CPO closely followed the model of 
the public fi nancial management system implemented in Kosovo by the 
United Nations and the IMF, whereas the design of the Petroleum Fund 
mirrored Norway’s sovereign wealth fund and international best practice. 
At the same time, clear international standards for banking supervision 
and other functions performed by central banks have allowed the institu-
tion to devise a long-term development plan and assess its progress against 
the various accepted benchmarks.
Considering the Timorese context, the Central Bank adapted some of its 
services and acted as a bank and a tax collection agent and, on occasion, 
mounted mobile payment units to reach districts. The institution opened 
a branch in Oecusse, which is physically separated from the rest of the 
territory. 
Using Partnerships to Deliver on the Organizational Mandate
The organization has strong relations with external partners that have been 
instrumental in creating the existing capacity. These include the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the central banks of Portugal, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 
among others. Over 85 percent of the technical staff has received train-
ing abroad or participated in secondment programs. Through these 
exchanges, the staff has been introduced to professional networks and 
the institution now participates in regional forums for central bankers. 
They share the goal of sustaining technical gains as a means to main-
tain macroeconomic stability and long-term policy development. In the 
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management of the Petroleum Fund, the institution works in  partnership 
with JP Morgan, the BIS, and Schroeder Management. 
Use of the U.S. dollar as national currency has contributed to the cred-
ibility of the country, while relieving the Central Bank from pressures to 
use monetary policy in the short term. At the same time, the original frame-
work of wealth management protected the Central Bank from external 
pressures by defi ning a clear division of responsibilities. 
At present, there are three commercial banks in Timor-Leste, all of 
which are branches of foreign-owned banks, including ANZ, CGD (Caixa 
Geral do Depósitos), and Bank Mandizi. ANZ is not a lending institution, 
but provides fi nancial services in the Dili area. CGD has branches in six 
districts (Bacau, Gleno, Maliana, Oecusse, Viqueque, and Suai), and offers 
a variety of products targeted to the informal sector and rural areas. Bank 
Mandizi mainly serves Indonesian businesses in Timor-Leste and commer-
cial enterprises. ANZ and CGD started their operations in 2000 and Bank 
Mandini in 2003. Although the fi nancial sector is still small and develop-
ing, the low fi nancial literacy among the majority of the population trans-
lates into little demand. 
The microfi nance sector is also small. The main institutions provid-
ing this type of services include IMFTL (Institução de Microfi nanças de 
Timor-Leste), three nongovernmental organizations (CASHPOR, Moris 
Rasik, and Tuba Rai Metin), and a credit union established by the Asian 
Development Bank. These are members of the Association for Microfi nance 
in Timor-Leste. Although the Central Bank does not regulate them, it 
grants them a limited license with caps on the microcredit loan portfolio, 
the amount of deposits maintained, and the liquidity ratio. 
Placing Transparency at the Center of Stakeholder Engagement
BPA has stressed the importance of transparency, and it actively engages 
external stakeholders and civil society. As part of its communication strat-
egy, the institution regularly publishes quarterly publications on statistics, 
monthly reports on the performance of the Petroleum Fund, and the 
 minutes of the committee meetings. BPA conducted a broad public out-
reach campaign to educate the public about the adoption of the dollar as a 
single currency. Following these practices, the Central Bank holds regular 
media conferences, and it was one of the fi rst institutions to have a working 
website, with most materials available in Tetum, Portuguese, and English. 
The Central Bank has since its early days strategically used the speeches 
of the governor and the communiqués of the board to introduce and 
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highlight topics of the public agenda related to the institutional mandate as 
defi ned by the incorporation law. This aspect has been highlighted as very 
positive by civil society representatives and development partners alike. In 
its July 2011 submission to the parliament on the proposed amendments 
to the Petroleum Law that would be passed later that year, BPA expressed 
its concerns about the implications of the changes in the following manner 
(July 2011 Submission to Parliament):
The BPA notes that the proposed amendments to the law have the poten-
tial to signifi cantly increase the infl uence and authority of the Ministry 
of Finance over the management of the Petroleum Fund at the expense 
of the institutional checks and balances built into the existing law. In 
particular, the Minister of Finance will have the power to determine 
(with the approval of parliament) who the operational manager shall 
be. Furthermore, the proposed amendments transfer signifi cant responsi-
bilities from the Investment Advisory Board to the Ministry of Finance, 
while at the same time disenfranchising the Central Bank and Treasurer 
from their ex offi cio positions in the Investment Advisory Board, poten-
tially separating the investment and management of the Petroleum Fund 
from the nation’s fi scal and monetary functions.
In 2004/5 BPA offi cials actively worked with the Ministry of Finance 
throughout the legal drafting of the Petroleum Fund law as it stands 
today. However during the 2010/11 review, the Ministry of Finance 
has not involved the Banking and Payments Authority in the develop-
ment of the proposed amendments, except to the extent of giving the 
BPA an opportunity to make a written submission on an earlier draft of 
the amendments during the brief period of public consultations in late 
October 2010, at which time the Minister gave the BPA an even shorter 
period. . . .
The institution works closely with counterparts such as JP Morgan, 
which is the custodian of the Petroleum Fund and manages passive invest-
ments, and with BIS and Schroeder who handle active investments. The 
Central Bank diligently supervises three banking institutions and has fre-
quent communications with them in addition to regular supervision visits. 
The clients describe the staff as “a competent team with a good organiza-
tion and division of labor” and as “paying great attention to details.” The 
clients in the interviews for this study provided many examples in which 
the close collaboration with the Central Bank has allowed them to solve 
problems and avert risks. Similarly, they unanimously recognize the signifi -
cant gains in capacity made by the institution in a relatively short period 
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of time and the professionalism and work ethic of its staff, which in their 
view are not as common in the public sector.
Another important client of the Central Bank is the Ministry of Finance 
and in particular the Director-General for Treasury. The advisors and staff 
members interviewed agreed that the institution has steadily improved its 
capacity and “supported the ministry in the rapid scaling up of payments 
and transactions since 2007.” The Central Bank has helped the ministry 
to improve its own technical capacity in areas such as economic modeling 
and statistics. The interviewees appreciated that the institution has resisted 
external pressures, including from donors, to keep expatriates in manage-
ment and consistently followed a policy of merit-based appointments and 
Timorization.
Incorporating the Lessons from Other Postconfl ict Experiences
The design of the Central Payments Offi ce and the decision to implement 
a quasi-central bank model were directly informed and infl uenced by the 
experience of the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank in the 
Balkans and particularly in Kosovo. This model emphasized the introduc-
tion of a simple structure and set of regulations, on the basis of which more 
complex tasks and structures could be built as the government and the 
domestic fi nancial sector developed. Similarly, the institutional structure 
for managing oil and gas, as well as the revenues resulting from its exploi-
tation, closely replicates that of Norway. The fact that Australia shares the 
rights to the Joint Development Area also has infl uenced the design of the 
petroleum regime and the features of the natural resource management 
architecture.
Another factor that has contributed to normative isomorphism is that 
central bankers and bank supervising agencies form one of the strongest 
transnational networks of government offi cials (Slaughter 2004).4 There 
is strong consensus among experts and practitioners on the principles and 
structures that would achieve the best results. These are crystallized for 
example in the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.5 Yet, the 
concept of an autonomous central bank, stressing the importance of taking 
politics out of the economy to ensure fi scal discipline and monetary stabil-
ity, is relatively new (Polillo and Guillén 2005); it spread during  the 1990s 
(Keefer and Stasavage 1998). 
The staff was introduced to these concepts and the professional net-
work through training and exchange programs early in the development 
of the organization.6 Most of the staff were recruited and trained by 
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the IMF and the World Bank. They were subsequently divided into two 
groups, one for CPO and one for CFA. Many of the staff members have 
spent time abroad in development assignments and working for peer orga-
nizations. Moreover, the returned diaspora, many of whom went on to 
occupy positions of leadership in the transitional government and in the 
economic sector, had been exposed to these ideas in the countries where 
they were educated and began their professional careers, such as Australia, 
Indonesia, and Portugal.
In addition, there have been other elements that have enforced this 
approach. The strong infl uence of donors for most of the independent 
history of the country has been a driver of the adoption of the cur-
rent economic management structure. In many instances, funding and 
technical assistance were made conditional on the country introducing 
specifi c institutional reforms. At the same time, having an  independent 
institution managing monetary policy and supervising banks constitutes 
an important signal to foreign investors that the government is commit-
ted to macroeconomic prudence. Thus, it was required for attracting the 
banks and investors necessary to achieve the  economic diversifi cation 
that the government sees as an important pillar of national development.
Benefi tting from Effective Donor Coordination
Close donor coordination has been in place from the outset of the 
peacekeeping operation and during the international administration. 
This coordination effort covered not only United Nations agencies, but 
also nongovernmental organizations and bilateral assistance. A Joint 
Assessment Mission conducted in October 1999 resulted in a common 
diagnosis of needs and a division of labor among development partners. 
The strong multilateral coordination was refl ected in the establishment 
of two trust funds, an IDA-administered Trust Fund for East Timor 
administered by the International Development Association (IDA), 
amounting to US$170 million, and a smaller UNTAET Trust Fund 
to cover recurrent expenditures and capital expenditures of the civil 
administration and justice sectors.7 A coordination unit at UNTAET 
facilitated the work of bilateral donors. The simple macroeconomic 
framework established ensured transparency in the fi nancial manage-
ment of these resources and laid the foundations for the new  government 
(World Bank 2006). In the specifi c context of CPO and CFA, the main 
donors working with the institution were the IMF, World Bank, and 
Asian Development Bank. 
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Internal Institutional Workings: Building-Block Approach and 
Organizational Learning
Strong donor coordination, an initial consensus between domestic and 
external stakeholders on a blueprint for organizational development, con-
sistent resourcing and technical assistance, and enough political space to 
guard the independence of the institution were some of the most relevant 
factors of the external operating environment that explain the early success. 
At the same time, these elements have been refl ected in how the institution 
developed internally (see table 13.3). The mandate has grown since the 
Table 13.3. Milestones of the Central Bank
Year
Sociopolitical 
context
External operating 
environment
Internal institutional 
workings
1999 Referendum and ensuing 
violence
INTERFET deployment
2000 UNTAET became 
responsible for the 
country’s administration
Australia signed 
memorandum of 
understanding over 
revenues from oil fi elds 
in Timor Sea, giving 
Timor-Leste 90% of 
revenues
Creation of the Central Payments 
Offi ce
2001 Election of 88-member 
Constituent Assembly, 
Fretilin party gained 
majority
Transition to the Bank and 
Payment Authority
2002 Independence declared
Political mission, UNMISET, 
replaced UNTAET
Constitution approved
Dollarization and issuing of 
Timorese coins
2004 Production at offshore gas 
fi eld began at Bay Undan 
Introduction of own 
terms of payment
Petroleum Law passed
Completion of Timorization
Creation of Petroleum Fund 
Division
2005 Remaining Australian 
peacekeepers left
Capitalization
Memorandum of 
understanding with 
the government 
on Petroleum Fund 
management
Petroleum Fund commenced 
operations
Credit Registry Information 
Systems and Large Value 
Transfer Systems operational
(continued next page)
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creation of the Central Payments Offi ce, but initially it was quite  succinct. 
Building on early achievements, the mandate was expanded considerably 
in the past decade, going from an offi ce exclusively dedicated to making the 
government’s payments to handling a multibillion dollar Petroleum Fund. 
Each new task has been accompanied with the addition of a specialized 
department, following a building-block approach to institution building 
from less to more complex activities.
Shielded from the political cycle, the institution has enjoyed stabil-
ity in its top leadership and in middle management. Senior management 
has emphasized professionalism and the strict adherence to the formal 
Table 13.3. Milestones of the Central Bank (continued )
Year
Sociopolitical 
context
External operating 
environment
Internal institutional 
workings
2006 Factional violence left 
25 dead and thousands 
internally displaced
Foreign troops returned 
to Dili
Prime Minister Alkatiri 
resigned 
UNMIT set up
2007 Elections resulted in a 
coalition-led government 
with Xanana Gusmao 
as Prime Minister, 
prompting violent 
protests
Timor-Leste EITI 
candidate
2008 Scaling-up of public 
spending
2009 International crisis
Food crisis
Appointment of the Bank for 
International Settlements as 
external manager of 20% of the 
Petroleum Fund
2010 Appointment of Schroder 
Investment Management 
Limited as manager of 4% of 
the Petroleum Fund (to be 
invested in global stocks)
2011 Central Bank Organic 
Law passed
Timor-Leste EITI 
compliant
Incorporation of the Central Bank 
of Timor-Leste
Source: Banking and Payments Authority and Central Bank Annual Reports, 2003–11.
Note: EITI = Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, INTERFET = United Nations International Force for East 
Timor, UNMISET = United Nations Mission in East Timor, UNMIT = United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste, UNTAET = United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor. 
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mandate of the institution as a means of defending its independence, as 
well as converging with international standards. These values are manifest 
in the activities and culture of the organization. 
The organization has gone a long way in terms of building capacity 
and actively promoting learning. CPO was initially staffed by international 
experts. A cohort of Timorese staff were recruited in the early days of inde-
pendence, trained and paired with an international staff until they were 
ready to take over the tasks. However, the staff was told that they needed 
to be ready to take over functions if expatriates were to leave at any time. 
Beyond the initial training and mentoring, the organization continued 
to invest in building the capacity needed to carry out the functions and 
acquire experience as central bankers. The introduction of the 2004–07 
Corporate Plan stated, “The intellectual capital of the BPA is in many ways 
more important than its fi nancial capital, and the emphasis on this aspect 
of our development is so that we can continue to respond to the chang-
ing  environment…” (BPA Corporate Plan 2004). This strategy has been 
 facilitated by the autonomy that the institution has over human resource 
management decisions and by a more competitive pay scale. 
The structure was designed to address core functions and in such manner 
that departments would be added as these expanded. There are four depart-
ments and four divisions (see fi gure 13A.1). The institutional structure has 
not signifi cantly changed since its inception, except for the addition of the 
Petroleum Department and the personnel and specialized investment and 
risk management divisions.
Developing Timorese Leadership and Corporate Identity
The institution has focused on generating human capital to fi ll top posi-
tions and on maintaining stability. At the early stage of its establishment, 
the organization was managed by international expatriates under the tech-
nical assistance program of the IMF. Since August 2004, all line manage-
ment positions have been Timorized, with a small number of expatriates 
remaining as advisors in key areas. The Central Bank has consistently 
invested in human capital through long- and short-term training, second-
ments (in the Bank of Portugal, Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Malaysia, 
Indonesian Banking Institute, South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN), 
and the IMF Institute in Singapore) and more recently the establishment 
of a training center. The Central Bank is exploring the possibility of send-
ing personnel to train in other entities with which it has links, such as 
JP Morgan, Mercer, BIS, KPMG, and Deloitte.
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In the fi rst 10 years of the organization’s history, there have been 
only two general managers, Luis Quintaneiro, 2002–04, and Abraão 
Vasconcelos, since 2004. All the department heads have been with the 
institution since the creation of CPO. Only one left to spend some time in 
the private sector and then returned after a year. Both general managers 
have emphasized accountability and transparency as central values that 
should guide the institution’s daily work. In the speech for the inauguration 
of the Central Bank in 2011, Mr. Vasconcelos stated, “The creation of the 
Timor-Leste Central Bank is an initiative to control the activities carried 
out by private banks scattered across the territory, and thus can advance 
with Accountability and Transparency, defi ning the powers conferred by 
its functions as Central Bank,” as well as that the institution “aspires 
to the highest standards of Stability, Transparency and Prosperity.” The 
emblem of a buffalo was chosen as the institutional logo because it rep-
resents “the Timor-Leste property and symbolizes the concept of stability 
and transparency in the Timorese fi nancial system,” in Mr. Vasconselos’ 
words (Governor’s Speech at the Inaugural Ceremony, September 2011). 
There is a strong emphasis on professionalism and work ethic, as well as 
a merit culture that is promoted at all levels of leadership. Employees refer 
to these values as the features that distinguish the Central Bank from the 
rest of public administration. They consider themselves “lucky that after 
being recruited they were assigned to CPO instead of CFA” (interview with 
senior staff, 2011). To them, their professional standing results from their 
belonging to the organization.
The Central Bank adopted a code of conduct in 2011 that stresses that 
in their conduct staff members should act to preserve the independence and 
credibility of the agency and be mindful of their legal obligations and what 
is proper. Other values that are stressed include honesty and diligence, as 
well as promoting equality in the workplace.
Laying the Building Blocks for Organizational Development
The building-block approach has been translated in successive changes 
and improvements to the structure and management of the institution. 
Various tools and organizational innovations have been introduced, with 
the  fi nancial and technical assistance of external partners, to respond to 
the expanding mandate and new demands from clients. The consistency 
of government supports the goal of creating an independent central bank, 
even in times of turmoil. Consistency has translated into a fairly  predictable 
external operating environment that in turn has allowed the institution 
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to focus on and deploy resources to improve its management practices. 
Buy-in from staff to these efforts has been critical. 
The organization has introduced various information management 
systems, such as the Credit Registry Information Systems and the Large 
Value Transfer Systems, statistical packages, and accounting and human 
resource management utility programs. Most of the documentation pro-
duced by the Central Bank is posted monthly and quarterly on the web-
site, including calls for bids and job openings (and updates on various 
processes) since its early days.
Since 2004, the organization has had its own remuneration system. In 
2006, remuneration conditions were revised and a plan to attract quali-
fi ed human resources developed. In 2009, with technical support from the 
Bank of Portugal, the institution underwent a complete review of its human 
resource policy, resulting in the implementation of a new Human Resource 
Management Integrated System, named SIGRH, and a new salary struc-
ture and bonus system. A key goal of the system has been to focus human 
resources management and rewards on merit rather than seniority and to 
promote a culture that is aligned with the institution’s mission and strategy.
The SIGRH was designed as a communication tool to reinforce the 
corporate identity and assess performance according to the importance of 
the position in the institution’s hierarchy, skills, knowledge, and attitudes 
required by each job defi nition. Furthermore, in the new career system, 
individuals who achieve certain goals or skills can be promoted faster with-
out going through all the steps. The Performance Improvement System 
was designed to measure performance in a more transparent manner, while 
providing rewards, including an annual bonus, to those employees that 
meet their expected objectives. The institution has improved its recruit-
ment and selection processes and implemented a new training policy that 
created opportunities for in-house training and increased transparency in 
the allocation of scholarships for study abroad. As part of its three-year 
corporate plan, the organization regularly assesses the staffi ng needs to 
accommodate possible expansion of activities and operations.
Challenges
After emerging from a long struggle for independence and internal confl icts 
in 1999 and 2006, Timor-Leste has made substantial progress in setting 
up a sound architecture for the management of its economy. Yet, many 
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challenges lie ahead, including the need to extend fi nancial service access, 
control double-digit infl ation, decide whether the country should adopt a 
national currency different from the U.S. dollar, and what the mechanisms 
for managing its oil wealth should be.
In the absence of monetary policy to fulfi ll the objective of contain-
ing infl ation, the Central Bank would need to persuade the government 
to change or phase spending and only increase government expenditures 
gradually. Rising government spending has helped spur short-term eco-
nomic growth (fi gure 13.5), but has increased price pressures and imposed 
costs on the poor (IMF 2012a). The previous spikes in infl ation were asso-
ciated with the social unrest of 2006–07 and high food prices in 2008 
(see fi gure 13.6). Many experts have pointed out that the actual rate of 
infl ation may be higher. In addition, Timor-Leste is affected indirectly by 
the appreciation of its neighbors’ currencies vis-á-vis the U.S. dollar. 
Although Timor-Leste has been relatively insulated from the global 
fi nancial crisis, the internal downturn has meant that the investments of 
the Petroleum Fund have not produced the expected returns. The low 
interest rates set by the U.S. Federal Reserve has decreased the return on 
U.S. government securities, which make up the majority of the portfolio. 
Figure 13.5. Gross Domestic Product in Constant Prices, 2000–11
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Fi gure 13.6. Infl ation, End-of-Period Consumer Prices, 2000–11
Source: IMF 2012b.
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At the same time, if the Petroleum Fund had invested in stocks, there could 
have been capital losses. Thus, the more conservative strategy proved 
sound in light of the losses suffered by other sovereign wealth funds, such 
as Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, which lost US$15 billion in 2011 as 
equities slumped due to concerns about Europe’s debt crisis.
However, the architecture of the Petroleum Fund has been increasingly 
challenged. The main changes proposed to the Petroleum Law included 
diversifi cation of investment and risk management, the possibility of 
assigning the administration of the Petroleum Fund to an entity other than 
the Central Bank, and the government’s use of the fund for temporary 
appropriations that do not require parliamentary approval. The main argu-
ment used to support these changes is that because Timor-Leste has little 
domestic capital and extensive infrastructure needs, frontloading capital 
investments would have greater economic and social returns than invest-
ments in foreign securities. At the same time, there are concerns around the 
quality of spending and how allocation decisions are being made to ensure 
that the expected returns materialize.
The fact that the large majority of Timorese remains unbanked and with 
limited access to credit is another important challenge that the Central Bank 
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and the government have not yet tackled. The interest rates remain high as 
a result of the business risk and the relative fragility of the  economy. Most 
of the potential borrowers do not have collateral, and there are signifi cant 
issues around land titling in urban and rural areas, as well as problems 
related to the regulation of commercial activity. Simultaneously, the own-
ers of saving deposits are receiving negative interest because the interest 
rates are very low.
Conclusions
The key elements driving success have been the deployment of a simple 
legal framework, a progressive approach to institutional development, a 
sustained emphasis on improving the capacity of national staff and orga-
nizational learning, and the stability in middle and senior management. At 
the same time, there has been strong buy-in from senior and middle man-
agement to the institutional development roadmap and a consistent focus 
on reaching milestones. Early successes have contributed to shaping the 
organizational identity and culture, including demonstrating the impor-
tance of communication with stakeholders and transparency. 
The external support from donors and the Timorese government has 
given the institution the space and resources to pursue capacity building at 
a steady pace. There have also been consistency and continuity in techni-
cal support and a conscious choice to use country systems (as opposed to 
creating parallel structures staffed with consultants) and phase out expa-
triates. Having an independent central bank has had important symbolic 
implications for the nation-building project. This has ensured the support 
of all political camps. At the same time, the high profi le and visibility of 
the Petroleum Fund ensured that developing the institution remained a 
high priority in the public agenda. The increasing degree of political and 
fi nancial autonomy has allowed the institution to increase the remunera-
tion of employees and introduce an innovative performance management 
system. Nonetheless, these elements came later on and are the result rather 
than the cause of success.
The trajectory of this institution, culminating with the incorporation 
of the Central Bank, demonstrates the benefi ts of following a building-
block approach in postconfl ict settings that need to build capacity from 
a very low level or zero. Starting with a simple structural design and set-
ting modest goals on the basis of which more complex functions and 
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structures could be added has been a critical element behind the success 
of the Central Bank. 
This case demonstrates that when factors such as a broad and sus-
tained commitment by all camps of the elite are coupled with suffi cient 
resources, access to specialized technical assistance, and strong buy-in of 
the  institution’s leadership and staff to the organizational development 
roadmap, state capacity can be built in a relatively short period of time 
and in a cost-effective manner. 
Introducing transparency and communication strategies to reach a wide 
audience early on not only helped the institution to build its credibility, 
but also demonstrated the benefi ts of transparency to internal and external 
stakeholders. To some extent, openness became the default way of operat-
ing and deviating from it became more diffi cult and increasingly costly.
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Table 13A.1. Monetary Developments, 2006–11
Percent, unless otherwise indicated
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Banking systema
Net foreign assetsb 113 318 393 443 622 558
 Gross reserves 84 230 210 250 406 368
 Other foreign assets 61 126 211 219 244 368
 Foreign liabilities 31 38 29 26 28 178
Net domestic assets −13 −174 −200 −174 −327 −210
 Net credit to central government −83 −219 −230 −206 −331 −248
 Net credit to state and local government 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Net credit to public nonfi nancial 
corporations
0 0 0 0 0 0
 Credit to private sector 111 101 102 104 110 136
 Other items (net) −42 −56 −73 −72 −105 −97
Broad money 100 144 193 268 295 348
 Narrow money 54 75 104 157 141 167
Currency in circulation 2 2 2 3 3 4
Transferable deposits 52 73 102 155 138 163
 Other deposits 46 68 88 111 154 181
Central Bank
Net foreign assetsb 84 230 210 238 394 356
Gross reserves 84 230 210 250 406 368
Foreign liabilities 0 0 0 12 12 12
Net domestic assets −76 −210 −185 −182 −340 −293
Net credit to central government −56 −190 −196 −163 −318 −240
Net credit to other depository corporations 1 1 42 2 24 8
Other items (net) −20 −20 −31 −21 −45 −61
Monetary base 20 26 56 55 63
Currency in circulationc 2 2 2 3 3 4
Other liabilities to depositary corporations 6 18 23 53 51 59
Memorandum items
Annual broad money growth 28.2 43.9 34.1 39.3 9.9 18
Annual reserve money growth 30 147 25.9 120.4 −2.7 15
Annual credit to the private sector growth 5.2 −9.8 1.9 1.1 5.9 23.6
Credit/non-oil GDP 25.6 20.3 16.1 13.1 12.5 12.9
Broad money/non-oil GDP 22.9 29.1 30.4 34 33.7 33.1
Credit/deposits 113.6 71.1 53.9 39 37.6 39.4
Nonperforming loans/total loans 27.8 30.2 28.2 32.1 41.7 —
Amount of nonperforming 25.6 30.3 29.7 35.6 46.3 —
Loand 16.6 15 12.3 10.8 11.1 —
Deposite 1 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 —
Sources: Central Bank of Timor-Leste; IMF staff estimates.
Note: — = not available.
a. Includes the Central Bank, three commercial banks (branches of foreign banks), and a microfi nance institution.
b. An oil fund was created in September 2005, and the deposits were moved off-shore and onto the 
government balance sheet.
c. Includes only coinage issued by the Central Bank. No data are available for notes because of the dollarization 
of the fi nancial system.
d. Rate offered by other depository corporations on three-month time deposits in U.S. dollars. The rate is 
weighted by deposit amounts.
e. Rate charged by other depository corporations on loans in U.S. dollars. The rate is weighted by loan amounts.
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Notes
 1. Currently, the assets in the Petroleum Fund are allocated in the following 
 manner: 4 percent in U.S. foreign government and supranational bonds, 
4  percent in other government bonds, 4 percent in global equity, and the rest 
in U.S. bonds.
 2. Notwithstanding the rapid increase in oil revenues, spending plans implied 
that ESI would be exceeded by a signifi cant amount in 2012. The projec-
tions on the performance of the Petroleum Fund are contingent on the level 
of the withdrawals in the next few years and the prospects of developing 
new fi elds. 
 3. “Over the last years the BPA continue to play important roles in educating 
the community and businesses on the use of the offi cial currency. Various 
programs have been introduced through public education campaign using 
different means that cover all territory of Timor-Leste. During the year 
the BPA focused its program to educate the population to differentiate 
the counterfeit notes. The program was conducted through staff visit to 
each district and sub districts, TV and radio programs, distributions of 
brochures and posters as well as training to relevant entity such as the 
national police including National Investigation Unit.” (BPA/Central 
Bank 2009)
 4. The process by which organizations such as fi rms or states adopt similar 
 structural forms or practices takes place as a result of normative, mimetic, or 
coercive pressures (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
 5. The document has been prepared by a group that includes representatives from 
the Basle Committee and from Chile; China; the Czech Republic; Hong Kong 
SAR, China; Mexico; Russia; and Thailand. Nine other countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Poland, 
and Singapore) have adopted it. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
brings together banking supervisors. It was established by the central bank 
governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of senior repre-
sentatives of banking supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It usually 
meets at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, where its permanent 
Secretariat is located.
 6. As early as in 2002, the senior staff of BPA took part in conferences and 
congresses such as the 12th Lisbon Meetings for central banks in countries 
having Portuguese as the offi cial language; the conference The Challenge of 
Sustainable Outreach, organized by the Asia-Pacifi c Rural and Agricultural 
Credit Association with GTZ (German Agency for Cooperation) in Sri Lanka; 
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and the Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington (BPA/
Central Bank 2002–03).
 7. As Posner (2007) explains: “The TSP [Transition Support Program] has also 
provided a mechanism for development planning. The two-week joint mis-
sions for the TSP that have been held every six months since it began have been 
crucial in this respect. These missions have involved a series of meetings and 
discussions among government offi cials, representatives from bilateral and 
multilateral donors, and the members of the TSP mission team. These missions 
have provided a forum in which the government and donors have been able to 
discuss policy issues, resolve donor coordination problems, review the govern-
ment’s progress in implementing an array of measures and activities agreed on 
with donors during earlier TSP missions, and formulate a new set of measures 
and activities for the coming year.” 
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